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THESIS

**RUSSIAN POLITICAL WARFARE: ORIGIN,
EVOLUTION, AND APPLICATION**

by

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ABSTRACT

Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and subsequent activities in Eastern Ukraine are not isolated incidents, but rather a new form of hybrid war, or asymmetric warfare. They are part of a decades-long and continent-spanning Russian political warfare (PW) campaign. Analysis of the origin, history, and evolution of Soviet/Russian PW from 1917 through today reveals that Russia is using PW to assert regional dominance and challenge the unipolarity of the United States and the West. A review of events in Ukraine demonstrates Russia is using its latest evolution of PW doctrine, the Gerasimov Model, to achieve strategic objectives while remaining below the military response threshold of the international community. This paper combines an empirical and case study review of PW, with lessons from the Cold War, to propose a conceptual framework and a supporting model for foreign policy makers, planners, and practitioners to better understand PW. Furthermore, it recommends the United States adopt a proactive PW strategy to support national policy objectives and counter the PW activities of Russia and other rising powers. United States Special Operations Forces are well-suited for PW and will play a pivotal role in a U.S. PW strategy that encompasses all elements of national power and synchronizes the interagency community.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACC	Allied Coordination Committee
AD	Action Directe
ADP	Army Doctrine and Training Publication
AFL	American Federation of Labor
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AP	Associated Press
APF	American Political Foundation
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
BDJ-TD	Bund Deutscher Jugend
BfV	Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
BND	West German Bundesnachrichtendienst
BPC	Building Partner Capacity
BSF	Black Sea Fleet
CA	Civil Affairs
CCC	Communist Combatant Cells
CCF	Congress of Cultural Freedom
CCIF	Combatant Commander Initiative Fund
CCWU	Clandestine Committee of the Western Union
CES	Common Economic Space
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIPE	Center for International Private Enterprise
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJFE	Cognitive Joint Force Entry
COCOM	Coordination Committee; Combatant Command
CPC	Coordination & Planning Committee
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CSCE	Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
C-UW	Counter Unconventional Warfare
SDO	Defense Attachè
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DCSF	Defense Coalition Support Fund
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic
DOD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
DoT	Department of Treasury
EEC	Eurasian Economic Community
ERP	Economic Recovery Plan
EU	European Union
EUCOM	European Combatant Command
FHO	Fremde Heere Ost
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FSB	Federal Security Service
FTUC	Free Trade Union Committee
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GNP	Gross National Product
GRAPO	Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre
GRU	Soviet Main Intelligence Directorate
HRC	Human Resources Command
ID	International Department
IDAD	Internal Defense and Development
IIA	Information and Influence Activities
IID	International Information Department
ILE	Intermediate Level Education
Interdoc	International Informational and Documentation Center
IRGC	Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

IUS	International Union of Students
IW	Irregular Warfare
JCET	Joint Combined Exchange Training
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational
JPAT	Joint Planning and Assistance Teams
JRS	Joint Regional Strategies
JSP	Joint Strategic Plan
KAN	Club for Committed Non-Party Members
KDP	Communist Party of Germany
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti
KI	Committee of Organization
KOR	Komitet Obrony Robotników
KSČ	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa)
LDP	Japanese Liberal Democratic Party
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MANPADS	Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
MfS	East German Ministerium für Staatssicherheitsdienst – Stasi
MGB	Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti
MISO	Military Information Support Operations
MKS	Międzyzakładowy Komitet Strajkowy
MLE	Military Liaison Element
MON	Memoranda of Notification
MSRP	Mission Strategy and Resource Plans
MVD	Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NKVD	People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs
NRI	National Republican Institute

NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OAS	Organisation Armee Secrete
ODA	Operational Detachment - Alpha
OPC	Office of Policy Coordination
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PCF	French Communist Party
PCI	Italian Communist Party
PDT	Partnership Development Teams
PE	Preparation of the Environment
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PR	Chilean Radical Party
PRL	Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa
Pr-UW	Proactive Unconventional Warfare
PSI	Italian Socialist Party
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PW	Political Warfare
PZPR	Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza
RAF	Red Army Faction
RFE	Radio Free Europe
RFF	Requests for Forces
RL	Radio Liberty
ROPCiO	Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela
SAC	Supreme Allied Commander
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAS	British Special Air Service
SBU	Ukrainian Intelligence
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative

SDPU	Social Democratic Party of Ukraine
SF	Special Forces
SKDL	Communist Finnish People's Democratic League
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command Europe
SOE	Special Operations Executive
SOLO	Special Operations Liaison Officer
SSA	Security Sector Assistance
StB	Státní bezpečnost
SW	Special Warfare
TSCP	Theatre Security Cooperation Plan
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
U.N.	United Nations
U.S.	United States
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USIA	United States Information Agency
USSF	United States Special Forces
USSOF	United States Special Operations Forces
UW	Unconventional Warfare
VAT	Value-Added Tax
VDV	Vozdushno-desantnye voyska
VOA	Voice of America
WFDY	World Federation of Democratic Youth
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPC	World Peace Council
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZOB	Zydowska Organizacja Bojowa

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I. INTRODUCTION: RUSSIAN POLITICAL WARFARE

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND

The rapid annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the current Russian unconventional warfare activity in Eastern Ukraine are not isolated incidents. They are part of a decades-long and continent-spanning Russian political warfare (PW) campaign. Since the end of the Cold War, Western leaders have been unable to clearly identify or counteract this campaign and, as a consequence, have incorrectly labeled the events in Ukraine. Myopic focus on violent events has propagated debate on the emergence and implications of hybrid-war, asymmetric warfare, and new-generation warfare in the region. Western responses have been ineffective because analysis was focused on only a part of the problem, rather than the entirety of Russia's protracted strategy.

Russia's PW affects U.S. national interests in three ways: it threatens the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it destabilizes the global security status quo, and demonstrates that constitutional democracies are vulnerable to PW strategies. NATO's members are guaranteed collective defense against armed aggression, but NATO members in Eastern Europe fear that Russia's current tactics can undermine their sovereignty and redraw their borders without triggering an armed NATO response. As the quintessential status-quo power, U.S. interests are at stake in maintaining the balance of power within, and respect for, the current international system of laws, regulations, and traditions. Any revanchist attempt to reshape that system through force and deception must be repudiated.

Finally, Russia is demonstrating the effectiveness of using PW strategies to target constitutional democracies. If this trend is not reversed, then it will be repeated in other situations by different actors. America must successfully oppose Russian PW to prevent it from becoming the strategy of choice for emerging regional or global powers opposed to U.S. interests. A broader analysis of Russian PW origins, evolution, and current capacity is needed in order to provide U.S. foreign policy makers and executors with viable options to address it.

B. PURPOSE

The purpose of this capstone project is four-fold: to define the general principles of PW, to understand the specifics of Russian PW, to explore how Russian and, previously, Soviet PW has been employed and countered in the past, and to propose ways to counter Russian PW in the future.

1. Research Question: How can the United States use United States Special Operations Forces (USSOF) to Counter Russian-Sponsored Political Warfare?

2. Primary Hypothesis

USSOF, synchronized with other elements of national power, provide a functional platform for the U.S. Department of Defense to support United States Government (USG) efforts to conduct U.S. political warfare and undermine or counter Russian political warfare.

The primary hypothesis is reinforced through an additional five supporting hypotheses, each examined independently.

3. Supporting Hypotheses

- George Kennan's 1948 definition of PW is valid for use in today's geopolitical reality, as it is prevalent and is being employed in the world today.
- The Soviet Union conducted PW during the Cold War in support of its strategic objectives, as did the United States in an attempt to counter Soviet efforts and secure its own strategic goals.
- Russia has renewed its ability to conduct PW since the collapse of the Soviet Union and is using it to consolidate power domestically, establish dominance regionally, and, ultimately, challenge the unipolarity of the West.
- Russia has engaged in and enhanced its PW activities in Ukraine since 1991 to secure its national objectives and vital interests.
- Russia's activity in Ukraine in 2014 is PW rather than crisis activity because it is part of a phased plan encompassing nonmilitary and military methods to secure Russia's goals as outlined in Gerasimov's new generation warfare doctrine.

4. Methodology

This capstone project answers the research question by testing the hypothesis and supporting hypotheses using a case study methodology. Findings related to the supporting hypotheses are organized and captured within each chapter for ease of reference. The final chapter contains the operational concept that answers the primary research question.

a. Supporting Hypothesis 1

This hypothesis is tested in Chapter II by presenting George Kennan's 1948 definition of PW. Next, the argument over the validity of this definition is presented and a conclusion determines that Kennan's definition is useful. Examples of PW activity by China, Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah support the argument that PW is still prolific today. The doctrinal origins of Russian PW are explored and traced to the Russian Bolsheviks. The early usage of PW by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1950 is presented as a case study of how the Soviets employed PW in the post-World War II time period.

b. Supporting Hypothesis 2

This hypothesis is tested in Chapters III and IV by exploring the Cold War period from 1947 to 1991 using the following analytical framework. First, in Chapter III, the Soviet Union's strategic goals during the Cold War period are identified and it is shown that Soviet doctrine at the time embraced a comprehensive PW program and implemented "active measures" to pursue these objectives. Then, examples of PW activity during the Cold War are explored through the lens of the elements of national power, or Diplomatic Information Military and Economic (DIME), in order to show that the Soviet Union did, in fact, engage in full-spectrum PW during the Cold War. A case study of Czechoslovakia in 1968, "The Crushing of the Prague Spring," is presented as an example of full-spectrum PW employed by the Soviet Union during this period. Next, in Chapter IV, a parallel analysis is presented for the United States to reflect that similar methods were employed according to Kennan's version of PW and augmented by covert action. A case study of Poland in the 1980s—the "Solidarity Movement"—is presented as an example of well-executed U.S. PW during this time period.

c. Supporting Hypothesis 3

This hypothesis is tested in Chapter V by exploring the evolution of Russian PW from 1991 to 2013 through the lens of DIME. It is determined that Russian PW was limited after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but has since re-evolved to enable Russia to challenge the unipolarity of the West, which is central to its grand strategy. It is further determined that the solidarity of the Russian identity, the authoritarian nature of Russia's leadership, Russia's relative military superiority to its neighbors, and its regional monopoly of the fossil fuel market were central factors to the resurgence of Russian PW. A case study of Georgia in 2008 is presented as evidence that Russia eventually redeveloped the ability to conduct PW synchronized across the DIME spectrum.

d. Supporting Hypothesis 4

This hypothesis is tested in Chapter VI by analyzing U.S. and Russian actions and policies in Ukraine from 1991 through 2013. Each one is a case study in itself, focusing on the employment of elements of national power (DIME). This comparative analysis provides important aspects related to PW. First, the brief analysis of U.S. objectives and interests in Ukraine provides context for the U.S. actions and policies that ensued. Then, a more in-depth analysis on Russian national interests, objectives, and PW in Ukraine is explored. It is evident the United States' limited approach is in stark contrast to that of Russia, which has conducted PW by Kennan's definition and advanced its effectiveness into the twenty-first century. The unrelenting, protracted, contemporary Russian PW in Ukraine has synchronized all elements of national power and allowed Russia to dominate the Ukrainian political and social landscape.

e. Supporting Hypothesis 5

This hypothesis is tested in Chapter VII by identifying the Russian activity during the events of the 2014 Ukraine crisis and overlaying them on Gerasimov's model for new generation warfare. It is shown that the majority of Russian activity during the crisis falls directly into phases III through V of Gerasimov's model. This is evidence that Russia's activities during the Ukraine crisis are actually part of a larger plan to achieve Russia's strategic goals. This conclusion also counters arguments that the events in Ukraine in

2014 were actually short-term Russian response measures resulting from the political instability of Ukraine in 2013 and 2014. Thus, Chapter VII, in its entirety, is a large-scale case study of Russian PW in Ukraine in 2014.

f. Primary Hypothesis

This hypothesis is presented in Chapter IX in the form of an operational concept, which uses information gleaned from five supporting theses to present recommendations for countering Russian PW. It proposes that Russia is conducting PW as an asymmetric strategy tool to secure strategic objectives without going to war with the West. Russia's current PW methodology is the product of a continuous evolution of PW doctrine since its inception during the Russian Revolution, refinement through the Cold War, and adaptation to today's technological and geopolitical environment.

PW is presented using a model and supporting deductions to depict PW activity across the covert-overt and direct-indirect spectrums. These deductions assist in categorizing PW activity into four domains: covert-direct methods, covert-indirect methods, overt-direct methods, and overt-indirect methods. These domains, visualized on a quad-chart, represent a valuable tool to analyze PW methods across the DIME spectrum. It can also be used to conceptualize the areas of U.S. agency responsibility, areas of responsibility overlap, and the role of USSOF within the interagency.

General policy recommendations for U.S. PW are proposed, as well as specific policy recommendations to enable proactive U.S. PW and counter Russian PW. The policy recommendations are founded on the premise that the United States interagency community is well-structured to embrace PW. The Department of State and its country teams are ideal to take the lead on regional- and country-specific strategies, with all members of the interagency community playing critical roles in advancing a strategy that spans the entire DIME spectrum. USSOF are particularly well-suited for PW and are capable of augmenting interagency efforts across the DIME spectrum.

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II. POLITICAL WARFARE: ORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATION

On February 27, 2014, following months of unrest in the Ukraine, masked Russian soldiers seized government buildings and key infrastructure in Crimea. Russian actions leading to this de facto invasion were not a new form of warfare, but an expression of a deliberate and long-term political warfare strategy directed at securing interests in their near-abroad. This strategy has a direct lineage beginning with Soviet political warfare after World War II, developed and evolved throughout the decades of the Cold War, and revived by the Russian Federation following the turn towards authoritarianism in the 1990s.¹

Scholars, soldiers, reporters, and politicians have referred to the Russian incursion in Ukraine by using a host of terms including asymmetric warfare,² fourth generation warfare,³ hybrid warfare,⁴ irregular warfare,⁵ psychological warfare,⁶ and unconventional

¹ For analysis of Russia's return to authoritarianism see: William Zimmerman, *Ruling Russia: Authoritarianism From the Revolution to Putin* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014), 220–266.

² *Asymmetric*: In military operations the application of dissimilar strategies, tactics, capabilities, and methods to circumvent or negate an opponent's strengths while exploiting his weaknesses. Department of Defense. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. (Joint Publication 1-02). (8 November 2010 as amended through 15 August 2014), 19. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

³ *Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW)*: Uses all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Thomas X. Hannes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006), 2.

⁴ *Hybrid War*: a fused mix of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder (some scholars also focus on the use of new or disruptive technologies to aid one or all of these modalities). See: Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid vs. Compound War," *Armed Forces Journal*, October 1, 2009 <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/>.

See also: James N. Mattis and Frank Hoffman, "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars," *Proceedings Magazine*, November 2005 Vol. 132/11/1,233 U.S. Naval Institute <http://milnewstbay.pbworks.com/f/MattisFourBlockWarUSNINov2005.pdf>.

⁵ *Irregular Warfare*: A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Also called IW. JP1-02, 134.

warfare.⁷ These terms are applicable to particular facets of the Ukrainian crisis, some more so than others, but none of them capture the full scope and intent of the Russian strategy and its implications for geo-politics. The chief problem with the liberal application of this terminology is that it is almost universally—with the exception of “psychological warfare”—focused on a very specific and tactical portion of conflict. These specialized terms hone in on the visible techniques, tools, or modes of military action, while ignoring the larger and more camouflaged manipulation of civilian populations and employment of nonmilitary means. Consequently, this vocabulary ignores the broader scope of Russian adversarial intent and thereby fails to capture the strategic intentions and implications of their operational art. Russia is employing a whole of government strategy and is making full use of its diplomatic, informational, military, and economic levers of power.

While some of the previously defined terminologies are useful for describing aspects of the crisis in Ukraine, and more fully separating and examining those aspects in depth, they are insufficient to describe it holistically. The term that best captures the breadth, depth, scope, and intent of the Russian intervention in Ukraine is *political warfare*. This chapter defines political warfare, discusses opposition to the terminology, and further explores the concept. Next, we demonstrate that China, Iran, and Russia are currently implementing political warfare strategies throughout the world. Then, we argue that current Russian political warfare practice is a direct descendant of Soviet political warfare theories and practices that began prior to World War II, evolved throughout the Cold War, and have been updated for modern usage by the Russian Federation.

⁶ In 2010 the U.S. military changed its doctrinal term from Psychological operation to Military Information Support Operations (the definition of the operations themselves remained similar to the original term): Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called MISO. JP1-02, 167.

⁷ *Unconventional Warfare*: Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Also called UW. JP1-02, 263.

A. POLITICAL WARFARE DEFINED

In May 1948, in the context of the early days of the Cold War, the State Department's director of policy planning, George Kennan, defined political warfare as:

The employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP [Economic Recovery Plan i.e. the Marshall Plan], and "white" propaganda, to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.⁸

Kennan's reference to "all of the means at a nation's command" mirrors the current understanding of grand strategy. Van de Velde categorized all the means at a nation's disposal into four instruments of statecraft: diplomatic, economic, military, and psychological.⁹ This concept has been adopted by the U.S. military and the *psychological* tool changed to the *informational* tool. Throughout this report, references to the instruments, levers, or tools of national power refer to diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means, abbreviated as DIME.¹⁰

Kennan's understanding of PW was not an original concept. His formative years as a Foreign Service Officer in Moscow, Prague, and Berlin had inculcated an intimate understanding of both the Nazi and Soviet methods for blurring the lines of conflict.¹¹ In response, he drafted the memorandum—"The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare"—containing the above definition, which proposed the establishment of a PW directorate within the U.S. government.¹² In it, Kennan cited Clausewitz, Marx, and Lenin as teachers of PW and maintained that the historical success of the British Empire

⁸ State Department Policy Planning Staff, "The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare," April 30, 1948. Box 11A, Lot File 64 D 563, Record Group 59, National Archives & Records Administration, College Park, Maryland. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269>.

⁹ R.W. Van de Velde, "Instruments of Statecraft," Reprinted from *Army* 13, no. 5, (December 1962): 1–6.

¹⁰ JP1-02, 161.

¹¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 79–98, 120–200.

¹² State Department, "Inauguration of Political Warfare."

and the rise of Communism in Russia were examples of effective PW.¹³

Kennan's citation of Clausewitz referred specifically to the often quoted passage, "War is a mere continuation of policy by other means . . . War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means."¹⁴ This statement of an ancient understanding, that war and politics exist on a continuum and that war is the servant of politics, reverberated throughout the philosophy and concept of war and warfare in the modern era. This aphorism gave rise to the belief that if war is politics, then politics can be warfare. Therefore, Kennan wrote, "Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace."¹⁵

Clausewitz's work has enjoyed a diverse readership. For early communist thinkers, the writings of Clausewitz were integral to the understanding of the relationship between war and peace.¹⁶ Both Engels and Lenin were enthusiastic students of *On War*. Lenin even made extended notes on the treatise in a separate notebook that was published by the Soviet government after his death. Stalin was also familiar with the Prussian, believing that Clausewitz's military doctrine was obsolete, but that his intimate understanding of the links between politics and war was identical to Marxist theory.¹⁷ "Clausewitz fascinated Lenin and Stalin. Simply put, his doctrines gave them a theoretical justification for extending the definition of war to the international theater of

¹³ State Department, "Inauguration of Political Warfare."

¹⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. by Anatol Rapoport (Harmondsworth, England; New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1982), 119.

¹⁵ State Department, "Inauguration of Political Warfare."

¹⁶ For a comparison of Clausewitz and Marx see: John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 12–19.

¹⁷ Byron Dexter, "Clausewitz and Soviet Strategy." *Foreign Affairs* (October 1950): 1–4.
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/70846/byron-dexter/clausewitz-and-soviet-strategy>.

class struggle.”¹⁸ The communist understanding of class struggle as the driver of history, in conjunction with their interpretation of Clausewitzian theory, led them to believe that warfare against other forms of government could never be over. War was continuous, but its intensity waxed and waned with the potential for success.

The concept of a blurred line between war and peace is the essence of political warfare. War and peace are not absolute states of being, but rather, exist on a continuum. This idea has been explored by a diverse group of thinkers: from Mao, “Politics is war without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed,”¹⁹ to Colin Gray, “Peace and War are different phases of statecraft—distinctive, but essentially united and permanently connected.”²⁰ Political warfare exists in the space between war and peace; it is political because it is a strategy that deliberately avoids open war, but it is warfare because it is implicitly violent and adversarial in nature.

Political warfare is difficult to align with Western understandings of war and peace; however, the rise of insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the proliferation of new and cheap communication technologies, have forced America to recognize its utility. Historians and foreign policy experts at the think tank Council for Foreign Relations called for a reinvigoration of American political warfare agencies to counter malign influence and positively shape American objectives in the Middle East.²¹ Events in Ukraine have also served as a reminder of the effectiveness of PW. David Maxwell, retired Special Forces Colonel and the Associate Director of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University, referred to Russian operations in Ukraine as

¹⁸ Stephen J. Blank, “Class War on a Global Scale: The Leninist Culture of Political Conflict,” in *Conflict, Culture, and History: Regional Dimensions*, by Stephen J. Blank, Lawrence E. Grinter, Karl P. Magyar, Lewis B. Ware, and Bynum E. Weathers (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1993), 10. http://webharvest.gov/peth04/20041016184158/http://aupress.au.af.mil/Books/Blanketal/Blank_etal.pdf.

¹⁹ Mao Zedong. *On Protracted War*. 3d rev. ed. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), section 64.

²⁰ Colin S. Gray, *Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy*, Pbk. ed. (Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, 2009), 190.

²¹ Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, and Michael Doran, “Political Warfare: Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 33.” June 2013. <http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/political-warfare/p30894>.

“unconventional warfare in support of political warfare,” recognizing that the violence above the surface is indicative of deeper machinations.²²

The term “political warfare,” however, is not without its detractors. Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research at National Defense University Frank Hoffman, formulates a succinct argument against it.²³ He first poses the question: If all wars are political, in the Clausewitzian sense, then what makes political warfare different from other modes of warfare? Hoffman goes on to contend that the term “political warfare” is an oxymoron because the word “warfare” refers to the use of physical force, “but there is no violence or lethal force in the kinds of political activity that Kennan listed.”²⁴ He later asserts that if political warfare is “short of war, then it’s not warfare.”²⁵ Hoffman finally argues that in the Kennan definition of PW, the use of “all means” extends the meaning beyond the political or diplomatic, and that the PW activities listed by Kennan are not things that one only does short of war; they will continue *into* war. Therefore, the term “political warfare” is “resistant to common understanding.”²⁶ Hoffman’s larger thesis, that American strategic planners eschew thinking about messy, but relevant, forms of warfare in favor of intellectually interesting, but unlikely means of conflict, is worth serious consideration. In addition, his argument against the term “political warfare” is a useful foil for exploring the concept in greater depth.²⁷ In contrast to Hoffman, we contend that PW is short of conventional war, but that the word “warfare” in the construct does not confound the concept or definition of the term. Violence, or the threat of violence, is integral to PW, but the role it plays and the intent of PW is what separates it from other concepts of warfare.

²² David S. Maxwell, “Taking a Spoon to a Gunfight: The West Dealing with Russian Unconventional and Political Warfare in Former Soviet States,” *War on the Rocks*, April 2, 2014. <http://warontherocks.com/2014/04/taking-a-spoon-to-a-gunfight/>.

²³ Frank Hoffman, “On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs. Hybrid Threats,” *War on the Rocks*, July 28, 2014. <http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/>.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

Political warfare is separate from other forms of warfare because it is a deliberate effort to achieve strategic goals using less-bloody means. Peace and war exist on a continuum. On one end is complete utopian peace, on the other is total nuclear conflagration. On this continuum, PW occupies the space in between contentious diplomacy and conventional war. It differs from other modes of warfare by integrating all levers of national power, in whichever admixture is most advantageous for the situation, in order to achieve strategic goals without resorting to conventional war. The actual use of military force is likely to be limited and in support of other elements of national power. Conversely, conventional war places the diplomatic, informational, and economic tools of national power in support of the military apparatus in order to compel or coerce the enemy into the desired end state. PW does not rule out—and in most cases is dependent upon—unconventional warfare or covert and clandestine violence. An effective PW strategy, however, will achieve strategic effects without either party to the conflict turning to conventional, overt force. The deliberate intent to ensure that all parties to a conflict avoid conventional war is what separates PW from other modes of warfare.

Political warfare, despite the fact that one of its operating principles is to avoid conventional war, is still a form of war. Less violent modes of warfare abound, but are recognizable as warfare because of their dynamic, adversarial, and zero-sum nature. Scholars and practitioners of war are comfortable with the economic, electronic, psychological, and cyber forms of warfare—among many others—but no one expects carnage from their employment. Warfare is not defined by body counts, but by violence. Violence—as an instrument, not an organizing principle—is inherent to PW. Kennan explicitly referred to irregular and unconventional warfare as tools of PW, tools that are explicitly violent. Whether harnessing the massed power of a social movement, raising a surrogate military force, or targeting specific personalities, PW clearly includes violent means. Short of conventional war does not mean short of force. It must also be noted that pursuit of a PW strategy directed at one state may not preclude engagement in conventional war with another. In this way, the United States fought so-called “limited

wars” in Korea and Vietnam to contain the spread of communism, while still pursuing PW against the USSR.

More broadly, the use or credible threat of violence is a necessary precondition for successful PW. “Political warfare may serve as a surrogate for actual war, but it does not work without actual force backing it up.”²⁸ This is because “military power undergirds the other instruments of statecraft.”²⁹ Without the plausible threat of violence there is limited room for maneuver in the political space. Conversely, strategies that undermine the probability of the successful use of force diminish the capabilities and opportunities to exercise the other levers of state power.

Activities conducted in support of PW can also be used in support of other ends and during wartime. However, one of the defining principles of political warfare is to remain short of conventional war. In case of war, the types of activities conducted in support of a PW campaign *should* continue—in support of conventional war—in order to shape the conflict and the peace following it. In such a case, however, the original conceptual framework of PW no longer applies. While the techniques and tactics may be the same, the intentions are not. Political warfare seeks to avoid war, while similar activities conducted during wartime seek advantage in war and should be defined by their intention and methodology. Political warfare is more conceptual than concrete. It is a means of bridging the Western intellectual gap between peace and war. Political warfare is a guiding vision for action, not an action in and of itself. It is not limited nor defined by its tools, but by its objective, which is to harness all available means to attain strategic objectives without war. Political warfare theorist Angelo Codevilla writes, “No lines demarcate the practice of political warfare from that of vigorous politics on one side, and from subversion, counter-subversion, and war on the other. Such names describe concepts by which we distinguish phenomena that, in reality, exist intermingled with one

²⁸ Angelo Codevilla and Paul Seabury, *War: Ends and Means* (New York: Basic Books 1989), 184.

²⁹ Robert J. Art, “The Fungibility of Force,” in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2009), 4.

another.”³⁰ Codevilla highlights the fact that in practice, the transition from PW to diplomacy or outright war is rarely clear.

This intermingling is what often confuses our thinking when trying to grasp the gray area between peace and war. Political warfare is an attempt to conceptualize and operationalize this space, or counter those that are doing so. Rather than create neologisms or attempt to modify a concept that is firmly rooted in American academic discourse and foreign policy practice, we will use George Kennan’s definition of political warfare.

Framing Russia’s current strategy as PW accomplishes three important tasks: it underscores Russia’s adversarial understanding of the Western world, it anchors recent and future events in the historical narrative, and points to historical examples of successful opposition to similar strategies. Russia’s leader has never really stopped believing that the United States is the “principal enemy.” Therefore, the increasing presence of the United States, NATO, or the European Union (EU), in former Soviet countries is perceived as a dagger aimed at the heart of Russia. Moreover, there is a historic fear that the Western world intends to minimize Russia and keep it from its rightful place in international affairs. Russia believes that the West wants to ensure that it never again regains its role on the world stage, which makes any dealings with the West not just competitive, but adversarial.

The term “political warfare” demystifies current Russian actions by suggesting historical parallels and anchors strategic thinking in the stream of past academic and military study. There is a direct and linear progression in Russian PW doctrine from Lenin’s Bolshevik party to Putin’s Russian Federation. Therefore, it is impossible to view Russian “New Generation Warfare” as a truly new form of warfare. Instead, it is a modern permutation of previous PW strategies. It is the logical progression of practical and capable people seeking a strategy to address the growth of Western power within their financial, manpower, and geographic constraints. Russia cannot oppose the Western

³⁰ Angelo Codevilla, “Political Warfare: Means for Achieving Political Ends,” in *Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare*, ed. Michael Waller J. (Washington, D.C.: Institute of World Politics Press, 2009), 212.

world while conforming to international norms; it must operate outside of those norms in order to achieve national objectives. The term “political warfare” is also a reminder that this is not the first time that the West has faced a Russia that was bent on reshaping the international order. During the Cold War, the brightest minds that could be brought to bear were focused on analyzing, assessing, understanding, and countering the Soviet Union’s PW apparatus. Maintaining the traditional term “political warfare,” while developing new insights informed by modern technology and society, ensures that we are not relearning old lessons. It provides a mature view of current events and is a reminder that revanchist powers have been bested in the past.

B. POLITICAL WARFARE TODAY

The practice and effects of PW are a key feature of today’s environment. Once the concept is understood and accepted, its features become ubiquitous. The construct also clarifies events that would appear chaotic, nonsensical, or unrelated without it. Today, the most prolific practitioners of PW are Russia, China, Iran, and some specific terrorist groups.

1. Russia

Political warfare describes the strategic intent that animates the full range of means employed by Russia in Eastern Europe, though seen most clearly in Ukraine. The Russians themselves are referring to their strategy as “New Generation Warfare,” in accordance with its conceptualization by the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov.³¹ Gerasimov’s doctrine emphasizes the role of nonmilitary means in achieving strategic goals, with unconventional warfare implemented late in the conflict to

³¹ Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” *In Moscow’s Shadows: Analysis and Assessment of Russian Crime and Security*, July 6, 2014.

<http://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/>.

*The original article by Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov that is translated and analyzed here was published in the *Military-Industrial Courier*, issue 8 (476) on February 27, 2013.

It must also be noted that Gerasimov never used the term *New Generation Warfare*, it was applied to his thinking after the fact: Col. S.G. CHEKINOV (Res.), Doctor of Technical Sciences Lt. Gen. S.A. BOGDANOV (Ret.), Doctor of Military Sciences, “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War,” *Military Thought: A Russian Journal of Military Theory and Strategy*, no. 4 (2013): 17–23.

cement previously established gains. Conventional forces are used only as a strategic reserve to avoid reverses or to complete the consolidation of power.

The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures—applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population. All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special-operations forces. The open use of forces—often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation—is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict.³²

Instead of focusing on the *new* portion of “New Generation Warfare,” attention is better directed to the *generation* portion of the term. The new doctrine flows directly from the old. It is the current expression of Russian destabilization doctrine that has roots in the early phases of the Bolshevik Revolution, evolved through the Soviet Union’s consolidation of power in Eastern Europe, modernized during the rough tutelage of both Afghanistan and Chechnya, and is currently continuing development in Ukraine. The old Soviet playbook has been updated for the digital age. “New Generation Warfare” is Soviet-style disruption using “active measures” and “masked warfare” with the addition of computers, social networks, and 24-hour news coverage. As with most forms of warfare, technology has increased the speed of communications and intelligence gathering. Cyber and electronic warfare have the potential to cripple governments and militaries alike. Actions and reactions are quicker and more agile, and not just for military formations. The Russian information and media apparatus can adapt its themes and content to tailor messaging to multiple targets simultaneously, based upon real-time awareness of events on the ground. Gerasimov’s model is also being applied to the whole Russian military, as opposed to just the special operations or intelligence services. Conventional military training does not change direction quickly. Conventional forces’ indoctrination and training with Gerasimov’s ideas signals that Russia intends to use this model to address international conflicts for the foreseeable future. Despite these updates,

³² Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” 17–23.

PW still accurately describes the Russian application of its ways and means to reach its strategic goals.

2. China

Today, China is a dedicated practitioner of PW. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has established a PW command within its General Political Department in order to shape international relations to its advantage. They accomplish this by using military and civilian practitioners to blend all instruments of national power to conduct PW, while simultaneously working to counter foreign PW.³³ In conjunction with the military, multiple civilian agencies take part in PW with—to external observers—no clear centralization.³⁴ “Chinese political warfare, or *liaison work* in contemporary PLA lexicon, has a rich tradition built upon centuries of military history.”³⁵ Chinese philosophers of conflict have embraced the continuum of war and peace from antiquity through today. Sun Tzu wrote, “those skilled in war subdue the enemy's armies without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations.”³⁶ More recently, Mao Zedong wrote, “Politics is war without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed.”³⁷

The most recent permutation of Chinese PW began in 1999, when two PLA colonels wrote a treatise called *Unrestricted War*. They claim that the principles of war have changed from “using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one's will,” to “using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one's interests.”³⁸ Their

³³ Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, The People's Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics (Project 2049 Institute, October 14, 2013), 3–4, 16.

³⁴ Ibid., 42.

³⁵ Ibid., 3.

³⁶ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 79.

³⁷ Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War*, 3d rev. ed. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), section 64.

³⁸ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), 7.

goal, in the context of the First Gulf War, was to formulate a strategy to sidestep American technological superiority and conventional capability. This line of development continued in 2003, with the concept known as the three warfares: the integration of psychological, media, and legal warfare to negate military advantage and achieve strategic objectives short of war. The concept is Kennan with a Chinese flavor. “Contemporary PLA liaison work is influenced by Marxist-Leninist theory, tempered by traditional Chinese strategic culture, and informed by careful study of foreign political warfare experiences since World War II.”³⁹ Interestingly, a U.S. government sponsored report on the three warfares, written in 2013, predicted the American inability to counteract PW. “By adopting *the three warfares* as an offensive weapon, the Chinese have side-stepped the coda of American military science. Our institutional apparatus and intellectual traditions are focused on a different phenomenon when we speak of, or think of, war.”⁴⁰

3. Iran

Since 1979, Iran has used the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Qods Force, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and Lebanese Hezbollah to export the Iranian Revolution and shape the geopolitical environment through methods short of war. The “Iran Action Network,” is the human infrastructure “involved in crafting and implementing the covert elements of Iran’s foreign policy agenda, from terrorism, political, economic and social subversion; to illicit finance, weapons and narcotics trafficking; and nuclear procurement and proliferation.”⁴¹ The effects of this network on American policy can be felt throughout the Middle East, Africa, and within the United States itself.⁴² Unfortunately, we do not have access to any Iranian documents detailing

³⁹ Stokes and Hsiao, *Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics*, 4.

⁴⁰ Stephen Halper, “China: The Three Warfares,” Prepared for Andy Marshall, Director, Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C., May 2013). http://images.smh.com.au/file/2014/04/11/5343124/China_%2520The%2520three%2520warfares.pdf.

⁴¹ Scott Modell and David Asher, “Pushback: Countering the Iran Action Network,” (Center for a New American Security, September, 2013), 8, 1–15. http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_Pushback_ModellAsher_0.pdf.

⁴² Ibid.

the theory, doctrine, or planning behind their political warfare methodology; however, their actions speak for themselves. Through the exercise of an extensive PW effort, they are able to have foreign policy effects far beyond what would be expected of another country of similar size and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Iran is able to punch above its weight class because of firm integration of all elements of national power to meet foreign policy objectives while avoiding war.

4. Terrorist/ Non-State Actors (NSAs)

Terrorist organizations and non-state actors cannot conduct PW because, by definition, they do not possess the instruments of statecraft. Non-state actors, even global terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, do not typically have more than a robust informational/propaganda wing and some irregular or terroristic military capability. Despite the powerful propaganda that terrorism relies on, “Each beheading, each bombing, and each beating sends a powerful message or, rather, *is* a powerful message,”⁴³ most terrorist organizations do not have the vital economic and diplomatic capabilities of a state. There are, however, a few intriguing exceptions. “Violent non-state groups offering social welfare services undermine the state by attacking the social contract.”⁴⁴ This gives these organizations the opportunity to form pseudo or shadow governments within the borders of a recognized state. Both Hamas and Hezbollah are examples of organizations that complicate the social contract by providing social services and subsuming the state’s legitimate monopoly on violence.⁴⁵ Clearly, both Hamas and Hezbollah engage in limited diplomatic and economic functions that go far beyond the capabilities of standard terrorist groups and border on PW. An area for further research is the relationship between the assumption of state functions and the development of the traditional elements of statecraft in non-state actors. This however, does not mean that

⁴³ Michael G. Mullen, “Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 55 (4th Quarter, 2009): 3.

⁴⁴ Alexis G. Grynekewich, “Welfare as Warfare: How Violent Non-State Groups Use Social Services to Attack the State,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31, no. 4 (April 2008): 351.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 359–363.

states cannot conduct PW against non-state actors. Such strategies would likely be directed at those states most likely to provide such entities with support.

This section has made the case for Kennan's definition of political warfare as an authoritative and useful construct and has explored the dimensions of the concept. It has applied the definition of political warfare to the foreign policy of Russia, China, and Iran, and argued that they are currently pursuing political warfare strategies. The following case study introduces the initial application of Russian political warfare, in the context of the early Cold War.

C. CASE STUDY: THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF EASTERN EUROPE

Thanks to ideology, the twentieth century was fated to experience evil-doing on a scale calculated in the millions. This cannot be denied, nor passed over, nor suppressed.

-Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn⁴⁶

The overarching theme of this entire body of work is the development of Russian PW doctrine into what it is today. It is uncontroversial to suggest that contemporary infantry or armor doctrines evolved from earlier forms; PW progressed in the same way. The earliest model can be broken down into four phases: infrastructure development, destabilization, conflict, and consolidation. The key differences between early Russian PW doctrine and later models was a protracted infrastructure development phase, because none had previously existed, and the use of the societal upheaval following World War II in place of a "demoralization" phase. This case study will provide a brief, historical background discussing the rationales supporting the primacy of PW within Soviet strategy and the development and implementation of the PW doctrine that Moscow used to establish the Eastern Bloc.

The earliest form of a doctrinal template for Soviet PW became evident in Eastern Europe immediately following World War II. It is important to note that this was not a written doctrine; there was no manual. The methods employed to install Soviet satellite

⁴⁶ Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *The GULAG Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation I-II*, trans. by Thomas P. Whitney (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 174.

regimes throughout Eastern Europe, however, share a remarkable similarity from one country to another. This, in conjunction with the extreme level of governmental control exercised by Stalin and a high degree of coordination between Moscow and the respective communist parties of Eastern Europe, indicates that a de facto doctrine was implemented. The Soviets actively spread and supported communist organizations throughout the world. Then “Sovietization or Bolshevization,” of communist parties—by expelling or discrediting individuals that disagreed with Moscow on any policy—created cadre parties that were capable of implementing effective PW.⁴⁷ World War II disrupted European society and cast the Red Army in the role of liberator from fascism and a societal stabilizing factor. Communist ideology and Soviet national interests demanded that states under the administrative control of the USSR become communist. The Soviets “had the advantages of geographical proximity, experience in running a police state, and the disorientation that the war had left behind.”⁴⁸

1. Historical Background

In 1848, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels penned the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, a work that is a paragon of propaganda, hinting at a seething mass of communism inherent in the working classes and inciting that mass to rise up in violent revolution.⁴⁹ Paul A. Smith, who literally wrote the book on political warfare, points out that the Manifesto claimed to represent a group that did not yet exist, thus creating the Communist Party instead of the other way around.⁵⁰ As the political philosophy of Marx and Engels languished, the turmoil of World War I disrupted the old orders of Europe and provided strategic space for new ones to rise up.

⁴⁷ George Schopflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe: 1945-1992*, (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 47–56. See also: H. Gordon Skilling, “Gottwald and the Bolshevization of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (1929-1939),” *Slavic Review* 20, no. 4 (December 1961): 641–655. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3004097>.

⁴⁸ John Lewis Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 195.

⁴⁹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, February 1848, trans. by Samuel Moore in cooperation with Frederick Engels, 1888 (New York: Bantam Dell, 2004), 13–48.

⁵⁰ Paul A. Smith Jr., *On Political War*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989), 121.

The violent revolution demanded by communism's founding document was executed in Russia following the Bolshevik coup of October 1917, and its success was partially rooted in WWI. World War I was ongoing and, in the face of German invasion, the Bolsheviks struggled for power internally against less radical socialists, while also conducting a civil war against fellow Russian "White" and "Green" factions. In the midst of this conflict, "The Bolsheviks did not acknowledge national boundaries and in the usage of the time 'civil war; referred first, and foremost; to the political and social struggle between the Bolshevik regime and its own citizenry.'" ⁵¹ After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ended Russia's involvement in World War I on March 3, 1918, British and American forces moved troops into Russia to prevent war materiel going to the Germans and to support Russian factions willing to carry on the war. At that point, all of the territory controlled by the Bolsheviks was under siege by external forces. ⁵² However, the Russian civil war was not solely about the control of terrain, but was "primarily a political conflict, a struggle for power and not a conventional war." ⁵³ These dual features, Russia besieged and an unending struggle for political power, would shape the worldview and international relations of the Soviet Union. According to internationally recognized expert on the USSR, Stephen Blank:

The legendary tactical flexibility of the Soviet regime derives from their conceptualization of conflict as being waged on all fronts or across the board—whence the internal structure of the protagonists becomes the center of gravity. The Bolshevik vision of politics as another form of warfare endowed its practitioners with the maximum feasible number of

⁵¹ Richard Pipes, *A Concise History of the Russian Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 234.

Even labeling their enemies as "Whites" was a Bolshevik propaganda move; an attempt to link them to the pro-monarchy Bourbon armies of the French Revolution.

⁵² David R. Stone, "The Russian Civil War, 1917-1921," in *The Military History of the Soviet Union*, ed. Robin Higham and Frederik W. Kagan (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 14–33. See also: Pipes, 249–252.

⁵³ Pipes, *A Concise History of the Russian Revolution*, 236.

instruments with which to wage their struggle even in the face of superior enemy military power.⁵⁴

The Bolshevik movement was forced to use every means at their disposal in their rise to and consolidation of control. Because of military necessity—due to conventional weakness—and their grasp of the peace/war continuum, the Bolsheviks were soon practitioners of whole-of-state PW.

2. Infrastructure Development

Infrastructure development was by far the longest phase of the early Soviet PW model, beginning after the success of the Bolshevik Revolution and transitioning after World War II. The spread of a revolutionary ideology and the development of a reliable and effective human network takes time and effort. Once this initial network had been developed, however, infrastructure development and maintenance ceased to be a separate phase of PW doctrine and became an ongoing and ever-present process in the background of all state functions. Initial Soviet infrastructure development depended heavily upon the diplomatic and informational levers of power to legitimize the nascent Soviet state, to propagate its ideology, and to protect its interests.

Early communists were convinced that the destruction of capitalism was a scientific inevitability and the inexorable direction of mankind. Therefore, the Bolsheviks began attempts to export their revolution before they had finished consolidating power within Russia. In 1919, the Soviets created the Communist International, or Comintern, to advocate, support, and direct world communism. This organization was born in blood and revolution, based upon internal propaganda and external political warfare, and determined to use every weapon at its disposal to destroy capitalism. “The Communist International was established to spread the revolution globally through subversion and the

⁵⁴ Stephen J. Blank, “Class War on a Global Scale: The Leninist Culture of Political Conflict,” in *Conflict, Culture, and History: Regional Dimensions*, by Stephen J. Blank, Lawrence E. Grinter, Karl P. Magyar, Lewis B. Ware, and Bynum E. Weathers (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1993), 11. http://webharvest.gov/peth04/20041016184158/http://aupress.au.af.mil/Books/Blanketal/Blank_etal.pdf.

foreign internalization of adversarial communist politics, in other words, to conduct worldwide political warfare.”⁵⁵

In response to this threat, communist parties were outlawed in most Eastern European countries following the Russian Revolution. This strengthened the movement, “Illegality encouraged the communists to develop the conspiratorial principle of rigid organization, centralized hierarchy, and military discipline and cell structures.”⁵⁶ Moscow encouraged the exportation of communism and the Russian importation of foreign communists for training in Moscow under the auspices of the Comintern, which gave Soviet leaders the opportunity to develop, train, and assess those who had the talent and proclivities for advancement within the party. The eventual communist political leaders of Eastern Europe were hard-core party members who trained in Moscow prior to and during the Second World War. This form of PW developed a cadre of revolutionary leaders and organizations for future recruitment and expansion among the populations of target countries. It became a form of externally directed political insurgency. During World War II, partisan organizations and governments in exile coalesced in anti-Nazi resistance. The Communists cadres were a small, but vocal and active minority within them. This prepared the parties to take advantage of the societal and governmental upheaval during and after the war.⁵⁷

In addition to foreign communist party advancement, the Soviets emphasized the development of fellow-travelers and agents of influence in order to control or manipulate foreign narratives about communism. As Stalin gained power, he was ruthless in his desire to maintain dominance within Russia. Forced collectivization of agriculture led to approximately 5.6 million Soviet deaths in 1932-1933, about half of which were ethnic Ukrainians.⁵⁸ Following the mass famine, the Great Terror of 1937-1938 “killed twice as

⁵⁵ Stephen J. Blank, “Class War on a Global Scale: The Leninist Culture of Political Conflict,” 18–21.

⁵⁶ George Schopflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe: 1945-1992* (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 46–47.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 60.

⁵⁸ Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 53.

many Soviet citizens as there were Jews living in Germany.”⁵⁹ The crucial role of Soviet PW in this era was to convince the Western world to ignore genocide in the mistaken belief that the Soviet Union was becoming more modern and westernized. Media control and perception management, using witting or unwitting European and American agents of influence acting as apologists for the Soviet regime, were vital to this strategy.⁶⁰ Masterful management of the informational lever of national power enabled the Soviet Union to gain and maintain normalized diplomatic relations with potentially adversarial countries throughout the world.

3. Destabilization

Destabilization was implemented by communist elements that infiltrated the governments, security forces, and societies of target countries in order to confound non-communists’ goals and install their own regimes. The horrors and demoralization of the Second World War provided the communists with the opportunity they needed to gain control of key levers of power across the DIME spectrum. This phase placed heavy emphasis on mass recruitment and population mobilization to subvert and control elements of the state across all four levers of power.

Advancement of the communist cause within national governments was achieved through anti-Nazi and exile-government service during World War II. The disciplined cadre parties developed during phase one were vital to the success of this effort, in particular by gaining control of key governmental ministries and assets. In the aftermath of the war, the positive public perception of the Red Army, combined with aggressive recruiting and economic and social incentives, led many people to join the communist party. The East European communist parties borrowed a page from Nazi recruitment by

⁵⁹ Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, 111.

⁶⁰ A prime example is the *New York Times*’ Walter Duranty, who famously denied the purposeful starvation of Ukraine. S.J. Taylor credits Duranty with influencing President Roosevelt to diplomatically recognize the Soviet Union. See: S.J. Taylor, *Stalin’s Apologist*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

In at least one case, during the visit of a foreign dignitary, the state concocted an elaborate display of fictive prosperity, stocking store shelves with food that was not for sale, putting every automobile in the area on one town’s roads, and carefully rehearsing those selected to be “bystanders” of the visit. See: Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 56–57.

sponsoring organizations of every conceivable type and target audience to increase party membership or affiliation. In many places, they also used the promise of land reforms or distribution of confiscated lands to win converts from the peasant classes. These methods resulted in an explosion of popular affiliation.

In four years, from 1944 to 1948, the Romanian Communist Party grew from 1,000 to one million members. In Czechoslovakia, the increase was from 40,000 to 2.67 million, in Hungary from 2,000 to 884,000.⁶¹ These astonishing rates of growth supplied a mass base that could be mobilized to support the communist party, protest governmental actions that ran counter to communist designs, or provide a threat of imminent violence and unrest. Immediately following the war, as governments were being established, communist leadership ensured that they received governmental positions that controlled security forces and internal communications, typically ministries of the Interior and Information.⁶² Development of “national committees”—groups purportedly representative of local government, but controlled by the communists—added credibility to communist claims of popular support. “At the national, regional, and local levels, communist dominated national committees were acting as organs of government.”⁶³ Communist elements also “colonized” organizations and institutions through legitimate membership or coercion.⁶⁴ They then sought ways to discredit their political rivals through what the Hungarian communist leader, Mátyás Rákosi, termed “salami slicing,” i.e., removing the outer edge of the opposition by accusing them of some unprovable crime. In a parallel to current Russian tactics, accusations of “fascism” were a common technique. They also sought to destroy their opponents on the left through internal division. The result was that, “Having split them time and time again, the Communists would swallow what was left of these parties whole.”⁶⁵

⁶¹ Schopflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe*, 65.

⁶² Staar, *The Communist Regimes*, 29, 64, 109, 155, 162; Keith Lowe, *Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2012), 333.

⁶³ Staar, *The Communist Regimes*, 64.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 65.

⁶⁵ Lowe, *Savage Continent*, 336.

4. Crisis

Initiation of the crisis phase began when irreversible momentum towards communism had developed, or when it seemed that communist parties were in danger of losing ground in legitimate elections. Communists would then foment, or, in some cases, exacerbate a crisis by using social movements to incite protests, work stoppages, and vigilantism. This would give the communist-controlled security forces and the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), the Soviet secret police, the opportunity to "restore order" by removing opponents through intimidation, violence, or arrest. Many potential resistors fled their countries; the intractable often met with "accidents," or were outright killed.⁶⁶ The communist party would then hold a single-list or rigged election to provide a veneer of "democracy" to their takeover.

5. Consolidation

In the consolidation phase, tensions would be reduced, while power was secured. Then the communists would accelerate their political agenda, while at the same time removing any remaining threats to the state. Once the full extent of the communist program was revealed—radical land reform, introduction of heavy industry, and the institution of a police state—it was too late for the revitalization of opposition political parties. The final step in the consolidation of power was the cleansing of the party itself. "In the late 1940's and early 1950's the whole of Europe descended into a terrifying purge, where everyone and anyone could find themselves under suspicion."⁶⁷ This final cleansing of the communist parties minimized deviation from Moscow, centralizing power under Stalin.

6. Conclusion

The communist takeover of Eastern Europe is a case of the successful implementation of a long-term PW strategy. The USSR patiently developed human infrastructure to spread their ideology. When the opportunity presented itself, the Soviets

⁶⁶ Lowe, *Savage Continent*, 331–339.

⁶⁷ Lowe, *Savage Continent*, 338.

integrated all elements of national power, using overt and covert means, to achieve their objectives. While it would be impossible to ignore the fact that the proximity of the Red Army was a factor in the speed of the takeover, it merely aided the process through the implicit threat of ready force. In some cases, the withdrawal of the Red Army actually aided the communist cause by “proving” that the USSR was noninterventionist.⁶⁸ The eight countries that were the target of successful Soviet political warfare—Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany—were diverse in language, culture, political tradition and thought, religion, and ethnicity.⁶⁹ Yet, effective PW turned them all into totalitarian Soviet satellites. The following case study will explore the implementation of early Russian PW doctrine in Czechoslovakia.

D. CASE STUDY: THE COMMUNIST TAKE OVER OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1921-1948

We go to Moscow to learn from the Russian Bolsheviks how to twist your neck. You know that the Russian Bolsheviks are masters of this.

-Klement Gottwald, speech in Czechoslovakian Parliament, December 1929

This section will present the case of the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia as a study of Soviet PW doctrine in practice. Czechoslovakia was chosen because it is demonstrative of the effectiveness of PW at subverting a representative democracy; it is also the scene of later doctrinal developments of Soviet PW. Events will be analyzed in accordance with the early Soviet PW model of infrastructure development, destabilization, crisis, and consolidation.

1. Infrastructure Development: 1921–1946

The infrastructure development phase was by far the longest phase of early Soviet PW—in Czechoslovakia and throughout Europe—spanning the period between the world wars, the duration of World War II, and the immediate post-World War II re-creation of Europe. This is logical, as communism was exporting its ideology and creating believers

⁶⁸ 1945 Czechoslovakia is a prime example. See: Staar, *The Communist Regimes*, 64.

⁶⁹ Anne Applebaum, *Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944-1956* (New York: Doubleday, 2012), xxiv.

whole-cloth. During infrastructure development, the communists relied almost entirely on the diplomatic and informational levers of power to spread communist ideology, while simultaneously discrediting individuals that were non-adherents to the Bolshevik party line. The Comintern became a kind of militant foreign service, spreading Soviet ideas and ideology throughout the world. The seeds of success were sown by years of patient labor, building the necessary human infrastructure and networks to support Moscow's decisions when crisis or opportunity presented itself.

a. Interwar

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa or KSČ) was inaugurated in May 1921, after two years of effort from the Communist International to ensure the establishment of a fledgling party in the democratic state.⁷⁰ The democratic traditions of Czechoslovakia, however, did not produce communists of sufficient ardor and tractability to suit Moscow. The Comintern thus set out to "Bolshevize" the nascent KSČ. "Throughout this process of Bolshevization the intervention of the Comintern was repeated and decisive, every major turn of policy and shift of leadership being accomplished with the aid of that body, and in one case through the personal guidance of Stalin."⁷¹ In February 1929, Klement Gottwald, selected and aided by the Comintern, rose to power. This change of leadership divided the party, with more than half of the members following the old leadership to form a new organization outside the auspices of the Comintern and Moscow.⁷² However, this division resulted in a party that was younger, less influenced by social democracy, and attracted to the revolutionary extremes of the Russian Bolsheviks; in short, members that were prepared to toe the Soviet party line.⁷³ "During the decade following 1929 a nucleus of Bolshevik

⁷⁰ H. Gordon Skilling, "The Comintern and Czechoslovak Communism: 1921-1929," *American Slavic and East European Review* 19, no. 2 (April 1960): 234. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3004193>.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 234.

⁷² Skilling, "The Comintern and Czechoslovak Communism," 245.

⁷³ H. Gordon Skilling, "Gottwald and the Bolshevization of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (1929-1939)," *Slavic Review* 20, no. 4 (December 1961): 644. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3004097>.

cadres was fashioned, capable of assuming the heavy responsibilities of wartime struggle and postwar government.”⁷⁴

In 1934, the KSČ opposed the reelection of the sitting president, Tomas Masaryk, using the slogan “Not Masaryk but Lenin.”⁷⁵ This slogan led to an arrest warrant for Gottwald on charges of high treason. He escaped to the USSR—giving him the opportunity to further bolster his reputation as a true communist believer—in August 1934 and remained there until February 1936, when he was allowed to return to Czechoslovakia. At the seventh Comintern Congress in the summer of 1935, the Comintern finally endorsed a “popular front” strategy to oppose fascism. This was completed working under the threat of Stalin’s purges and despite earlier Moscow directions to tolerate the Nazis. The popular front strategy led to the KSČ’s support for Edward Benes’ election as president, support that was to serve communist goals during the postwar reconstruction of the country. It also provided yet another opportunity to identify those individuals who did not adhere to the party line. Benes was to be supported as an antifascist, but also to be regarded as an enemy of the revolution. By 1939, Gottwald had established control of the KSČ and developed it into a disciplined and Moscow-orthodox communist machine; an organization that was both reflective of the policies and desires of the Soviet Union and the Communist International, while at the same time prepared to take political control of postwar Czechoslovakia.⁷⁶ The KSČ was a force in being, waiting for an opportunity.

b. World War II

Following the German occupation of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939, President Benes fled to London to establish a government in exile and Gottwald went back to the bosom of communism in Moscow. Other key communist leaders, who seem to have been following a prearranged evacuation plan designed to ensure continued

⁷⁴ H. Gordon Skilling, “Gottwald and the Bolshevization of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (1929-1939),” 646–647.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 650.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 641, 654.

influence in any exile governments, fled to Moscow, Paris, and London. The KSČ immediately began working to ensure their place in the postwar government. The Czech communists were quick to pledge their loyalty to Benes and provide assurances of collaboration, while at the same time planning to remove him from power after the war. President Benes was not entirely taken in by communist practicality, but he believed that the allies, including Russia, would be victorious and would support Czechoslovakian independence, his only goal.⁷⁷

In early November 1943, Benes travelled to Moscow to meet with Stalin and the Czech communists in residence concerning the future government of his country. He left believing, with some reservations, that democracy would return to Czechoslovakia after the war.⁷⁸ President Benes and the majority of democratic politicians believed—along with many in the West—that the crucible of war would have a “purifying effect on the Communist regime, which would grow tamer, more liberal, and more tolerant—at least of democratic socialist practices. It would in no way endanger the humanist values cherished in Czechoslovakia.”⁷⁹ This mistaken belief in the predominance of democracy would influence all Czech governmental interactions up to the brink of the communist overthrow. On October 18, 1944, the Red Army crossed the border into Czechoslovakia and with them they brought the Soviet secret police, the NKVD. Local communists quickly began to organize “National Committees” at the village or town level. These committees were supported with funding and supplies by the Red Army’s political commissars and the NKVD; noncommunist groups were left to their own devices. Where sufficient local communists could not be found, the commissars provided them.⁸⁰ The elections for the National Committees were hasty affairs, generally consisting of local residents and show-of-hands style voting. The Communists did much better in these

⁷⁷ Josef Korbel, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938-1948: The Failure of Coexistence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 48–52.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 83–93.

⁷⁹ Paul E. Zinner, *Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-48* (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1963), 102.

⁸⁰ Korbel, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia*, 130–133.

elections than later support for the party would have indicated.⁸¹ ⁸² Thus, the victorious liberation of the Red Army enabled the advancement of the communist cause at the local level of government throughout Czechoslovakia.

It was vital to the popular perception of communist power for the London government to make the pilgrimage to Moscow and integrate with the KSČ prior to returning to Prague. The communists worked very hard to ensure that this happened for popular prestige and to aid favorable negotiation.⁸³ On March 17, 1945, Benes and the political delegations from the London government in exile arrived in Moscow to reunite with their representative. They began negotiations concerning the composition of the future Czechoslovakian government that appeared to be equitable; however, KSČ planning and preparation ensured that communist party members, or their fellow travelers, dominated the government, especially the all-important Ministries of the Interior and National Defense. Thus, the KSČ was able to favorably influence the reintroduction of democracy to Czechoslovakia with the intention of using it to gain control of the country or subvert it.

2. Destabilization: 1946–December 1947

In the destabilization phase, the KSČ made use of economic and informational factors to increase party membership and its importance in a democratic environment. Its ability to attract membership is truly astounding and is another testament to the effectiveness of communist infrastructure development prior to the war. The disciplined and committed cadre party multiplied itself many times over. The real goal was not to increase the size of the party for its own sake, but to gain the ability to mobilize masses of people at a moment's notice. Whether it was getting out the vote, protesting or

⁸¹ Zinner, *Communist Strategy*, 146–147.

⁸² “The Secretary General of the Party, R. Slansky, giving an account before the first session of the Cominform in September 1947 about party activities, reported that all three chairmen of the Provinces National Committees were communists, that out of 163 district National Committees 128 (80 percent) and out of 11,512 local Committees 6,350 (57 percent) were chaired by communists. Almost 140,000 party members worked in various National Committees and their commissions.” Korb, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia*, 147.

demonstrating, staging general strikes, or incitement to violence, the KSČ could manufacture crowds at will. The communists infiltrated trade unions, multiple governmental ministries, the military, and the police in order to leverage elements of national power. The KSČ used economic factors in the form of land and jobs to incentivize party leadership. They employed informational factors, control of newspaper, broadcasting, and word of mouth to influence the actions of both party members and the general populace. This gave the KSČ the opportunity to destabilize democratic institutions by controlling a minority of the population.

Postwar Czechoslovakia was a country with ravaged institutional systems and internal ethnic conflicts. It looked to the Soviet Union and the Red Army as agents of liberation and stability. This had an immediate and positive effect on the popularity of both the Soviet Union and the KSČ. The Soviet Union also had a prepared plan to assist and develop Czechoslovakia; the West did not.⁸⁴ In addition to control of the influential ministries, the communists set about establishing their presence in every organization and institution within Czech society. Mass recruitment resulted in unprecedented organizational growth. Between 1944 and 1948 the Czech Communist Party grew from 40,000 to 2.67 million members.⁸⁵ This unprecedented growth was accomplished through organizational infiltrations carried out by the Gottwald-developed cadre party.

During the war, the KSČ conducted a major campaign in the trade unions. After the war, white collar workers, government workers, and students were invited to enter the communist-dominated organizations. The Central Council of the Trade Unions (URO) became “the most powerful instrument of communist policy, in the name of an organization which was supposed to be non-partisan and in which many members were non-communists, indeed even anti-communists.”⁸⁶ An additional key feature of trade union domination was the establishment of armed factory militias, ostensibly to guard key infrastructure in the turbulent months immediately following the war. By communist

⁸⁴ Korbelt, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia*, 119; Zinner, *Communist Strategy*, 111.

⁸⁵ Schopflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe*, 65.

⁸⁶ Korbelt, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia*, 157.

design, however, these paramilitary formations were never disarmed and remained under staunch communist control until they were put into action at the behest of the KSČ.

“In Czechoslovakia, as in all other countries in Eastern Europe, land reform and nationalization served as economic levers that the Communists exploited to further their own political ends.”⁸⁷ Through control of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Czech Communist Party accelerated the redistributions of land that had been agreed upon during the Moscow conference. Throughout this redistribution they ensured that loyal communists were at the front of the line for receiving redistributed land. Land redistribution was also controlled by the communist-controlled Interior Ministry, which was entrusted with the postwar tasks of national purification from fascist influence and the resettlement of citizens in lands that had been owned by Germans.⁸⁸ The ability to distribute land or denounce collaborators and “fascists” presented the Czech Communist Party with a unique opportunity to gain friends and undermine potential enemies. In the short-term, land distribution was a tangible economic benefit that the KSČ used to further its membership goals and gain control of the population.

Control of the national security forces was the key feature of the Ministry of the Interior. The KSČ neutralized the reconstituted Czechoslovakian military by ensuring that men who had served in the Red Army or sat out the war achieved positions of importance within the hierarchy. Soldiers who had fought with the British or French militaries, or were known proponents of democracy, were relegated to dead-end positions; however, the Czechoslovakian armed forces, especially the officer corps, were extremely conservative. This made them an uncertain prospect from a communist perspective. The police force would be their preferred tool of violence.

Vaclev Nosek, the Minister of the Interior, recognized that rapid communization of the police force would be overly transparent and would result in a backlash against the party. Instead, he created several internal organizations that received special emphasis, duties, and training. Namely, he organized a mostly communist group of mobile and

⁸⁷ Zinner, *Communist Strategy*, 117.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 138.

heavily armed police to patrol volatile border regions with the excuse of combatting any fascist remnants that might still exist. In addition to these police, he established a secret police force—the StB (Státní bezpečnost), which was modelled on the NKVD—and the land security division, the Zydowska Organizacja Bojowa (ZOB). The ZOB was eventually abolished by the democratic parties within the government, but its personnel and equipment were absorbed into the Ministry of the Interior, thus it remained a force in being, if not a sanctioned organization. These new organizations provided the KSČ with a paramilitary force that had the added authority of wearing the uniforms of those dedicated to the preservation of law and order. At the same time, average police officers were mostly left to continue with business as usual in order to preserve appearances.

The KSČ used complete control of mass media to manage and advance its agenda. At the same time, the communists were very careful to project the image of a democratically oriented, Czech-nationalist, coalition government. They carefully and artfully worked to increase their power and popularity within Czechoslovakia through control of both the press and the radio, under the communist Minister of Information, Vaclav Kopecky. No publications could appear without Ministry approval and none could be owned by private individuals, only political parties or public institutions. Conservative newspapers were suppressed with the explanation that they had supported fascism. The communists also limited disfavored periodicals or newspapers through economic controls of paper and ink. Communist-controlled trade unions could also refuse—on order—to deliver these precious commodities to opposition voices.⁸⁹

The KSČ also endeavored to pack government ministries with adherents or fellow travelers. Once the number of governmental workers had ballooned to an unsustainable level, they suggested the economic reduction of workers—of course ensuring that the majority of the jobs reduced belonged to non-communists. Thus, “The governmental offices became hot-beds of infiltration, subversion, and denunciation.”⁹⁰ In the 1946

⁸⁹ Korbelt, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia*, 142–145.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 148.

election, the KSČ mobilized the widespread social movements it had developed and won 38% of the vote; Gottwald became Prime Minister.

None of this is to imply that the communists had control of every political or mass organization in Czechoslovakia. In contrast, the KSČ remained a minority party, which is what made full-scale PW necessary. The communists would have been just as happy with a peaceful democratic take over. However, outside of the trade unions and ministries, the KSČ had difficulty gaining adherents in local farmer's associations, influential athletic clubs, youth groups, and especially, university students. As the KSČ infiltrated society, geopolitical events nudged the situation towards a breaking point. Two events accelerated the impending conflict—the Stalin ordered rejection of the Marshall Plan and Soviet condemnation of the KSČ.

On 9 July 1947, Gottwald was summoned to Moscow and informed by Stalin that Czechoslovakian participation in the Marshall Plan would be viewed as an act of aggression against the USSR. Once Gottwald relayed this news to the capital, while President Benes was incapacitated with a brain hemorrhage, the Czech government agreed to withdraw from their original acceptance of the Marshall Plan. This incident revealed to the population the true depth to which the KSČ was responsive to Stalin's will. This revelation sparked a backlash within the population. A poor economy and the KSČ's increasingly evident radicalization also began to take their toll on communist popularity. The communists realized that they did not have the same level of support as 1946; there was a crisis coming.

In September 1947, the Communist Information Bureau, Cominform, was founded in the face of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. At the inaugural meeting, the Czechoslovakian delegates were severely criticized by the Soviets. The world was becoming bipolar and the KSČ was failing to move Czechoslovakia into the Soviet sphere. In the face of this dangerous reprimand, the KSČ redoubled their efforts.⁹¹

⁹¹ Pavel Tigríd, "The Prague Coup of 1948: The Elegant Takeover," in *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers*, ed. Thomas T. Hammond and Robert Farrell (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975), 406–409.

3. Crisis: January-February 1948

Conflict initiation was not begun until the party leadership was ready to stage-manage the outcome. The KSČ had the ability to temporarily control or neutralize all of the democratic bulwarks of Czechoslovakian society. Once people were in the streets and violence was visible, true democracy was too slow to react. The Red Army was on standby should intervention have become necessary; however, as with any successful PW campaign, the use of overt violence is only useful if PW fails. The military was a supporting effort to the control of the economic, informational, and diplomatic levers of power.

At the end of January 1948, the KSČ used a program of economic factors as a provocation for action. The Ministries of Internal Commerce, Finance, and Agriculture all proposed nationalization measures that were far more extreme than what the coalition government was prepared to accept. These measures were targeted to separate leftist political parties from the rest of the government. “Their tactic was successful; the Social Democrat Party—reliably left-wing and populated with communists fellow travelers—voted on these questions with communists and the opposing democratic parties were attacked in the communist press as champions of the capitalists and reactionaries.”⁹² This political move helped to mobilize the communist-dominated trade unions in an effort to continue the separation of the Social Democrats from the rest of the government. The other political parties had one card left to play in an effort to keep the Social Democrats voting with them—protesting the increasing communization of the police force.

On 13 February 1948—Friday the thirteenth—the democratic Minister of Justice presented a report to the Ministerial Council that detailed the continuing communization of the police force, culminating with the fact that Minister Nosek had recently replaced eight democratic police commanders with communists.⁹³ The non-communist members of the council demanded that the communists cease this subversion and voted that the senior police officers should be reinstated. Despite the vote, Gottwald and Nosek refused

⁹² Korbél, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia*, 204.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 207.

and triggered the mobilization of their social movement networks as a demonstration of power. On 21 February, 12 of the non-communist cabinet members submitted their resignations, believing that President Benes would not accept them and that the communists would be publically embarrassed. With the common knowledge that the KSČ was polling poorly, they hoped to force an early election and ensure a communist electoral defeat. This would have been a shrewd political move against opponents operating under democratic principles; however, the communists used it as a pretext to spark the conflict they had been seeking.

While the separate parties of the National Front government were paralyzed by debate, the KSČ unleashed their social networks into massive procommunist demonstrations, with the implied threat that if there was violent unrest then the Red Army would intervene to “restore order.” The Soviet ambassador, Valerian Zorin, travelled to Prague, presumably to serve as a go-between and observer for Stalin. His presence reinforced Soviet support for the KSČ and the potential of Red Army intervention. On 22 February, Gottwald declared a state of emergency and recalled the communist-dominated frontier police that had been created by Nosek. Communist “action committees,” armed by the worker’s militia members in conjunction with the police, took over Prague. This access to weapons and people willing to use them further emphasized the importance of communist control of the Interior Ministry. Army personnel were ordered to stay within their barracks and did not interfere. Communist demonstrations were mounted throughout the city and an anticommunist student demonstration was broken up with gunfire from police and militia members.⁹⁴ Communist “People’s Militias” took over noncompliant government ministries and prevented the entrance of non-communist government workers and the ministers themselves. To shut down uncontrolled information, printers refused to run any non-communist press, mills refused to produce their paper, and workers refused to load it or unload it.⁹⁵ Non-communist

⁹⁴ Zinner, *Communist Strategy*, 210.

⁹⁵ Korb, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia*, 227.

members of the Ministry of Information were not allowed in the building and radio airtime was refused to non-communist officials.⁹⁶

Gottwald then gave a speech promising a general strike unless President Benes agreed to form a new, communist-dominated government. In a nicely staged piece of political theater, Valerian Zorin offered the use of the Red Army—then poised on the country’s borders—to “restore order.” “The process of infiltration which had started in June 1941, after the Soviet Union had entered the war—process which the democrats’ own good will and loyal cooperation had facilitated—now, in February 1948, paid rich dividends. It could not be stopped by any weapons which democrats knew how to use.”⁹⁷

4. Consolidation: February 1948–March 1953

Consolidation of power in the final stage can be viewed in hindsight as an inevitable process; however, Gottwald and the KSČ realized how fragile the situation was. They attempted, at every turn, to retain the trappings of democracy: political parties, elections, and democratic titles; all carefully controlled by decisions in Moscow. Economic incentives and informational influence, backed by the threat of violence, provided the communists time and space to remove, coopt, or subdue those who presented threats to their rule. This process continued throughout the era of communist control in Czechoslovakia.

The communist consolidation of power began with the seating of a KSČ government in February 1948 and did not end until March 1953, with the deaths of both Stalin and Gottwald. In the face of internal and external threats, on 25 February 1948, President Benes allowed the formation of a majority KSČ government, with Gottwald as the Prime Minister. The only important ministry held by a noncommunist was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held by Jan Masaryk; two weeks later he was dead. To this day, there is still debate about whether he jumped out of his apartment’s bathroom window or was thrown out by communist agents. On 9 May, a new constitution was

⁹⁶ Zinner, *Communist Strategy*, 207.

⁹⁷ Korbelt, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia*, 224.

adopted and on 30 May, “elections” were held. These were a single-list affair—with only one party, the communist-dominated National Front represented—and they predictably received 89.3% of the vote. After the completion of the takeover, opposition to the KSČ began to melt away. This was partly due to the leadership of other political parties fleeing the country. President Benes, psychologically and physically ruined by years of political abuse, resigned on 7 June and was succeeded by Klement Gottwald. He died in September 1948 and his archives were seized by the communists a few hours later.⁹⁸ While the KSČ continued to dispose of potential enemies and consolidate power, the death of Benes signaled the end of the last remaining democracy in Eastern Europe. The KSČ continued to institute Moscow’s policies and there were several rounds of purges until the death of Stalin on 6 March 1953 and the death of Gottwald immediately thereafter, on 14 March. Strikes soon began across Czechoslovakia, many directly related to protests against the death of Jan Masaryk, sowing the seeds of future resistance against the communists and setting the stage for new rounds of PW.⁹⁹

5. Conclusion

While the majority of historical analyses focus on the personalities and events in Czechoslovakia during 1947 and 1948, it is vital to remember that the action was the denouement of a decades-long effort to spread Soviet influence and the players were surrogate forces of Moscow, developed as tools of Soviet foreign policy. The communist takeover of Czechoslovakia is often referred to as a coup d’état or putsch, terms that connote a violent change of the heads of government with no real change to the governmental system or operation. The terms do not apply here. The proxy forces of the Soviet Union, the Bolshevized KSČ, subverted a democratically elected government and rapidly established a communist satellite. It was a nearly bloodless—at first—and externally supported communist revolution. It demonstrates the power of PW concentrated against a democracy. Moscow, through the KSČ, employed all the levers of

⁹⁸ Korbel, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia*, 3–9.

⁹⁹ Applebaum, *Iron Curtain*, 435–438.

national power across the DIME spectrum in order to meet its foreign policy objectives, which included, among many others, the communization of Czechoslovakia.

III. THE COLD WAR – PART I: SOVIET POLITICAL WARFARE 1947-1991

Political warfare was a fundamental mechanism for achieving long-term Soviet objectives during the Cold War. Unlike U.S. grand strategy that remained rooted in containment policy, but vacillated in intensity with each administration, the Soviet strategy was anchored in a relatively consistent ideological frame and resource commitment for the duration of the Cold War period. Security dominated all other aims. Internally and along her immediate periphery, the Soviet Union used ideological, structural, and cultural subjugation to maintain the security gains achieved in Eastern Europe following the Second World War. In Western Europe, the USSR pursued an aggressive policy of gaining security dominance over the continent through the expulsion of American influence and the establishment of a new geopolitical defense and economic structure. Soviet political warfare outside of Europe was based on the formation of an international consensus block that would support Soviet policy and facilitate the ascendance of a Soviet-dominated security structure on the European continent. In all three cases—the immediate, intermediate, and global spheres—the Soviet model for conducting PW to achieve its aims was similar. The Soviet Union, relying on a combination of its security and military intelligence services and “soft power” diplomatic and economic levers, refined a complex political warfare model over the course of the Cold War. This model, made public by the Soviet defector Yuri Bezmenov in the mid 1980s, factored in short-, intermediate-, and long-term (generational) effects and used relatively unrestrained subversion to alter the global geopolitical balance.

This chapter will describe the principal objectives and strategies of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, provide a general analysis of Soviet active measures as essential methods to achieve these objectives, and discuss the phased application of these methods through the Bezmenov model. The last section of the chapter analyzes, and provides examples of, the various elements of PW used by the Soviet Union across DIME. This method allows us to see the effectiveness of political warfare in each individual element and understand the complexity involved in synchronizing overt and

covert measures, as well as identify strengths and vulnerabilities of various PW programs. The chapter concludes with a case study that demonstrates the effectiveness of PW in achieving national objectives when sufficient synchronization takes place. Though the USSR disintegrated in 1991, the Soviet model and its methods have survived, and are an integral component of the current political warfare doctrine for the Russian Federation in the twenty-first century.

A. OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY AND METHODS: ZERSTZUNG AND ACTIVE MEASURES

The overarching objectives of the Soviet Union were the consolidation of security gains in Eastern Europe following World War II and the expansion of that security blanket as far away from the Russian border as possible. All other strategic goals were directed towards this end. These interim objectives included gaining influence in Western European affairs, the establishment of a Soviet-dominated security structure on the European continent, gaining support for Soviet policies within international organizations, and the global spread of communist and socialist ideology. Soviet policy was often misrepresented during the Cold War as deriving directly from one of these ancillary objectives. Each one of these was independently an important pillar in the overall strategy, but given the staggering toll that the “Great Patriotic War” took on the Soviet Union, the penchant was to ensure security above all other aims.

The United States was the main strategic threat. The USSR overtly pursued a gradual strategy of minimizing U.S. military, political, and cultural presence in Western Europe by influencing the defense policies and internal politics of these nations and hindering progress towards Western European unity. The ultimate goal was the vital interests of stability and security within the Soviet sphere. The promotion of Western Europe’s transition to socialism was a declared objective throughout the Cold War, but was subordinate to the stability and security paradigm.¹⁰⁰ The USSR’s historic ties to Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, superpower status, and ideological frame also helped cement the idea that the “Soviet Union has the right to greater

¹⁰⁰ John van Oudenaren, *Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe: Objectives, Instruments, Results*, A Project AIR FORCE report, RAND Publication Series, R-3310-AF. February 1986, 64–66.

influence in all European affairs than she [presently had].”¹⁰¹ This notion helped justify their strategic initiatives in Western Europe. Soviet strategists believed that breaking U.S. influence in the West would lead to a global shift in economic parity towards the Soviet Union by undermining the “unequal” monetary, trade, and commercial order championed by the United States since the end of the Second World War.¹⁰² This would allow the USSR to aggressively promote its system of “pan-Europeanism” and “collective security,”¹⁰³ and set the stage for the inevitable “revolutionary transition from capitalism . . . to socialism and communism.”¹⁰⁴ Only these conditions would guarantee peace in Europe.

The relative impasse on the European Continent in the post-early Cold War period that followed Stalin’s death in 1953 shifted the contest for global influence between the United States and Soviet Union to the Third World. Despite Premiere Khrushchev’s pronouncement in 1961 that “the ‘sacred’ anti-imperialist struggle of colonies and newly independent states,” would advance the Soviet Union’s “own progress to Communism and ‘bring imperialism to its knees’,”¹⁰⁵ the principles behind the conflict were far more pragmatic. The concept of an existential battle between communism and capitalism, with the eventual global triumph of a Marxist-Leninist revolution, certainly existed among some within Soviet decision-making circles. This was especially true within the Soviet security services, where the conceptual shift to aggressive action in the Third World originated; but, the more realist policy approaches from the politburo and Soviet foreign ministry tended to balance out the ideologues. There was agreement on near- and mid-

¹⁰¹ Malcom Mackintosh, “Moscow’s View of the Balance of Power,” *The World Today* 29, no. 3 (1973): 111.

¹⁰² The U.S.S.R. progressively built economic relationships with Western Europe in the détente era, raising the costs of a potential breakdown of East-West relations, and ensuring that a policy of isolating the Soviet Union from international markets and financial institutions by the United States and Western nations. Oudenaren, *Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe*, 108–110.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 1–5.

¹⁰⁴ V.V. Zagladin (ed.), *Mirovye kommunisticheskoe dvizhenie, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury*, Moscow, 1982, 7.

¹⁰⁵ Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 8.

term policy prescription in the Third World, which aimed to create an environment of international consensus at the United Nations (U.N.) and other international bodies that would counterbalance the United States and favor the Soviet Union through either neutrality or socialist unanimity.¹⁰⁶ In theory, this international consensus would directly support Soviet policy in Europe and elsewhere along the Soviet periphery. Once again, security dominance over the European continent and along Russia's immediate borders was the overriding aim for actions in the Third World.

The primary mechanisms for achieving these objectives, in Europe and elsewhere, were bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts to gain influence, economic interdependence measures, support for communist and socialist parties, active military intimidation, and advantageous arms control agreements that asserted Soviet conventional dominance.¹⁰⁷ Given the extremely narrow geopolitical gap between the superpowers throughout the Cold War, however, these overt policies were inadequate on their own to achieve Soviet aims and required the critical support mechanism of "active measures."¹⁰⁸ When understood in the perspective of a global struggle for influence against the "principal enemy," all this activity falls under the PW umbrella.

Where the USSR could not gain decisive bilateral or bloc influence through diplomatic, economic, and military leverage alone, they adopted the idea of "Zerstzung" as an important pillar of long-term strategy. Zerstzung was the splitting of the social and political structure of a state by targeting the tension control mechanisms in a society, be they democratic consensus or authoritarian governance.¹⁰⁹ This approach was initially adopted by the Soviets in the early postwar years and proved successful in Poland in 1946 and again during the bloodless takeover of Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1948,

¹⁰⁶ Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World*, 1–24.

¹⁰⁷ These parties began to lose their domestic appeal by the late 1960s, or in the case of Italy, gained domestic appeal by splitting with Moscow. The prospect of communist bids for power significantly declined in the 70s; however, the U.S.S.R. wanted to maintain the long-term prospects for revolutionary change and preserve influence through communist representation in Western states. Oudenaren, *Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe*, 64–66.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., v–vii.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 50.

using existing tensions between the Czechs and Slovaks to tear the governing social and political systems apart and facilitate Soviet intervention. Similar tactics during France's coal and railroad strikes in 1947 and 1948, orchestrated through the French Communist Party, were less successful.¹¹⁰

The lack of Soviet-influenced state control mechanisms in the West; namely Soviet-dominated security services, a monopoly on print and radio, and the pervasive threat of the Red Army, necessitated a slightly different approach. The strategy in Western Europe, following a similar pattern to early Cold War Eastern Europe, aimed at creating international and subnational disequilibrium leading to a fracturing of the idea of collective security and a popular expulsion of American influence. Due to the lack of Soviet systems of influence, however, the time frame to fully execute this strategy had to be extended. Accordingly, the Soviet Union adopted a generational approach to gently steer the population and politics of Europe in a desired direction.

The Soviet Politburo's covert postwar campaign to weaken Western Europe and drive out U.S. influence was primarily tasked to the newly formed MGB (Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti), which, in 1954, was renamed the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti). Operations ranged from basic intelligence collection and analysis to subversion, media manipulation, propaganda, forgeries, political repression, political assassinations, agents of influence, the establishment of opposition parties and criminal organizations, antiwar movements¹¹¹ and front organizations, and proxy paramilitary operations.¹¹² The term "aktivnyye meropriatia," or "active measures" was adopted in the 1960s to describe these activities and remained in use through the collapse of the Soviet Union. These programs gradually grew in complexity, incorporating Soviet military intelligence, the Foreign Ministry, and Communist Party of the Soviet Union

¹¹⁰ van Oudenaren, *Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe*, 53.

¹¹¹ The Soviet military intelligence service, GRU, spent nearly \$1 billion U.S. dollars on anti-Vietnam peace movements in Europe and the United States, and helped fund countless peace organizations throughout the world, holding women's movements, youth congresses, campaigns against NATO nuclear assets. Stanislav Lunev and Ira Winkler, *Through the Eyes of the Enemy: Russia's Highest Ranking Military Defector Reveals Why Russia Is More Dangerous than Ever* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Pub., 1998), 78.

¹¹² Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield*, 1–8, 224–246, 276–293.

(CPSU) agencies like the International Department (ID) and the International Information Department (IID).¹¹³

Active measures were a key component of PW in each principal element of national power and were aimed at influencing the policies of Western governments, undermining their social and leadership structure, straining bilateral and multilateral relationships between nations, preventing the successful posturing and modernization of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), and price manipulation in Western markets.¹¹⁴ Specific goals and methods varied by country and region; however, the principal objectives remained consistent. These included frustrating opposition strategies—mainly those of the United States, her Western Allies, and China—engineering a diplomatic split between target countries by contriving negative public and diplomatic perception of the opponent, and “enhancing the Soviet positions in diplomatic and economic relations.”¹¹⁵ The central objective of Soviet active measures, however, was targeted at the “principal enemy” and aimed to “discredit, isolate, and separate the U.S. from its allies.”¹¹⁶

Soviet PW was not simply limited to engaging adversarial and neutral states, but included keeping the Eastern Bloc firmly in the Soviet sphere. In Eastern Europe, Stalin’s death provided an opportunity for nationalists, halfheartedly supported by Western clandestine services, to reject Soviet sociopolitical doctrine and break away from Moscow’s grip. These attempts were met with brutal internal suppression and large-scale

¹¹³ Soviet active measures were strictly controlled by the Politburo, the leadership structure of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), and executed through the International Department (ID) and the International Information Department (IID) of the CPSU, as well as Department “D” and Service “A” of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. These entities assisted KGB “residents” in executing active measures across Europe, with the program expanding in the late 1970s to over 10,000 personnel and an estimated budget of \$4 billion, nearly 1/2% of the Soviet GDP. Roy Godson and Richard H. Shultz, “Active Measures in Soviet Strategy,” in *Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, eds. Laird, Robbin F. and Erik P. Hoffmann (New York: Aldine Pub., 1986), 207–209.

¹¹⁴ Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 91–124.

¹¹⁵ Jeffrey Richelson, *Sword and Shield: The Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Pub., 1986), 137–138.

¹¹⁶ Godson and Schultz, “Active Measures,” 208.

Soviet military interventions. Aggressive Soviet repression of the East German Revolt in 1953¹¹⁷ and the Hungarian Revolution in 1956,¹¹⁸ the subjugation of Polish opposition in the 1950s and 60s, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968¹¹⁹ served as the stepping stones for the adaptation of the Brezhnev Doctrine; utilizing all means necessary to stabilize the Soviet sphere from both internal disintegration and external influence.¹²⁰ PW served as the vanguard of Soviet policy in all these instances.

When viewed from a macro perspective, the centralized and ideologically grounded substructure of Soviet decision making throughout the Cold War period created an ideal environment for the conduct of PW. Soviet mid- and long-term objectives remained relatively consistent for the duration of the Cold War. Strategy and methods were kept highly compartmentalized and were not subjected to the same external influences as in Western democratic countries. The result was an effective synchronization of ends, ways, and means that negated the inherent structural and ideological flaws in the Soviet economic and social systems relative to the West. This not only occurred between the organs of the Soviet state and the elements of national power, but temporally; leading to a long-term, phased approach to conflict management that still permeates the contemporary Russian system.

B. THE SOVIET SUBVERSION MODEL OF CONFLICT

Ideological, structural, and cultural subversion, all pillars of Leninist ideology, were the foundation of Soviet PW doctrine during the Cold War. Former deputy Chief of the Soviet Research and Counter-Propaganda Group, Yuri Bezmenov, following his defection from the USSR in the 1970s, identified the four phases of Soviet subversion:

¹¹⁷ Christian F. Ostermann, and Malcolm Byrne, *Uprising in East Germany 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval Behind the Iron Curtain* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001).

¹¹⁸ Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, and M. János. Rainer, *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2002).

¹¹⁹ Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler. *The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010).

¹²⁰ Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

demoralization, destabilization, crisis, and normalization.¹²¹ This model was based on a key principal in the conduct of PW, that of using all elements of national power below a calculated “provocation threshold” to achieve long-term national aims.

“Demoralization” was the systematic breakdown of ideological, structural, and cultural consensus within a society, and active measures were the primary method to achieve this breakdown. This phase encompassed a substantial time period of 15 to 20 years and served as a foundation to conduct subsequent phases. Bezmenov describes the lengthy time period as a necessity to develop a new generation that would be unwittingly more susceptible to Soviet influence. Tactics encompassed the full range of measures along the peace-war continuum, below actual “hot” war, and targeted the domestic and international policies of adversarial states, destabilizing social consensus for the purposes of either disunity or external control, manufacturing strain in bilateral or multilateral relations between nation states, and attempting to tilt the global economy in favor of the Soviet Union.¹²²

Ideological manipulation was conducted by politicizing and utilizing religion, manipulating education and media to create a “uniformed myopia,” and creating cultural phenomena, such as role models, to generate mass movements of public sentiment towards a desired direction. *Structural* subversion was based upon manipulating legislative and security systems, social relations, aggravating the security apparatus to create a sense of “defenselessness” in a population, manipulating internal politics to sow disunity and antagonism, and, finally, the gradual isolation of the target nation internationally. The last area of subversion within this phase was *cultural*, and involved the steady dissolution of societal loyalty to the state, the inflaming of racial and ethnic divisions, alienating segments of the population from one another, such as rural versus urban centers, and creating a sense of victimization through the use of existing organizations, such as labor unions.¹²³

¹²¹ Tomas D. Schuman, *Love Letter to America* (Los Angeles, CA: NATA, 1984).

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

Demoralization occurred, to a varying degree, in virtually every corner of the globe and spanned the entire Soviet time period. This phase took a persistent generational approach, attempting to slowly change the global social and political landscape, and was not specifically targeted at a particular crisis or potential crisis point. Bezmenov details the structures of choice for the demoralization phase, including black and white propaganda outlets, “agents of influence” within government and society, and “international forums” orchestrated to cover and legitimize Soviet operations. These actors executed a diverse set of measures, including the organization and provocation of social unrest and mass demonstrations, misinformation and rumor campaigns, widespread use of forgeries of official documents and press releases, and the planting of spurious news stories in Western media. Further active measures included the establishment of countless front organizations and media outlets, subsidized by the USSR, not only for the purposes of information warfare, but in order to develop semilegitimate financing channels to “subversives and radicals.” This soft campaign would be coupled with more aggressive tactics such as sabotage, character assassination, terrorism, and the occasional targeted killing; all designed to achieve long-term psychological effects on the targeted society. The idea was that if you stretch out subversive action over an extended period of time, your opponent would be “unable to perceive the process of subversion as a [consistent] and willful effort.”¹²⁴

Destabilization aimed to exacerbate the perceived power struggles within society. This was done by engineering an overreaction of social control mechanisms by the government and security forces, creating substantial negative economic effects on the population, fracturing the societal and governmental fiber and producing grass roots opposition social movements, and further isolating the target nation in the international system.¹²⁵ This was the necessary buildup to generate a crisis.

The *crisis phase* was the generation of the perception of national emergency. This involved the full complement of PW measures, to include limited military actions. The

¹²⁴ Schuman, *Love Letter to America*.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

generated crisis necessitated a prefabricated “solution” to the emergency and created conditions for the eventual reduction of tensions and an increased level of influence or control by the Soviet Union on the target state.¹²⁶ Due to the nuclear and conventional force balance between the superpowers during the Cold War, controlling the pace and level of escalation by threatening overwhelming retaliation, a concept known as escalation dominance,¹²⁷ allowed for a generous amount of flexibility in initiating peripheral conflicts, especially within traditional spheres of influence where an overt military intervention was unlikely to generate a military response.

Normalization, a term coined following the Russian invasion and subjugation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, referred to the establishment of a post-conflict settlement, reduction of tensions, “peacekeeping operations,” and international stability. Bezmenov describes this period as a time of stability and “a pause in expansion,” causing a reevaluation of strategic aims by the opponent, namely the United States.¹²⁸ This phase further presented an opportunity to selectively and permanently remove undesirable individuals from the political landscape. The Soviet crushing of the Czechoslovakian Prague Spring in 1968 is one of the many examples of the full model being systematically implemented and serves as a case study at the conclusion of this chapter.

There are a number of key lessons from the Bezmenov model for our broader analysis of PW. Bezmenov provides us with a framework to view seemingly disjointed and isolated events as a systematic and well-organized PW campaign, coordinated across a variety of disciplines and carefully sequenced to achieve a desired effect. The long-term aspect of the model, in addition to being a strategic multigenerational approach to national policy, has a built-in deception feature designed to disguise various aspects of the ends, ways, and means in Soviet strategy. Finally, this model was designed to factor in a variety of Western response measures to Soviet action, thus being able to operate

¹²⁶ Schuman, *Love Letter to America*.

¹²⁷ John Erickson, “The Soviet View of Deterrence: A General Survey,” *Survival* 24, no. 6 (1982): 242–251.

¹²⁸ Schuman, *Love Letter to America*.

below any effective countermove in the initial phases due to the covert nature of its actions.

The following section examines Soviet PW within the individual elements of national power. The Bezmenov model can be used to maintain the perspective that while an individual element may have been dominant in a particular case, it was the synchronized framework over time and across all of DIME that characterized Soviet strategy. It is precisely this model that we will see reemerge in the post-Soviet Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin, and be driven to the crisis point during the 2008 Georgian war and the 2014 Ukrainian conflict.

C. SOVIET DIPLOMATIC POLITICAL WARFARE

All political warfare is diplomatic in nature in that it aims to affect the foreign or domestic policies of its target. The distinction of Soviet diplomatic PW in the is that it attacks the existing political structure through direct manipulation. This is done by infiltration of the target's political system, and covert and overt support for elements of that system such as political parties, with money, resources, and intelligence. Other activities include bribes or coercion of officials, and international diplomatic pressure constructed through the careful arrangement of allies, multinational blocs, or extra-governmental organizations.

The use of the "Comintern," the Communist International, in the prewar years and the "Cominform," the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties, in the early Cold War period, are classic examples of Soviet diplomatic PW. The Cominform was founded in 1947 and was a successor organization to the prewar Soviet Comintern. The bureau was designed to coordinate the activities of national communist parties under Soviet leadership. Since most of the senior leaders in these national communist parties were former Comintern members and spent the prewar years in the Soviet Union, they became a natural mechanism to establish Soviet control over Eastern Europe. The Cominform, not particularly influential as a coordination mechanism, nevertheless effectively dissolved any veneer of East European pluralism by ending, through

absorption, the vestiges of social democracy.¹²⁹ This was Stalin's tool to press his policy across the fledgling communist parties in the Eastern Bloc, as well as conduct PW initiatives in Italy, France, and the rest of Western Europe.

Almost immediately following the Soviet liberation of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union began to establish control through the development of Soviet-supervised secret police elements, controlling print and radio, dominating youth groups and civic organizations, and often conducting intimidation, massive deportation of whole societal segments to the gulags, and ethnic cleansing. Initial democratic elections were permitted as the perceived control of media and internal security services would, in theory, bring communist elements into power through the natural acquisition of class consciousness among the working class majority. It did not. The communists lost across Eastern Europe, causing party leaders to suspend democratic elections in Poland in 1946, install a communist government in Romania in 1947, oust the Bulgarian Prime minister, and stage a communist coup in Czechoslovakia in early 1948.¹³⁰ Across Eastern Europe, the formula was the same. The first steps involved the engineering of procommunist social movements through organized demonstrations, the disbanding or disruption of any opposition movements, and the establishment of control over the government. This was all supported by the communist-dominated security apparatus and under the threat of Red Army intervention. Once power was taken, systematic purges of any remnants of opposition soon followed and, finally, a democratic façade was established by holding a single-list election. Communist control over Eastern Europe was firmly established by 1949, and precipitated a second round of Stalinist purges, this time aimed at communist elements deemed to be a threat to Soviet domination. The result was the total supremacy of Moscow's power across the Eastern Bloc.¹³¹

Outside the Eastern Bloc, the KGB relied heavily on *agenty vliyania*, or “agents of influence” such as journalists, government officials, academics, labor leaders, and

¹²⁹ Applebaum, *Iron Curtain*, 193–222.

¹³⁰ Ibid., xxx–xxxi.

¹³¹ Ibid.

prominent citizens to support Kremlin policies. These were used in an interactive systems framework, *kombinatsia*, combined with overt propaganda campaigns and clandestine direct operations, to achieve strategic objectives. The term “agents of influence” was, in essence, an assortment of relationships fostered or generated by the Soviet intelligence apparatus. There were three primary categories. Actual MGB/KGB or Soviet Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) operatives and their recruited agents formed the foundation of the program. “Fellow travelers” were individuals who were ideologically sympathetic to perceived Soviet objectives and conducted both directed and desultory activities in support of these aims. The third category were unwitting agents, ranging from social contacts passing information or executing an operational act without awareness of the hidden hand behind the activity, to “useful idiots” that en masse helped unsuspectingly drive the Soviet agenda.¹³²

Agents of influence spanned the full spectrum of society: from government, media, academics, the security services, military and law enforcement, the banking sector, and criminal enterprises. The “illegals” program, a massive network of deep cover Soviet agents living abroad under Western identities, was a key control mechanism. The illegals, operating under both the KGB’s Directorate S and the GRU, were perhaps the most active element in identifying and priming these individuals for further recruitment or operational control, coordinating efforts through the “center” with Directorate K and the KGB residencies.¹³³ What places this activity predominantly in the diplomatic element of national power is that these agents, despite their clear ability to collect intelligence and facilitate propaganda, primarily focused on influencing the domestic or international political landscape through direct access to government officials, or indirect access through the body politic, using business, labor, and various other forums.

Soviet support for nonruling communist and socialist opposition parties was another key pillar of Soviet long-term strategy. Many of the communist parties, despite their populist appeal, survived entirely on Soviet subsidies during the Cold War. This was

¹³² Godson and Schultz, “Active Measures,” 208–212.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 212.

especially true in the Third World, where resistance movements and communist parties in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East endured almost entirely on funds, arms, propaganda support and military training provided by the USSR; but, due to the overt nature of the relationship with the CPSU, these communist parties proved less effective in promoting Soviet interests. Soviet ties and support to nationalist-socialist movements proved far more fruitful.¹³⁴ The ID of the CPSU supplanted the Cominform in the 1950s and was the principal coordinating element to both nonruling communist and socialist parties. Over the next three decades, the ID became the prominent arm of the Politburo in dealing with radical movements across Europe and in the Third World, including controlling all monetary and material flow from the USSR and running the various global front organizations.¹³⁵ Hundreds of these fronts, including four United Nations certified organizations—the World Peace Council (WPC), World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), and the International Union of Students (IUS)—added depth in the system, with the ID using their professed neutrality and independence to push coordinated Soviet agendas and reactions on various national and international stages.¹³⁶

Unfortunately for Soviet strategists, early successes in the diplomatic PW gave way to relative stagnation later in the Cold War, as the global communist model began to lose its appeal due to its inability to generate promised social and economic reforms. This precipitated a nuanced shift in Soviet PW away from the diplomatic and towards the other national power elements. The ID likely served a secondary function to both complement and restrain actions by the KGB and GRU. This multiorganizational approach illustrates the depth within the Soviet system, but also exposes the competitive and sometimes disjointed operational decision-making scheme between the political leadership, the military, and the security services. The underlying factor that maintained efficiency in the system was a common sociopolitical vision that permeated the various

¹³⁴ Office of Soviet Analysis, “The Soviet Union and Nonruling Communist Parties,” Directorate of Intelligence, August 1982, CIA Historical Review Program, released as sanitized, 1999.

¹³⁵ Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York, NY: Aldine Pub., 1980), 445.

¹³⁶ Richelson, *Sword and Shield*, 146–150.

structures of power through generational indoctrination and careful recruitment and selection criteria. This calls attention to a critical weakness in the Soviet, and now the Russian, PW model. The “deep state” may have been effective at coordinating complex strategic efforts, but compartmentalization and a lack of ideological diversity made the various organizations especially prone to certain cognitive biases, especially mirror imaging Western intentions and groupthink within the decision-making bodies. Major strategic errors, such as the decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979, can be partially attributed to this structural flaw.

D. SOVIET INFORMATION POLITICAL WARFARE

Following the conclusion of hostilities in 1945 Europe, the Soviet Union rapidly established robust mechanisms to control the information environment. This structure included a “full array of ‘non-political’ fronts, organized from above and below, ‘spontaneous’ mass appeal and resolutions, subsidized media, and manipulated politicians serving hidden agendas.”¹³⁷ The newly formed Cominform promulgated policy set by the Secretariat of the CPSU across the European continent. In Eastern Europe, this was accomplished through “official media, educational, and cultural establishments,”¹³⁸ and backed by the clandestine efforts of the Soviet security services and the occupation forces of the Red Army. In Western Europe, the Communist and Socialist parties, as well as Front organizations, backed by covert actions, served as the principal medium. The basic policy that would dominate the Soviet narrative for the duration of the Cold War was set in the first meeting of the Cominform in 1947, declaring that:

The imperialist and anti-democratic camp having as its basic aim the establishment of the world domination of American imperialism and the smashing of democracy, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp

¹³⁷ Paul A. Smith, *On Political War* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989), 186–187.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 187.

having as its basic aim the undermining of imperialism, the consolidation of democracy, and the eradication of the remnants of fascism.¹³⁹

Propaganda was the heart and circulatory system of Soviet active measures and was perhaps the best coordinated structure within the Soviet PW machine. The politburo and the central committee of the CPSU approved all major themes of the propaganda campaign. The IID of the CPSU, established by Brezhnev in the late 70s as a successor to the Soviet Information Bureau, was responsible for all overt media campaigns, and coordinated propaganda efforts with the generally “gray” activities of the International Department and the covert and “black” activities by the KGB’s Service A. The IID, as the overt arm of the tightly woven Soviet information infrastructure, included two major newspapers (*Pravda* and *Izvestiya*), Radio Moscow, and numerous official information departments based out of Soviet embassies. The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) news service, with branches in nearly 100 countries, and the “competing” *Novosti* News service that connected with hundreds of national and international news agencies, in addition to countless radio and television stations, publishing houses, and over 7,000 newspapers and magazines, in essence comprised a global mass media empire.¹⁴⁰ The system was designed to provide operational synchronization between covert and overt active measures and get ahead in the information reaction cycle with both engineered and chance events. The ID’s front organizations and KGB agents of influence and forgery operations further amplified the propaganda effect by propagating and supporting the overall narrative.¹⁴¹

The efficiency of this global disinformation network was evident early in the Cold War. In 1952, at the height of the Korean War, the World Peace Council released a report accusing the United States of using germ warfare in Korea. This report, originating with Kuo Mo-Jo, the head of the Chinese branch of the WPC, claimed that U.S. military aircraft were actively disseminating microbes of plague, cholera, typhus, and other

¹³⁹ Royal Institute for International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs: 1947-1948*, ed. Margaret Carlyle (London, 1952), 122–46. From Paul A. Smith, *On Political War*, 187.

¹⁴⁰ Richelson, *Sword and Shield*, 147.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 146–150.

contagions across North Korean territory. The story, accompanied with pictures of supposed germ warfare and supported by an investigative delegation of doctors that was organized by the various Soviet front organizations, was quickly propagated through various WPC branches across the globe. Further “investigations” from the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, another Soviet front, supported the germ warfare conclusions and the story rapidly spread through recruited “agents of influence” into Western media, including the *Daily Telegraph*, *The Times*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, as well as the *Daily Express* in London. Declassified Soviet documents in the 1990s reveal that the Soviet MGB fabricated the germ warfare scenario, going as far as to prepare “false areas of exposure” by bringing in corpses from China and germinating those corpses with cholera.¹⁴²

“Black” radio operations, generally located within the Soviet Bloc, but presenting themselves as transmitting from within the target country, aided in the broad disinformation campaign, and were active from the borders of Western Europe to as far away as Turkey, Iran, and China.¹⁴³ Though attempts at misinformation inside the United States proved to have very limited overall effects, the combined efforts of the Soviet propaganda architecture had substantive impact in entrenching opinions in Europe and the Third World. The anti-Vietnam movements in the 60s and 70s,¹⁴⁴ and campaigns in the 70s and 80s against enhanced-radiation warheads and U.S. nuclear modernization were relatively successful in affecting global perception and causing social and political friction within the Western-aligned bloc.¹⁴⁵ Among the more successful propaganda mechanisms were the Cuban-led and KGB-sponsored publications of Philip Agee, a former Center Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations officer in Latin America, who wrote

¹⁴² Herbert Romerstein, “Counterpropaganda: We can’t win without it,” in *Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare* ed. Michael J. Waller, Lord Carnes, John Lenczowski, Jennifer Marshall, Robert R. Reilly, Herbert Romerstein, Andrew Garfield, Angelo Codevilla, John J. Tierney, Hampton Stephens, Stephen C. Baker, and Juliana Geran Pilon. (Washington, D.C.: Institute of World Politics Press, 2009), 137–179, 156–158.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 153.

¹⁴⁴ Lunev, *Through the Eyes of the Enemy*, 78.

¹⁴⁵ Richelson, *Sword and Shield*, 156.

Inside the Company; *CIA Diary* in 1975, exposing hundreds of CIA operatives and claiming that “millions of people all over the world had been killed or had their lives destroyed by the CIA and the institutions it supports.”¹⁴⁶ The widespread global propagation of the memoir by the Soviet information instrument caused substantial effects, including a majority sponsored bill in the British House of Commons calling for the expulsion of the CIA station, and a flood of media efforts across Europe to expose CIA stations and operations worldwide. In 1978, Agee began publishing the *Covert Action Information Bulletin* as well as another book titled *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*, both supported and supplied with a steady stream of information by a specialized task force (codename RUPOR) within Service A of the KGB’s Directorate K. The combined efforts of Agee and RUPOR ended up exposing nearly 2,000 CIA operatives across Europe and Latin America.¹⁴⁷ Further propaganda efforts in the 1980s, aimed primarily at the European and Third World audiences, were the supposed artificial synthesis and dispersal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) created in U.S. military laboratories at Fort Detrick, and allegations of Americans butchering Third World children in order to harvest their organs for transplants in the U.S.¹⁴⁸

Forgeries were another critical component of the active measures campaign. One of the more sophisticated and influential falsified documents was Supplement B to U.S. Army Field Manual 30-21, titled *Stability Operations Intelligence – Special Fields*. This document, first appearing in 1975 and carrying a “SECRET NOFORN” label, contained operational parameters to create a “strategy of tension” within foreign societies and their governance systems. The document advocated false flag operations blamed on leftist extremists to discredit communist and socialist movements, and press the target nation’s security services into harsh civilian control measures. This theme continued to echo in further falsified U.S. documents, to include a remarkably prophetic “leaked” 1978 National Security Council (NSC) memorandum from Zbigniew Brezinski to Carter. This document proposed a destabilization policy in Poland along socio-economic, diplomatic,

¹⁴⁶ Andrew, *The Sword and the Shield*, 230.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 232–234.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 245.

and covert lines of effort, including the use of Polish labor unions and mass media, designed to weaken Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. Forgery activities in the Third World were just as pervasive, and included everything from leaked plans to supply South Africa with combat aircraft, to documentation implicating U.S. Ambassador Thomas W.M. Smith in Ghana of ordering the assassination of Nigerian politicians and attempting to stage a CIA led coup, prompting Ghanaian officials to publically charge the United States with interfering in its internal affairs.¹⁴⁹ The use of forgeries continued well into the 1980s, and included a 1987 forged document from William Casey, then the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), to stage a coup d'état of India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, instructions by President Reagan to destabilize Panama in 1988, and efforts to interfere in the internal affairs of South Africa in 1989.¹⁵⁰

Disinformatzia and active measures in Soviet information PW were highly successful in supporting existing anti-Western and specifically anti-U.S. sentiment across the globe and helping drive the generational disequilibrium of Bezmenov's demoralization phase. The relative success of this approach was clearly rooted in the massive investment of time and resources that the Soviet Union placed in information PW. The United States, however, did not fully commit to this dimension of PW until the late Carter and early Reagan administrations, essentially allowing the USSR to hold a monopoly in the information domain for three decades. The fatal flaw in the Soviet system was its reliance on fabrication. Once the United States engaged in a concerted effort to expose Soviet deception measures and substantially increased its own involvement in the information arena without relying on misinformation, the Soviet propaganda system was unable to keep up.

E. SOVIET MILITARY POLITICAL WARFARE

There are three components of Soviet military PW that need to be explored. These are the role of the GRU as a mirror organization to the KGB, the use of strategic signaling through military means, and the actual application of military force in conflict

¹⁴⁹ Richelson, *Sword and Shield*, 145–146.

¹⁵⁰ Andrew, *The Sword and the Shield*, 245.

management, which falls underneath the PW umbrella. Together, they give a clear picture of the utility of the military arm in the conduct of political warfare.

Soviet military intelligence also played a critical role in the PW mechanism. From the onset, and in line with Leninist philosophy, Soviet military intelligence was organized by a duplication principle, in order to both create redundancy and develop an internal rivalry designed to prevent one organization from consolidating power and one day challenging the political leadership. In the early days of the USSR, the Cheka was counterbalanced by the Registered Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, an organization that would later develop into the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, also known as "Unit 44388," or the GRU.¹⁵¹ For the better part of the twentieth century, the Soviet Union functioned under a "triumvirate," with the Party, the Internal Security Service, and the Army functioning as the three pillars of the Soviet system.¹⁵² In the years following the Second World War, Stalin attempted to weaken the Army and the Ministry of State Security by removing the "intelligence organs" from these organizations and consolidating the intelligence apparatus under a centrally controlled Committee of Organization (KI) that was subordinate to the party. The turmoil following Stalin's death in 1953 resulted in another restructuring of Soviet intelligence and the reestablishment of the triumvirate, with the GRU under the General Staff and the creation of the KGB.¹⁵³

The GRU developed a nearly identical structure to the KGB, with its officers operating out of Russian embassies as diplomats, military attachés, and trade representatives; tasked primarily with recruitment and intelligence gathering, and also subversion, sabotage, and targeted killing operations.¹⁵⁴ The GRU, in parallel with the KGB, developed a robust "illegals" program. Just like the KGB illegals, these GRU officers were tasked with infiltrating all facets of Western society, from business,

¹⁵¹ Viktor Suvorov, *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence* (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1984), xii–xiii.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 27–30.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 31.

industrial, and financial sectors to political parties, the military, and government institutions. They would serve as critical agents of influence in pushing the overall Soviet agenda.¹⁵⁵ Two key GRU capabilities absent from the KGB were a broad “space intelligence” program and the control of Spetsnaz units—the GRU’s shock troops designed to conduct “espionage, terrorism, and large-scale partisan operations.”¹⁵⁶ Though the practical methods between the GRU and KGB were nearly identical, the essential function of the two organizations differed markedly. The KGB was guided by a principle of preventing a collapse of the Soviet Union from within, while the GRU focused on an externally generated collapse in the form of general warfare (the military front), or the political, technological, and economic fronts.¹⁵⁷

The majority of Soviet military-centric PW occurred in the Third World, but the GRU became progressively more involved in the conduct of military “active measures” on the European continent as the political and social climate began to turn away from Communism. The evidence for both KGB and Soviet military involvement in the rise of European left-wing terrorism in the 1970s, points to an unmistakable tie with the decline of communist political appeal.¹⁵⁸ As one PW element began to lose its functionality, the

¹⁵⁵ Suvorov, *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence*, 75–82.

¹⁵⁶ Viktor Suvorov, *Spetsnaz: The Story Behind the Soviet SAS* (London: H. Hamilton, 1987), 14.

¹⁵⁷ Suvorov, *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence*, 46.

¹⁵⁸ Major Terrorist groups involved the Action Directe (AD) in France, (Dennis A. Pluchinsky, “Western Europe’s Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations” in *Europe’s Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations* Eds. Yonah Alexander and Dennis A. Pluchinsky (Oxford: Frank Cass and Company, 1992), 134) the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC) in Belgium, (Stephen E. Atkins, *Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 278) the First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups (GRAPO) in Spain, (Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism* (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Readers Digest Press, 1981), 291–297) The Popular Forces 25 April (FP-25) in Portugal, the Red Army Faction (RAF), which developed out of the Baader-Meinhof Group in Germany (Harvey W. Kushner, *Encyclopedia of terrorism*, (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2003), 148), N17 in Greece, The Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front in Turkey, Italy’s *Brigate Rosse* (Red Brigades). The Red Brigades primary foreign support came from the Czechoslovak StB (Ion Mihai Pacepa, *Red Horizons* (Regnery Publishing, 1990). and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (*Terrorist Group Profiles*, Dudley Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005). Soviet and Czechoslovakia small arms and explosives came from the Middle East along well-established smuggling routes. (Sterling, *The Terror Network*, 291–297) Logistic support and training were carried out directly by the Czechoslovak StB both in Prague and at remote PLO training camps in North Africa and Syria. James M. Luntz and Brenda J. Luntz, *Global Terrorism* (Routledge, 2004).

Soviet Union adjusted to another. By 1975, the KGB center in Vienna was deeply involved in strengthening “terrorist formations in Italy, Germany, Belgium, Holland, and France.”¹⁵⁹ The GRU set up training centers in Czechoslovakia and across the Eastern Bloc, facilitated the transfer and dispersal of large arms and explosives caches across Western Europe, and heavily utilized Cuban armed forces and intelligence services in training camps on the North African Coast to Syria and Lebanon, as well as the Palestinian Rejection Front in southern Yemen.¹⁶⁰ Direct Soviet involvement was largely minimized not only due to the advantage of political distance in the event of compromise, but also for the “revolutionary credentials” of Cuba and Palestine and their romanticized revolutionary appeal, which far exceeded that of a Soviet authoritarian hegemony.¹⁶¹

The conduct of Soviet PW using the military arm was not limited to covert GRU operations, but extended to everything from military assistance programs to the use of naval and air assets in attempts to effect political change in target nations. The exponential rise of Soviet submarine incursions in Swedish waters during the 1980s, to include penetrations of Swedish harbors and naval bases, is an excellent example.¹⁶²

On the surface, the geopolitical effects of the increased naval activity may have been negative for the Soviet Union; undermining Soviet-Swedish relations, causing an increased emphasis on Swedish defense spending, contributing to a shifting pro-Western outlook among the population, and most critically undermining Soviet efforts to assert its image as a peaceful superpower intent on ensuring stability and security on the European continent.¹⁶³ These intrusions were generally dismissed as motivated by military versus political calculus, designed around generating intelligence on the susceptibility of Swedish naval and air defenses, with the overall objective of crippling Sweden’s ability

¹⁵⁹ Sterling, *The Terror Network*, 287.

¹⁶⁰ Andrew, *The Sword and the Shield*, 475–476.

¹⁶¹ Sterling, *The Terror Network*, 291–297.

¹⁶² Gordon McCormick, *Stranger than Fiction, Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Waters*, A Project AIR FORCE report, RAND Publication Series R-3776-AF, January 1990.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, vi.

to effectively oppose Soviet use of their airspace in a military campaign against Norway.¹⁶⁴

Sweden's official neutrality was, in reality, a façade for its domestic audience. Sweden was very much aligned with NATO through both official and unofficial agreements, authorized transit lanes for U.S. nuclear submarines, participation of Swedish officers in NATO exercises, covert membership in NATO stay-behind networks in the event of a Soviet invasion, and even the development of contingency plans to establish a government-in-exile in the United States.¹⁶⁵ The Kremlin, being well aware of Sweden's unofficial status, used the submarine incursions as a strategic communication tool, signaling its intent to treat Sweden as a hostile NATO power in the event of the Cold War turning "hot." This was a prime example of James Cable's *purposeful, catalytic, and expressive* "gunboat diplomacy," designed to assert Soviet military dominance and willful imposition of force against a NATO "ally" without breaching the NATO provocation threshold.¹⁶⁶ Because the long-term Soviet aim was to shift the security structure of Europe in favor of the USSR, visible intimidation without reciprocation was a viable tool to gradually degrade trust in the NATO security blanket. Sweden's initial aggressive response to Soviet submarine incursions in the early 80s was met with only increased Soviet provocations and eventually led Sweden to reevaluate the political risks of confrontation and adopt a more passive policy after 1985. Sweden limited public disclosure of Soviet incursions and continuously downplayed the Soviet threat, likely out of fear that repeated pronouncements of an anti-Soviet policy would threaten the domestic picture of Swedish neutrality and place it officially in the NATO camp.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴ McCormick, *Stranger than Fiction*, *Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Waters*, viii.

¹⁶⁵ Elizabeth Pond, "Secrets of the Baltic: Swedish Cold War Neutrality Revisited," World Policy Blog, September 26, 2012, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2012/09/26/secrets-baltic-swedish-cold-war-neutrality-revisited>.

¹⁶⁶ James W. Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1991: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 16–64.

¹⁶⁷ McCormick, *Stranger than Fiction*, 60–62.

The final element of the Soviet military as a political tool blurs the line between political and conventional war. Despite varying in intensity, duration, and commitment of conventional forces, all Soviet military interventions during the Cold War were proxy actions, in the sense that they aimed to alter the geopolitical balance relative to the United States, Western Europe, and China, without a direct military confrontation. In these instances, the military aspect of the four elements of national power briefly took the dominant role in the PW program. Military intervention was incorporated as a contingency in the crisis resolution phase of Bezmenov's state subversion model and served the Soviet Union well on several occasions. The idea of conditions being set for military involvement through the varied forms of PW is foundational for any military conflict. What made Soviet actions stand out was the successful application of conventional and proxy military force, while remaining below a calculated response threshold of the West. Soviet military operations to crush the East German revolt in 1953, the Hungarian uprising in 1956, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 generated little more than condemnation from the West. Likewise, advisory missions in Korea and Vietnam, limited military actions during the Israeli "War of Attrition," the Ethiopian-Somali War from 1977 to 1978, Mozambique, Angola, and other countries were calculated against an assumed Western reaction.¹⁶⁸ The one great miscalculation was Afghanistan. The Western reaction was far more intense than the Soviet Union could absorb, and over the course of a decade the USSR would pay dearly in blood, treasure, political will, and domestic consensus. Afghanistan factored into Soviet inaction to the Polish Solidarity movement in the early 1980s, and contributed to the gradual socioeconomic unraveling of the USSR.

Two critical aspects of Soviet military PW stand out. First, the versatility of having a parallel GRU structure to that of the KGB greatly increased the ability of the Soviet Union to conduct military-based PW; including paramilitary action, training of proxy elements, influence operations, and direct subversion. While U.S. covert action

¹⁶⁸ Andrei Mikhailov, "Soviet Union and Russia lost 25,000 military men in foreign countries," *Pravda*, February 15, 2011, http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/15-02-2011/116909-soviet_union_foreign_wars-0/.

became progressively more restricted by congressional oversight by the 1970s, the KGB and GRU enjoyed relative freedom and autonomy in pursuing similar activities. The Soviet parallel structure created an internal mechanism to prevent policy overreach by diffusing authority and creating competition between the two organizations. This structure had the additional effect of establishing an internal monitoring program among the three pillars of Soviet power.

A second notable feature of Soviet military PW was the calculus involved in military activity deliberately designed to achieve effects and, at the same time, remain below an assessed provocation threshold. This was accomplished through two methods: strategic communication used to demonstrate will through military force and the actual application of force to gain strategic objectives. The Soviet leadership, true to their Leninist origin, believed “will” was the deciding factor in the global contest. Victory rested in the eventual deterioration of your opponent’s resolve, achieved through the gradual and often times seemingly insignificant imposition of one’s will. The use of the Soviet military for strategic signaling, as was the case with the sub example, was used to project strength and resolve for a particular political effect, while factoring in the potential reactions of various players. The application of actual military force for strategic ends followed the same threshold principal. Soviet military engagements in the Third World attempted to tilt the global balance of power, while keeping the principal enemy on the sidelines as an idle observer or, at best, a spirited cheerleader.

Covert GRU operations, overt strategic signaling as a measure of will, and military campaigns below the international provocation threshold are important concepts in understanding the role of the Soviet, and now Russian, militaries in the conduct of PW. These ideas continue to resonate in the ever-shrinking inner circle of the contemporary Russian leadership, who view covert action as a principal policy tool, see the West as weak and lacking that essential element of will,¹⁶⁹ and evaluate military activity on the question of “whether we can versus whether we should.” The Russian Federation has

¹⁶⁹ Brian Whitmore, “The Shrinking ‘Collective’ Putin,” *The Power Vertical Podcast*, RFE/RL, January 30, 2015.

resurrected these PW techniques, believing them to be integral components of its long-term strategy.

F. SOVIET ECONOMIC POLITICAL WARFARE

“We declare war on you . . . in the peaceful field of trade. We declare war. We will win over the United States.” Khrushchev, November 1957¹⁷⁰

The Soviet Union’s posture in the economic realm is critical to understanding the full scope of PW during the Cold War. The Soviet Union singularly used its economic policies to promote the “interests of the Soviet State and the philosophy on which it was founded.”¹⁷¹ Foreign economic endeavors were not based on the realities of the global market, but designed as a politico-economic activity to improve the cultural, political, economic, or military position of the USSR relative to the West, and facilitate the spread of socialism and communism across the globe.¹⁷²

Until the death of Stalin, the USSR practiced relative economic isolation, importing primarily capital goods needed for industrialization and exporting raw materials needed to balance the import costs. By 1953, the Soviet Union began to emerge from its economic isolation and engage in a comprehensive strategy to establish global, bilateral trade relationships designed to degrade the “flexibility and freedom” of its trade partners’ economic affairs, leading to a gradual loss of sovereignty. In the 1950s, the economic policy of the Soviet Union centered on the building of a Soviet-controlled “economic bloc” and the “economic, political, and ideological penetration of underdeveloped countries” through bilateral trade and economic and military assistance and “designed to aid in disrupting Western alliances, encouraging neutralism, and in spreading Soviet and communist influence.”¹⁷³

Overt methods of economic manipulation were the establishment of aid and lines of credit to underdeveloped nations, bilateral trade agreements that balanced cost by

¹⁷⁰ Floyd A. Bond, “The Nature and Goals of Soviet Planning,” *Michigan Business Review* 13-14, no. 8.

¹⁷¹ Robert Loring Allen, *Soviet Economic Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960), 3.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 4–6.

adjusting the volume of trade per commodity, and creating further lines of credit and dependence through export surplus. Additional measures included the use of Soviet-controlled financial institutions such as the Banque Commerciale pour L'Europe du Nord in Paris that supported local communist interests, and direct interference in select global commodities such as tin and aluminum, selling these products at below market cost.¹⁷⁴ Furthermore, by the 1970s, the Soviet Union began a series of steps to entrench its economy in Western European markets, primarily in the export of oil and natural gas in exchange for capital goods, in order to make economic pressure on the Soviet Bloc a perilous endeavor requiring both international consensus and the willingness to hurt one's own economy.¹⁷⁵

A clear example of the use of the economic aspect of PW was demonstrated in Finland in the late 1950s. The USSR established a bilateral relationship that purchased nearly three-quarters of all Finnish metal products and a large portion of other commodities, and further instituted "triangular arrangements" with other Eastern European countries to tilt the export balance in favor of the Soviet Bloc. Additional actions established a trade environment where nearly all the grain, oil, coal, and fertilizer requirements for the country's economy were supplied out of the Soviet Union and its satellite states. When the Communist Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) was left out of the coalition government in 1958, the Soviet Union applied pressure by threatening the trade relationship, causing the resignation of the new Finnish government and the reestablishment of the SKDL, and correspondingly of Soviet influence in Finland.¹⁷⁶ It is precisely this concept of "state trading," where a state's economic, political, and military interests are harmonized in implementing commercial policy that drove much of Soviet economic decision making during the Cold War. The Soviet Union, linking its economic position to geostrategic security, attempted to increase its influence in international affairs and block any consensus opposition to the Soviet position by

¹⁷⁴ Allen, *Soviet Economic Warfare*, 9–12.

¹⁷⁵The Library of Congress Country Studies, "CIA World Factbook: Soviet Union (former): Trade With Western Industrialized Countries," 2004, http://www.photius.com/countries/soviet_union_former/government/soviet_union_former_government_trade_with_western_i~1814.html.

¹⁷⁶ Allen, *Soviet Economic Warfare*, 40.

establishing political, military, and economic dependence across the globe. Just as it had been in Finland, the overall goal was to assure a positive response to coercive pressures such as economic retaliation, cessation of trade or strategic commodities, or the withdrawal of aid.¹⁷⁷

The concept of state trading to achieve political gains at the expense of economic ones was the foundation of Soviet economic PW. The USSR established dependence relationships and monopolized essential materials needed by other nations to sustain their economies. This made virtually any nation with a substantive trade relationship with the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc proxies susceptible to economic coercion. The only true counter to this policy is the diversification of trade partnerships and generating redundancy in the supply of strategic commodities. As we have witnessed with the other elements of national power, Soviet economic PW did not die out with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but continued in the post-Cold War period. The centralization of the Russian economy under Putin has seen a reemergence of this state trading PW mechanism, particularly in the oil and gas sector, and will likely remain a key component of Russia's foreign policy in the foreseeable future.

G. CONCLUSION

The quest for security, from both internal and external antagonists, was the overriding goal of the USSR. The control of Europe was a key objective to this end, and Soviet peripheral actions in the Third World were supporting measures. PW was a fundamental component of Soviet grand strategy. It was executed across all four major elements of national power, coordinated through various organizations under the leadership of the politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU, and executed over multiple generations using a doctrinal phased approach that included the Bezmenov subversion model. The complexity and sophistication of the Soviet PW apparatus was unparalleled in human history. How did it fail? Significant vulnerabilities existed within the substructure of specific elements of national power.

¹⁷⁷ Allen, *Soviet Economic Warfare*, 67.

The increasingly unrealistic views of the Soviet leadership, brought about by endemic compartmentalization, paranoia, and a lack of ideological diversity, combined with the economic and social stagnation of the global communist system, was a recipe for disaster. This made diplomatic PW progressively less effective as the Cold War entered its later stages, and much more vulnerable to aggressive exploitation by the West. Increased reliance on the other elements of power to compensate for this factor did not produce results. The Soviet use of the information was tainted with misinformation, and when the United States reciprocally engaged the USSR, truth proved a far more powerful tool. The military element served primarily as a supporting function to other elements of national power. Soviet military intelligence paralleled KGB operations, while the Red Army was relegated as a strategic signaling tool, only taking a leading role in select instances of paramilitary or conventional conflict. The military, while relatively effective in its own right and less vulnerable to external pressures, could not compensate for the erosion present in the other levers of power. Finally, economic PW by the USSR and its surrogates was only effective when a narrow set of conditions supported a favorable Soviet economy. Through both internal and external pressures, these conditions shifted and revealed the structurally hollow command economies within the Bloc that were vulnerable to fluctuations in global energy and commodities prices as well as direct economic measures by the West. The entire Soviet system, to include its PW apparatus, was fundamentally fragile. U.S. policy in the 1980s directly targeted many of the weaknesses along the DIME spectrum with its own PW campaign, greatly contributing to the collapse of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe in 1989 and the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. Given the right leverage, the structure came down like a house of cards.

H. CASE STUDY: THE CRUSHING OF THE PRAGUE SPRING

Don't talk to me about socialism. What we have, we hold.

-Leonid Brezhnev Comment to Alexander Dubček, 1968¹⁷⁸

The best case study of the Bezmenov model is the crushing of reform movements in Czechoslovakia between 1968 and 1970. Following the Second World War, the prevailing view within the Kremlin was that the “democratic façade had to be preserved throughout Eastern Europe, [and] the open use of force to exclude non-Communist Parties from power had, so far as possible, to be avoided.”¹⁷⁹ Within this context, the Soviet security services began a systematic campaign of violent repression, coercion and disinformation, layer by layer, destroying any opposing force in Eastern Europe and reinforcing the one-party system through a fraudulent democratic veneer.¹⁸⁰ This was the generational first phase approach to *demoralization* directed at any potential opposition within an allied state, and pervaded the first two decades of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe. The idea was never to move past the “first phase” within an aligned state unless compelled by external events. Those events confronted the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in the spring of 1968 in Prague. In response to political and social reform movements threatening to break the Soviet system, the KGB launched a comprehensive PW campaign involving various active measures inside Czechoslovakia. This was a designed approach following the Soviet subversion model; the *destabilization* of the social and political structure while building a bloc coalition, the generation of a *crisis* to justify a military intervention, and finally *normalization* to consolidate gains. Yuri Andropov, the KGB chairman and driving force behind the PW campaign, believed the reforms in Prague threatened to break the very fabric of Soviet control over its satellites and, more importantly, understood that force, not ideology, was the purveyor of that control.

¹⁷⁸ Robert C. Tucker, “Swollen State, Spent Society: Stalin’s Legacy to Brezhnev’s Russia,” *Foreign Affairs* 60, no. 2 (Winter, 1981): 429.

¹⁷⁹ Andrew, *The Sword and the Shield*, 247.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

1. Background and Demoralization (1947–1968)

The Soviet Union and its East European satellites were anything but a unified bloc. Immediately following Stalin's death in 1953, an uprising in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and workers' protests across Czechoslovakia signaled what was to come. Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 put significant strain on party legitimacy across the satellite states. Inner-party power struggles and massive economic problems caused waves of political discontent and social unrest, as 1956 brought multiple workers' uprisings and demonstrations in Poland, and student protests in Czechoslovakia and Romania.¹⁸¹ The Hungarian Revolution in October was violently suppressed under the weight of Soviet armor. In the late 1950s, there was growing disunity in Poland, Ukraine, and within intellectual circles inside the Soviet Union.¹⁸² By the mid-1960s, criticism of the Soviet system seeped into the communist party itself, and was directed at the "ideological dogmatization and perversion in practice of the socialist idea."¹⁸³

In the 1960s, worry of growing Western influence within the Soviet Bloc permeated the politburo. The KGB cited "subversive activity in the political and ideological sphere against the socialist countries . . . seeking to persuade the population of the superiority of the Western way of life." Soviet concerns about pervasive pro-Western print and broadcast media, anti-Soviet subversive literature, Western tourism, postal exchange, and cultural programs were amplified by the perceived lack of social monitoring and control mechanisms of the national security services, in particular within Poland and Czechoslovakia.¹⁸⁴

The January '68 election of Alexander Dubček as the First Secretary of the KSČ was initially viewed by the KGB as a positive, as Dubček spent his formative years in the

¹⁸¹ Detlef Pollack and Jan Wielgohs, *Dissent and Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe: Origins of Civil Society and Democratic Transition* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 22–23.

¹⁸² Karen Dawisha, *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 15.

¹⁸³ Pollack and Wielgohs, *Dissent and Opposition*, 24.

¹⁸⁴ Andrew, *The Sword and the Shield*, 249.

Soviet Union and graduated from the Moscow Higher Party School in 1958. However, the growing Czechoslovakian reform movement and Dubček's progressive reform policies, branded "socialism with a human face," caused alarm bells to go off across the Soviet Bloc, with various party leaders declaring the entire system in danger.¹⁸⁵ In early 1968, the Soviet leadership was preoccupied with calls for political reform in Ukraine, a growing split with Romania, and large-scale anti-Soviet riots in Poland. By mid-March, however, the situation in Prague began to take center stage.¹⁸⁶ Initial Soviet efforts to curb Czechoslovakian reform programs centered on diplomatic and economic measures, including negotiations on a loan to restructure the Czech economy.¹⁸⁷ On April 5, 1968, Dubček and the reformist bloc of the KSČ published the Action Program, a plan to introduce individual liberties and social, political, and economic reforms into a uniquely Czechoslovakian socialist structure; in essence, rejecting the Soviet-led socialist platform.¹⁸⁸ The most striking aspects of the Action Program called for the "right of non-Communists to form social organizations that would work with the party in a rejuvenated National Front," and proposals for a "new constitution, further guarantees for the freedoms of assembly and association, a law lifting censorship," as well as programs for electoral and security service reforms.¹⁸⁹ The CPSU Plenum, held in Moscow on 9 and 10 April, reaffirmed "to do everything necessary for the steady political, economic and defensive consolidation of the socialist commonwealth," citing "foreign ideological subversion" as the root cause of bloc instability.¹⁹⁰ Without directly mentioning Czechoslovakia, the CPSU advanced the argument that events in Prague threatened the security of the entire Soviet system.

¹⁸⁵ Andrew, *The Sword and the Shield*, 251.

¹⁸⁶ Dawisha, *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring*, 26–31.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 78.

¹⁸⁸ F. M. Barnard, *Pluralism, Socialism, and Political Legitimacy: Reflections on Opening up Communism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 37.

¹⁸⁹ Dawisha, *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring*, 51.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 59–60.

2. Destabilization (April–July 1968)

As Soviet influence continued to deteriorate, the free press in Czechoslovakia began challenging Soviet “ideological control over the bloc” and exposing Moscow’s interference in internal politics. At the May Day parade in Prague, Dubček was greeted with “Czechoslovak-style hippies carrying homemade placards and even an American flag.”¹⁹¹

While the Soviet Politburo was busy devising economic incentives and political maneuvers to bring Prague back under control, the hardliners in the KGB acted. The KGB chairman, Andropov, redirected the full scope of Department S resources, previously concentrated on Western Europe, to identify and expose the “counter-revolutionary” movements. Department S consisted of deep cover Soviet operatives living under assumed Western identities who’s primary task was to infiltrate and influence various segments of Western society. By mid-April, Andropov had expanded the legal KGB residency in Prague, and set up a second undeclared residency tasked with “identifying reliable, pro-Soviet members of the KSČ to form a quisling government after a Soviet invasion.” Operation PROGRESS, designed to set conditions for a military intervention in Czechoslovakia, was up and running by early May. The illegals began attempted infiltration of identified centers of the “counterrevolutionary” movement, including the Union of Writers, radical journals, television and radio, the K-231 club for former political prisoners, the Club for Committed Non-Party Members (KAN), and the Socialist and People’s Parties.¹⁹²

Soviet propaganda directed at the KSČ focused on the idea that “agents and saboteurs disguised as Western tourists had been able to penetrate Czechoslovakia because of poor border security” and were actively engaged in subversive activity. Active measures, codenamed KHODOKI, used fabricated evidence of a right-wing conspiracy engineered by Western intelligence services to justify a Soviet invasion. The Department S deep cover operatives, operating as counterrevolutionary Western sympathizers, pushed

¹⁹¹ Dawisha, *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring*, 71.

¹⁹² Andrew, *The Sword and the Shield*, 251–257.

reformist journalists to publish provocative anti-Soviet articles, attempted to convince reformist organizations to accept aid from fictitious groups armed with Western supplied arms, and planted caches of American made weapons across the country. The Soviet leadership made public a “secret [American] plan” to overthrow the regime in Prague. The extensive propaganda network across the Eastern Bloc was quick to propagate the apparent fear that “Czechoslovakia could fall victim to NATO aggression or to a coup.”¹⁹³

In late June and early July, Soviet political and military pressure intensified. The Šumava military exercises conducted on Czechoslovakian soil and scheduled to end by 30 June extended into July without Dubček’s or KSČ concurrence. Dubček’s request for the removal of Soviet troops was ignored, and Soviet forces did not fully withdraw until early-August. Several Hungarian military participants acknowledged in a top secret report that the exercises “were organized essentially for political reasons” to “paralyze and frighten . . . anti-socialist forces [and] intimidate wavering elements.” More importantly, they served to “gain greater experience in planning, organizing, supervising, and cooperating in a large-scale military operation.” During the exercises, Soviet commanders openly drew “comparisons between the events in Czechoslovakia and the Hungarian Counterrevolution [in 1956].”¹⁹⁴ By late July, a second massive Soviet military exercise, dubbed Nemen, began in Western Ukraine, moving large troop formations through Poland near the Czechoslovakian border. Concurrently, a large-scale air defense exercise, “Heavenly Shield,” was conducted from the Baltic to the Black Sea coast.¹⁹⁵ Outside of conventional military force, the CPSU “encouraged” an increase in activities of The People’s Militia, a hardline communist paramilitary contingent in Czechoslovakia. The organization announced plans to conduct street marches “in full

¹⁹³ Andrew, *The Sword and the Shield*, 251–257.

¹⁹⁴ Report on the Šumava Exercise by Generals I. Olah and F. Szucs of the Hungarian People’s Army to the HSWP Politburo, July 5, 1968 (Excerpts), in *The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader*, ed. Navrátil, Jaromír (New York, NY: Central European University Press, 1998), 199.

¹⁹⁵ Jaromír Navrátil, *The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader* (New York: Central European University Press, 1998), 187.

gear,” similar to ones conducted during the February crisis of 1948. Dubček negotiated with the militia leaders in mid-June and managed to prevent a full confrontation.¹⁹⁶

On the political side, the CPSU Politburo sent a letter of concern to the KSČ Presidium on 4 July, echoed by similar letters from other Warsaw Pact members, affirming the dangerous developments inside Czechoslovakia and pronouncing that the USSR was “ready to provide all the necessary help” to counter the subversion of Socialism in Czechoslovakia.¹⁹⁷ The rhetoric intensified through July and culminated in a 29 July meeting in Čierna nad Tisou, between the KSČ and virtually the entire CPSU Politburo, including Brezhnev. While Dubček continued to defending the reform program, Brezhnev issues a stern warning condemning the reforms as “counterrevolutionary” and proposing a new Warsaw Pact provision to deploy Soviet troops under the decision of a joint command, essentially threatening invasion.¹⁹⁸

3. Crisis (August 1968)

By early August, negotiations curbing Dubček’s reform programs between the Soviet Union and the KSČ were stalled. Brezhnev made several more attempts at diplomacy on 13 August, but was unconvinced of Dubček’s commitment to stopping the reforms.¹⁹⁹ Andropov continued to push inflated threat assessments of Western involvement and potential dire consequences to the Soviet politburo and key Warsaw Pact members, and by mid-August, Moscow, along with the leadership of Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland had formally agreed to military intervention. Using a letter signed by senior leftist members of the KSČ that requested immediate support and assistance to combat the “imminent danger of counterrevolution” propagated by right-

¹⁹⁶ Navrátil, *The Prague Spring 1968*, 90.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 194.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 189.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 312.

wing groups “fomenting a wave of nationalism and chauvinism, and provoking and anti-communist and anti-Soviet psychosis,” the Warsaw Pact initiated the conflict.²⁰⁰

Another large-scale military exercise, “Horizon,” began on 11 August in the GDR, southern Poland and Western Ukraine, and was used as cover for the invasion.²⁰¹ On 17 August, after two days of deliberation, the Kremlin finally gave a green light.²⁰² On the night of 20 August, over 100 plain-clothed Spetsnaz agents secured Ruzyne International Airport in Prague, followed shortly by a Soviet Airborne Division.²⁰³ Simultaneously, nearly 200,000 Warsaw Pact troops and 2,000 tanks crossed the border with virtually no resistance by outmatched and outnumbered Czechoslovakian forces.²⁰⁴ Reminiscent of the crushing of the Hungarian opposition movement in 1956, on the morning of 21 August, the KGB stormed in and arrested Dubček and his “collaborators,” extraditing them to Moscow to be “browbeaten into a degree of submission.”²⁰⁵²⁰⁶ The international reaction was relatively weak. A symbolic vote, condemning the invasion and calling for the removal of Warsaw Pact troops, was conducted at the United Nations Security Council and was naturally vetoed by the USSR. The United States, with its own problems in Vietnam and ongoing attempts to negotiate the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) treaty with the USSR, had no intentions of escalating the situation. Furthermore, U.S. condemnation of Soviet actions was tempered by the still fresh U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 (Operation POWER PACK), where the United States insisted that the action was a regional issue outside the UN’s scope and fully justified as a self-defense measure against the spread of Marxism-Leninism within

²⁰⁰ Kieran Williams, *The Prague Spring and its aftermath: Czechoslovak politics 1968–1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

²⁰¹ Navrátil, *The Prague Spring 1968*, 310.

²⁰² Ibid., 312.

²⁰³ Andrew, *The Sword and the Shield*, 257.

²⁰⁴ Gina M. Peirce, *1968 and Beyond: From the Prague Spring to “Normalization,”* Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, <http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/crees/sites/www.ucis.pitt.edu/crees/files/images/documents/outreach/from-the-prague-spring-to-normalization.pdf>.

²⁰⁵ Andrew, *The Sword and the Shield*, 248.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 257.

the U.S. sphere of influence.²⁰⁷ The Soviet calculation of acting below the Western response threshold proved accurate.

4. Normalization (September 1968–1970)

Following the military intervention, the KGB expanded its activities to penetrate and disrupt reform movements, incorporating Warsaw Pact security services and their “illegals” into their operations. The illegals effectively accessed key leadership within K-231 and the Christian Democratic Party, as well as the Socialist and People’s Parties. Dubček was allowed to remain in office, but his position was compromised by Soviet-controlled KSČ hardliners placed around him. The KGB continued its active measures campaign, staging anti-Soviet riots and using instigators within peaceful protests to turn the demonstrations violent, causing further repressive measures against the reformists and reinforcing the Soviet party line of Western interference.²⁰⁸ By April 1969, Dubček was forced to resign and was replaced by the anti-reformist and more controllable Slovak First Secretary, Gustáv Husák, who would remain in power until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With KGB and Soviet politburo coordination, Husák expanded the power of Czechoslovakian security services to crack down on reformists; purged virtually all reformers from leadership positions within the government, mass media, and the judiciary; revoked and modified laws instated under Dubček; reinstated centralized control over the economy; and established closer ties to Moscow and his Soviet Bloc neighbors.²⁰⁹ Cultural subjugation continued and, by 1970, nearly one-third of all university professors had been dismissed, all social and literary journals had been closed, and Czechoslovakia became a “veritable cultural cemetery.”²¹⁰

The crushing of the Prague Spring ushered in a new era of KGB involvement in the Soviet Bloc. The KGB, reenergized by the adoption of the “Brezhnev doctrine,”

²⁰⁷ Thomas M. Franck, *Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the U.N. Dream and What the U.S. Can Do About It* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

²⁰⁸ Andrew, *The Sword and the Shield*, 262.

²⁰⁹ Peirce, “1968 and Beyond.”

²¹⁰ Hans Renner, *A History of Czechoslovakia Since 1945* (London: Routledge, 1989), 100, from Andrew, *The Sword and the Shield*, 266.

vastly expanded its use of active measures and “illegals” to penetrate every facet of reformist or potentially subversive groups in Eastern Europe, to include the 1972 KGB Directive No. 150/3-10807, expanding the use of “illegals” into the Baltic States.²¹¹ On the international front, the Soviet Union embraced détente (*razryadka*) as part of the broader normalization phase outside the limited scope of the Czechoslovakian conflict, but Brezhnev continued to make pronouncements to the Politburo that the relaxing of tensions allowed for a regrouping of Soviet capacity and the reprioritizing of the main adversary’s (U.S.) strategic priorities in favor of the Soviet long game.²¹²

5. Analysis

There existed two competing tracks in the Soviet handling of events in 1968. Divisions between the hardliners and moderates within the CPSU Politburo necessitated a diplomatic approach to resolving the Czechoslovakian crisis in the months leading up to the invasion. While this track proceeded with political, economic, and military pressure to compel a rollback of reforms by the KSČ, a second track to destabilize Czechoslovakia and force a military solution was being conducted by the KGB. This second track undertook a systemic, doctrinal approach developed by the KGB to foment instability, bait reformists into overt provocations, and produce inflammatory evidence of Western interference. Bezmenov’s model is clearly evident in the process. The *demoralization* phase pervaded all Soviet satellite states in the decades following their absorption into the Soviet sphere, and included harsh repression of dissent by state security services under the direction of the KGB, widespread communist and anti-Western propaganda, direct manipulation of the political structure by the CPSU, and the ever-looming threat of the Red Army. The publishing of Dubček’s Action Program in April ’68 cemented hardliner opinion and the KGB initiated the *destabilization* phase outside of the Politburo’s direct control. The phase reached its desired state by August and transitioned into a *crisis*; resolved by the Warsaw Pact invasion. The protracted period of *normalization* that

²¹¹ Andrew, *The Sword and the Shield*, 268–272.

²¹² Gus W. Weiss, *The Farewell Dossier: Duping the Soviets*, Center for the Study of Intelligence, CSI publications, posted 14 April 2007, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/96unclass/farewell.htm>.

followed allowed for a gradual reestablishment of draconian control over the country and the cementing of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe for the next decade.

The elements of national power were not synchronized; however, they served to complement each other in execution. Diplomatic, economic, and military levers were used to pressure Dubček and the KSČ into reversing the reform programs without resorting to a costly military solution. Since the military option was never “off the table,” actions in these three elements helped reinforce divisions within the KSČ and created conditions for information to play a decisive role in dictating final Soviet and Warsaw Pact policy. The KGB controlled the information arena. KGB active measures to foment instability inside Czechoslovakia, an intense propaganda campaign across the Soviet Bloc, and corresponding inflated threat assessments reaching the Soviet Politburo and other Bloc countries created irreversible momentum for a military intervention.

Ideally, an effective PW program requires careful management and synchronization of diplomatic and economic efforts, the threat or use of military forces, and control of the information environment. As can be surmised from the Czech case, however, as long as actions within the elements of national power are complementary, they can achieve a desired end-state without the clear synchronization of “ends.” Andropov and the KGB controlled the information domain, and were able to dictate the desired end-state for the PW program in Czechoslovakia.

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IV. THE COLD WAR – PART II: U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE 1947–1991

Soviet political warfare during the Cold War did not occur in a vacuum. The United States engaged in its own robust PW program, providing a critical counterweight to Soviet policy. From World War II to the mid-1960s, the USSR possessed overwhelming conventional military superiority in Europe.²¹³ Although the late 1960s and early 1970s saw an increase in NATO conventional capability, significant doubt persisted in U.S. and NATO circles of their ability to successfully defend against a Soviet conventional attack without relying on tactical nuclear assets.²¹⁴ The defensive posturing of NATO conventional forces, combined with the accepted viability of a mutual nuclear threat, provided an element of stability for the duration of the Cold War. As a result, “both sides pursued an alternative and complementary policy of keeping the opponent off balance by means of political warfare.”²¹⁵ This section describes the broader U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union through its renderings across different administrations, offers a review of U.S. covert action programs that largely mirrored Soviet active measures, and provides examples of the use of PW by the United States across the various elements of national power. The chapter concludes with a case study demonstrating the effectiveness of a well-coordinated political warfare strategy. What this review demonstrates is that a balanced approach to PW—synchronized across DIME guided by clearly stated, overt national policy objectives—is essential to effective foreign policy in adversarial, state-on-state interactions below the level of war. This was the case in the late Cold War period of the 1980s, when the United States engaged in an aggressive and well-coordinated PW

²¹³ The USSR had a standing army of 140 to 150 moderately-to well-equipped divisions and 2 million men at various levels of readiness. Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe (1945-1970)* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 166. In 1952, a plan to develop 96 NATO divisions in Europe to match Soviet power dissolved as NATO countries were unwilling to provide the necessary ten percent of NATO’s combined GNP, thus cementing U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence and retaliation against a conventional Soviet threat. Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough?* (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1971), 118–120.

²¹⁴ Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1978, 109.

²¹⁵ Paul W. Blackstone, *The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), 301.

campaign against the Soviet Union that underwrote the collapse of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe and the eventual dissolution of the USSR.

A. U.S. COLD WAR POLICY

U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War can be divided into four distinct phases. The first phase was the early Cold War period from 1947 through 1953, was characterized by idealistic and aggressive actions by the Truman and early Eisenhower administrations to contain the spread of Communist influence, and careless attempts to pry Eastern Europe from Moscow's control. The developing nuclear stalemate between the superpowers and the death of Stalin in 1953 ushered in the next phase. This second period, from 1953 to 1969, was true "containment" designed to halt the spread of Soviet influence in the Third World, while accepting the status quo at the end of the Second World. This was followed by a decade of *détente* in the Nixon, Ford, and early Carter White House years and was complemented by the loss of domestic U.S. consensus and substantive disengagement by the United States from previous Cold War policies, including PW. The United States began to reverse this trend in the late 1970s under the second half of Carter's term in office and into the Reagan years. The last phase of the Cold War, from 1979 through 1991, was a relentless ideological campaign against the USSR, pushing back Soviet gains in the Third World and directly targeting the Soviet Union through overt and covert measures. U.S. PW vacillated with each phase shift; from early growing pains and relative freedom of action in the first two periods, to near-total incoherence as a policy tool in the third period, to a final resurrection and ascendancy in the 1980s, as indispensable to a successful foreign policy. Across the various administrative shifts, the United States did not have a stable grand strategy, an enduring national narrative, a collective vision of an existential threat posed by communism, or even a resemblance of domestic unanimity on foreign policy. Though "containment" and the "Soviet threat" remained very influential factors in the framing of U.S. foreign policy during each phase of the Cold War, the extent of PW programs targeting the USSR greatly varied in intensity and commitment. These facts are not meant to be a condemnation of U.S. policy, but a recognition that the lack of durable strategic clarity is an inherent feature of representative democracies. What made the U.S. ultimately

successful in the Cold War was seizure of strategic initiative during a limited window of opportunity, starting in the summer of 1979, to “roll back” and destabilize the Soviet Union prior to the next invariable shift.

By 1947, the United States viewed the potential economic collapse of Western Europe and the consequent ascension of communist power across the continent as the “principal threat to American national security.”²¹⁶ The year 1947 was pivotal in the consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. Communist regimes were installed in Romania and Hungary, democratic elections in Poland were cancelled, and the elected Bulgarian prime minister was removed, leading to the establishment of a communist People’s Republic. Czechoslovakia would follow in early 1948, with a near-bloodless coup supported by the Soviet military that eliminated the last independent government in Eastern Europe.²¹⁷ The rise of communist party membership in Italy and France following the Second World War, and Stalin’s systematic subjugation of Eastern Europe, set the stage for the adoption of the “containment strategy” that would dominate U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviet Union for decades. Outside of Eastern Europe, in 1946-1947, the Soviet Union began conducting PW in Greece and Turkey in an effort to bring the two countries closer to the Soviet sphere. In response, on March 12, 1947, President Harry Truman announced what came to be known as the *Truman Doctrine*, pledging aid to any country facing Communist pressure.²¹⁸ One of the first strategic applications of the containment policy in the Truman administration was the announcement of the European Recovery Program (ERP) in June 1947. Its implementation as the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, later known as the Marshall Plan, provided economic support

²¹⁶ Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, *U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1945*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 21.

²¹⁷ George Schopflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe: 1945-1992* (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 62–74.

²¹⁸ President Truman’s Message to Congress, Document 171, 80th Congress, 1st Session, no. Record Group 233, National Archives, March 12, 1947. <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=81>.

for Europe's devastated agricultural and industrial capacity in order to prevent the social and political slip towards communism.²¹⁹

In December 1947, the National Security Council (NSC) drafted memorandum NSC-4, calling for the U.S. State Department to develop interdepartmental plans and programs in order to influence foreign opinion in directions favorable to the United States.²²⁰ The U.S. government then planned and conducted its first postwar PW campaign in Europe, potentially swaying the 1948 election in Italy.

The Italian election marked a crucial moment in the development and organization of American political warfare. The U.S. campaign had been conducted below the level of total military conflict and the fact that the Italians had rejected communism appeared to be tangible proof that the approach could meet the broader Soviet challenge.²²¹

Following the perceived success of the Italian campaign, America began to codify PW and Kennan penned *The Inauguration of Political Warfare*.²²²

Then, in August 1949, the USSR tested its first nuclear bomb. This changed the playing field and the advent of substantive thermonuclear capability on both sides tempered the "militant, ideological crusading spirit of the classic Cold War period [and gave] way to a cold calculation of vital national interests."²²³ With the Eastern and Western blocs relatively solidified in Europe, the struggle between the United States and the USSR shifted to proxy warfare and subversion in the Third World. "Indeed, Soviet analysts made no bones about the fact that while nuclear weapons ruled out the inevitability of a military clash with imperialism, they only made the ideological-political

²¹⁹ Dobson, U.S. Foreign Policy, 25.

²²⁰ Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), 18.

²²¹ Kaeten Mistry, *The United States, Italy and the Origins of Cold War: Waging Political Warfare, 1945-1950* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 3.

²²² State Department Policy Planning Staff, "The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare," April 30, 1948. Box 11A, Lot File 64 D 563, Record Group 59, National Archives & Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269>.

²²³ Blackstone, *The Strategy of Subversion*, 301.

one more likely and more intense.”²²⁴ The developing Cold War became the context for the dynamic interaction of U.S. and Soviet policy, evolving strategic goals, and the interaction of PW measures within the contested space in Europe.

In the decade that followed, the key guiding document for the U.S. containment strategy was National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), issued by the National Security Council in April 1950. NSC-68 took on a more rigid and aggressive tone than George F. Kennan’s original concept of selective and multidimensional containment, emphasizing the existential threat faced by the spread of global communism, militarizing the concept of containment, and adopted the idea of negotiating with the USSR only from a position of overwhelming strength.²²⁵ In the words of John Lewis Gaddis, NSC-68 made “all interests vital, all means affordable, [and] all methods justifiable.”²²⁶ The Eisenhower administration would take the principles of NSC-68 and developed its “New Look” policy that attempted to accomplish “containment on the cheap” by focusing efforts on nuclear versus conventional containment.”²²⁷ It also emphasized increased burden-sharing by allies in their mutual defense framework, with the aim to “encircle the Soviet Union and China with states aligned with the U.S.,” and most critically renewing focus on “covert, economic, and psychological warfare.”²²⁸

With a nuclear-conventional stalemate developing in Europe in the 1950s, PW emerged as the principal weapon to influence the Cold War balance. For the United States, winning the sociopolitical narrative across the globe necessitated discrediting the principles of Soviet communism, especially among Third World nationalist movements fighting Western colonialism. Where socialist and communist ideologies were firmly

²²⁴ Stephen J. Blank, “Class War on a Global Scale: The Leninist Culture of Political Conflict,” in *Conflict, Culture, and History: Regional Dimensions*, by Stephen J. Blank, Lawrence E. Grinter, Karl P. Magyar, Lewis B. Ware, and Bynum E. Weathers (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1993), 27. http://webharvest.gov/peth04/20041016184158/http://aupress.au.af.mil/Books/Blanketal/Blank_etal.pdf.

²²⁵ Ibid., 34–35.

²²⁶ J.L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 95.

²²⁷ Dobson, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 37.

²²⁸ Ibid., 36.

entrenched or beginning to threaten national interests, the United States adopted more aggressive policies. These often conflicted with “American principles of Democracy, anti-colonialism and national self-determination,” by directly interfering in the social and political fabric of states, often supporting colonial powers or dictatorial regimes and subverting democratic movements.²²⁹ The Cold War calculus of overcoming the perceived threat of Soviet global domination through incremental strategic gains, simply outweighed American idealism.

To further tip the balance, the United States needed to disrupt the economic stability of the Soviet bloc. This was accomplished through a combination of overt trade initiatives and covert measures, denial of USSR access to technology and resources, signaling U.S. commitment to supporting allies to prevent a slip away from the West, and signaling the potential negative consequences of Soviet alignment or neutrality. The overall shift from the superpower military balance to that of global sociopolitical competition placed primary emphasis on the tools of PW: coercive state diplomacy, public diplomacy and psychological warfare, conventional and nuclear military posturing and paramilitary activity, covert action, and influence through economic statecraft.²³⁰

The 1960s saw a shift in U.S. containment policy to the Kennedy “flexible response” doctrine, which proposed a gradual escalation to nuclear war in case of a military confrontation with the Soviets. This concept, however, rapidly evolved into the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) following the Cuban Missile Crisis. On the PW front, the idea of ideological containment remained consistent with previous administrations, but was vastly expanded in scope and shifted in focus to the Third World. This expanded focus fixated on countering communist insurgencies and subversion efforts through unconventional military measures such as the use of covert action, Special Forces, economic and educational endeavors, as well as “nation-building around progressive movements.”²³¹ The Peace Corps, Food for Peace project, and the

²²⁹ Dobson, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 29–30.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 29–31.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 40.

Alliance for Progress in Latin America were all initiatives in the early years of the Kennedy administration to curb the structural and ideological appeal of communism.²³²

With the visceral divide of the Vietnam War and the reemergence of neo-isolationist sentiment in the United States, the containment policy saw its second major adjustment. Under Nixon, U.S. foreign policy shifted away from the ideological realm and centered on the *realpolitik* calculations of reprioritized national interests.²³³ *Détente*, defined by then National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger as “mutual restraint, coexistence, and, ultimately co-operation,”²³⁴ aimed to contain the Soviet Union by attempting to incorporate the Eastern Bloc into the economic and internationalist framework, strategic arms limitations, and exploiting existing rifts between communist regimes, such as the Sino-Soviet split, to gain leverage in negotiations with Moscow.²³⁵ The Soviet Union had its own view of *détente*, with Brezhnev delivering a secret speech to the politburo in 1971, declaring:

We communists have to string along with the capitalists for a while. We need their credits, their agriculture, and their technology. But we are going to continue massive military programs and by the middle 1980s we will be in a position to return to a much more aggressive foreign policy designed to gain the upper hand in our relationship with the West.²³⁶

The Carter administration attempted to change the nature of *détente*, trying to move away from Kissinger’s *realpolitik* to intemperate idealism, favoring “international law, open diplomacy, promoting self-determination and universal human rights, [and] avoiding the use of force.” In doing so, the administration unintentionally took a much more confrontational posture with the Soviet Union, which was perceived as a move away from Nixon’s “tacit coexistence to being satisfied only with a fundamental change

²³² Dobson, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 37–40.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 42.

²³⁴ Henry Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy* (New York, NY: W.W Norton, 1977), 305.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, 42–43.

²³⁶ Gus W. Weiss, “Duping the Soviets: The Farewell Dossier,” *CIA Studies Archive Indexes* 39, no. 5 (May 2007).

in the Soviet System.”²³⁷ The second half of the decade, with the fall of Saigon in 1975, communist gains in Africa and Latin America, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, signaled a substantive escalation in the Cold War.

In the next decade, U.S. containment would take on a much more aggressive nature. Reagan, accusing the Soviet Union of using détente as a cover to spread communism across the globe, adopted the idea of “rollback” by taking initiatives in the Third World to push back communism, including the overthrow of the Marxist government in Grenada, providing support for the Afghan rebels against the communist government in Afghanistan and for the Contras against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, as well as supporting anticommunist forces in Angola, Kampuchea, and Ethiopia.²³⁸ The policy of rollback was extended to Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe with aggressive political and economic actions in Poland supporting the Solidarity trade-union movement. Further actions included the drastic escalation in defense spending on programs such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), wide-ranging economic measures against the USSR, and a renewed emphasis on public diplomacy and strategic communication to counter Soviet propaganda. These efforts helped aggravate the growing scientific-technological gap and massive political, ideological, and economic flaws in the Soviet system, which were exposed by Gorbachev’s disastrous *glasnost* policy in the second half of the decade, and led to the rejuvenation of regional nationalism in the USSR.²³⁹

Reagan embraced PW and used it effectively to support overt national strategic aims. By the time George H. W. Bush was inaugurated as the 41st President of the United States in January 1989, the Baltic republics were openly running nationalistic popular fronts, Soviet Central Asia was witnessing similar nationalist movements, and the first domino in the Soviet system, Poland, was already falling.²⁴⁰ Aggressive U.S. actions,

²³⁷ Dobson, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 44–46.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, 48.

²³⁹ Norman Friedman, *The Fifty Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 450–471.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 474–484.

both overt and covert, played a critical role in the eventual disintegration of Soviet control over Eastern Europe and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Policy fluctuation due to U.S. administration changes limited what PW measures were deemed acceptable or practical. Soviet successes in the PW realm directly correlated with U.S. vacillation. Passive acceptance of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe in the late Eisenhower, Kennedy, and early Johnson administrations allowed the USSR to aggressively repress any deviation from Soviet control and expand its subversive activities to the West and the Third World. Assertive U.S. policies in the First and Third World, however, counteracted Soviet efforts. Through the late 1960s, the U.S. and the West managed to maintain the narrow geopolitical balance with the USSR; however, fracturing U.S. domestic and Western international consensus over Vietnam under Johnson and Nixon, the restructuring of covert action and continuance of détente under Ford, and the blind idealism in the first half of Carter's term led to the drastic decline of U.S. PW in the 1970s. This brought about major Soviet gains in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. PW essentially became a one player game. As Karen Brutents, the deputy head of the Soviet ID pointed out, "the world was going our way."²⁴¹ The late 1970s and early 80s, under the Carter and Reagan administrations, saw a dramatic shift in U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union, hallmarked by a drastic revitalization of U.S. PW, negating Soviet momentum and helping bring the Cold War to its end. Two critical concepts emerge from this historic perspective. First, given a relative geopolitical parity, states that engage in comprehensive PW programs possess a significant advantage over states that do not. Second, a PW program, especially one that involves covert action, which is out of synch with overt national policy goals, will not be effective.

B. U.S. COVERT ACTION

Covert action in support of PW was the U.S. parallel to Soviet active measures. Covert action, regulated by 50 U.S.C. § 413(b), is defined as "activities of the United

²⁴¹ Odd Arne Westad, "Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974-1976: A New Pattern of Intervention," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, nos. 8-9, 1996-1997, 21. From Christopher M., Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2005), 24.

States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”²⁴² This concept can be divided into four mutually supporting functional areas: propaganda, political action, paramilitary activity, and intelligence assistance. The first, propaganda, is any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefire the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.²⁴³ Political action is the use of covert political means, agents of influence, or material support to target both governmental and third party institutions—labor unions, religious movements, ethnic groups, or criminal enterprises—to achieve desired outcomes, which can range from policy shifts to coup d’états. Paramilitary activity lies on the more destructive and objectionable edge of the covert action spectrum and encompasses everything from counterterrorism operations, to assassinations, to fully sponsored unconventional warfare. Finally, intelligence assistance is the nonattributable support to governments or groups with intelligence training, material and technical support, and information sharing in order to influence the decision cycle of the supported entity or a third party actor through secondary or tertiary effects.²⁴⁴

Starting with the Truman administration in the post-World War II years, the overarching intent of U.S. covert action was to halt the spread of communism outside of the newly formed Eastern Bloc and to weaken internal communist consensus within the Soviet sphere without the actual overthrow of Soviet-controlled regimes.²⁴⁵ In 1948, Truman authorized NSC-20 and NSC-20/4, allowing the use of paramilitary operations, assistance to resistance groups, and supporting sabotage activities within the Baltic States

²⁴² 50 U.S.C. § 413(b), <http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/50/15/III/413b#sthash.mMZ7P5MG.dpuf>.

²⁴³ JP 3-13.2, dated 7 January 2010. Propaganda is defined as “Any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.” (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.2)

²⁴⁴ Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence*, (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1995), 3.

²⁴⁵ William J Daugherty, *Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 124.

and Soviet Bloc countries in order to “place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power and control, particularly in the relationship between Moscow and the satellite countries.”²⁴⁶ From 1949 through the mid-1950s, the CIA unsuccessfully supported nationalist resistance elements in Ukraine, the Baltic States, Poland, and Albania. The failure of these efforts lay with the high-level Soviet penetration of Western intelligence services and the underestimation of the scope and sophistication of Soviet counterintelligence and counterinsurgency operations that managed to effectively infiltrate and annihilate U.S.-sponsored émigré movements.²⁴⁷

Eisenhower built upon the previous administration’s initiatives with NSC-162/2, that spelled out a “third option” between diplomacy and military force in achieving U.S. national security objectives and countering Soviet subversion efforts of “political and economic warfare, propaganda and ‘front activities,’ Communist-controlled trade unions, sabotage, exploitation of revolutionary and insurgent movements, and psychological warfare.”²⁴⁸ In the early 1950s, CIA-sponsored coups in Iran (Operation TP-AJAX) and Guatemala (Operation PB-SUCCESS) were determined to be resounding successes in U.S. covert action, though both had significant, lasting, negative effects on U.S. regional foreign policy that are still felt today. The overarching motivations for the two operations were markedly similar, shaped by existing economic interests and the global balance for power that necessitated the actions in order to prevent a potential shift in regional geopolitical orientation to the USSR.²⁴⁹ Europe was deemed far too sensitive for aggressive covert action programs. Despite some emotional appeals for assistance during the Hungarian uprising in 1956, the United States stayed out and Budapest quickly fell back under the Soviet boot heel.

The Kennedy administration oversaw an expansion in covert action programs well beyond the “containment” scope of the previous two administrations and into the realm

²⁴⁶ Daugherty, *Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency*, 126.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 126–127.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 133.

²⁴⁹ James Callanan, *Covert Action in the Cold War: US Policy, Intelligence, and CIA Operations* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 109–129.

of justified “unlimited intervention” into the internal politics of allied and adversarial nations. These included a prolonged paramilitary intervention in the Belgian Congo, financial and propaganda support for the Chilean Radical Party (PR) in preparation for the 1963 elections, and similar support for Western-aligned democratic parties in Italy. Further activities involved the facilitation of bribery and social disturbances in an attempt to prevent the pro-communist Cheddi Jagan from taking power in British Guyana, the supplying of weapons and explosives to internal dissident groups in the Dominican Republic, and covert operations against the Castro regime in Cuba. The latter included disastrous operations like the Bay of Pigs invasion and a series of failed assassination attempts against Castro that were “generated from within the White House.”²⁵⁰ The programs initiated during the Kennedy years were continued in largely the same tone during the Johnson administration. When Nixon took over the oval office, he expanded the scope of several programs, most notably operations in Chile, which increased funding and propaganda activities, initiated programs to “destabilize the Chilean economy,” and, finally, support for an eventual coup against Allende.²⁵¹

From the early days of the Cold War until the 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistances Act of 1961, U.S. covert action was largely unhindered by legislative oversight. From its inception, the CIA had “the standing authority to initiate and execute low-level, low-cost, low-risk ‘routine’ covert action programs without presidential approval or even notification, so long as the programs were in consonance with presidentially established foreign policy objectives.”²⁵² The amendment created a necessity for a “presidential finding” and a “Memoranda of Notification” (MON) to congress in the event that a covert action was authorized, and eliminated the “plausible deniability” argument if a covert activity became compromised or publically exposed. The consequence of this legislation was that Congress now had veto authority for any covert action program through the power of the purse, which severely diminished the

²⁵⁰ Daugherty, *Executive Secrets*, 155–159.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 171–172.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 98.

executive branch's willingness to engage in such actions.²⁵³ Further fallout from the detailing of CIA and executive abuses in the conduct of covert action operations during the Church and Pike Committee hearings in 1975 exacerbated the impact of Hughes-Ryan, and effectively stalled U.S. covert operations. Without the counterweight of U.S. PW, the Soviet Union made significant strides, including aggressive PW actions in Angola, opposed by only lackluster U.S. financial support to anticommunist elements, resulting in the USSR gaining a strategic foothold on the African continent for military and naval basing, and as a staging base for further operations in Africa.²⁵⁴

For all its initial general disdain for the CIA, the Carter administration realized very quickly that their overt humanist policies were ineffective against a tide of Soviet PW measures. With the urging of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor, the U.S. began "an unprecedented White House effort to attack the internal legitimacy of the Soviet Government."²⁵⁵ The blatant structural manipulation of the political processes of Third World nations that had occurred in the preceding decade was quickly dismissed as a policy option. With Carter's approval, however, the United States began directly targeting the USSR in a covert propaganda campaign that included the distribution of illegal dissident literature, known as *samizdat*, across Soviet society. U.S. covert support to European human rights and prodemocracy groups vastly increased, and CIA covert action specialists, along with Brzezinski's influence, managed to push the agenda of supporting nationalist programs inside the Soviet Union, thus "keeping alive the culture, history, religions, and traditions of the oppressed non-Russian minorities."²⁵⁶ Covert successes were intermixed with inaction during the Carter administration, with failures to initiate findings or preempt Soviet political actions in Zaire, Somalia, and Ethiopia early in the administration contrasting with approved presidential findings for

²⁵³ Daugherty, *Executive Secrets*, 93–95.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 178–179.

²⁵⁵ Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 85, 89–91, 142; Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards*, 18; from *Ibid.*, 186.

²⁵⁶ Daugherty, *Executive Secrets*, 187.

covert action in Yemen and Central America in 1979.²⁵⁷ By far the most aggressive measure undertaken by the administration was a presidential finding authorizing lethal aid support for the mujahedeen in Afghanistan six months before the actual Soviet invasion in December 1979. Brzezinski wrote a memo to Carter first declaring that the aid to the mujahedeen would likely induce a Soviet military intervention and then, on the day the Red Army actually crossed the border, stating that “we now have the opportunity of giving to the U.S.S.R. its Vietnam.”²⁵⁸

The Reagan presidency, building on Carter initiatives, directed a substantial escalation of covert actions against the Soviet Union. Operations in the Third World accelerated, with covert actions being conducted in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Central America, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Lebanon, to name only the declassified initiatives.²⁵⁹ In May 1982, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-32 came into effect as the U.S. *National Security Strategy*, authorizing a broad spectrum of covert programs aimed at destabilizing Soviet control over the Eastern Bloc. This was to be accomplished through the use of aggressive propaganda campaigns to bring to light Soviet “active measures” initiatives and utilize sponsored social movements, in conjunction with economic measures and diplomatic pressure, to drive the deeply flawed Soviet system into collapse.²⁶⁰ NSDD-54, signed in September 1982, further targeted Eastern Europe by “encouraging more liberal trends in the region Furthering human and civil rights in East European countries Reinforcing the pro-Western orientation of their peoples Lessening their economic and political dependence on the U.S.S.R. . . [and] Undermining the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact.”²⁶¹

²⁵⁷ Daugherty, *Executive Secrets*, 190–191.

²⁵⁸ The Brzezinski interview with *Le Nouvel Observateur* (1998), translated from the French by William Blum and David N. Gibbs. This translation appeared in Gibbs, “Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Retrospect,” *International Politics* 37, no. 2 (2000).

²⁵⁹ Daugherty, *Executive Secrets*, 193–94.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 197–198.

²⁶¹ National Security Decision Directive 54, United States Policy toward Eastern Europe, September 2, 1982, <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/Scanned%20NSDDS/NSDD54.pdf>.

Perceptions of covert action in the Reagan administration are dominated by the Iran-Contra scandal with its “not so covert” action program. Other Central American and Third World programs also put congressional and executive policies at odds; however, it was the CIA’s covert action in Afghanistan and U.S. PW in Poland that was the culmination, and ultimate vindication, of U.S. Cold War doctrine. Covert action in Poland, facilitated through an alliance with the Catholic Church in much the same manner as the 1948 Italian election campaign, was well synchronized with U.S. economic and diplomatic levers of national power.²⁶² Afghanistan bled the Soviet Union dry, not in manpower and resources, but in will and domestic consensus. These actions, combined with U.S. PW across the Eastern Bloc, precipitated the beginning of the end for the USSR.

Competent covert action, when appropriately synchronized with overt elements of national power in a coherent foreign policy with realistic goals, can be a dominant force for global change. Full-spectrum PW, with covert action at its core, maintained the geopolitical balance for nearly two decades after World War II, stagnated in the 1970s, and decidedly tipped the Cold War balance in favor of the United States in the 1980s. The 1970s theme of overregulating and marginalizing PW programs through congressional oversight would reemerge again in the early 1990s. However, unlike the rapid realization of the Carter and Reagan administrations that covert programs in support of PW were essential to counter the Soviet Union, post-Cold War administrations let many capabilities atrophy, while the Russian Federation gradually rebuilt its capability and fortified its domestic will.

C. U.S. DIPLOMATIC POLITICAL WARFARE

As George Kennan noted, U.S. involvement in the 1948 Italian elections was the “inauguration of organized political warfare” in the post-Cold War period.²⁶³ The first part of this section provides an overview of the U.S. PW program in the run up to the

²⁶² Daugherty, *Executive Secrets*, 197–211.

²⁶³ Kaeten Mistry, *The United States, Italy, and the Origins of Cold War: Waging Political Warfare, 1945-1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7–8.

1948 Italian elections. The election serves as both an excellent example of U.S. diplomatic PW and as a foundational construct for broader U.S. PW efforts examined in the second part of the section. The second part looks at the “state-private network” concept adopted as a cornerstone of U.S. PW in the early Cold War, its decline in the late 1960s and 70s, and its reemergence under the Reagan administration with the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The underlying argument is that the structures of diplomatic PW, such as covert funding channels to foreign parties, state-private networks, and sponsored nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the NED, are critically important to an effective foreign policy when dealing with a cunning and antagonistic adversary.

U.S. support for anticommunist elements in the 1948 Italian elections is one of the defining moments in the early Cold War period. Fearing that a communist victory would strengthen communist parties across Western Europe and precipitate the collapse of European democracy under Soviet domination, the United States engaged in a comprehensive PW program to prevent the slip. The U.S. funneled millions of dollars to the Italian Christian Democratic Party as well as right-wing socialist parties that opposed the Soviet-backed coalition of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and Italian Socialist Party (PSI). The economic aid offered by the Marshall Plan and Vatican support was used as political leverage to present a clear choice for Italian voters: either democracy, Christianity, and prosperity; or totalitarianism, atheism, and impoverishment. In the run up to the election, the U.S. pumped “interim economic aid” into Italy as a measure to prevent the economic and social structure from collapsing until the Marshall Plan could be implemented. This was coupled with increased shipments of military equipment to the Italian security services and indirect funding support for pro-U.S. political parties in Italy through U.S. businesses and organized labor groups.²⁶⁴

As the April '48 elections approached, polls showed that a communist victory was likely, and the U.S. intensified its involvement. The flow of covert funding and other

²⁶⁴ Mistry, *Waging Political Warfare*, 46.

measures increased.²⁶⁵ U.S. propaganda, in the form of press releases, newsreels, Voice of America radio broadcasts, anticommunist and pro-U.S. documentaries, and even the re-release and saturation of Greta Garbo's 1939 film *Ninotchka*, a satire on Soviet life, flooded Italy in the weeks prior to the election. On the diplomatic side, the United States pulled off a masterful diplomatic move in late March. The United States, along with Britain and France, rejected Yugoslavia's territorial claims on the Free Territory of Trieste and, playing on Italian nationalistic sentiment, declared for the return of the disputed region to Italy. Stalin backed his Yugoslav ally and denounced the move against the interests of the PCI, and Italian public opinion of the widely popular move shifted away from the communists. Further actions supported the agenda. The U.S. helped engineer a splitting of the socialist vote, using Great Britain to legitimize PSIL trade union representatives through an official invite and recognition, while the PSI remained sidelined. These measures played a role in the Christian Democrats emerging with an absolute parliamentary majority in the elections.²⁶⁶ Whether or not the United States actually tilted the balance in the Italian elections, the prevailing view inside Washington was that U.S. overt and covert methods kept Italy from slipping into the communist sphere, and thus justified the employment and expansion of PW programs in the coming decades.²⁶⁷

The use of direct covert funding to support foreign parties in conjunction with overt diplomatic initiatives was a key component of PW in the diplomatic realm. The Italian model would prove the inauguration of many similar initiatives across the globe. Actions such as the decades-long program, beginning in the Eisenhower administration, to support the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with covert funding in order to undermine the communist agenda in Japan were prevalent across the globe in the early Cold War period. In the Japan example, the covert program allowed the LDP to overcome socialist movements in Japan, secure close U.S.-Japanese economic and political ties, and overcome popular opposition to the U.S. military presence on the

²⁶⁵ Mistry, *Waging Political Warfare*, 49.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 50–53.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

islands.²⁶⁸ Outside of direct funding, there were other indirect influence programs that dominated the diplomatic domain.

In the early Cold War period, front organizations on both sides served as a key mechanism of influence. The U.S. developed a “state-private network” concept; private organizations, covertly funded by the CIA through either direct channels or dummy foundations, served as the vanguard of U.S. PW. The state-private relationship developed on the idea of “ideological convergence” between the private sector and government based on an anticommunist domestic consensus and complementary short-term goals. Many of the early initiatives began as independent, ideologically driven private actions.²⁶⁹ The Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC) was established by the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1944 to assist foreign trade unions and offset communist influence.²⁷⁰ Jay Lovestone and Irvin Brown of the FTUC funded anticommunist efforts independent to the United States Government (USG) in Italy and France in 1946, and were involved in the covert action during the 1948 Italian elections. Sidney Hook laid the groundwork for the Congress of Cultural Freedom (CCF) in 1949 as a private venture that only later became a CIA front organization.²⁷¹ The CCF employed American writers, artists, musicians and intellectuals to “negate Communism’s appeal” by contrasting the communist repression of ideas and artistic expression with artistic and intellectual freedom in Western society. By 1950, the CCF was covertly funded by the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) in the State Department until the OPC was absorbed under the CIA in 1951.²⁷² The role of the CIA remained unknown to many members of these and other front organizations.

As the domestic consensus began to fall apart in the 1960s, significant friction developed inside many of the state-private network organizations. The entire structure

²⁶⁸ Daugherty, *Executive Secrets*, 140–141.

²⁶⁹ Robert Pee, “Political Warfare Old and New,” *49th Parallel*, no. 22 (Autumn 2008): 22–24.

²⁷⁰ Ted Morgan, *A Covert Life: Jay Lovestone, Communist, Anti-Communist, and Spymaster* (New York, NY: Random House, 1999), 144.

²⁷¹ Pee, “Political Warfare Old and New,” 22–24.

²⁷² Daugherty, *Executive Secrets*, 124–125.

collapsed after a series of revelations of CIA and USG involvement in multiple front ventures. The “tipping point” was the *Ramparts* article in 1967, exposing the CIA’s connection with the CCF, which led to a series of media efforts that further exposed the “AFL-CIO, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, the Asia Foundation, the National Students’ Association, and many other allies and front groups.”²⁷³ With the system exposure, these organizations became largely ineffective as a PW tool, their unwitting members felt deceived, and the revelations significantly limited the pool of willing partners for the CIA, as the risks of exposure now seemed too great.²⁷⁴ These events brought on a decade of disengagement by the United States from PW in the 1970s, hallmarked by the retreat from covert action by the Ford and early Carter administrations. Only in late 1979, with virtually unopposed Soviet advances in the Third World, did the United States begin to reconstitute its PW capacity.

In November 1979, the Carter administration created the American Political Foundation (APF), which would pave the way for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). In March 1982, Secretary of State Alexander Haig drafted a memorandum to Reagan proposing a strategy to counter Soviet expansion efforts in the Third World by supporting democratic forces and further “preoccupying” the Soviet Union with internal problems “by giving practical assistance to democratic and nationalist forces and thus going on our own political offensive.” Haig called for the establishment of an “Institute for Democracy” that would become the NED in December 1983.²⁷⁵ The NED was designed to reconstitute the PW capacity that existed with the early state-private networks without the covert and potentially discrediting programs of the CIA.²⁷⁶ The NED was designed to be a semiprivate and semiautonomous “democracy promoting” institution openly funded by the USG. Its disassociation from the official U.S. policy allowed for the institution to pursue actions that bridged the space between

²⁷³ Pee, “Political Warfare Old and New,” 25.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 26.

²⁷⁵ Alexander Haig, “Strategy for Building Democracy in Communist and non-Communist countries,” March 8, 1982, Washington, D.C., Declassified Documents Reference System, 2. From Pee, “Political Warfare Old and New,” 30.

²⁷⁶ Pee, “Political Warfare Old and New,” 26–30.

the overt policies of the State Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Information Agency, and CIA covert action. The “gray” purpose of the NED was to “channel money, equipment, political consultants, and other expertise” to foreign “democratic forces.”²⁷⁷ The U.S. effectively established its own version of the Comintern.²⁷⁸

The NED consisted of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and National Republican Institute (NRI), The Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), and the AFL-CIO. The NDI and NRI were training and funding channels to political parties outside the United States, while the CIPE and AFL-CIO assisted foreign businesses and trade unions, respectively. The NED supported activities across Latin America, including funds to anticommunist elements in Grenada, Panama, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Programs in Eastern Europe were just as robust, with the NED providing some \$3.7 million to the Polish Solidarity trade union movement starting in 1984.²⁷⁹

The program leading up to the 1948 elections in Italy laid the groundwork for the expansion of U.S. PW in the early Cold War. Both covert CIA funding to various foreign entities and the large array of state-private networks served as an effective counterbalance to covert KGB funds and the countless Soviet front organizations that supported communist and socialist parties and revolutionary movements across the globe. When this balance was upset in the 1970s, the Soviet Union made tremendous strides in advancing its overall aims. In the zero-sum frame of the Cold War perspective, these aims were achieved at the expense of the United States. The revitalization of U.S. PW in the 1980s, spearheaded by the NED and similar programs in the diplomatic realm, and synchronized with overt U.S. foreign policy and the other elements of national power, created irreversible momentum for the resolution of the Cold War.

Diplomatic political warfare is essential to an effective national foreign policy. This is especially true when faced with a geopolitical rival that engages in a robust PW

²⁷⁷ Gerald Sussman, *Branding Democracy: U.S. Regime Change in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe* (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2010), 45.

²⁷⁸ Pee, “Political Warfare Old and New,” 31–32.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 22.

program across the various elements due to an inherently weaker strategic position, as was the case with the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Today, the United States finds itself again the subject of wide-ranging PW campaigns from multiple adversarial nation states, making U.S. diplomatic PW initiatives, like the NED, as relevant today as they were during the height of the Cold War.

D. U.S. INFORMATION POLITICAL WARFARE

U.S. information PW provides two important insights. First, the battle for the narrative in a contested space is a massive undertaking, requiring a substantial commitment of national resources. This commitment further requires a multidimensional approach across covert and overt systems, and necessitates an organization outside of the U.S. State Department to coordinate activities. A direct association with the State Department severely restricts the national capacity to conduct influence operations in the information environment by tying overt national policy aims to all messaging campaigns. Separating an information coordination agency from the State Department would allow a degree of disassociation from overt, and often delicate, diplomatic efforts and covert or limited attribution media efforts that may cause diplomatic friction. Second, the United States is particularly susceptible to blowback from state-sponsored misinformation and “black” propaganda efforts. Truth is the best weapon in the U.S. arsenal and can be a dominant force on the information field if properly managed and adequately supported.

In stark contrast to Soviet “disinformation” efforts, U.S. PW in the information environment largely rejected the use of classical propaganda measures of distortion and manipulation. U.S. efforts mainly focused in the realm of public diplomacy and “white” propaganda readily acknowledged by the sponsor. “Gray” propaganda, designed to remove the sponsor’s hand from the message by not revealing its source, was also effectively used by the United States throughout the Cold War.²⁸⁰ Media manipulation, disinformation, and “black” propaganda were still employed effectively by the CIA in the

²⁸⁰ Carnes Lord, “What ‘Strategic’ Public Diplomacy Is,” in *Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare*, eds. Michael J. Waller, Carnes Lord, John Lenczowski, Jennifer Marshall, Robert R. Reilly, Herbert Romerstein, Andrew Garfield, Angelo Codevilla, John J. Tierney, Hampton Stephens, Stephen C. Baker, and Juliana Geran Pilon. (Washington, D.C.: Institute of World Politics Press, 2009), 48.

first two decades of the Cold War, but the scale of these programs was limited and largely dwarfed by similar efforts by the Soviet Union. A series of public exposures and a breakdown of domestic consensus in the late 1960s and 1970s ushered in a drastic shift of PW in the information environment, rejecting misinformation as a viable tool and focusing on the right information to the right audience. In principle, the relentless idealistic use of truth would prevail against clear Soviet deception and disinformation efforts, but in reality the organizational sophistication and operational flexibility of the Soviet propaganda engine minimized any contextual perception drawbacks, leading to a tightly contested battle for the geopolitical narrative all the way to the end of the Cold War.

Though the U.S. PW apparatus did not match the Soviets in scope or sophistication, “the C.I.A. [had] at various times owned or subsidized more than 50 newspapers, news services, radio stations, periodicals and other communications entities . . . mostly overseas, that were used as vehicles for its extensive propaganda efforts.”²⁸¹ Furthermore, numerous foreign news organizations and nearly a dozen publishing houses were infiltrated, controlled, or at least heavily influenced by the agency.²⁸² Between 1947 and 1967, over 1,000 books were “sponsored, subsidized, or produced” by the CIA; one quarter of them in English.²⁸³ The United States controlled its own covert media empire. In the late 1940s, the CIA launched Operation MOCKINGBIRD, designed to influence media organizations and recruit individual journalists to both provide cover for CIA operations overseas and conduct propaganda. The network under MOCKINGBIRD would eventually include high-level assets at the “big three” U.S. television networks (American Broadcasting Company, National Broadcasting Company, and Columbia Broadcasting System - ABC, NBC, CBS), *Time* magazine, *Newsweek*, *Associated Press* (AP), *Reuters*, and a vast assortment of other major media outlets, and included up to 400

²⁸¹ John M. Crewdson and Joseph B. Treaster, “The CIA’s 3-Decade Effort to Mold the World’s Views,” *New York Times*, 25 December 1977, 1, 12.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. April 1976, 191–201.

journalists working under the CIA payroll.²⁸⁴ Details of the operation were revealed by the Church committee in 1975-76, with the final report concluding:

The CIA currently maintains a network of several hundred foreign individuals around the world who provide intelligence for the CIA and at times attempt to influence opinion through the use of covert propaganda. These individuals provide the CIA with direct access to a large number of newspapers and periodicals, scores of press services and news agencies, radio and television stations, commercial book publishers, and other foreign media outlets.²⁸⁵

In 1976, George H. W. Bush, as the newly appointed CIA Director, announced a change in the agency's media policy, stating that "the CIA will not enter into any paid or contract relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station."²⁸⁶

Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) were the U.S. answer to mounting Soviet propaganda efforts in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s. Originally conceived by George Kennan and Frank Wisner, RFE began broadcasting to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in 1950, recruiting primarily from the émigré communities in Europe and the United States. RL would shortly follow suit, but focused on broadcasting inside the Soviet Union in 16 regional languages, including Russian. The two organizations provided "local news not covered in state-controlled domestic media as well as religion, science, sports, Western music and locally banned literature and music." For much of Eastern Europe, RFE and RL served as critical links, not only to the Western world, but to their-own cultural and national identities that were under attack by Soviet propaganda.²⁸⁷ An effective early use of both mediums was the release and widespread dissemination of Khrushchev's 1956 speech at the 20th Congress

²⁸⁴ Mary Louise, "Mockingbird: CIA Media Manipulation," *The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP)*, 2003, <http://www.apfn.org/apfn/mockingbird.htm>.

²⁸⁵ *Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities*. April 1976, 191–201.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ A. Ross Johnson, "Then and Now: Free Media in Unfree Societies," December 2008, <http://www.rferl.org/info/history/133.html>.

of the CPSU, where the scope of Stalin's crimes was revealed. The reaction to the speech set in motion reform movements across Eastern Europe and contributed to the 1956 Hungarian Uprising, which was encouraged through RFE by suggestions of Western support and intervention that never materialized.²⁸⁸ The U.S. would learn its lesson and take a more tempered approach in future broadcasts, being careful not to instigate brutal Soviet oppression measures, while attempting to gradually influence societal perceptions.

The broadcasts were met with continuous Soviet overt and covert measures, including long-distance jamming, sabotage, intimidation and terrorist actions, including the assassination of a Bulgarian correspondent in London in 1978 and the bombing of the RFE/RL headquarters in Munich in 1981.²⁸⁹ So critical was the perceived role of RFE/RL in the final victory of the Polish Solidarity struggle that Lech Wałęsa, the cofounder of Solidarity and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, commented "Would there be earth without the sun?"²⁹⁰

The United States Information Agency (USIA) was the overt information arm. Set up in 1953, it was charged with the conduct of "public diplomacy in support of U.S. foreign policy," complementing U.S. diplomatic engagements by "communicating directly with foreign publics through a wide range of international information, educational and cultural exchange activities."²⁹¹ USIA absorbed Voice of America (VOA) as its radio arm, and utilized extensive broadcasts across the globe to push U.S. values. USIA was used to a high degree of success in the 1950s, but some claim its "unbiased mandate" for objectivity clouded its usefulness as a political tool, and as the U.S. domestic consensus regarding the Soviet Union began to falter in the 1960s and 70s, USIA began to view itself not as an instrument of national policy, but as an independent information medium. This began to change in the Carter administration, with Brzezinski

²⁸⁸ Glenn P. Hastedt, *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy* (New York, NY: Facts on File, 2004), 409.

²⁸⁹ Johnson, "Then and Now."

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Office of Public Liaison, U.S. Information Agency, Washington, D.C., August 1998, <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/oldoview.htm#overview>.

pushing the agency to adopt a more anti-Soviet line, and was finally reinvigorated in the Reagan administration with substantial funding increases and a new mandate to “reengage in ideological struggle with the Soviets.”²⁹²

The U.S. counterpropaganda effort against Soviet active measures intensified in the 1980s with Congressional hearings on Soviet covert action (The Forgery Offensive) and the establishment of the Active Measures Working Group by the Reagan administration. The interagency effort produced a series of *Foreign Affairs Notes* that were distributed by the State Department, USIA, and VOA to a global audience, and were relatively successful at exposing Soviet front organizations and disinformation campaigns. The 1987 *Foreign Affairs Note*, compiled from reporting by CIA, USIA, and Department of State stations around the globe, described the extensive USSR campaign to frame the global AIDS epidemic as U.S. germ warfare against the Third World and their own gay community. The report gave the U.S. ammunition to coerce the Soviet Union into abandoning the propaganda campaign by threatening to stop all AIDS-related scientific aid and information to the USSR, which was dealing with its own growing epidemic. The effect was immediate and virtually all AIDS-related propaganda disappeared from the headlines. The newfound emphasis on this overt information warfare tilted the ideological balance in Europe and spearheaded the final campaign against the Soviet Union.²⁹³

The early Cold War contest for information dominance, much like other confrontations between the two superpowers in the period, resulted in a protracted stalemate. In the 1970s, weak domestic consensus and strict congressional oversight resulting from revelations of CIA and executive impropriety caused a U.S. retreat from the information war, shifting the balance towards the Soviet Union. The United States was ultimately successful in the information arena by the revitalization of the media apparatus through the directed use of USIA, the State Department, and the CIA as

²⁹² Carnes Lord and Helle C. Dale, “Public Diplomacy and the Cold War: Lessons Learned,” The Heritage Foundation, September 2007.

²⁹³ Herbert Romerstein, “Counterpropaganda: We Can’t Win Without It,” in *Strategic Influence* ed. J. Michael Waller. (137–179), 162–164.

mutually supporting, but structurally independent, PW instruments within the framework of a cohesive foreign policy towards the USSR. This multiechelon effort would have been far less likely to succeed had the U.S. heavily relied on misinformation and black propaganda as a cornerstone of its information program. Any revelations of such activities would likely derail the weak domestic consensus remaining in the United States, taint the overall narrative (thus making it that much more unpalatable to target audiences), and create ample room for Soviet propaganda to discredit even the most benign U.S. efforts. Two critical lessons should be learned. First, the battle for perceptions is indispensable to foreign policy in a competitive environment and requires a substantial apportionment of national resources to be successful. An organization for the management of PW in the information environment, separate from the U.S. State Department to avoid mixing sensitive diplomacy initiatives with aggressive limited attribution information programs, is necessary to have an effective information system. Second, the United States has to rely heavily on truth to have an effective narrative; a limitation not shared by most of her geopolitical foes, both then and now.

E. U.S. MILITARY POLITICAL WARFARE

U.S. military PW can take many forms and vary in intensity. Actions can range from strategic signaling through exercises, force deployments, or weapons procurement projects, all the way to paramilitary activities and the use of conventional forces in proxy actions. Two PW categories, implemented effectively by the United States during the Cold War, deserve particular attention. The first is the development of NATO stay-behind networks in Europe in the early Cold War period and the redesign of these networks to conduct operations against Soviet interests in the West. The second category of interest is the United States' use of military and paramilitary global engagements as a PW tool against the Soviet Union.

A critical medium for countering Soviet "active measures" in Europe was the covert repurposing of NATO stay-behind networks by the U.S. and British intelligence services. The organization was a net of semiautonomous resistance cells spread across Europe with the task of conducting partisan warfare in the Soviet rear in the event of a

Red Army offensive. This structure eventually transformed from a strict stay-behind element to a PW apparatus conducting anticommunist operations. This shadow organization, generally referred to by its Italian branch's name *Gladio*, built upon the existing NATO structure, spanned across all of Western Europe and projected its influence into non-NATO member states. The frontlines of this conflict were most prominent in West Germany, Italy, and France,²⁹⁴ though actions between Soviet and Western intelligence agencies in peripheral spheres such as the Iberian Peninsula, Greece, Turkey, Belgium, Holland, and the Nordic countries were critical components to the eventual resolution of the overall struggle.

Having lived under German occupation, many people in Western Europe understood the challenges associated with developing resistance movements after a territory became subjugated. Drawing on these lessons, and in light of a developing threat from Soviet invasion, West European nations began to develop internal stay-behind mechanisms shortly following the conclusion of the Second World War. These were modeled after their own World War II experiences, as well as the training and organization of "auxiliary units" in England, set up by the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in the event of a German invasion and occupation.²⁹⁵ U.S. and British intelligence services coordinated some of these efforts on a bilateral and, occasionally, on a trilateral basis, but no formal relationships existed until the creation of the Clandestine Committee

²⁹⁴ The French Communist Party (PCF) rapidly rose to prominence at the end of World War II, primarily due to its leading resistance role against the Vichy government and German occupation. This was most visible in the first French national elections in 1945, where the Communist/Socialist coalition gained a majority of parliamentary seats. In conjunction with the newly formed French secret service, the SDECE, British SAS and the U.S. Central Intelligence Group, which originated from the OSS, began setting up stay-behind elements under the codename "Plan Bleu" in 1946. The SDECE, which recruited from right-leaning segments of French society and veterans of the anticommunist civil war in Greece, was actively engaged against the PCF. In conjunction with the CIA, the SDECE was able to split the Communist heavy CGT labor union and significantly diminish the PCF's power. In late 1947, the SDECE created a new stay-behind organization, the "Rose des Vents," which shared a close training and operational relationship with the French commando regiment "11th Demi-Brigade Parachutiste du Choc." The 11th du Choc' and Rose des Vents elements would play a prominent role in the founding of the *Organisation Armee Secrete* (OAS), which split from the policy of the French Fifth Republic to continue fighting in the Algeria Conflict. De Gaulle withdrew France from the NATO military command structure in 1966, but maintained the stay-behind structure by integrating it into the security arm of his political party, the "Service d'Action Civique" or SAC. Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies, Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe* (New York, NY: Frank Cass, 2005), 84–102.

²⁹⁵ Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 40.

of the Western Union (CCWU) in 1948, the adaptation of the NATO charter, and the formation of the Coordination & Planning Committee (CPC) and Allied Coordination Committee (ACC) in the 1950s under the NATO umbrella.²⁹⁶

United States Special Forces (USSF) and the British Special Air Service (SAS) interacted at the tactical level with NATO stay-behind elements, training operatives in sabotage and guerilla operations. USSF and SAS elements served as the principal trainers and facilitators for this network, developing coherent communication mechanisms, cross-border “rat-lines,”²⁹⁷ coordinating the distribution of large weapons and explosives caches across Europe, and conducting large-scale exercises in conjunction with conventional NATO forces.²⁹⁸ Flint Kaserne at Bad Tölz in Bavaria, home to the U.S. 10th Special Forces Group, served as the primary training base on the European continent, with additional centers in *Capo Marargiu* in Sardinia and *Las Palmas* on the Canary Islands serving as principal training venues throughout the Cold War period.²⁹⁹ Though the overt signature of such a secretive network made many member elements uncomfortable, a greater deterrent purpose was achieved by introducing added complexity into Soviet invasion and stabilization plans, especially as the scale and sophistication of the stay-behind network reached Soviet intelligence through the information sieve that was the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND).³⁰⁰

As the awareness of Soviet PW grew among Western powers and displaced the immediate prospect of a conventional military invasion, NATO planners and Western

²⁹⁶ The CPC (Coordination & Planning Committee) was established in 1952 to coordinate clandestine and stay-behind activities with NATO military planners, while the ACC (Allied Coordination Committee) was formed in 1954 to coordinate planning internally among the intelligence agencies and stay-behind networks. Most intelligence agencies had representation in both the ACC and CPC. The intelligence agencies were not subordinate to NATO command, but followed the charter of developing stay-behind mechanisms and cooperating bilaterally or multilaterally with NATO members in joint exercises, training exchanges, and adopting standardized communication platforms and intelligence terminology. *Ibid.*, 25–30, 202.

²⁹⁷ Rat line: An organized effort for moving personnel and/or material by clandestine means across a denied area or border. *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, September 17, 2007.

²⁹⁸ Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 25–30.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 42.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 203–204.

intelligence agencies began to see the utility of well trained, difficult to penetrate preestablished networks. Such networks could be used to counter Soviet long-term plans to fracture and subjugate Europe using socialist and communist political movements. The unifying democratic principles shared by NATO members strictly contrasted with the notion of internal interference and psychological warfare. As a result, West European secret services, under the coordination and training of the CIA's OPC³⁰¹ and Section "D" of MI-6, began to repurpose the stay-behind networks for internal efforts against Soviet "active measures."³⁰² Initial responsibility for coordination was split, with MI-6 developing and integrating clandestine networks in France, Belgium, Holland, Portugal and Norway, while OPC ran the nonaligned networks in Sweden and Finland, as well as the remainder of Western Europe.³⁰³ A psychological warfare department outside of NATO direct command was created in The Hague in 1962, designated the International Informational and Documentation Center (Interdoc), and aided in coordinating active information warfare in Europe through the national intelligence agencies and corresponding stay-behind networks.³⁰⁴

At the operational and tactical level of the stay-behind networks, membership was restricted to individuals who were members of right-wing national groups or demonstrated anticommunist leanings to prevent infiltration and compromise. This reliance on right-wing membership would severely damage the networks long-term credibility, as some operatives were implicated in major overt actions against democratically elected officials, right-wing violence, and the tide of "black" right-wing

³⁰¹ In 1947, the National Security Act established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Council (NSC). In addition to intelligence collection, the CIA, under directive NSC 4-A, was tasked with the conduct of "covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities which constitute[d] a threat to world peace and security" Memorandum From the Executive Secretary to the Members of the National Security Council, NSC 4, Washington, D.C., December 9, 1947, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-4.htm>.

³⁰² Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 40–42.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, 46.

³⁰⁴ Giles Scott-Smith, "Not a NATO Responsibility? Psychological Warfare, the Berlin Crisis, and the Formation of Interdoc," *Transforming NATO in the Cold War, Challenges Beyond Deterrence in the 1960's*, eds. Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 32–35.

terrorism that swept across Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. The eventual unveiling of these networks and their CIA and NATO connections significantly discredited both organizations.³⁰⁵

The network in West Germany is a good case study for understanding the effectiveness of the program across Europe. The CIA helped set up the stay behind “Technischer Dienst” of the “Bund Deutscher Jugend” (BDJ-TD), the existence of which was revealed in 1952. In addition to organizing resistance and sabotage operations in the event of a Soviet invasion, the stay-behind network had the role of domestic subversion against the Communist Party of Germany (KDP) and the Socialist Party of Germany (SDP).³⁰⁶ During this period, German stay-behind members (not only from the BDJ-TD) worked in close cooperation with the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), the German internal security service, and the ORG (Organization Gehlen) in a counterpropaganda and information war against communist elements.³⁰⁷ After the 1952 revelations, the ORG absorbed many BDJ-TD elements. West Germany joined NATO in May 1955, and the ORG became formally incorporated into the NATO CPC/ACC structure, changing its name to the Bundesnachrichtendienst in 1956, and establishing Department IV as the West German stay-behind element.³⁰⁸ The anticommunist PW campaign in West Germany proved to be an effective counter to Soviet propaganda and attempts to reintegrate East and West Germany on Soviet terms.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of the West German stay-behind network was also its biggest flaw: the lack of operational security and ease of access by Soviet intelligence agencies. The German BND was considered a “high-risk” service by most Western security services and NATO, as infiltration by the East German Ministerium für Staatssicherheitsdienst – Stasi (MfS) was rampant due to the shared culture and

³⁰⁵ Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., 193.

³⁰⁷ The ORG was set up by the U.S. as Germany's postwar security service and headed by General Reinhard Gehlen, former chief of the Fremde Heere Ost (FHO, Foreign Armies East). His vast knowledge of the USSR impressed many U.S. officials, including William Donovan, Allen Dulles, and Frank Wisner, and made him a valuable asset. Ibid., 191–192.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., 200.

camaraderie across the German east-west divide. As a result, the Stasi and Moscow were well informed of both West German and NATO stay-behind network structures and capabilities, at one time running the deputy chief of the BND, Joachim Krase, as a high-level intelligence source. According to declassified Stasi documents, the East Germans cracked the BND stay-behind “Harpoon” codes in 1979 and were able to identify over 50 operative locations on the East German and Czechoslovakian borders.³⁰⁹ The deterrent and strategic signaling aspect of the stay-behind net should not be undervalued, however, as both Soviet plans for military intervention or political reunification would be exponentially more difficult given the expansive structure and capabilities of a German resistance.

The United States, just like the USSR, engaged in numerous proxy conflicts, mainly in the Third World. War, “an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds,”³¹⁰ whether executed covertly by a national intelligence service or conducted overtly by the legitimate military arm of a nation-state, can only belong in the military element of national power. What places most Cold War military and paramilitary actions in the PW realm is the proxy nature of the conflicts, where the intended primary target of the action was not a principal belligerent. Virtually all the paramilitary actions and conventional engagements by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War were PW activities executed in tertiary worldwide engagements, aimed to tilt the global balance of power between the two superpowers.

There exists a blurred line separating conventional and political war. U.S. “hot” conflicts in the Cold War, such as Korea and Vietnam, existed on both sides of this divide. The Korean War is by far the farthest removed from the PW realm, especially once China entered the conflict in late 1950 and Soviet MiG-15s began engaging in air-to-air combat with U.S. aircraft in 1951.³¹¹ Vietnam, due to its limited nature and lack of

³⁰⁹ Ganser, *NATO’s Secret Armies*, 203–204.

³¹⁰ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War, Volume I*, eds. J. J. Graham and F. N. Maude (McLean, VA: IndyPublish.com, 2002), 4.

³¹¹ Georgi Lobov, “Black Spots of History: In the Skies of North Korea,” JPRS Report, JPRS-UAC-91-003, 28 June 1991.

direct confrontation between the United States and the USSR or China, was a far murkier affair, and contained elements more closely resembling classic PW activity, such as the Phoenix program, which was designed “to attack and destroy the political infrastructure of the Lao Dong Party . . . in South Vietnam.”³¹² Further into the PW realm were OPC and CIA paramilitary actions, starting with the civil war in Greece and the failed attempts at unconventional warfare in the Baltic States, Albania, Poland, and Ukraine in the late 1940s and early 1950s. U.S. military engagements during the Cold War ran the full spectrum of military and paramilitary activity. These included sponsored unconventional warfare in Guatemala, Tibet and Afghanistan; covert counterinsurgency efforts in the Congo; direct paramilitary action such as the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba;³¹³ and conventional military interventions such as Operation POWER PACK in the Dominican Republic³¹⁴ and Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada.³¹⁵ The one unifying feature of these actions was the strategic proxy nature of the conflicts, aimed at preventing or rolling back Soviet influence through the spread of communism. The strategic signaling effect of these actions is another key aspect of proxy warfare. By engaging in these conflicts, the United States was communicating to the Soviet Union its intentions to aggressively hold on to their sphere of influence in Latin America and Western Europe, and to preserve pockets of influence in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

Key lessons emerge from both the Gladio program and proxy warfare during the Cold War. The Gladio networks allowed the United States and its allies to counteract Soviet initiatives in Western Europe. The infrastructure developed under the banner of

³¹² Colonel Andrew R. Finlayson, USMC (Ret.), “A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations: The Tay Ninh Provincial Reconnaissance Unit and Its Role in the Phoenix Program, 1969-70,” *Studies in Intelligence* 51, no. 2.

³¹³ John Prados, *Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II* (New York, NY: W. Morrow, 1986), 24, 41–54, 98–107, 149–170, 198–211, 232–238.

³¹⁴ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968 Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, Document 43. U.S. Department of State.

³¹⁵ Ronald H. Cole, “Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada 12 October – 2 November 1983” Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., 1997.

the “stay-behind” proved a far more effective PW mechanism in coordinating anti-Soviet efforts across the continent. The critical lesson learned from these networks is that an effective covert infrastructure to combat subversion efforts by an adversary as robust and effective as the Soviet Union is difficult to develop without a pre-established backbone. The stay-behind networks set-up after the Second World War provided just such a mechanism, allowing for the creation of counter-subversion elements under a NATO banner. The idea of a Gladio-type organization as an *unconventional deterrent* is also noteworthy. This concept is often overlooked by policy makers that view clandestine and covert activities as incompatible with credible deterrent signaling in geopolitics. On the contrary, this type of deterrence is precisely PW conducted through strategic military signaling and is a viable military counter to the preferred vanguard of belligerent global actors today: engineered social movements. Finally, the use of conventional force and paramilitary action by the United States as a PW tool was a key factor in maintaining the structural global balance between the superpowers. The negative regional and social effects of these conflicts were massive. U.S. actions created protracted animosity towards the United States in key regions across the globe, kept repressive regimes in power for decades, and tallied up an enormous human cost with protracted civil wars and insurgencies, some lasting well into the 90s. When looking at these conflicts from a long-term strategic perspective, the United States managed to contain global Soviet influence by the limited application of military force. These U.S. military PW actions greatly contributed to the USSR disengaging from military activities in the Third World in the late-1980s and abandoning the Brezhnev doctrine in Europe. The Soviet Union simply could not afford to play the game any longer. Had the United States chosen not to engage in these proxy wars, communism and Soviet influence would have likely spread globally, and the United States could have become progressively isolated in the international community. West European economic and security consensus could have fractures and been replaced with a Soviet-dominated, pan-European security structure, and the idea of Western democracy might have slowly faded into the shadows.

F. U.S. ECONOMIC POLITICAL WARFARE

The use of economic warfare by the United States in the early days of the Cold War was hallmarked by embargos against communist states, primarily in the realm of strategic technology that could aid the Soviet Union in developing their military capacity. They were further intended to exploit the inefficiency of the command economy and provoke its eventual collapse. To increase the effectiveness of this economic lever, a Coordination Committee (COCOM) made up of NATO members was formed in 1949 to develop multilateral embargo lists and lasted through the duration of the Cold War. The COCOM lists were far less robust than the U.S. national list, and the United States would use the Marshall aid program to pressure COCOM members into compliance with the national list, most notably using the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act) that banned U.S. assistance to nations dealing with the Soviet Union.³¹⁶

On the covert side, the OPC conducted extensive economic actions targeting the Soviet Union. These involved commodity operations including “preclusive buying, market manipulation, and black market projects,” and fiscal operations such as counterfeiting and currency speculation.³¹⁷ The commodity covert measures were critical components of the overt embargo policy by denying Moscow strategic resources already squeezed by the overt resource denial programs. Fiscal operations targeted broader strategic aims. One example included cross-border OPC counterfeiting operations designed to destabilize the Czechoslovakian economy and increase dissent in the Soviet satellite.³¹⁸

As the Soviet economy developed into a competitive global force in the 1960s and 1970s, the use of embargos shifted in purpose from a strategic technology and commodity denial program to a more pragmatic soft power tool. This tool was designed to extract favorable agreements from the USSR and force them to “behave in the

³¹⁶ Dobson, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 59–60.

³¹⁷ Callanan, *Covert Action in the Cold War*, 54.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 56.

international economy so as not to gain political advantage in Third World countries or to cause distortions in the free market.”³¹⁹

Following the détente period of the 1970s, the U.S. reinvigorated its use of the economic lever against the USSR by attempting to “undermine Soviet standing in the world financial markets, attacked its export earnings, tightened the technological blockade, forced the U.S.S.R. into a military spending contest and bled it through a proxy war in Afghanistan.”³²⁰ The Reagan White House, through NSDD-66 entitled “Protracted Economic Warfare Against the U.S.S.R.,” established a policy of intensifying the economic privation within the Soviet Union.³²¹ Though the view persists that the objectives of the Reagan White House was to “starve” the Soviet Union into collapse through export control, global commodities manipulation, and a forced arms race, the overall strategy centered on bringing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table with a weak position and developing constructive agreements that favored the United States.³²²

The Soviet Union remained relatively secure from direct economic manipulation due to a wealth of natural resources, reasonably secure foreign exchange reserves, limited interaction within the international capital market, and heavy investment in the exportation of strategic commodities that were too important to embargo. Despite this security, vulnerabilities did exist, especially with the USSR’s dependence on capital generated by the oil and gas market to maintain the Soviet military and industrial capacity, the requirement for hard currency, and the relative economic weakness of Soviet Bloc members such as Poland.³²³

In the summer of 1981, the United States launched its economic offensive against the USSR. Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe had limited export capacity to the West, and the “bloc’s only significant source of hard currency . . . was Soviet oil and gas

³¹⁹ Dobson, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 61.

³²⁰ R.T. Naylor, *Economic Warfare: Sanctions, Embargo Busting, and Their Human Cost* (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 2001), 39.

³²¹ Daugherty, *Executive Secrets*, 199.

³²² Dobson, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 62.

³²³ *Ibid.*, 39–40.

sales.”³²⁴ This made most East European economies wholly dependent on the Soviet Union. Poland was especially vulnerable, needing to borrow “\$10 to \$11 Billion, of which \$7 to \$8 Billion would roll over the huge existing debt.”³²⁵ The United States pressured Western banks to demand immediate repayment of Polish debt, causing a Soviet bailout of \$4.5 billion in hard currency, essentially wiping out Soviet hard currency reserves in Western banks and helping shift the Soviet trade surplus of 1980 to a \$3 billion deficit.³²⁶ The attack on the Soviet system took on a simple formula; grain and energy. Soviet collectivization under Stalin and shortsighted agricultural reforms under Khrushchev turned the USSR into a net importer of grain by the mid-1960s, with domestic production fixed at 65 million tons per year for nearly two decades through the 1980s. The growing urban population in the Soviet Union demanded the ever-increasing imports of grain from the West, and the corresponding hard currency outflow was only partially offset by the oil and gas exports.³²⁷ Reagan reversed Carter’s embargos on U.S. grain sales to the USSR that followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This was not a humanitarian gesture. The move further extracted hard currency from the Soviet Union and left the Soviet oil and gas sector as the single pillar holding up the Eastern Bloc.³²⁸

U.S. efforts at affecting the Soviet natural gas exports to Europe played a key role in pressuring the Soviet economy. The United States prevented the full development of a trans-Siberian natural gas pipeline that would supply Western Europe by denying the use of any American equipment or technology, to include the use of U.S. subsidiaries abroad in the construction of the project. This led the USSR to sink billions of additional dollars into the venture that, in the end, could only produce half of the original expected capacity.³²⁹ In 1982, the project suffered a massive setback when a multikiloton

³²⁴ Friedman, *The Fifty Year War*, 460.

³²⁵ Friedman, *The Fifty Year War*, 460.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Yegor Gaidar, “The Soviet Collapse: Grain and Oil,” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, April 2007, <http://www.aei.org/feature/the-Soviet-collapse/>.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Dobson, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 40.

explosion destroyed a significant amount of pipeline. The explosion has been attributed to a CIA effort to use a Canadian company to develop deliberately flawed software that, after a period of normal operation, “reset pump speeds and valve settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to the pipeline joints and welds.” Thanks to Western penetration of the KGB’s Directorate T for Science and Technology, the CIA supposedly knew of the Soviet plans to steal the software and was able to place the “Trojan Horse” and conduct perhaps the first large-scale, industrial cyber-attack in history.³³⁰

U.S. options in effecting Soviet revenue from oil production were limited, primarily centering on the ban of advanced extraction technology that the Soviet Union could not procure elsewhere. In 1980, the price of crude had spiked to over \$35 per barrel and coincided with a major increase in gold prices. To put this into perspective, the Soviet economy annually gained roughly one billion USD for every one dollar increase in crude. Over the next six years, however, the price of both oil and gas were gradually driven down, causing a final plunge of oil prices in 1986 to under \$10 per barrel and a near 50% devaluation of gold.³³¹ Throughout the early 1980s, Saudi Arabia and other OPEC nations attempted to prop up the price of oil by cutting production, but waning global demand and the introduction of new sources of petroleum from the North Sea, Mexico, and Alaska, as well as the refusal of emerging petrol players such as Great Britain and Norway to cut production prevented such price manipulation.³³² There still remains some debate about whether the final collapse of oil in 1986 was a product of a U.S.-Saudi economic warfare strategy to influence the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan or simply a Saudi move to ramp up production and find a bottom to the market, paving the

³³⁰ Thomas C. Reed, “At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War” (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 2004), 268–269.

³³¹ Macrotrends, “Asset Price Bubbles Since 1976,” <http://www.macrotrends.net/1311/asset-price-bubbles-since-1976>.

³³² Rania El Gamal, “Facing New Oil Glut, Saudis Avoid 1980s Mistakes to Halt Price Slide,” *Reuters*, October 14, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/14/us-saudi-oil-policy-analysis-idUSKCN0I229320141014>.

way for a gradual price recovery.³³³ The likely scenario is that both factors played into the Saudi calculus. The gradual squandering of Soviet gold reserves (from over 2,000 tons in 1953 to just under 600 in 1984) in supporting pro-Soviet regimes and buttressing a structurally weak Soviet economy in the preceding decades,³³⁴ and the drop of gold prices from the 1980 peak further complicated the Soviet economic position. The combined effect on the USSR was staggering, causing a near \$20 billion loss in annual revenue, the necessity for increased dependence on foreign lending to prevent a complete economic meltdown across the Soviet Bloc, and was perhaps the pivotal condition leading to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.³³⁵

U.S. economic PW directly targeted the Soviet Union and its satellite states in the 1980s and was a decisive factor in resolving the Cold War. A wide range of measures were employed by the United States including the denial of technology, preclusive commodities purchasing, currency and banking sector manipulation, the initiation of an arms race that the Soviet economy could not afford, and indirect sabotage of Soviet oil and gas infrastructure. The “weight” of U.S. economic leverage in the twentieth century was its biggest strategic asset. This was especially true in the PW realm; however, this view advances the flawed concept of a “weighted” U.S. strategy towards the economic lever of national power that has persisted to this day. The Cold War was won across all of DIME; synchronized by a clear expression of national strategic objectives. Overreliance on the economic lever of power, while neglecting other PW options, allows an opponent to predict, compensate for, and counteract economic measures; a pattern that has clearly reemerged in the twenty-first century.

³³³ Several sources have claimed that the final plunge was a result of a U.S.-Saudi arrangement in response to Soviet Actions in Afghanistan. Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), 133; Michael Dobbs, *Down with Big Brother: The Fall of the Soviet Empire* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 137; Statement made by Michael Reagan on March 6, 2014 in an op-ed on Townhall.com, <http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/mar/13/michael-reagan/ronald-reagans-son-says-his-father-got-saudis-pump/>.

³³⁴ Alan Smith, *Russia and the World Economy: Problems of Integration* (London: Routledge, 1993), 97.

³³⁵ Gaidar, “The Soviet Collapse: Grain and Oil.”

G. CONCLUSION

The United States succeeded in the Cold War thanks, in large part, to the effectiveness of its PW programs. Two central concepts made these programs successful. First, U.S. PW was effective when it supported clearly stated, overt, national objectives. This was true in the 1950s and 60s with the policy of containing the Soviet Union, but not aggressively contesting for space within the Soviet sphere. The policy may have generated Western inaction during the uprisings in Hungary in 1956 and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, but maintained U.S. strategic influence in Africa, Latin America, and, to a lesser extent, Asia. The breakdown of domestic consensus in the late 1960s and 1970s, and the added turmoil over the CIAs covert action programs, created a rift between national strategy and PW that allowed the USSR to fill the empty space and make significant strategic gains. The shift to an aggressive and overt anti-Soviet national policy in the 1980s, coupled with a heavy investment in PW mechanisms, allowed the United States to reengage in the Cold War, but this time with the aim of rolling back Soviet global influence and domination of Eastern Europe.

The second key factor for the success of U.S. PW programs was the synchronized approach that included substantial effort and commitment of national resources across the DIME spectrum. The 1980s saw a reinvigoration of PW with numerous covert actions; the National Endowment for Democracy and similar diplomatic programs a new focus on countering Soviet propaganda and aggressively engaging in the information domain with USIA, VOA, RFE/RL, and the U.S. State Department; military support for the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, and a growing arms race that the Soviet Union could not afford, and, finally aggressive economic warfare targeted at the heart of a structurally flawed Soviet command economy. The pressure generated on the Soviet system by a synchronized PW campaign across the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic levers of national power in support of a singular, overt national policy objective of the United States was a major contributing factor to the collapse of USSR's domination of Eastern Europe and the eventual failure of the 74-year experiment in Soviet communism. As is often the case with empires, victory brought neglect, and aggressive U.S. PW was decried as a vestige of the Cold War, unsuitable for the new internationalist structure.

H. CASE STUDY: *SOLIDARITY* AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE EASTERN BLOC

The Pope! How many divisions has he got?

-Joseph Stalin³³⁶

The triumph of the Polish Solidarity movement in the 1980s is perhaps the finest example of successful U.S. PW against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unlike Soviet models that relied on a phased, protracted, and systematic approach, U.S. political warfare was far more opportunistic and reactionary in nature. For this reason, structurally framing a case study on U.S. PW using a phased model, similar to the Soviet case studies, is problematic. The U.S. PW campaign in Poland did not generate the labor crisis, nor the economic privation of the Polish command economy, nor orchestrate the formation and organization of Polish opposition. The U.S. simply exploited an existing opportunity that practically fell in its lap. Following the declaration of martial law by the Polish regime in 1981, the United States responded with a well-coordinated PW strategy that effectively used purported covert action³³⁷ and overt policies across the *diplomatic*, *economic*, and most importantly, the *informational* elements of national power. U.S. support for the Solidarity trade union helped sustain the opposition, enabling the gradual change in the geopolitical landscape in Eastern Europe and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Bloc. U.S. willingness to engage in aggressive PW in Poland, with covert action as a key element, was just one of *many* factors that contributed to the overall resolution of the Cold War. However, without such measures being implemented across the full breadth of national capacity in lock step with overt national aims, the repressive regimes behind the Iron Curtain would likely endure well into the '90s and perhaps beyond. This case study

³³⁶ As quoted in Winston Churchill, *The Second World War* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), vol. 1, ch. 8, 105.

³³⁷ The USG does not officially confirm that a covert program took place in Poland; however, multiple unofficial sources exist to substantiate the contention that a covert action occurred. All further references in this document to U.S. covert action are substantiated only through available open sources, and cannot be verified through official USG channels. See: Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 450–51; Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994); Carl Bernstein, "Cover Story: The Holy Alliance," *Time*, June 24, 2001.

mirrors the structure of the preceding chapter, discussing the background, covert action program, and PW across three of the four elements of national power. The *military* played an important background role in U.S. strategy by helping containing the Soviet threat, but was not a principal component of the PW action in Poland.

1. Background

Helsinki was a major turning point in the Cold War. Criticized by many as the selling of Eastern Europe to the Soviets through the reaffirmation of Yalta, the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) gained something enigmatic and invaluable for the West—it created a spark of resistance. By 1976, a number of organizations began to spring up across Eastern Europe in line with the CSCE human rights provision. This was especially evident in Poland, which had a strong resistance base following the strikes by the Gdańsk shipyard workers in 1970 that ended in a violent military crackdown, but forced significant regime concessions.³³⁸ The Helsinki accords allowed Polish opposition to form the Workers' Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników – KOR) and the Movement for Defense of Human and Civic Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela - ROPCiO), organizations that “gave rise to the idea of an independent trade union to defend the rights of workers.”³³⁹

The Catholic Church also played a key role in the Polish resistance movement. While KOR and ROPCiO provided the structural base for the formation of Solidarity in 1980, the strength of will to challenge the existing regime, as well as the underground networks to sustain the dissident movement in its darkest hours, had their origins in 1978, with the election of Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II. In June 1979, John Paul returned to Poland and, while speaking to crowds numbering in the millions, challenged the fundamental premise of communism and reaffirmed the idea of human and spiritual freedom in the Polish narrative and the necessity to maintain trust and faith, and “not be defeated.” The Polish regime propaganda and censorship efforts failed, and

³³⁸ Libcom, “1970–1971: Uprising in Poland,” <https://libcom.org/history/1970-71-uprising-poland>.

³³⁹ Gates, *From the Shadows*, 85–87.

only highlighted the crude efforts to misrepresent the dramatic events unfolding before their very eyes.³⁴⁰

Solidarity formed in August 1980, arising out of growing strikes at the Gdańsk shipyards that expanded to support mines, factories, and businesses across the country. The movement, organized under the Interfactory Strike Committee (Międzyzakładowy Komitet Strajkowy, MKS), issued a list of 21 demands including the acceptance of free trade unions independent of the Communist Party; freedom of speech, the press, and publication; access to mass media; the release of all political prisoners; and the selection of management independent of communist party affiliation.³⁴¹ The possibility of nationwide work stoppages forced the regime to accept the demands and triggered the resignation of Edward Gierek as party chairman, who was replaced by Stanisław Kania on 6 September 1980.³⁴² From the perspective of the USSR, the path Poland was taking resembled the Czechoslovakian reform movements in 1968. The entire Soviet system was in danger. By mid-September, growing concern of a Soviet military intervention began to emerge. A military intervention was supposedly planned for 5 December and several accounts indicate that preemptive signaling by the Carter Administration and Kania's pleas for more time convinced the Warsaw Pact leadership to delay the invasion.³⁴³

³⁴⁰ Peggy Noonan, "We Want God," *Wall Street Journal*, April 7, 2005, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122479408458463941>.

³⁴¹ UNESCO, "Twenty-One Demands, Gdańsk, August 1980. The birth of the SOLIDARITY trades union – a massive social movement," 2003.

³⁴² Gates, *From the Shadows*, 163.

³⁴³ Observation of unscheduled large-scale Soviet military exercises on the East German-Polish border beginning on 30 November, (Gates, *From the Shadows*, 166.) and information received from a high-ranking CIA source in the Polish general staff indicated that a Warsaw Pact intervention was imminent. (Malcolm Byrne, "New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 1980-1982," *Cold War International History Project: Cold War Flashpoints*, Issue 11, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., Winter 1998.) The U.S. administration approved Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) recommendations to raise NATO's alert posture, activate the war-time headquarters, and implement other high visibility measures such as the increase of war reserve munitions, all as a signal to the Soviet Union. Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Adviser, drafted a hotline message warning of "very grave consequences to U.S.-Soviet relations" in the event of a Soviet invasion. A Soviet intervention was, in fact, planned for 5 December, and included 18 Warsaw Pact divisions, with an additional nine Soviet divisions scheduled to arrive within days. Kania was attending a Warsaw Pact summit in Moscow on the day of the scheduled intervention, and managed to convince the Soviet leadership to delay the intervention by promising to stop concessions to Solidarity and regain control. Following these events, the United States initiated "clandestine activities" in support of dissident Poles. (Gates, *From the Shadows*, 167–168.)

Politburo minutes from the time period, however, indicate that the invasion plans and corresponding preparations were likely an elaborate deception operation (*maskirovka*) designed to pressure the Polish government into harsher control measures.³⁴⁴

In early spring, 1981, the situation in Poland began to deteriorate again, with Solidarity continuing to extract concessions from the regime, especially on issues of security service repression and political prisoners.³⁴⁵ CIA assessments of the situation indicated a serious dilemma for the Soviet Union. CIA Director William Casey wrote to the President:

If they go [invade], they will get economic chaos arising from the debt, a slowdown of the whole Polish work force and millions of Poles conducting a guerrilla war against them. If they don't, they are open to the West and a political force which could unravel their entire system. Before sending divisions in, they will move heaven and earth to get the Poles to crack down on themselves.³⁴⁶

The assessment was accurate, and the Soviets determined that the price to pay for a military intervention was too high. The decision was the death knell for the Soviet Union. Solidarity continued its peaceful strikes and intensified pressure on the regime through early December 1981. The Soviets rejected proposed policies of Polish “national reconciliation” and forced a resolution. Communist Party Chairman Kania was replaced by Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski, who assumed both of the top posts in Poland. On 13 December, amid the threat of a general strike, martial law was declared.³⁴⁷

The declaration of martial law on December 13, 1981 was the impetus for initiating a comprehensive overt and covert program to challenge the Soviet Union in Poland. Solidarity was outlawed, nearly 6,000 leaders within the movement were detained, with hundreds charged with “treason, subversion and counterrevolution,” and

³⁴⁴ Wilfried Loth, “The Soviet Nonintervention in Poland, 1980/81,” *Lelewel-Gespräche*, Historisches Institut der Universität Duisburg-Essen, June 2012.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 231.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 232.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 232–237.

Polish resistance was driven underground and on the verge of collapse.³⁴⁸ Prior to the declaration of martial law, Solidarity operated openly for nearly 16 months, becoming ingrained in the Polish national narrative. The crackdown was an opportunity for the U.S. to exploit the massive resentment growing within Polish society and help bring the Catholic Church into “direct conflict with the Polish Regime.”³⁴⁹

On June 7, 1982, Ronald Reagan and Pope John Paul II met for the first time in the Vatican Library. Both men shared a common vision that rejected the communist dominance in Eastern Europe imposed by the 1945 Yalta accord. The extent of the collaboration between the Catholic Church and the United States Government over Poland remains unknown; however, at a minimum, the exchange of intelligence did take place. The Catholic Church would go on to play a critical role in the mitigation of violent repression by the Polish government and fostering eventual dialogue with Solidarity. On the local level, Catholic institutions would serve as vital hubs of the Polish underground movement.³⁵⁰

The hesitation of the Soviet and Polish regimes to use the Red Army to crush unrest, as they did in East Germany and Hungary in the 1950s and Czechoslovakia in 1968, exposed a critical vulnerability inside the Iron Curtain. For the United States, the concept to exploit this vulnerability was simple. If Solidarity could be kept alive and nurtured through both covert and overt actions following the imposition of martial law, and the Communist PRL (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa) government gradually made to look impotent in the face of popular opposition, then Poland could be made to move Westward, if not torn away from the Soviet orbit entirely.³⁵¹

³⁴⁸ Carl Bernstein, “Cover Story: The Holy Alliance,” *Time*, June 24, 2001, <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,159069,00.html>.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

2. U.S. Covert Action

The covert action was undertaken under the wide-ranging umbrella of NSDD Number 32, which laid out Reagan's National Security Strategy. NSDD-32 reversed the long-standing policy of containment that had pervaded U.S. foreign policy for nearly 30 years, stating that a fundamental U.S. objective was to "reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world" and "encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries."³⁵²

The cornerstone of the covert action was the supply of funding for Polish resistance. The CIA used various European financial institutions with existing Polish ties to funnel money to Solidarity. By the mid-1980s, Solidarity's operational budget was upwards of \$2 million,³⁵³ principally funneled through CIA fund transfer mechanisms, using witting and unwitting European financial institutions and individuals.³⁵⁴ CIA contact with Solidarity was established inside Poland by February 1982, instituting the funding transfer mechanism through a European businessman in Warsaw.³⁵⁵ Equipment and technology also played a vital role. The CIA used various channels to smuggle funds and media support infrastructure to Solidarity. The network encompassed Catholic priests, recruited agents, U.S. and European labor organizations,³⁵⁶ and newly activated smuggling mechanisms that included the direct maritime shipments from Sweden to the Gdańsk shipyards using an Israeli Mossad ratline, where the Polish underground collected the equipment prior to inspection.³⁵⁷ Large quantities of third party-purchased printing presses, copiers, fax machines, cameras, shortwave radios and transmitters, teleprinters, and computers, were smuggled into Poland and formed the physical

³⁵² U.S. National Security Strategy, (NSC-NSDD-32), May 20, 1982. <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-1618t.gif>.

³⁵³ Bernstein, "Cover Story."

³⁵⁴ Schweizer, *Victory*, 76.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 84–86.

³⁵⁶ Bernstein, "Cover Story."

³⁵⁷ UK Essays, "Covert Support to Solidarity in Poland," <http://www.ukessays.com/essays/history/covert-support-to-solidarity-in-poland-history-essay.php>.

infrastructure to sustain Solidarity through enhanced command and control and propaganda potential.³⁵⁸ Most mechanisms remained unaware of CIA involvement in the process. The logistics chain included multiple large storage warehouses in Brussels and operatives in Stockholm that would remark shipping containers as “tractor parts,” “machine tools,” and “fish products,” and ship them to operatives in Gdańsk for distribution in Poland.³⁵⁹ To enhance Solidarity’s intelligence capability and preempt regime action, the CIA reportedly deployed a four-man, joint CIA-NSA Special Collection Element that conducted both passive and active operations in Warsaw, attempting to provide intelligence support to the Polish underground.³⁶⁰ The amount of direct intelligence actually reaching the underground through this channel is speculative; however, by 1983, a Polish underground security and intelligence organization, referred to as the Bureau of Hygiene and Safety, was set up by the resistance. Resistance operatives in the Bureau maintained communication equipment, served as a hub for resistance command and control, conducted site surveys for meeting locations and hideouts, and managed counterintelligence (CI) operations against potential infiltration of the opposition by Polish or Soviet security services.³⁶¹

3. Diplomatic

On the diplomatic side, relentless U.S. pressure to force the Polish government to accept Solidarity played a critical role in the eventual success of the movement. Following the implementation of martial law, the U.S. suspended Poland’s “most-favored-nation trade status and vetoed Poland’s application for membership in the International Monetary Fund.”³⁶² Martial law was lifted in 1983, but this was, in reality, a façade. Multiple new laws designed to suppress Solidarity, even stricter than those

³⁵⁸ Bernstein, “Cover Story.”

³⁵⁹ Schweizer, *Victory*, 146.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 88.

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 145.

³⁶² U.S. country study on Poland, <http://countrystudies.us/poland/92.htm>.

enforced under martial law, were adopted by the regime.³⁶³ The United States continued the pressure, demanding a change in Poland's political prisoner policy and movement towards "political pluralism."³⁶⁴ The United States further used indirect ties to parts of the European socialist international, including French and Swedish officials, to support programs aimed at the gradual establishment of a Christian Democratic majority in Poland, leading to the reconstitution of the Polish Socialist Party in 1987.³⁶⁵

The AFL-CIO had a long-standing relationship with Polish labor movements through the 1970s,³⁶⁶ and became the primary mechanism of U.S. support for the Solidarity movement in 1980 and 1981.³⁶⁷ Following the imposition of martial law, the AFL-CIO was intimately involved in the assistance and preparation of propaganda material and the smuggling of equipment to Solidarity. Though U.S. covert programs were kept from the AFL-CIO leaders, so as not to degrade the legitimacy of the organization, a high degree of coordination with the administration did exist. The biggest advantage that the AFL-CIO had over CIA covert action was its ability to assist in the organization and management of the movement. This had a decisive impact on the long-term sustainability and viability of Solidarity in Poland.³⁶⁸ By 1983, the AFL-CIO had been absorbed under Reagan's initiative for the NED. The NED was an aggressive venture to support various prodemocracy movements worldwide, and was the principal mechanism to supply funds to anticommunist organizations. The NED provided some \$3.7 million to Solidarity, starting in 1984.³⁶⁹

³⁶³ Leopold Labedz, *Poland Under Jaruzelski: A Comprehensive Sourcebook on Poland During and After Martial Law* (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984), 270–75.

³⁶⁴ U.S. country study on Poland, <http://countrystudies.us/poland/92.htm>.

³⁶⁵ Piotr Wróbel and Anna Wróbel, *Historical Dictionary of Poland: 1945-1996* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 1924.

³⁶⁶ James M. Shevis, "The AFL-CIO and Poland's Solidarity," *World Affairs* 144, no. 1 (Summer, 1981): 31–35.

³⁶⁷ Gates, *From the Shadows*, 237.

³⁶⁸ Bernstein, "Cover Story."

³⁶⁹ Pee, "Political Warfare Old and New," 22.

4. Information

Propaganda played a critical role in Solidarity's long-term success. CIA-funded equipment and support started arriving in 1982, which allowed for the mass publication of print media and broadcast signal intrusion. The overall purpose of the propaganda campaign was to "supply uncensored information on political, social, and economic issues, and to maintain a spirit of opposition among the populace."³⁷⁰ Poland's strong history of underground press through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—from Polish dissident literature during the revolt against Russia in 1863, to resistance publications during the Second World War, to the anticommunist press that flourished even under Stalin's subjugation in the 1940s and 1950s—set the eventual conditions for the success of Solidarity in the 1980s.³⁷¹

In the mid-1970s, Polish opposition was again on the rise, and the regime was reluctant to aggressively block the dissident press for fear of destabilizing the delicate sociopolitical structure. The Workers' Defense Committee was very active during this period in distributing illegal publications including *Communique (Lomunikat)*, *Information Bulletin (Biuletyn Informatyczny)*, and *The Worker (Rabotnik)*. Further illegal ventures included NOWA, an independent publishing house targeting "laborers, students, farmers, and other social groups." These organizations were the seeds of the Solidarity's media network that emerged by mid-1980.³⁷² Solidarity made significant early strides after its inception, extracting free-media concessions from the Polish government that included legal recognition of unofficial publishing activities, respect for freedom of speech, and commitments not to suppress independent publications. The movement also ran its own press, *Solidarity Weekly (Tygodnik Solidarnosci)*, with individual branches across the country contributing with a number of secondary journals and newsletters.³⁷³

³⁷⁰ Laurence J. Orzell, "Psychological Operations in Action: Poland's Underground Media," in *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies* ed. Frank L. Goldstein, (Air University Press, September 1996), 279.

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² Ibid., 280.

³⁷³ Ibid., 281.

The base for Polish underground propaganda was very strong and, with Solidarity being driven underground after the declaration of martial law, became a solid foundation for U.S. covert action.

The martial law period lasted until July 1983. During this time, much of the existing Solidarity infrastructure operated on a limited basis from within the urban centers, but nonetheless kept up a significant level of publication consisting of short newsletters and limited runs on periodicals, largely restricted by the availability of equipment and the regime's strict monitoring and attempted control of printing supplies. By the mid-1980s, however, the Polish underground press was reinvigorated with funding, equipment, and supplies. New dissident press organizations began to take prominence and made up for aggressive regime suppression of Solidarity print and broadcast media. These included the Committees for Social Defense (*Komitety Obrony Społecznej*) that published *KOS*, a journal directed at the Polish intellectual community; *Fighting Solidarity* (*Solidarnosc Walczaca*), advocating a more confrontational position within Solidarity; and *The Confederation for an Independent Poland* (*Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej*), which propagated an aggressive antiregime stance through journals *Independence* (*Niepodleglosc*) and *We Don't Want Commies* (*Nie chcemy komuny*).³⁷⁴ CIA funds were funneled directly into *NOWA* and supported weekly newspapers such as *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, which was operated through an impressive clandestine network consisting of 37 different printing locations prior to actual assembly and distribution.³⁷⁵ Émigré journals, namely the Paris-based *Kultura* and the opposition publication, *Aneks*, based in Sweden, also played an important role in the Polish resistance. *Kultura* was founded in 1946 and served as an intellectual outlet for the opposition in the 1980s, coordinating and framing the debate within Solidarity, while circulating appropriate tactics and strategy, especially during the martial law period.³⁷⁶ In the 1950s and '60s,

³⁷⁴ Orzell, "Psychological Operations in Action: Poland's Underground Media," 280–282.

³⁷⁵ Schweizer, *Victory*, 90.

³⁷⁶ George Sanford, *Military Rule in Poland: The Rebuilding of Communist Power, 1981-1983* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 257–258.

Kultura was funded heavily by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a CIA-backed front organization designed to support anticommunist publications in Western Europe.³⁷⁷

By 1985, the Polish resistance was producing some 400 underground periodicals, with circulation in the tens of thousands. Thousands of books and pamphlets directly challenged Soviet authority and the Polish communist government. Anticommunist documentaries were widely distributed and viewed by millions of Poles.³⁷⁸ Videocassettes from the Paris-based *Videoknotakt* organization and Polish-produced interviews with Lech Wałęsa were in wide circulation. Audiocassettes with antiregime songs, news, interviews with various dissident leaders, and programs on Poland's history added to the media onslaught.³⁷⁹ Radio Solidarity, set up during the martial law period by Zbigniew Romaszewski, recovered from initial suppression and was effectively operating across Poland.³⁸⁰ Solidarity broke through Polish television and radio broadcasts with slogans of *Solidarność Żyje* (Solidarity Lives), and "RESIST," calling for mass demonstrations and strikes.³⁸¹ More symbolic propaganda efforts included the printing of stamps depicting dissident Polish leaders, commemorating "150 Years of Underground Press in Poland," and even honoring George Orwell, as well as counterfeit currency depicting Lech Wałęsa in place of Polish communist leaders.³⁸²

RFE and VOA were also instrumental in the information campaign in Poland. During the Pope's visit in 1979, both VOA³⁸³ and RFE³⁸⁴ provided minute-by-minute

³⁷⁷ Taras Kuzio, "U.S. support for Ukraine's Liberation During the Cold War: A Study of Prolog Research and Publishing Corporation," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 2012.

³⁷⁸ Bernstein, "Cover Story."

³⁷⁹ Orzell, "Psychological Operations in Action," 287.

³⁸⁰ Zbigniew Romaszewski, Interview. The Freedom Collection. http://www.freedomcollection.org/interviews/zbigniew_and_zofia_romaszewski/.

³⁸¹ Bernstein, "Cover Story."

³⁸² Orzell, "Psychological Operations in Action," 283.

³⁸³ Ted Lipien, Tomlinson on Voice of America coverage of Pope John Paul II, May 12, 2014, <http://tedlipien.com/blog/category/history-2/cold-war-blog/feed/>.

³⁸⁴ Arch Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 269.

coverage of the events, largely negating Polish censorship attempts, while stressing the Pope's calls for religious and social freedom. Just prior to and during the martial law period, RFE exercised a restrained approach. Having learned hard lessons from encouraging the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and watching it be crushed by Soviet tanks, RFE walked the fine line of supporting Solidarity and streaming much needed information to the opposition, while at the same time not encouraging open confrontation that could spark a Soviet intervention.³⁸⁵ As the movement was driven underground and Radio Solidarity suffered significant setbacks, including the seizure of several transmitters in August 1982,³⁸⁶ RFE and VOA became the principal source of information. RFE broadcast streamed programs critiquing communist policies, focused on the dismal state of the Polish economy, and presented a noncommunist vision of Poland in a program entitled *The Poland that Could Be*.³⁸⁷ Due to strong jamming, VoA generally came in better than RFE in many areas, and provided a similar narrative, broadcasting interviews with Polish opposition leaders, reporting on U.S. and private efforts to help the dissident movement, calling for the release of political prisoners, stressing the need for national reconciliation, and even running religious services from a Polish-American church in the D.C. area.³⁸⁸

5. Economic

By 1980, Poland, weighed down by nearly \$25 billion in foreign debt, plummeting national income, and a stall in foreign investment entered an economic crisis. The economic turmoil created a unique opportunity for the United States to engage in proxy PW in Poland.³⁸⁹ The Solidarity trade union movement, primarily made up of shipyard and coal workers, was the ideal economic instrument for the United States to

³⁸⁵ Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom*, 269.

³⁸⁶ Lawrence C. Soley and John S. Nichols, *Clandestine Radio Broadcasting: A Study of Revolutionary and Counterrevolutionary Electronic Communication* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1987), 208.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 272.

³⁸⁸ Ted Lipien, Interweaving of Public Diplomacy and U.S. International Broadcasting, A Historical Analysis, <http://tedlipien.com/blog/category/history-2/cold-war-blog/feed/>.

³⁸⁹ R.T. Naylor, *Economic Warfare: Sanctions, Embargo Busting, and Their Human Cost*, (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 2001), 39–41.

pressure the Polish system into capitulation and reform. In the already weakened economic environment, any labor stoppages in the coal mines spelled financial disaster for the Polish communist government, as Poland almost wholly relied on coal export to pay for its petroleum imports from the USSR, as well as generating much of its revenue from West European trade. From 1980-1981, work stoppages and wide-spread labor agitation were having a devastating impact on the already run-down Polish economy.³⁹⁰ Polish national income had dropped by 25%, standards of living had plummeted, inflation was at 15% in the first half of 1981 alone, and food and base necessity items were barely enough to sustain the population. One-third of Poland's industrial capacity was not functioning due to endemic "shortages of energy, materials, and intermediate goods." Central planning was on the verge of collapse.³⁹¹

Once the Polish government declared martial law and banned the Solidarity movement, the United States responded by escalating its economic measures; stopping further lines of credit to the Polish government, ceasing the supply of grain crippling Poland's agricultural sector, restricting Polish access to critical industrial equipment and technology, and increasing the tariffs on Polish goods. U.S. objectives were clear; to either force the Soviet Union into a bailout it could not afford, force the Polish government into deeper austerity and social control measures that would fracture the sociopolitical structure of the country, or extract drastic reform concessions from the Regime to bring Solidarity into the open political structure, eventually triggering a pro-Western slide.³⁹² Poland's leadership attempted economic reforms to modernize factories and develop "market socialism," but these were empty gestures that failed to accept the reality of a hollow and unrecoverable command economy. A combination of growing labor unrest, Western economic measures, dropping demand for poor quality Polish export goods, a substantial trade imbalance, mounting foreign debt, and high inflation

³⁹⁰ Naylor, *Economic Warfare*, 39-41.

³⁹¹ Mario Nuti, "The Polish Crisis: Economic Factors and Constraints," *The Socialist Register*, 1981.

³⁹² R.T. Naylor, *Economic Warfare*, 39-41.

had effectively crippled the Polish economic system.³⁹³ The United States was able to effectively utilize economic pressure to destabilize the Polish economy and incentivize regime reforms so that Solidarity could survive. Following the lifting of martial law, U.S. sanctions remained in play to extract three primary demands from the Polish regime: a general amnesty for all political prisoners, the opening an official dialogue with the Church, and the recognition and acceptance of Solidarity. The regime conceded all three.³⁹⁴ More importantly, the United States used the hanging \$2 billion in guaranteed credits that Poland could not repay, and the cessation of economic sanctions in 1987, to ease some economic pressure on the Polish population and guarantee Polish capitulation to move towards “national reconciliation.”³⁹⁵ This greatly bolstered the prospects for Solidarity to emerge from the shadows and advanced the possibility of ripping Poland from the Soviet Bloc.

6. The Beginning of the End

By early-1987, the internal and external pressure on the Polish regime was unbearable. Labor strikes and Western sanctions were crippling the Polish economy, and the Soviet Union was unable to support the Polish communists due to its own economic spiral, brought about by its failing command economy and aggressive U.S. economic warfare. By mid-1988, Gorbachev had publically rejected the concept of Soviet interference in Eastern Europe and stated that the Polish government could not function without Solidarity.³⁹⁶ Naïvely, Gorbachev believed the social and political reforms in Eastern Europe (and in the USSR) would usher in a new era of legitimate communist governance across the Bloc, disregarding the lessons of his predecessors that the entire communist system functioned on brutality, repression, and force.³⁹⁷ A final wave of labor

³⁹³ John E. Jackson, Jacek Klich, and Krystyna Poznanska, *The Political Economy of Poland's Transition: New Firms and Reform Governments* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 21.

³⁹⁴ Schweizer, *Victory*, 265–267.

³⁹⁵ Times Wire Service, U.S. Lifts Sanction but Warns Poland, *Los Angeles Times*, February 20, 1987. http://articles.latimes.com/1987-02-20/news/mn-3075_1_u-s-lifts-sanctions.

³⁹⁶ Bernstein, “Cover Story.”

³⁹⁷ Gates, *From the Shadows*, 450.

strikes at the Gdańsk shipyards and a number of coal mines in August 1988 finally forced the communist government to the negotiating table. Solidarity was legalized in April 1989 and allowed to participate in open elections in June.³⁹⁸ Despite preelection public opinion polls “virtually assuring” a communist victory, Solidarity won all 161 of their allowed seats in the Sejm and 99 out of 100 seats in the Senate.³⁹⁹ Two key groups within the Communist PZPR (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza); the centrist Alliance of Democrats (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne) and the United Peoples Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe), defected to join Solidarity and formed a new coalition government with a noncommunist prime minister.⁴⁰⁰

The Communist monopoly on power in Eastern Europe that had existed for over 40 years had been broken. The Polish example opened a wave of counterrevolutionary transitions in Eastern Europe, with Hungary abandoning “Leninism” and opening its borders for the passage of East Germans fleeing to the West, the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, and revolutions in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania in the closing months of 1989.⁴⁰¹ The Soviet Union would stumble along for another two years, until it, too, dissolved under its own weight.

7. Analysis

The success of the U.S. PW program in Poland can be attributed to a number of fundamental maxims that still apply today. First, information is a dominant instrument of national policy, but any actions within this domain must be conducted with a careful understanding of the cultural and political environment, and supported by a significant commitment of national resources to be effective. The success of the Polish opposition can be largely attributed to the relentless campaign of print, broadcast, and electronic media that exploited the existing disequilibrium in the socio-political structure. U.S.

³⁹⁸ Bernstein, “Cover Story.”

³⁹⁹ David S. Mason, *Revolution and Transition in East-Central Europe* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 53.

⁴⁰⁰ Ronald J. Hill, *Beyond Stalinism: Communist Political Evolution* (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 51.

⁴⁰¹ Gates, *From the Shadows*, 464–470.

covert and overt focus on the information domain during and following the martial law period, from 1981-1989, had the greatest external impact on the survival and ultimate success of the Polish opposition.

Second, economic and diplomatic leverage are excellent tools in PW, but require a robust information component to effectively negate the countermeasures of totalitarian states. Without controlling information, the effects of external economic and diplomatic pressure can be turned to support the target regime's narrative by blaming internal problems on external influence and galvanizing nationalism to support regime policies. Economic sanctions, bilateral and multilateral diplomatic actions, and support for the opposition through U.S. and international labor organizations contributed to Solidarity's victory, but the heavy emphasis on information dominance by the opposition and its Western sponsors kept the dissident movement alive and active while under regime repression. The key emerging feature of PW is that a totalitarian state's ability to deny the means of communication to the opposition is a decisive element in overall success or failure. Likewise, the ability of an external entity engaged in PW to gain, maintain, and expand its information footprint, either directly or through proxy, is a fundamental component of a sound strategy.

Third, a limited, well-defined covert action program that supports overt U.S. policy is indispensable to achieving national objectives when dealing with repressive authoritarian regimes. At a minimum, covert logistics and financial support to dissident groups and social movements is necessary to counteract regime suppression. U.S. covert action in Poland helped sustain the resistance through covert funding and equipment, allowing the movement to maintain pressure on the regime in the information war. Since Solidarity's success, social movements have taken a prominent role in reshaping the post-Cold War space. Prodemocracy "color" revolutions in Yugoslavia, Georgia, Ukraine, Kirgizstan, and Lebanon in the 2000s, and the Arab Spring from 2010-2012 and Ukraine in 2013-2014 have utilized many lessons from Solidarity to drive political change through relatively nonviolent resistance. This is a critical shift in the nature of conflict resolution, and U.S. covert action programs must embrace this new reality.

Finally, U.S. PW is historically opportunistic and reactionary. The 1980s saw a reinvigoration of aggressive U.S. actions to destabilize the Soviet Union, but localized success still required robust, preexisting dissident networks and physical support infrastructure. Unlike Soviet subversion doctrine, the United States does not develop comprehensive agitation strategies that function on a generational or multigenerational timeframe. Yes, media broadcasts into the Soviet Bloc and dissident literature programs did attempt to inform and influence the populations in these countries over a multi-decade span, but the efforts varied in intensity based on changing U.S. policy and systems of control over the broadcasts, and were not part of a cohesive, long-term strategy with well-defined intermediate and long-term objectives. In Poland, existing conditions like the Solidarity movement, a strong history of resistance, and an established underground network of the Catholic Church, had to be present for an external PW program to be effective. This remains a key principal today. U.S. PW to destabilize or force concessions from a geopolitical adversary must have preexisting conditions for success; including an already strong networked opposition, historical precedent to develop the narrative of resistance, and the physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information.

The influence of expanding social and mass media, and the emergence of NGOs as players able to effect geopolitical change on an unprecedented scale, has altered the nature of conflict in the twenty-first century. Events move too quickly for a nation to be successful with a reactionary PW posture predicated on set patterns of crisis response. It is imperative for the U.S. to develop the networked infrastructure well in advance of any possible implementation of a PW strategy to give the National Command Authority an array of options to deal with an emerging situation. To do this requires a shift to a more aggressive foreign policy and a commitment to conduct both overt and covert infrastructure development in identified hot spots around the world. If the United States does not have skin in the game, the national leadership is bound to be overtaken by events and forced into a weak geostrategic position by either a realpolitik or opportunistic adversary.

V. THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN POLITICAL WARFARE 1991-2014

A. INTRODUCTION

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has evolved from a nation struggling to solidify its identity apart from the specter of the former USSR to a rising power that is capable of exerting strategic influence through the proficient use of PW. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that Russia has developed full-spectrum PW in order to consolidate power domestically, establish dominance regionally, and ultimately challenge the unipolarity of the West, which includes the United States, its NATO allies, and other global partners. This chapter concludes that Russia's vast arsenal of PW methods constantly evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Russia's leaders have leveraged these PW methods as individual DIME elements matured in order to propel Russia out of the shadow of the Soviet Union and the West. Russia now considers itself an established regional hegemon and a rising global power capable of securing its interests through PW.

B. RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC POLITICAL WARFARE

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States embodied antithetical views on how to structure political, economic, and social life.⁴⁰² This polarizing effect made the Soviet identity easy to characterize, as one simply needed to contrast it with the West. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russians found themselves in a position to reclaim their Russian identity; however, Russia's national identity could have been defined in a number of ways including as Russian speakers, as ethnic Russians, as people of Slavic origin, as a union identity to define Russians as an imperial people, or as a civic state whose members were all Russian, regardless of ethnic or cultural background.⁴⁰³ The domestic debate over the Russian identity was

⁴⁰² James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, *Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 1.

⁴⁰³ Nicole J. Jackson, *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories, Debates and Actions* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003), 29.

inextricably tied to the debate over diplomacy, since the way Russians viewed themselves would fundamentally determine how they viewed their territory and their relationship with the rest of the world.⁴⁰⁴ As the debate over the Russian identity ensued, Russian policy makers were simultaneously struggling to develop a coherent diplomatic strategy.

Throughout 1991 and 1992, Russia's identity and political direction remained confused; however, by 1993, Russia slowly developed consensus that it should move toward liberal democratic and market economic reforms, while protecting Russians in the near abroad. This emphasis on protecting the Russian diaspora provided Russia with the necessary diplomatic trajectory to successfully employ regional diplomacy. Russia excelled at creating treaties following its participation in regional conflicts that further established its role as a regional peacekeeper.⁴⁰⁵ Similarly, Russia exerted early diplomatic influence on behalf of its diaspora at the UN and at the CSCE when Estonia and Latvia passed controversial citizenship laws that effectively removed voting rights from ethnic Russians in the summer of 1992.⁴⁰⁶ The success of these diplomatic efforts on behalf of its diaspora led to an increase in assertiveness in the near abroad that conflicted with Western ideals and emboldened nationalist perspectives in Moscow.⁴⁰⁷

Initially, the Yeltsin administration was unable to establish accord on national identity or national interests, and wavered between adopting a cooperative or confrontational relationship with the West.⁴⁰⁸ Russia found itself initially following Western initiatives, but increasingly asserting its own interests as nationalism took root.⁴⁰⁹ The quickly diverging perspectives in Moscow resulted in a clash between

⁴⁰⁴ Jackson, *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS*, 28.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 181.

⁴⁰⁶ Viktor Aleksandrovich Kremeniuk, *Conflicts in and Around Russia: Nation-Building in Difficult Times* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 114.

⁴⁰⁷ Michael Kraus and Ronald D. Liebowitz, *Russia and Eastern Europe After Communism: The Search for New Political, Economic, and Security Systems* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 11.

⁴⁰⁸ Angela Stent, *The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 24.

⁴⁰⁹ Maria Raquel Freire and Roger E. Kanet, *Russia and its Near Neighbours* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 1.

Western and nationalist perspectives on October 3, 1993. Yeltsin made some provocative shifts in foreign policy in an attempt to solidify his power base and secure the support of the military. “Both Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov had openly expressed their opposition to NATO’s expansion eastward. Yeltsin seems to have shifted his public position on NATO at the height of the constitutional standoff with [this] simple fact squarely on his mind.”⁴¹⁰ Using this shift in foreign policy as a weapon, Yeltsin was able to secure the allegiance of the military and preserve his position of power.⁴¹¹ Yeltsin then ordered the military to conduct an assault on rebellious deputies, which included shelling the parliament building and resulted in the death of 147 people, but preserved his position of power.⁴¹² The conflict in Moscow in October 1993 marked the first major change in foreign policy anchored by Russian nationalism versus Western cooperation and partnership. This event was a critical milestone in the development of Russian diplomacy because it synergized the disparate views on Russian identity, which enabled an increasingly anti-Western narrative.

In January 1996, President Yeltsin relieved the pro-Western Kozyrev from his position as foreign minister and replaced him with Evgeny Primakov, whose nationalistic perspective was more in line with the rapidly solidifying Russian identity.⁴¹³ Primakov had recently served as the head of the Federal Intelligence Service, the KGB successor unit, and represented a renewed focus for securing Russia’s Eurasian great power status.⁴¹⁴ This was a PW action designed to emphasize Russia’s foreign policy shift both domestically and abroad. It also positioned Russia to openly and reasonably review all diplomatic obligations from its new, less Western, vantage point. The appointment of

⁴¹⁰ Kraus and Liebowitz, *Russia and Eastern Europe After Communism*, 307.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, 308.

⁴¹² Stent, *The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century*, 21.

⁴¹³ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁴¹⁴ Rick Fawn and Stephen White, *Russia After Communism* (London; Portland, OR: F. Cass, 2002), 167.

Primakov is considered to be the final shift from Yeltsin's initial pro-Western perspective to a nationalist perspective that emphasized statehood.⁴¹⁵

Although Russia's steady migration away from the West helped it to develop its regional diplomacy, it was not sufficient to oppose the West directly throughout the 1990s. This was clearly evidenced by the events of the Kosovo War. In the 1990s, Russian officials and senior military leaders often supported Serbia, citing Russia's historic alliance and shared Orthodox religious and cultural ties.⁴¹⁶ Although Yeltsin was likely frustrated by Milosevic and understood NATO's goals, he stood by Milosevic because this position also represented taking a stand against NATO, which resonated well with the Russian populace.⁴¹⁷ The United States was taking significant steps to expand NATO during this period, despite the fact that the Cold War was clearly over.⁴¹⁸ Ultimately, Yeltsin believed the American military was spreading U.S. power inside the Russian sphere of influence.⁴¹⁹ Russia leveraged the full extent of diplomacy in protest, including Primakov turning his plane around in midair while en route to Washington when he heard that NATO has initiated a bombing campaign in Serbia.⁴²⁰ In spite of Russia's diplomatic effort on the international stage, it was unable to preclude the NATO bombing campaign and viewed the situation from a realist perspective, which framed the likely outcome as a win for the United States and the West and a clear loss for Russia.⁴²¹ Kosovo highlighted Russia's lack of diplomatic power when measured against what was needed to achieve strategic goals in the international arena.

A few years after the Kosovo War, while Vladimir Putin was still relatively new to the presidential office, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States presented an

⁴¹⁵ Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 95.

⁴¹⁶ Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 42.

⁴¹⁷ Goldgeier and McFaul, *Power and Purpose*, 265.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 183.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 12–13.

⁴²⁰ Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 44.

⁴²¹ Goldgeier and McFaul, *Power and Purpose*, 265.

opportunity to reset Russian-U.S. relations. While surprising, it was not entirely unexpected that Putin would embrace a considerably different kind of diplomacy in support of Russia's strategic interests. Abjuring earlier frictions, Putin was the first foreign leader to call President Bush after the 9/11 attacks to offer assistance and condolences. Russia subsequently enabled U.S. operations during Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban and al-Qaeda by sharing intelligence, cancelling distracting Russian military exercises, and not objecting to the U.S. expansion of bases and transit hubs in the region.⁴²² Putin presented Russia as an essential partner in the Global War on Terror, and quickly drew parallels between the 9/11 attacks and the intensification of terrorist activities in the Caucasus.⁴²³ This move was meant to not only elevate Russia's status within Washington, but also to acquire an ally in its struggle against Islamist opponents in the North Caucasus.⁴²⁴ This move linked Russia's own struggles with terrorist activities to the United States in order to improve its credibility in the international arena.

While enjoying the benefits of ostensible alignment with the U.S.-centric Global War on Terror, Russia covertly employed bribery to affect the regional political apparatus. One glaring example is the scandal over the resignation of Latvian Prime Minister Aigars Kalvitis in the fall of 2007, when "it was discovered that Russian-funded political organizations were buying Latvian politicians."⁴²⁵ "Prime Minister Aigars Kalvitis observed at the time that there [was] a criminal gang consisting of former employees of the KGB and employees of the Latvian security services of parliament and the presidential office."⁴²⁶ When the anticorruption minister's report was presented to President Valdis Zatlers, the President did not accept the findings regarding the alleged

⁴²² Richard Weitz, *Revitalising US-Russian Security Cooperation: Practical Measures*, Vol. 377 (Routledge, 2005), 10.

⁴²³ Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy*, 133–134.

⁴²⁴ Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 70.

⁴²⁵ Stephen Blank, "Web War I: Is Europe's First Information War a New Kind of War?" *Comparative Strategy* 27, no. 3 (2008a): 231.

⁴²⁶ *Ibid.*, 231.

network of corruption. As a result, Kalvitis and a large portion of the cabinet resigned.⁴²⁷ Another such example occurred during the 2002 Lithuanian presidential election. This scandal revolved around allegations that Moscow funded former Prime Minister Rolandas Paksas's campaign, waged disinformation campaigns, and bought or controlled Lithuanian customs and police officers. The ensuing investigation resulted in the impeachment of President Paksas in 2004.⁴²⁸ These two examples demonstrate that Russia has used PW to subtly shape the political landscape in the near abroad into a construct that enables Russia's strategic goals.

Russia's brief diplomatic alignment with the U.S.-driven Global War on Terror came to an abrupt halt over the conflict in Syria in 2013. Syria was one of the top buyers of Russian defense equipment, which made Syria a significant economic interest to Russia.⁴²⁹ Putin assessed that Assad was stronger than his opponents, the strongest of which were jihadis, and prudently decided to back Assad during the conflict.⁴³⁰ Moreover, Russia also feared the spread of radical Sunni Islamist governments that could invigorate Muslims in the North Caucasus. The Assad regime represented a bulwark against this threat to Russian interests. First, Moscow vetoed a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution that called for Assad to step aside. Next, Putin offered the United States a chance to jointly lead diplomatic efforts to resolve the Syrian conflict, but the United States predictably pursued its own agenda to get rid of Assad. When President Obama's "redlines" were openly challenged in the August 2013 chemical attack near Damascus, Obama was on the verge of implementing military strikes against his own desires. Putin seized the opportunity and offered a deal to rid Syria of its chemical weapons. Using diplomacy as PW Putin had rejected the U.S. agenda, prevented U.S. military intervention, and compelled Syria to give up its sole deterrent in the form of

⁴²⁷ Blank, "Web War I: Is Europe's First Information War a New Kind of War?" 231.

⁴²⁸ Pranas Ciziunas, "Russia and the Baltic States: Is Russian Imperialism Dead?" *Comparative Strategy* 27, no. 3 (2008): 296–297.

⁴²⁹ Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 249.

⁴³⁰ Dmitri Trenin, "The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry," *Carnegie Moscow Center* 9 (2014): 13.

chemical weapons of mass destruction.⁴³¹ This discredited the West and the U.S., while demonstrating that Russia was a great power capable of achieving peace in the Middle East where the U.S. and the West could not. This success emboldened Russia and solidified its position as a great power in spite of its relatively weak and almost non-existent military presence in the Middle East.

Quickly following the Syria crisis, Russia again asserted its position as a great power capable of challenging the United States and the West when, in the middle of 2013, the Edward Snowden whistleblower incident rose to the forefront of the international media. After releasing classified documents from the NSA, Snowden subsequently fled the United States and sought asylum in a number of countries. Whereas China and several leftist Latin American regimes would not confront the United States by offering Snowden asylum, Russia accepted him, knowing full well it would materially damage relations with the Obama administration.⁴³² Snowden arrived at Sheremetyevo airport on June 23rd with several computers containing documents about classified NSA programs and the Russians even orchestrated a press conference for him.⁴³³ As a result of the incident, President Obama cancelled a summit in Moscow, marking the first such cancellation of a U.S.-Russian summit since Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev cancelled a 1960 summit in Paris.⁴³⁴ This move came at great cost to the diplomatic relations between the United States and Russia, but it was widely understood in the international community to be an embarrassment to the United States. The Snowden incident illustrated Russia's position that it was a great power capable of standing up to the unipolarity of the United States and its Western allies. Russia's diplomatic PW victories during the Syria crisis and the Snowden incident established a precedent of autonomous decision making unbounded by Western pressure.

⁴³¹ Trenin, "The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry," 14.

⁴³² Ibid., 14.

⁴³³ Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 269.

⁴³⁴ Trenin, *The Ukraine Crisis*, 14.

Summary: Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's use of diplomatic PW has been reestablished, as Russia solidified its post-Soviet Russian identity and established a foreign policy agenda independent of Western ideology. Russia demonstrated a pattern of concurrent regional and global diplomatic efforts to support its strategic interests. In the early 1990s, diplomacy helped to secure favorable conflict resolutions within the former Soviet space in the interests of its diaspora. Yeltsin's eventual resolution on a Russian foreign policy agenda, following the October 1993 parliament crisis in Moscow, enabled a shift from the West that culminated with the Kosovo War, but highlighted Russia's relatively weak diplomacy when compared to the West. Putin deftly aligned Russia's counterterror efforts with the United States following 9/11 to overtly increase diplomatic credibility, while consolidating gains covertly in the former Soviet space. Finally, Russia was able to selectively employ diplomacy as PW during the Syria crisis and Snowden incidents to signal to the international community that it was now capable of confronting the United States and the West in the diplomatic arena to achieve its strategic goals.

C. RUSSIAN INFORMATION POLITICAL WARFARE

Like diplomacy, Russia's ability to leverage information as PW has grown steadily since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike diplomacy, however, which improved with the development of the Russian identity and migration from Western influence, Russia's use of information improved with the increasing authoritarian nature of the Russian power apparatus and establishment of an anti-Western narrative. Initially, widespread foreign policy ideas proliferated through Western free-speech media models, which limited the development of a coherent national narrative during the Yeltsin era. Russia began to develop its ability to leverage information more effectively, however, when Putin came to power in 2000. He began to solidify the Russian narrative and established dominance over Russia's mass media outlets. Media oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky were exiled, and the state initiated a takeover of their media empires. This gave greater control over the internal flow of information and allowed Putin to propagate the national narrative. In conjunction with appropriating internal media outlets, he appointed several super governors that reported directly to

him.⁴³⁵ Putin's initial efforts appeared almost exclusively focused on securing control over the domestic aspect of the information element of national power, but soon Russia would shift its focus externally.

The "Color Revolutions" that swept over Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan promoted fear in Russia of revolutionary social movements.⁴³⁶ Russia criticized the West for inciting and supporting the revolutions, and insisted they were seeking to produce a revolution within Russia as well.⁴³⁷ The Russians effectively manipulated the fact that Western NGOs promoted civil society and demanded transparency during elections, and portrayed these efforts as yet another Western plot to reduce Russia's influence in its near abroad.⁴³⁸ Russia's primary lesson from the Color Revolutions was the need to ensure that nothing similar would happen in Russia. This prompted a renewed focus on solidifying the anti-Western narrative. Perceived Western expansion into Russia's area of influence via the Color Revolutions justified Russia's increased assertiveness in controlling and projecting the informational element of national power.

Tangible economic improvements in the Russian people's lives, increasing oil revenues, and exploding growth rates truly enabled Russia to vocalize firm rejection of a Western-dominated and U.S.-led unipolar world.⁴³⁹ During the Munich conference of February 2007, Putin proclaimed "today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force—military force—in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way."⁴⁴⁰ This international proclamation represented the maturation of Russia's overt, anti-Western national

⁴³⁵ Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 79.

⁴³⁶ Freire and Kanet, *Russia and its Near Neighbours*, 288.

⁴³⁷ James Sherr, *Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia's Influence Abroad* (London: Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Washington, D.C.: Distributed worldwide by the Brookings Institution, 2013), 121.

⁴³⁸ Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 101.

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid., 148.

narrative. Furthermore, this statement allowed Putin to posit the idea of a multipolar world in which Russia would be a key player. This idea became the cornerstone of Russia's narrative under Putin's regime. This narrative was codified in Russia's 2008 and 2010 NSCs, which bluntly portrayed Western and NATO expansion as the primary external threat to Russia.⁴⁴¹ With respect to its near abroad, Russia's NSCs declared it to be Russia's area of privileged interest and pledged to provide comprehensive assistance, including military force, to protect Russian citizens wherever they were.⁴⁴² Also, it proclaimed NATO expansion and construction of military infrastructure and missile defenses near its borders to be in violation of the UN Charter.⁴⁴³

One of the primary vehicles that Russia has used to promote its anti-Western narrative is Russian-sponsored international news media, which has a budget of over \$300 million and is projected to increase by as much as 41% by 2016.⁴⁴⁴ *Russia Today* was a news agency created in 2005 to create a more positive picture of Russia and present the Russian side of international news stories. The original programming emulated CNN and BBC, "while mixing in puff stories about the country."⁴⁴⁵ In 2008, *Russia Today* rebranded itself as "RT" to focus less on promoting Russia and more on marginalizing the West, particularly the United States. RT focuses on already existing anti-Western and anti-U.S. themes that originate from Western media outlets, then adds interviews with President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov, and finally injects blatant "opinion TV" with wild and unfounded accusations. Recent examples of misinformation-infused reporting include a report that considered whether the United States was behind the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Africa, reporting of a fictional massacre at Adra during the Syrian civil war in 2013, and a report that accused Syrian rebels of a sarin attack in East Ghouta,

⁴⁴¹ Freire and Kanet, *Russia and its Near Neighbours*, 5.

⁴⁴² Sherr, *Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion*, 59.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., 61.

⁴⁴⁴ Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, *The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money* (New York, NY: Institute of Modern Russia), 6imrussia.org/media/pdf/Research/Michael_Weiss_and_Peter_Pomerantsev__The_Menace_of_Unreality.pdf.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid., 15.

Damascus, using video “proof” that was date-stamped prior to the event.⁴⁴⁶ In recent years, Russia has continued to grow its international news empire. “In late 2013, the Russia Today International Agency was established by merging the Russia Today television, the Golos Rossii radio and the RIA Novosti news agency.”⁴⁴⁷ In November 2014, the company’s Chief Executive Officer, Yevgeny Kiselyov, announced an emerging project called Sputnik that would broadcast in 30 languages on mobile and digital platforms. Sputnik will attempt to reach “billions of listeners the world over, who are tired of the aggressive propaganda promoting a unipolar world.”⁴⁴⁸ *RT* is an excellent example of Russia’s use of the media to anchor a nationalist narrative at home, while simultaneously projecting misinformation to discredit what it perceives to be Western unipolarity.

Russia ensured that any opposition to its information dominance and ability to proliferate its anti-Western narrative was met with voracity. Suspicious deaths following Putin’s rise to power indicate covert initiatives aimed at securing internal information dominance. On October 7, 2006, Anna Politkovskaya, an outspoken critic of Russian policy in the North Caucasus, was gunned down while carrying groceries into her apartment. Similarly, on November 1, 2006, Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB officer who was working for the exiled media oligarch Boris Beresovskiy, died from acute polonium-210 poisoning, which is a radioactive substance produced almost exclusively in one Russian laboratory. Traces of the polonium-210 found in a plane and the London restaurant in which he was exposed indicate that this was an act of nuclear terrorism executed by foreign agents on British soil.⁴⁴⁹ These examples are yet further evidence of Russia’s broad spectrum of information PW.

Russia also employed information-based methods that fell within the cyber-warfare realm. During the 2007 “Bronze Soldier incident,” “Estonia defied Russian

⁴⁴⁶ Weiss, *The Menace of Unreality*, 15–16.

⁴⁴⁷ Jolanta Darczewska, “The Information War on Ukraine New Challenges,” (2014), 11.

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 11–12.

⁴⁴⁹ Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 145.

threats and removed the so-called Bronze Soldier, the monument to the Red Army in Tallinn that memorializes the Soviet liberation of Estonia in World War II from the city center, Estonia soon experienced a full-scale information war directed against much of its critical telecommunications infrastructure.”⁴⁵⁰ Experts modeled that this cyber attack was actually planned against Estonia over a year before it occurred, indicating this was not a spontaneous criminal act, but a preplanned, state-sponsored initiative.⁴⁵¹ Russia conducted cyber warfare once again during the 2008 invasion of Georgia. During this conflict, cyber attacks were conducted which “included various distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks to deny/disrupt communications and information exfiltration activities conducted to accumulate military and political intelligence from Georgian networks.”⁴⁵² Russia’s demonstrated proficiency in cyber war illustrates its ability to use a wide variety of technologies and mediums in the information arena as PW.

Any illusions that regime change might reduce the domestic information stranglehold or slow the proliferation of an anti-Western narrative were dissolved on September 24, 2011, when President Medvedev proposed that Putin become the Russian president yet again.⁴⁵³ Protests in Russia, with crowds between 30,000 and 100,000, demanded that Putin go, but Putin was declared victorious in the presidential election on March 4, 2012.⁴⁵⁴ Upon reelection, President Putin implemented further measures to clamp down on civil society and to stamp out regime opposition and its foreign support. Russian NGOs that benefited from foreign funding were required to register as a “foreign agent.” As a result, USAID was closed and bilateral cooperation in law enforcement and narcotics was terminated.⁴⁵⁵ The Russian power brokers that surrounded and enabled Putin and Medvedev fundamentally viewed freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as a

⁴⁵⁰ Blank, “Web War I,” 227.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid., 232.

⁴⁵² David M. Hollis, “Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008,” *Small Wars Journal* 6, no. 11 (2011): 3.

⁴⁵³ Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 251.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid., 245.

⁴⁵⁵ Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 253.

weakness that could be exploited by Western influence.⁴⁵⁶ Their agenda to centralize government power and co-opt the mass media was overwhelmingly successful, in spite of creating a government that was less accountable to the Russian public. Increased domestic prosperity and external Russian influence had firmly established public support for “Putin’s plan” among the Russian population.⁴⁵⁷ Putin was able to label democratization and marketization of the near abroad as negative consequences of Western intervention that are contrary to Russia’s interests; moreover, this narrative appears to be effective in mobilizing the Russian population to a degree sufficient to ensure his position of power for the foreseeable future.⁴⁵⁸

Inflated threat assessments further contributed to the Russian anti-Western narrative. These threat assessments self-perpetuated a cycle that intensified fears of Western influence. The assessments asserted that the West was attempting to exclude Russia from its rightful place as a global leader by weakening the former Soviet space and plundering Russia’s natural resources. For example, Russian military publications regularly promulgated the idea of “Russia under siege” from “rigorous informational-psychological warfare [aimed] at undermining Russia’s statehood and integrity . . . by the adept exploitation of the national and religious contradictions within.”⁴⁵⁹ NATO involvement in Yugoslavia in 1999, the 2001 withdrawal of the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Ukrainian Orange Revolution of 2004, the fifth NATO enlargement in 2004, and the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan cemented Russia’s perception toward the West. This perception asserted the West intended to foment instability along Russia’s borders,

⁴⁵⁶ Olga Oliker, *Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Project/United States Air Force, 2009), 176.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 175.

⁴⁵⁸ Daniel Gourè, “Moscow’s Visions of Future War: So Many Conflict Scenarios so Little Time, Money and Forces,” *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 27, no. 1 (2014): 100.

⁴⁵⁹ Rostov na Donu, *Voyenny Vestnik Yuga Rossii*, in Russian, November 20, 2006, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central Eurasia*, November 20, 2006, from Stephen Blank, “Information Warfare A la Russe,” unpublished paper, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2012 (henceforth SB-IW).

aggressively interfere in the Russian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)⁴⁶⁰ internal life and politics, and compromise greater Russian national interests.⁴⁶¹ By the closing of the decade, the United States was singularly viewed as a “unipolar hegemon” with the “goal of depriving Russia of its independence, interfering in its internal affairs and infringing on its economic and national interests” through “indirect forms of political, diplomatic, economic, and informational pressure, subversive activities, and interference in internal affairs.”⁴⁶² This increasingly aggressive narrative has proliferated sufficiently throughout the Russian political apparatus to warrant the emergence of increasingly provocative Russian policy.

Summary: Russia’s ability to use information as PW improved with the increasing authoritarian nature of the Russian power apparatus and the solidification of an anti-Western narrative. The primary catalyst for this change was Vladimir Putin’s assumption of the Russian presidency and his subsequent media and domestic information crackdowns. Concurrent circulation of Western-driven ideas throughout the post-Soviet space contributed to the Color Revolutions, which Putin exploited to solidify an anti-Western narrative that would enable further centralization of power and information control. This narrative has been proliferated domestically and internationally via Russian-sponsored media outlets such as *RT*. Persistent inflated threat assessments regarding Western capabilities and intentions further enabled the resurgence of the anti-Western narrative. This helped to rally the Russian population around an anti-Western narrative that has been crucial to preserving the current Russian power apparatus and central to the justification of increasingly provocative political warfare against the West.

D. RUSSIAN MILITARY POLITICAL WARFARE

In the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia excelled at employing its military to secure regional objectives in spite of the degraded

⁴⁶⁰ Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia (Georgia withdrew in on August 18, 2008), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine (Unofficial participating member, withdrew March 14, 2014). CIS Executive Committee, <http://www.cis.minsk.by/>.

⁴⁶¹ Blank, “No Need to Threaten Us, 29–30, 44.

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*, 63.

state of its former Soviet forces. Its forward-stationed elements proved critical in realizing its foreign policy objectives in the Transnistria conflict, the Georgia conflict, and the Tajikistan civil war. In addition, Russia used its military as a force-in-being in the Baltics to exert influence over the issue of voting rights for its diaspora. The successful use of military forces during these limited conflicts, both conventionally and unconventionally, helped to solidify Russia's foreign policy around a pragmatic nationalist political agenda that would continue to rely heavily on military forces in the decades to come.

Russia first employed its military in the former Soviet space during Moldova's separatist war with its Transnistria region.⁴⁶³ The Transnistria region contained a sizable Russian diaspora, which inevitably raised the question of what Russia's position would be in protecting the interests of Russian speakers in the near abroad. Moreover, Russia's 14th Army was stationed in Moldova, which presented concerns for Moscow should the conflict escalate. Before the Russian government was able to solidify a course of action regarding the conflict, however, the 14th Army independently began supplying the Transnistria separatists and training the local population.⁴⁶⁴ The inevitable escalation of the conflict led the Russian Parliament, in July 1992, to authorize the 14th Army as a Russian-dominated peacekeeping force in Moldova until a CIS peacekeeping unit could be assembled.⁴⁶⁵ The actions resulted in a surprising level of support from the Russian population, prompting Yeltsin to become even more vocal in his support of the Russian diaspora. "The outbreak of violence in March and the ensuing foreign policy debates led to a consensus among the Russian political elite that Russia should be more actively involved in preventing war and in protecting its diasporas—particularly those threatened by war."⁴⁶⁶ Effectively, a Russian diaspora had separated itself from another state, enabled by support from the Russian military and Moscow. The lack of reaction from the

⁴⁶³ Jackson, *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS*, 81.

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 109.

⁴⁶⁵ Kraus and Liebowitz, *Russia and Eastern Europe After Communism*, 305.

⁴⁶⁶ Jackson, *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS*, 110.

West further established this “road map” for dealing with such conflicts, given there was no previous precedent for how such a matter should be resolved.⁴⁶⁷

Russia again employed its military in the post-Soviet space when war broke out in Georgia in 1992.⁴⁶⁸ During this conflict, Russia was less interested in protecting the interests of its diaspora. Rather, Russia’s primary interest in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict was to prevent the dissolution of Georgia, which could initiate a domino effect that would embolden Chechens.⁴⁶⁹ As with the Transnistria conflict, Russia’s employment of military as peacekeepers was unchallenged by the West, which underscored the utility of using its military forces in a peacekeeping role to secure conflict resolution favorable to Russian interests. This further solidified the role that Russia and its military would play in the former Soviet space.⁴⁷⁰

The third conflict in which Russia employed its military was the Tajikistan civil war. Russia had 10,200 troops stationed in Tajikistan and a diaspora of over 300,000 ethnic Russians.⁴⁷¹ Russia’s disjointed policy at the time led to Moscow to lean initially toward a Western view in support of the Tajik opposition, while the military prematurely involved itself with Tajikistan’s communist government.⁴⁷² Eventually, concerns over the spreading of Islamic fundamentalism and the Russian diaspora convinced Moscow to support the communist Tajik regime.⁴⁷³ Although the Russian diaspora was of little objective concern during the conflict, it was used to convince the public that military engagement was needed and further solidified Russia’s role as a peacekeeper in support of the communist Tajik government.⁴⁷⁴ In 1993, the Friendship Treaty decided that

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., 111.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid., 112.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid., 138.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., 139.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., 145–146.

⁴⁷² Ibid., 169.

⁴⁷³ Ibid., 168–169.

⁴⁷⁴ Jackson, *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS*, 169.

Russian troops and peacekeepers would remain in Tajikistan in pursuit of peace.⁴⁷⁵ The Tajikistan civil war was yet another example of how Russia could use its military as peacekeepers to conduct PW in limited regional conflicts in pursuit of foreign policy goals.

In addition to involving its military directly in regional conflicts, Russia also leveraged its military indirectly to apply political pressure. In the summer of 1992, Estonia and Latvia passed controversial citizenship laws that effectively removed voting rights from ethnic Russians. When it was perceived that Russian minister Kozyrev would not be able to secure an adequate diplomatic response, President Yeltsin ordered a halt to the planned withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics until improved treatment of the Russian diaspora was evident.⁴⁷⁶ This move was widely supported domestically and appeased the military, which had concerns about giving up their presence in the Baltics.⁴⁷⁷ Russia's successful use of its military in the former-Soviet space firmly established military methods in Russia's PW arsenal and provided a model for how to deal with regional instability.⁴⁷⁸

Years later, in the closing days of the Kosovo War in 1999, Russia executed a bold PW move using its military forces at Pristina. At the end of the war, Russian and U.S. forces nearly clashed when Russia violated the terms of the cease-fire agreements by surging their forces to the airport in Pristina, Kosovo's capital, before NATO troops arrived. General Wesley Clark, the supreme allied commander in Europe, favored the direct confrontation of Russian soldiers at the airport, but British General Michael Jackson, the NATO ground force commander, staunchly resisted, claiming he was "not starting World War Three for you."⁴⁷⁹ Some speculate that this was yet another example of the Russian military acting without authority from Moscow, but Yeltsin quickly

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid., 179.

⁴⁷⁶ Kremeniuk, *Conflicts in and Around Russia*, 114.

⁴⁷⁷ Kraus and Liebowitz, *Russia and Eastern Europe After Communism*, 306.

⁴⁷⁸ Jackson, *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS*, 6.

⁴⁷⁹ Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 44.

claimed he decided to give the order, proclaiming “this last gesture was a sign of our moral victory in the face of the enormous NATO military, all of Europe, and the whole world.”⁴⁸⁰ Regardless of whether Yeltsin, in fact, issued the order to occupy the Pristina airport, Yeltsin’s claim of issuing the order represented Russia’s clear priority to thwart the West, even at the cost of appearing indifferent to atrocities like ethnic cleansing.⁴⁸¹ Russia’s actions at the end of the Kosovo War demonstrated that Russia was capable of using its military to conduct PW in direct opposition to Western interests. Prior to Pristina, Russia employed its military in regional conflicts that had little to no international involvement; however, Russia’s actions during the Kosovo War represented a significant leap because they directly challenged Western powers.

Putin proved that he could use his military to further Russia’s strategic agenda by aligning with the West as well as against it. Putin dutifully followed up the 9/11 diplomatic reset with a renewed effort to expand partnership in the realms of counterterrorism (CT) and counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Putin recognized that WMD proliferation was a concern for the United States and recognized that “for countering WMD proliferation, Russia and the United States are the two indispensable nations.”⁴⁸² Furthermore, Putin exploited the perception that “Russians see Americans as their leading ally in the GWOT. Russia and the United States have suffered more casualties from radical Islamist-inspired terrorism [between 2000-2005] than any other country.”⁴⁸³ The result of such renewed engagement was a U.S.-Russia summit in Moscow in May 2002, during which Presidents Bush and Putin expanded the mandate of the existing Working-Group on Counterterrorism. The cooperation program resulted in the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arresting a British national smuggling Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) into the United States to attack civilian transportation aircraft.⁴⁸⁴ Putin

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid.

⁴⁸² Weitz, *Revitalising US-Russian Security Cooperation*, 10.

⁴⁸³ Ibid., 10.

⁴⁸⁴ Weitz, *Revitalising US-Russian Security Cooperation*, 11.

used these positive relations with the West on the CT and WMD fronts as a distraction to obscure other areas of foreign policy that were directly at odds with the West. For example, in July 2002, Russia signed a deal with Iran to build five civilian nuclear reactors that would bring in billions of dollars in exports. Also, Putin extended invitations to Kim Jong Il of North Korea, despite him being a known proliferator and member of Bush's "Axis of Evil."⁴⁸⁵ Putin's willingness to align his military to parallel Western CT and WMD objectives during this time period allowed him to make gains at the West's expense, without significant reprisal.

Putin's post-9/11 westward shift in military posture, however, did not endure very long. Russian assertiveness increased as Russia perceived an increased Western influence in its near abroad. This Russian assertiveness was amplified by the perception that the United States was exploiting the Global War on Terror (GWOT) to insert Western influence in Russia's periphery.⁴⁸⁶ Each successful Western alliance military operation in Afghanistan and Iraq was perceived as an increased potential threat to Russia.⁴⁸⁷ Vladimir Putin toughened his discourse regarding NATO expansion and reinforced Russia's perception of an unbalanced world order that was out of synch with Russia's preference for a multipolar world order, in which it exercised clear influence.⁴⁸⁸ Primakov summarized that Russia opposed NATO expansion, since it brought a military alliance up to Russia's border for no purpose.⁴⁸⁹ The approved NATO expansion on March 29, 2004, which included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, was viewed as provocative involvement in what Moscow considered its privileged area of interest.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁵ Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 78.

⁴⁸⁶ Weitz, *Revitalising US-Russian Security Cooperation*, 8.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid..

⁴⁸⁸ Freire and Kanet, *Russia and its Near Neighbours*, 288.

⁴⁸⁹ Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 77.

⁴⁹⁰ Freire and Kanet, *Russia and its Near Neighbours*, 288.

The new assertive foreign policy stance climaxed in 2008, during the Russian incursion into Georgia and Moscow's subsequent recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Georgia was not a limited crisis, but a clearly communicated PW message that Russia would no longer accept Western expansion into the former Soviet space.⁴⁹¹ Although this operation was predominately military focused, it was the first occurrence where supporting PW methods from the rest of the DIME spectrum were synergized to produce compounded effects. On August 7, 2008, Georgia launched a sizable artillery strike on Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital. During the next five days, over 40,000 Russian troops entered Georgia and conducted an assault, coordinated with a massive cyber attack that crippled military, government, and financial operations. A cease-fire was quickly declared on August 12th and on the 25th Russia officially recognized the independence of the separatist states.⁴⁹² This conflict portrayed Russia's clear intention to play a dominant role over Western influence in its near abroad.⁴⁹³

Summary: Russia has successfully employed its military to conduct PW with great frequency since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia's early use of its military was largely enabled by Russia's inheritance of the lion's share of the Soviet Union's war machine. Although this military apparatus was somewhat degraded after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was still relatively superior to that of Russia's neighbors. This regional disparity in military power led to the almost obvious preference to use the military to conduct PW, especially given Russia's relatively underdeveloped diplomacy, information, and economic elements of national power during the early 1990s. This use of military power in Transnistria, Georgia, and Tajikistan established a roadmap for regional conflict resolution that would become a significant part of Russia's foreign policy in the near abroad. After successfully using its military regionally, Russia adapted to strategic usage, as evidenced by the capture of Pristina during the Kosovo War—a move that directly challenged the collective military might of NATO and the West.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid., 3.

⁴⁹² Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 171.

⁴⁹³ Freire and Kanet, *Russia and its Near Neighbours*, 289.

Russia again used its military to directly take a stand against Western influence in the former Soviet space during the Georgian War.

E. RUSSIAN ECONOMIC POLITICAL WARFARE

Russia's ability to employ economic power as PW was limited after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Initial desires to convert to Western democracy and marketization did not yield immediate economic results, leaving the population questioning the value of this Western-style plan.⁴⁹⁴ Even with staunch support from the Clinton administration, Russia was not able to implement marketization rapidly enough to increase the standard of living for the Russian population to any significant degree. In such a state of economic vulnerability, Russia was in no position to implement PW using economic methods. Despite Yeltsin's efforts to improve the state of the Russian economy, Russia suffered a significant economic collapse in 1998.

The financial crash had significant, long-term effects: "incomes took a long time to recover, foreign investment shied away for years, and the Russian banking system—not in great shape before the crash—never recovered."⁴⁹⁵ There were, however, significant positive effects that Putin, Yeltsin's successor, was well-postured to benefit from.⁴⁹⁶ First, domestic food producers found new markets in Russia and energy exporters saw dramatic increases in volume. Second, oligarchs suffered significant economic losses, greatly reducing their influence in Moscow, which would enable Putin to begin centralizing power.⁴⁹⁷ Third, the Russian government implemented huge financial reforms and passed the first balanced budget in post-Soviet Russian history, positioning Putin to take credit for the eventual economic upswing.⁴⁹⁸ Then, the effects of the 1998 financial crisis positioned Putin to continue to swinging Russia away from

⁴⁹⁴ Jackson, *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS*, 180.

⁴⁹⁵ Goldgeier and McFaul, *Power and Purpose*, 245.

⁴⁹⁶ Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 46.

⁴⁹⁷ Goldgeier and McFaul, *Power and Purpose*, 269.

⁴⁹⁸ Goldgeier and McFaul, *Power and Purpose*, 245.

the West and establish the linkage between Russia's economic recovery and Russia's new foreign policy trajectory that placed it in competition with the West.

Following the culmination of Russia's provocative stance during the war with Georgia, Russia's assertiveness marginally thawed in lieu of more economic-based influence measures.⁴⁹⁹ The foundation for this shift in coercive influence was Russia's regional monopoly of the oil and natural gas industry.⁵⁰⁰ "Since Putin came to office, energy policy has exemplified Russia's capacity to act strategically."⁵⁰¹ "Between 1999 and 2008, Russia was one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. GDP grew by 7 percent per annum, the stock market increased twentyfold, and poverty rates fell from 30 percent of the population in 1998 to 14 percent in 2007. Real wages rose by 140 percent."⁵⁰² During this period of growth, Russia's ability to leverage its regional dominance over the oil and gas industry to influence the actions of its neighbors reached its peak. When Putin came to power, he initiated a state takeover of Gazprom, Russia's largest gas company, and appointed Dmitri Medvedev as chairman of Gazprom, which enabled the Russian government to more effectively wield the economic tool of national power.⁵⁰³ Gazprom is now 50.1% owned by the state and the taxes it pays provide 15% of Russia's budget and produced 80% of Russia's gas exports.⁵⁰⁴

Russia has used its dominance over the oil and gas sector to conduct PW against its neighbors on multiple occasions. Russia interrupted delivery of oil and coal to Estonia in 2007.⁵⁰⁵ On New Year's Day in 2006, Russia cut off gas to Ukraine, which deprived parts of Europe of heat in subzero temperatures.⁵⁰⁶ In Lithuania, Russia has raised gas

⁴⁹⁹ Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy*, 207.

⁵⁰⁰ Freire and Kanet, *Russia and its Near Neighbours*, 3.

⁵⁰¹ Sherr, *Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion*, 103.

⁵⁰² Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 182.

⁵⁰³ Ibid., 192.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁵ Sherr, *Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion*, 84.

⁵⁰⁶ Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 138.

prices over 450% in the last seven years.⁵⁰⁷ These are just a few examples of the times Russia has cut off energy supplies to Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic countries as a foreign policy tool.⁵⁰⁸ By 2009, however, it appeared that Russia's coercive use of this technique may have started to lose its effectiveness as countries began to better prepare for this approach. Gazprom failed to reach an agreement with Ukraine in January 2009, which resulted in interruption in gas supply. Compared to the 2006 incident, however, Ukraine and Europe seemed far more prepared to mitigate the cutoff with alternative short-term sources of energy.⁵⁰⁹ Although Russia's economic methods appear to have lost potency in recent years, its regional dominance in the oil and gas sector represent significant potential for PW so long as the oil and gas market remains strong. Russia has taken steps to secure its regional monopoly on energy by making bilateral deals with countries that Gazprom's South Stream pipeline project would pass through. Russia is gaining support from Europe by leveraging top European energy companies such as Italy's ENI, Germany's Wintershall/BASF, and France's EDF, who have 20%, 15%, and 15% stakes in the project, respectively. Such support is being used to advance South Stream and disrupt Nabucco, the competing project aimed at reducing EU dependence on Russian energy.⁵¹⁰ This strategy allows Russia to simultaneously incentivize European investment partners and punish dependent energy consumers in order to advance pro-Russian policy in the international arena.

Russia has demonstrated its ability to employ economic measures outside of the oil and gas sector as well. These measures range from regional tariffs and import restrictions to strategic partnering with other rising powers. For example, in 2013, it blocked \$100 million in Moldovan wine imports largely believed motivated by Moldova's desire to join the European Union.⁵¹¹ Beginning in September 2013, Russia imposed a series of punitive trade restrictions on Moldova in order to dissuade them from

⁵⁰⁷ Pomerantsev and Weiss, *The Menace of Unreality*, 25.

⁵⁰⁸ Ciziunas, *Russia and the Baltic States: Is Russian Imperialism Dead?* 298.

⁵⁰⁹ Stent, *The Limits of Partnership*, 196.

⁵¹⁰ Pomerantsev and Weiss, *The Menace of Unreality*, 26.

⁵¹¹ Jeffrey Gedmin, "Beyond Crimea," *World Affairs* 177, no. 2 (2014): 3.

signing the European Union Association Agreements, which included Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area provisions.⁵¹² These restrictions represented a direct attack on the Moldovan economy and included bans on imported processed pork products on grounds of African swine fever infections, imported canned vegetables on grounds of standards nonconformity, and imported fruits due to pests allegedly discovered by Russian agricultural experts.⁵¹³ Similarly, Russia continued to bulwark its economy from adverse Western influence by establishing tighter economic ties with countries such as China. Putin visited Shanghai in May 2014 to establish a 30-year, \$400 million gas deal and to double their trade to \$200 billion by 2020.⁵¹⁴

Russia has also fomented instability in its neighbors through the use of economic warlords, Mafia, and criminals. The origins of these groups are linked to the late-Soviet-era black market and thrived following the collapse of the USSR to a point that they “could not have functioned without the complicity of high-level officials and members of law enforcement agencies.”⁵¹⁵ “Russian gangs, along with military personnel and customs and other government officials have sold assault rifles, pistols, machine guns, anti-aircraft weapons, explosives, and even nuclear materials to a wide variety of customers.”⁵¹⁶ For example, in 1994, 25,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles and 40,000 Tokarev military handguns were “lost” in Estonia to Russian criminal networks. In Pechora, Latvia, three tons of aviation weapons and 347 gun parts in two railway carriages were found during a routine check of a train heading from Russia to Riga. In 2002, six Lithuanians were arrested in Vilnius while attempting to conduct the sale of one kilogram of radioactive cesium-137 to a buyer suspected to have links to organized crime. Also in 2002, four Arrow antiaircraft missiles were “lost” in Poland.⁵¹⁷ Such

⁵¹² Denis Cenuša et al., “Russia’s Punitive Trade Policy Measures Towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia,” *CEPS Working Documents*, no. 400 (2014): 1.

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*, 5–6.

⁵¹⁴ Trenin, *The Ukraine Crisis*, 20–21.

⁵¹⁵ Richard J. Krickus, *Iron Troikas: The New Threat From the East* (Diane Publishing, 2006), 28.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 29–30.

⁵¹⁷ Krickus, *Iron Troika*, 29–30.

examples indicate the presence of a robust black-market economy and associated underground network spanning the former Soviet space. This represents a vulnerability to Russia's neighbors and a means by which Russia can apply covert economic PW methods with a high degree of deniability.

Summary: Although Russia's economy was weak immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia eventually recovered and was able to use its economy to conduct PW when three important factors coincided around the year 2000: Putin's presidency and bold economic reforms, rising oil and gas prices, and the nationalization of Gazprom and regional dominance over the oil and gas sector. These factors resulted in a resurgence of the Russian economy and the employment of less provocative, economic-based PW. This provided a tool that allowed Russia to assert its agenda in the near abroad, while simultaneously rolling back its military-based measures. Although Russia's economic-based PW can be expected to wax and wane with the strength of its economy and the oil and gas industry, Russia is clearly taking steps to stabilize its economic position for the long term by establishing mutually supporting economic ties with rising powers, such as China. Also, Russia maintains connectivity to Soviet-era black market economies and criminal networks that provide ideal covert mechanisms to implement PW.

F. CONCLUSION

Russia has developed and exercised PW across DIME. As Russia emerged from the remnants of the Soviet Union, each of the elements of national power developed at a different rate. As a result, Russia's PW capabilities in each element of DIME evolved separately, and were linked to particular dynamics. Russia's diplomatic PW developed alongside the solidification of the post-Soviet Russian identity. Similarly, Russia's information-based variations developed as Putin's created Russia's authoritarian power apparatus and firmly established an anti-Western narrative. Military methods started out far more developed, due to the inheritance of the bulk of the Soviet military and became the preferred method to culminate regional conflicts and drive favorable resolutions. Russia's economic methods were the slowest to develop because they were largely tied to

Russia's regional dominance of the oil and gas industry, and the global fossil fuel marketplace. As PW potential was realized in each of these categories, they were readily employed by Russia's leaders, both overtly and covertly, in order to consolidate power domestically, establish dominance regionally, and ultimately challenge the unipolarity of the West.

Russia's initial applications of PW were often regionally focused and rarely integrated across all elements of national power; but, Russia has since expanded its use of PW to achieve strategic goals and has also improved its ability to synergize PW methods across the DIME spectrum to compound their effects. The Ukraine crisis of 2014 represents the latest evolution of Russian PW. Russia's evolution of PW has established it as a regional hegemon, with rising power capable of challenging the interests of the United States and the West in the PW arena. This reality suggests that the United States should reevaluate its relationship with Russia and accept the possibility that Russia might be an emerging adversary when it comes to preserving the global security status quo. Furthermore, Russia's evolving ability to conduct PW suggests that the United States should develop concepts to counter it or, at least, degrade its effectiveness.

The dynamics that enabled the development of Russian PW present themselves as potential vulnerabilities that might be exploited. For example, Russian PW effectiveness in the diplomatic realm could be reduced by degrading the solidarity of the Russian identity, particularly in the political arena. Limiting information-based measures would require penetrating Putin's media crackdown and discrediting the strengthening anti-Western narrative. Countering military-centric methods would require the reduction of Russia's relative military superiority to that of its neighbors, which might be achieved through revitalized alliances or increased security assistance programs. Similarly, marginalizing the effects of economic PW might be achieved by disrupting Russia's monopoly over the Eastern Europe's fossil fuel market. Singularly or brashly implemented, such measures may be viewed as provocative; but if they are administered gradually, in accordance with a well-constructed narrative, then they might prove effective at containing Russian PW effects and preserving the U.S. interest of preserving the global security status quo.

G. CASE STUDY: THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR OF 2008

1. Introduction

The 2008 war in Georgia is evidence that Russia's ability to conduct PW has been reconstituted since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although Russia did have regional goals to reestablish control in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it also aimed to accomplish larger goals, such as reciprocity for the NATO operation that solidified Kosovo independence and signaling the consequences for a post-Soviet state aspiring NATO membership.⁵¹⁸ Russia intended to communicate that Western expansion into the former Soviet space would no longer be accepted, which made the conflict strategic in nature, rather than simply a regional flashpoint.⁵¹⁹ When the 2008 conflict and its preceding events are analyzed through the lens of Bezmenov's Soviet subversion model and organized by the elements of national power, it becomes apparent that the conflict itself was simply the culmination point of a protracted PW campaign against Western expansion.

2. Demoralization Phase

The demoralization phase of Bezmenov's model extends back to 1992, when war broke out in Georgia during the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. Conflict was largely based upon ethnic demographics, which translated to secessionist aspirations. For example, as captured in a 1989 Soviet census, of 98,000 people in South Ossetia, 66% were Ossetians and 29% were Georgians.⁵²⁰ Russia asserted a leading role for itself in restoring peace, both politically in conflict negotiations and militarily as a neutral "peacekeeper."⁵²¹ "In two separate sets of arrangements with the United Nations and the OSCE, respectively, the West sanctioned Russia to be the main peacekeeping force on

⁵¹⁸ Ariel Cohen and Robert E. Hamilton, *The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications* (Strategic Studies Institute: 2011), 91.

⁵¹⁹ Freire and Kanet, *Russia and its Near Neighbours*, 3.

⁵²⁰ Emmanuel Karagiannis, "The Russian Interventions in South Ossetia and Crimea Compared: Military Performance, Legitimacy and Goals," *Contemporary Security Policy* 35, no. 3 (2014): 4.

⁵²¹ Jackson, *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS*, 112.

the ground in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”⁵²² Russia leveraged these diplomatic arrangements to interpose Russian troops on the administrative borders separating these regions from the rest of Georgia to enforce a cease-fire agreement.⁵²³ Russia’s imposition of artificial control effectively “froze” the conflict, but also provided Russia with a position of military strength and diplomatic credibility, sanctioned by the international community, from which it could foment secessionist inclinations using the information-based measures. From 1992 through 1998, news outlets, including *Izvestia*, *Sevodnya*, and *Kommersant*, perpetuated a narrative of friction between Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.⁵²⁴ By imposing military forces, securing international sanction through diplomacy, and proliferating a narrative of friction through the media, Russia effectively implemented the demoralization phase of Bezmenov’s subversion model and established the foundation for a PW campaign.

3. Destabilization Phase

The destabilization phase began with Putin’s rise to power in Russia at the end of 1999, and includes PW activity across all elements of national power. In the diplomacy arena, Putin installed Eduard Koikoty as President of South Ossetia who first sabotaged the Baden peace plan between South Ossetia and Georgia and then began installing former Russian intelligence officials in key ministry positions.⁵²⁵ Similar programs were implemented in Abkhazia and, by 2004, ethnic Russian intelligence officials occupied positions of influence including defense minister and chief of staff positions in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.⁵²⁶ Diplomatic efforts continued with Putin’s early 2008 announcement that Russia was unilaterally withdrawing from the CIS sanctions that

⁵²² Ronald Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West* (Macmillan: 2010), 65.

⁵²³ Svante E. Cornell, *Georgia After the Rose Revolution: Geopolitical Predicament and Implications for US Policy* (2007), 19.

⁵²⁴ Ana K. Niedermaier, *Countdown to War in Georgia: Russia’s Foreign Policy and Media Coverage of the Conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia* (East View: 2008), viii–xi.

⁵²⁵ Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, 73.

⁵²⁶ Cornell, *Georgia After the Rose Revolution*, 28.

prohibited the delivery of military equipment into Abkhazia and was unofficially establishing government-to-government contact with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.⁵²⁷

In the information realm, Russia exploited a 2002 change to its citizenship laws to begin “passportisation,” which resulted in 98% of South Ossetia having Russian passports by August 2006.⁵²⁸ This was followed by the claim of a right to defend the interests of Russian citizens abroad, militarily if necessary, and became the cornerstone for Russia’s narrative to justify political warfare escalation.⁵²⁹ In parallel, Russian media continued to broadcast the anti-Georgia message, which culminated in mid-May 2008, with broadcasts that claimed war was imminent because Georgians were planning to attack Abkhazia from the Kodori Gorge and the Gali region.⁵³⁰

Military measures increased most dramatically throughout 2008. On March 6, 2008, Moscow began openly arming separatists.⁵³¹ In April, Russia shot down a Georgian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) over Abkhazia, which managed to capture footage of the Russian aircraft that destroyed it.⁵³² In May, Russia increased its troop presence in Abkhazia to over 2,500 soldiers⁵³³ and sent 400 troops to fix Abkhazia’s rail and road infrastructure, which facilitated rapid movement of Russia’s forces later in the conflict.⁵³⁴ In July, Russia held the “Caucuses 2008” exercise, which observers described as a dress rehearsal for the invasion of Georgia.⁵³⁵ In August, Russia infiltrated advance elements of the 135th and 693rd Motorized Rifle Regiments into South Ossetia on or before August 7th, well before the actual fighting began.⁵³⁶

⁵²⁷ Cohen and Hamilton, *The Russian Military and the Georgia War*, 15.

⁵²⁸ Freire and Kanet, *Russia and its Near Neighbours*, 92.

⁵²⁹ Cornell, *Georgia After the Rose Revolution*, 28.

⁵³⁰ Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, 148.

⁵³¹ *Ibid.*, 146.

⁵³² Cohen and Hamilton, *The Russian Military and the Georgia War*, 17.

⁵³³ Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, 148.

⁵³⁴ Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, 150.

⁵³⁵ Per Gahrton, *Georgia: Pawn in the New Political Game* (London: Pluto Press, 2010), 177.

⁵³⁶ Cohen and Hamilton, *The Russian Military and the Georgia War*, 20.

Economically, Russia routinely exploited Georgia's energy dependence by cutting gas supplies, as occurred during political negotiations over Russian basing in 2001 and debates over price gouging in 2006. Furthermore, Russia funded the budget for the Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatist administrations and imposed a full economic embargo in the fall of 2006 that banned trade, transport, and postal links.⁵³⁷ In March 2006, Russia banned the import of Georgian wine and deported Georgians en masse in early 2007.⁵³⁸ Although not critical to the outcome of the crisis, these economic measures placed considerable stress on the Georgian leadership.

4. Crisis Phase

Moscow exploited the lack of coherent Western response measures to Russian pressures by diplomatically isolating and inciting President Saakashvili, who was already prone to Russian provocations.⁵³⁹ President Bush made it clear through his Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, that the United States could not be expected to intervene militarily should war break out between Georgia and Russia. Presented with provocative Russian troops movements into South Ossetia on August 7, 2008, Tbilisi attacked against Tskhinvali in an attempt to protect Georgian territory, which provided Moscow the leverage it needed to eschew diplomacy measures in lieu of crisis measures founded on military and information dominance.⁵⁴⁰

Russia quickly adapted its information management apparatus to control the narrative of the conflict by flying some 50 reporters to Tskhinvali several days before the war. These reporters propagated a central narrative throughout the Russian media that emphasized three themes: President Saakashvili was the aggressor, Russia was defending its citizens, and the West could not criticize Russia because of Western actions in Kosovo.⁵⁴¹ Russia also employed cyber war and information operations in support of

⁵³⁷ Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, 72–73.

⁵³⁸ Karagiannis, *The Russian Interventions in South Ossetia and Crimea Compared*, 5.

⁵³⁹ Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, *The Guns of August 2008* (ME Sharpe: 2009), 118.

⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 160.

⁵⁴¹ Cohen and Hamilton, *The Russian Military and the Georgia War*, 46–47.

conventional operations to great effect during the conflict. “The Russian cyber campaign attacked a total of 38 Georgian and Western websites upon the outbreak of the war, including those of the Georgian President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Bank, the Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the U.S. and United Kingdom (UK) embassies in Georgia.”⁵⁴² They appeared to be coordinated, starting and ending within 30 minutes of each other starting at 5:15 pm on August 8th and ending at 12:45 pm on August 11, when Russia declared its ceasefire.⁵⁴³ Russia’s integration of information-based methods into the crisis phase of the Georgia War represents a developed PW methodology absent in the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Between 7 and 12 August, Moscow deployed some 40,000 forces to Georgia, with 20,000 through the Roki Tunnel into South Ossetia and 20,000 in Abkhazia, which provided the military power necessary to resolve the crisis in Russia’s favor.⁵⁴⁴ By exploiting the Roki Tunnel, the entrance of which was outside of Georgian artillery range, Russia was able to quickly mass conventional combat power to South Ossetia.⁵⁴⁵ These conventional forces were preceded by irregular Russian and separatist forces prior to the war, who conducted reconnaissance and advance-guard operations for the Russian formations.⁵⁴⁶

By August 10th, . . . Russia had deployed the following forces to South Ossetia: the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments, of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division; elements of the 104th and 234th Airborne Regiments from the 76th Air Assault Division; elements of the 45th Intelligence Regiment; and elements of the 10th and 22nd Special Forces Brigades, as well as significant armor, artillery and air defense formations. By this time Russia had opened a second front in Abkhazia by deploying units from the 7th Airborne and 76th Air Assault Divisions, the 20th

⁵⁴² Ibid., 44.

⁵⁴³ Ibid., 45.

⁵⁴⁴ Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, 165.

⁵⁴⁵ Cohen and Hamilton, *The Russian Military and the Georgia War*, 26.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid., 42.

Motorized Rifle Division, and two battalions of Naval Infantry from the Black Sea Fleet.⁵⁴⁷

Georgians generally had better equipment, training, and small-unit-based fire and maneuver tactics, but suffered from reactive strategic and operational plans. The Russians used Soviet-style tactics that emphasized speed and not deploying forces upon initial contact, but rather fighting with the lead of the column and pushing through with the main body. These tactics seemed to help mitigate their equipment and training shortfalls in favor of the increased strategic pressure that a deep penetration into Georgia provided.⁵⁴⁸ After five days of fighting, Russia had occupied Gori and Zugdidi, controlled the highway connecting Tbilisi with western Georgia, destroyed all of Georgia's key military bases, and controlled the port of Poti.⁵⁴⁹ Russia's deep penetration into Georgia presented an imminent threat to Tbilisi, which provided the necessary pressure to drive favorable conflict resolution conditions for Russia.

5. Normalization Phase

Russia reengaged its diplomatic apparatus after five days of combat operations. "On August 12 President Medvedev ordered Russian troops to end all military operations in Georgia, and the next day all the belligerent parties—Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia—accepted a peace plan proposed by the acting president of the European Union, French President Nicolas Sarkozy."⁵⁵⁰ Russia agreed that by October 15th, no single Russian soldier would be anywhere other than where he was before August 7th, but this promise proved to be hollow.⁵⁵¹ Following negotiations on August 26th, Russia's official "recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was condemned by the European Union, the Council of Europe and most Western states."⁵⁵² This disagreement over

⁵⁴⁷ Cohen and Hamilton, *The Russian Military and the Georgia War*, 26.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid., 31.

⁵⁴⁹ Oksana Antonenko, "A War With No Winners," *Survival* 50, no. 5 (11/01; 2015/02): 26.

⁵⁵⁰ Gahrton, *Georgia: Pawn in the New Political Game*, 179.

⁵⁵¹ Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, 213.

⁵⁵² Gahrton, *Georgia: Pawn in the New Political Game*, 179.

Georgia's territorial integrity would continue to be a point of friction between Russia and the European Union for years to come.⁵⁵³ Russia's failure to adhere to the cease-fire agreements and refusal to accept Georgia's territorial integrity resulted in NATO and the EU calling emergency meetings to propose fundamental reviews in relations with Moscow. Russia, in response, suspended negotiations about World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, imposed sanctions on U.S. companies, and froze cooperation with NATO. The result of Russia's diplomatic choices during the normalization phase resulted in increased isolation from the international community, which Russia's political elite leveraged as a tool to further consolidate power domestically.⁵⁵⁴

Russia's information management apparatus shifted to emphasize a narrative that would resonate with the Russian population. Patriotic slogans, such as "finally, Russia has emerged as a force to be reckoned with" and allegations that the conflict was planned by U.S. President Bush to secure Senator John McCain's presidential campaign, combined to shape unwavering popular support for Russian intervention and standing up to the West.⁵⁵⁵ The Russian leadership exploited the increased diplomatic isolation resulting from the conflict and translated it to galvanized popular support for Russia's increasing assertiveness.⁵⁵⁶

Although Russia formally declared it would withdraw from Georgia in October 2009, it positioned 3,700 soldiers in South Ossetia and another 3,700 in Abkhazia. Russia also declared it would permanently retain warships in Abkhazia and stated that it would spend \$400 million to open military bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Military cooperation agreements were also formed with the separatist regions to provide joint protection of their borders.⁵⁵⁷ Russia retained a larger military footprint in Georgia after the war than before the war, effectively leaving a "force in being" that could be used as a

⁵⁵³ Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, 213.

⁵⁵⁴ Antonenko, *A War With No Winners*, 26–28.

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁷ Mehmet Bardakçi, "EU Engagement in Conflict Resolution in Georgia: Towards a More Proactive Role," *Caucasian Review of International Affairs* 4, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 217–218.

political tool and a symbol of Russia's commitment to reject Western encroachment, by force if necessary.

Russia transitioned away from military operations and favored more subtle economic forms of PW as the normalization phase continued. Russia continued to employ the punitive trade measures it put in place in 2006 and displayed no indication of relenting them.⁵⁵⁸ Since Georgia was an open economy, it did not take reactionary economic measures against Russia, which allowed for Russian investment into Georgia infrastructure and businesses. Gazprom continued to supply Georgia with natural gas, which provides Russia with an important economic leverage point until construction in alternative pipelines can diversify Georgia's energy requirements.⁵⁵⁹

6. Conclusion

Russia independently redeveloped its elements of national power after the collapse of the Soviet Union and slowly reintegrated PW as a central component to its strategy. The Georgia War of 2008, and the related series of events that enabled it, are an excellent example of Russia's reevolved ability to conduct PW. When seemingly benign or individual interactions between Russia and Georgia are analyzed through the lens of Bezmenov's model for Soviet subversion and organized across the DIME spectrum, it becomes evident that such interactions were actually components of a protracted PW strategy designed to maintain control of Georgia and preclude its migration towards the West. The Georgia War itself, which was merely the culminating crisis point of the overall campaign, was brief, violent, and effective because it capitalized on the conditions established during the early phases of Bezmenov's model.

In the demoralization phase, Russia integrated diplomatic, informational, and military PW methods by using a UN-approved Russian "peacekeeping" force in Georgia to "freeze" the 1992 conflict, which insulated the separatists and allowed Russia to scale up secessionist rhetoric via its media apparatus at a time of its choosing. Russia

⁵⁵⁸ Cenusa et al., *Russia's Punitive Trade Policy Measures Towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia*, 7.

⁵⁵⁹ Steven Woehrel, "Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries," (DTIC Document, 2010), 12.

synergized all elements of national power during the destabilization phase to isolate Georgia from external diplomatic and military support, generate a popular narrative for Russian intervention, mobilize relative military superiority, and apply economic pressure. These compounding effects essentially provoked Saakashvili to initiate the conflict, which “justified” Russia’s overwhelming response. During the crisis phase, Russia synergized its cyber, irregular, and conventional operations to drive within striking distance of Tbilisi in five days, while simultaneously dominating the early conflict narrative with pro-Russian propaganda and anti-Western messages. Lastly, during the normalization phase, Russia leveraged the strength of its bargaining position to rebuke its promises of immediate withdrawal and emplace an enduring military presence in the separatist regions. It also galvanized an anti-Western narrative within the Russian population by touting Russia’s decisive military victory and translating its diplomatic isolation from the international community into justification for increased nationalism.

Russia succeeded in thwarting Georgia’s aspirations to join NATO, deposited a sizeable military presence in Georgia, and marginalized the unity of NATO and the West through the effective execution of a protracted PW campaign synergized across all elements of national power.

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VI. UKRAINE: RUSSIA'S CRISIS IN THE MAKING (1991–2013)

All of the ingredients exist to ensure that relations between Russia and Ukraine will continue to remain cool or worsen Russian-Ukrainian relations deserve a high priority for reflection within Western security structures and governments. However, until recently, this most certainly was not the case and is something that the West ignores at its own peril [1994].⁵⁶⁰

This chapter's main focus is Russia's PW in Ukraine, from its independence in 1991 to the Euromaidan protests in 2013. Its implementation demonstrates a steady-state, protracted strategy across all elements of national power designed at altering the social and political landscape in Ukraine. This campaign supports Russia's vital interests and national objectives in Ukraine and has gone largely unchallenged by the United States and its European allies. As a result, Russia has tilted the balance of power in its favor to ensure Ukraine, or parts of it, remains under its control or frozen in conflict. Its actions have left the United States paralyzed in its efforts to formulate an effective comprehensive response beyond diplomatic condemnation and targeted economic sanctions. U.S. national objectives in Ukraine have lacked any measures to undermine Russia's PW focusing intently on democratic and economic development. The clear distinction between Russia and the United States provides revealing comparative analysis and demonstrates key points:

- PW encompasses the employment of all elements of national power.
- PW is tied to national interest.
- Uncontested, sustained PW strengthens and burgeons over time.

This chapter examines U.S. and Russian national interests and objectives in Ukraine as a foundational framework for analyzing Russia's PW in Ukraine. This structure illustrates how interests tied to national objectives correlate directly to PW. In the case of the United States, national objectives were limited, leading to the employment of few elements of national power with relatively low levels of intensity. Russia, in sharp contrast, has overarching national objectives resulting in the employment of all elements

⁵⁶⁰ Taras Kuzio, *Russia-Crimea-Ukraine: Triangle of Conflict* (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1994), 31.

of national power with high levels of intensity when applied. Interests and objectives are not the chief focus, but rather how PW supports them. In addition, Ukraine is an example of an unopposed adversarial PW strategy. Therefore, this chapter provides context for considerations in combating unabated PW and formulating strategy when faced with asymmetric national interests.

A. UNITED STATES AND UKRAINE

U.S. interests in Ukraine are anchored in European stability and international order. The security alliance in Europe—NATO—is one of the strongest in the world, and a disruption to European stability invokes a form of automaticity for the United States. In addition, the United States plays a leading role in protecting and upholding international order including laws, treaties, and agreements, particularly those it is directly involved with. In relation to Ukraine, the United States has brokered and signed agreements related to Ukraine’s sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and economy. The U.S. relationship with Ukraine is characterized and referred to as a “strategic partnership” founded on shared values and interests such as expanding democracy, promoting nonproliferation, and supporting free-market economics. In part, Ukraine’s sovereign prosperity and development will lead to cooperation and partnership with other European nations, presumptuously promoting stability and progress on the continent as a whole. These interests have driven U.S. national objectives.

U.S. national objectives in Ukraine over the last two decades have oscillated, depending upon the geopolitical and security environments in Europe. In general, they have centered on democratic, political, and economic progress, evidenced as recently as the 2008 U.S.-Ukraine Partnership Charter through which these objectives were pursued mainly by diplomatic efforts and economic aid.⁵⁶¹ U.S. engagement in Ukraine has had diminutive informational or military aspects other than menial broadcasting, limited

⁵⁶¹ United States Department of State, “United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership,” Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, www.state.gov/p/eru/rls/or/142231.htm.

publications, and U.S. participation in NATO-sponsored exercises.⁵⁶² ⁵⁶³ Of note, Ukraine has supported the U.S. GWOT, deploying 1,600 peacekeepers to Iraq under the joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion and providing overflight rights and airlifts for NATO cargo and peacekeepers in Afghanistan.⁵⁶⁴ ⁵⁶⁵ Otherwise, direct military interaction between the U.S. and Ukraine has been restricted. Although this approach has been far from comprehensive, it is conducive to the dynamic geopolitical conditions Ukraine presents. Both Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-European relations weigh heavily on U.S.-Ukrainian policy. As the former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, Sherman Garnett describes, this has been problematic because “Ukrainian-Russian ties are far from normal,” and “key European states and institutions have yet to acknowledge Ukraine’s strategic significance or to fashion policies which are commensurate with that significance.”⁵⁶⁶ Ukraine itself has struggled internally to implement reforms, both politically and economically, and this has cast a shadow over its prosperity and progress.⁵⁶⁷ Overall, the United States acknowledges that “the maintenance of Ukraine’s independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty is a crucial factor for stability and security in Europe,” yet continues to reconcile “whether any U.S. vital interests are involved at all in a post-nuclear Ukraine.”⁵⁶⁸ Unquestionably,

⁵⁶² Olena Prytula, “The Ukrainian Media Rebellion,” in *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough*, ed. Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 113–114.

⁵⁶³ Helle C. Dale, “Propaganda, Disinformation, and Dirty Tricks: The Resurgence of Russian Political Warfare” (Lehrman Auditorium, The Heritage Foundation, April 21, 2014).

⁵⁶⁴ Deborah Sanders, “Ukraine after the Orange Revolution: Can It Complete Military Transformation and Join the U.S.-Led War on Terrorism?” (Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006), 5.

⁵⁶⁵ Jeffrey Simon, “Ukraine Against Herself: To Be Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, or Neutral” in *NATO at 60: The Post-Cold War Enlargement and the Alliance’s Future*, ed. Anton Bebler (Fairfax, VA: IOS Press, 2010), 108.

⁵⁶⁶ Sherman Garnett, “U.S.-Ukrainian Relations: Past, Present, and Future,” in *Ukraine in the World*, ed. Lubomyr A. Hajda (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 116–117.

⁵⁶⁷ Taras Kuzio, “Twenty Years as an Independent State: Ukraine’s Ten Logical Inconsistencies,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* (2012): 1–10, doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.06.005>.

⁵⁶⁸ Garnett, “U.S.-Ukrainian Relations: Past, Present, and Future,” 114–116.

the Soviet nuclear arsenal that Ukraine took custody of was of vital interest to the United States.

1. U.S. Role in Ukraine's Denuclearization

U.S.-Ukrainian relations were dominated by nuclear weapons after Ukraine's declaration of independence. Ukraine faced many challenges, similar to today, in its early stages of sovereignty. The centralized Soviet economic and military structures were difficult to break away from and even more difficult to reconsolidate. In conjunction with forming a new government, Ukraine was unable to facilitate a rapid transition.⁵⁶⁹ This resulted in economic decline, further weakening the newly formed Armed Forces of Ukraine, which were charged with the responsibility of its nuclear arsenal.^{570 571} Coupled with concerns of ultra-nationalism and Russia's insistence "that Ukraine was determined to use the weapons to its advantage," the United States decided to intervene.⁵⁷² From 1992 through 1997, Secretary of State James Baker orchestrated concerted negotiations with Ukraine and Russia that led to the Trilateral Statement of the Presidents of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine (often referred to as the Trilateral Agreement) signed in January 1994 and directed at removing Ukraine's nuclear weapons. The agreement affirmed to Ukraine that the United States and Russia would respect their "independence and sovereignty and the existing borders . . . refrain from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity . . . and refrain from economic coercion."⁵⁷³ Also, Russia and Ukraine were provided economic assistance for the removal and dismantling processes. The agreement was followed by the Budapest Memorandum in December 1994, which mainly

⁵⁶⁹ Ilya Prizel, "Ukraine Between Proto-Democracy and 'Soft' Authoritarianism," in *Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 344.

⁵⁷⁰ Stephen J. Carl, "United States Foreign Assistance Programs: The Requirement of Metrics for Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012).

⁵⁷¹ Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine under Kuchma* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 214.

⁵⁷² Nadia Schadow, "The Denuclearization of Ukraine: Consolidating Ukrainian Security," in *Ukraine in the World*, ed. Lubomyr A. Hajda (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 272.

⁵⁷³ See Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of the United States, Russia, Ukraine (14 January 1994) in *Ukraine in the World*, ed. Lubomyr A. Hajda (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 314.

restated the Trilateral Statement, but also added Ukraine as a member of the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Several scholars contend that the agreement and the U.S. “package” lacked the necessary mechanisms to ensure Ukraine’s security and future prospects.⁵⁷⁴ For instance, it has been noted that these agreements provided security assurances—not guarantees—to Ukraine, and “these assurances are political, not legally binding.”⁵⁷⁵ Additionally, as noted by Russia, the agreement states that “border changes can be made only by peaceful and consensual means.”⁵⁷⁶ The perceived U.S. accomplishment was equally shared with Russia—Ukraine was now lacking a strategic deterrent against a far superior Russian military and defense apparatus. Apart from the nuclear issue, the United States has carried and continues to carry relations with Ukraine through economic aid and diplomatic support.

2. U.S. Economic Efforts in Ukraine

The United States has provided Ukraine with a substantial amount of economic aid that has yielded unexceptional results. Congressional Research has reported that “the United States obligated over \$4 billion in aid to Ukraine from FY1990 to FY2012” through various Department of State and Department of Defense programs designed for humanitarian and civic assistance, internal security, economic growth, and democratic development.⁵⁷⁷ ⁵⁷⁸ In the mid-1990s, the United States “helped Ukraine gain massive international assistance to reform its economy” via the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.⁵⁷⁹ The United States “reinstated tariff preferences for Ukraine under the General System of Preferences” and reopened the “United States Overseas Private

⁵⁷⁴ Stephen Blank, “Russia, Ukraine, and European Security,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, DTIC (1993): vi.

⁵⁷⁵ Garnett, “U.S.-Ukrainian Relations: Past, Present, and Future,” 113; Schadlow, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine,” 280–282.

⁵⁷⁶ See Trilateral Statement, in *Ukraine in the World*, 314.

⁵⁷⁷ Steven Woehrel, *Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy* (CRS Report No. RL33460) (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 20, 2014), 13. <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33460.pdf>.

⁵⁷⁸ Carl, *United States Foreign Assistance Programs*, 52.

⁵⁷⁹ Paul D’Anieri, Paul Kravchuk, and Taras Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 224.

Investment Corporation that “provides financing and political risk insurance for U.S. investors in foreign countries.”⁵⁸⁰ These provisions have done little in the way of sustainable economic progress, domestic reform, and democratic development.^{581 582} In fact, a research study conducted in 1999 revealed that a majority of Ukrainians believe “the United States does absolutely nothing to assist the Ukrainian economy,” and they were particularly resentful of the United States and “disappointed with market economics and its effects on their lives.”⁵⁸³ This same report indicated that the United States was viewed as “money-grubbing monsters interested in keeping Ukraine barely afloat so that it serves as a market for American goods and a source of cheap labor.”⁵⁸⁴ Conversely, economic reforms implemented in 2000, by then Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, did result in an economic boom; however, this was principally attributed to the reigning oligarch’s fear of Ukraine approaching external default and the potential that it may trigger a demise similar to the 1998 financial crash in Russia.⁵⁸⁵ Foreign aid had little, if any, role in the reformation and positive economic movement.⁵⁸⁶ Even so, Ukraine’s economy was devastated by the global recession and inflation reached as high as 31% in May 2008.⁵⁸⁷ Heavy reliance on Russian energy, corrupt oligarchs, and privatization issues have further stymied any progress since then.⁵⁸⁸ Democratic development in Ukraine has been far from exemplary, especially in terms of human rights and the rule of law. Free and fair elections are also viewed as a mythical phenomenon; the same study

⁵⁸⁰ Steven Woehrel, *Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy* (May 12, 2011), 10–11.
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/164374.pdf>

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵⁸² Kuzio, “Twenty Years as an Independent State,” 1–10.

⁵⁸³ Thomas Klobucar and Steven A. Grant, *Ukraine and the World* (R-3-00) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State Office of Research, 2000), 3.

⁵⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁵ Anders Aslund, “The Ancien Regime: Kuchma and the Oligarchs,” in *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough*, ed. Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 13.

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁵⁸⁷ Woehrel, *Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy* (May 12, 2011), 4.

⁵⁸⁸ Woehrel, *Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, 4.

indicated “near unanimity [among participants] that the November 1999 presidential elections, in which Leonid Kuchma was re-elected, were neither fair nor open.”⁵⁸⁹ Yet, there has been some measure of realization; for example, the Orange Revolution.

3. U.S. Role in Orange Revolution

The Orange Revolution is attributed to the fraudulent Ukrainian presidential political process that appointed Viktor Yanukovych. Several other galvanizing factors contributed, including massive corruption by political figures and Ukrainian oligarchs, disparity in socio-economic conditions, the ouster and arrest of Deputy Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, the poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko, and the cover-up and murder of investigative journalist Heorhiy Gongadze.⁵⁹⁰ The incumbent, Russian-backed Yanukovych, was challenged by the Western-oriented Leonid Yushchenko. In general, the population was emotionally charged and vehemently dissatisfied with the Yanukovych-supported incumbent Kuchma regime, and it sought change. The overt U.S. involvement was nominal; most Western-sponsored information mechanisms were shut down, including Radio Liberty and Voice of America, while local media resistance movements—such as Channel 5 and *Ukrainska Pravda*—spearheaded opposition messaging and communications.⁵⁹¹ Though U.S.-sponsored NGOs allegedly were largely to blame for the revolution, local, grass-root movement groups—such as PORA—bear the lion’s share of credit.⁵⁹² Lessons drawn from failures in the 2002 elections, and suppression of the “Ukraine without Kuchma” movement in 2001, led to an overhauled and reorganized strategy that was executed in 2004.⁵⁹³ Andrew Wilson, a professor at the School of Slavonic & East European Studies, University of London, has extensive first-

⁵⁸⁹ Klobucar and Grant, *Ukraine and the World*, 3.

⁵⁹⁰ Jerry Conley, “Orange Revolution of Ukraine: 2004–2005,” in *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 1962–2000*, Vol. 2 (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2012), 808–811.

⁵⁹¹ Olena Prytula, “The Ukrainian Media Rebellion,” 110, 115.

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*, 103–125.

⁵⁹³ See Chapters Four and Five for in-depth accounts of events and elections from 1999 to 2004. Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 70.

hand experience in Ukraine, and his account dispels the notion the revolution followed some kind of U.S. script, he professes, “It is true that the demonstrators were highly organized, but they were organized by Ukrainians.”⁵⁹⁴ What’s more, these groups received a majority of their financing and resources from local Ukrainian businesses, groups, and citizens, particularly entrepreneurs.⁵⁹⁵ In fact, U.S. funding overall for Ukraine had declined over the previous two years because Washington believed President Kuchma had illicitly supplied Saddam Hussein with hi-tech radar systems.⁵⁹⁶ Estimates vary, but in fiscal year 2004, the United States provided \$143.47 million, including \$34.11 million for democracy assistance.⁵⁹⁷ The United States Agency for International Development provided \$1.475 million to organizations like Development Associates, and Freedom House to assist in administering and monitoring the election, and other NGOs contributed as well, notably George Soros’s Renaissance Foundation spent \$1.65 million in the year leading up to the election.⁵⁹⁸ The activities these funds supported were neither conspiratorial nor nefarious and, though helpful, contributed marginally to the overall foundation on which the Orange Revolution was built.⁵⁹⁹ The United States did, however, provide strong support on the diplomatic front.

President George W. Bush noted in a letter to Kuchma after the first round of fraudulent voting that “a tarnished election will lead us to review our relations with Ukraine.”⁶⁰⁰ The second round was as blatantly falsified as the first. In response, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that “the United States cannot accept the Ukraine

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid., 188.

⁵⁹⁵ Pavol Demes and Joerg Forbig, “Pora-‘It’s Time’ for Democracy in Ukraine,” in *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough*, ed. Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 98.

⁵⁹⁶ Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*, 184.

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁹ Oleksandr Sushko and Olena Prystayko, “Western Influence,” in *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough*, ed. Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 135; Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*, 188.

⁶⁰⁰ Sushko and Prystayko, “Western Influence,” 133.

election result as legitimate.”⁶⁰¹ In the end, Yushchenko was eventually elected president, a victory for the democratic process, but not based solely or largely on U.S. contributions—though they did exist and were influential. In light of Russian PW throughout his tenure, Yushchenko’s defeat in 2010 by Yanukovych marked the end for the Orange movement.

4. U.S. Diplomatic Efforts in Ukraine

The United States has reinforced Ukraine’s democratization efforts and ambitions to join the international community and European/Euro-Atlantic organizations (NATO) through diplomatic backing, but have failed to achieve long-term, sustainable results.⁶⁰² Following the Trilateral agreement, U.S. and Ukrainian diplomats “created a binational commission, chaired by Vice President Al Gore and President Kuchma . . . dealing with foreign policy, security trade and investment and other economic issues.”⁶⁰³ In late 1996, the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship was pronounced a “strategic partnership,” and the United States reinforced Ukraine’s role in European security, outlining the basis of the NATO-Ukraine Charter in 1997.⁶⁰⁴ In response to the Orange Revolution, the United States applauded the election of Viktor Yushchenko; he met with President Bush (see Figure 1) and addressed a joint session of Congress “interrupted by several standing ovations.”⁶⁰⁵

⁶⁰¹ Ibid., 134.

⁶⁰² Garnett, “U.S.-Ukrainian Relations,” 103–105.

⁶⁰³ Ibid., 114.

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁵ Woehrel, *Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy* (May 12, 2011), 10.



Figure 1. President Bush talks with Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko in the Oval Office.⁶⁰⁶

Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice openly criticized Russia, responsible for the 2006 and 2009 gas crises during Yushchenko's presidency, stating they had made "politically motivated efforts to constrain energy supply to Ukraine."⁶⁰⁷ The United States also offered strong support for Ukraine to receive a Membership Action Plan to NATO, which was denied in 2008 at a NATO summit in Bucharest.⁶⁰⁸ This resulted in the U.S.-Ukrainian 2008 Charter on Strategic Partnership that deals with a "wide range of issues, including energy security, science and technology, and political dialogue."⁶⁰⁹ President Obama reiterated U.S. support for Ukraine after the 2010 election of Russian-favored Yanukovich. Obstinate, the U.S. diplomatic front has endured, yet, ultimately, its meaningful effects on Ukraine are inconsequential, if not futile.

⁶⁰⁶ U.S. Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, United States Department of State, April 4, 2005. <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/pix/b/51786.htm>.

⁶⁰⁷ Woehrel, *Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy* (May 12, 2011), 10.

⁶⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 5, 10.

⁶⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

5. Conclusion

U.S.-Ukrainian objectives and policy have been formulated to foster and maintain bilateral relations, while promoting cooperation and normalization with Ukraine's European neighbors. These objectives were supported primarily through diplomatic and economic efforts, but at levels that produced varied results, as military and informational elements of national power were nearly absent. U.S. engagement with Ukraine in regard to nuclear disarmament was effective and yet involved U.S. vital interests. Economic aid outside of nuclear disarmament has had a paltry influence on Ukraine's democracy and economy, except for the Orange Revolution. Corruption, violation of human rights, poor rule of law, and poor economic conditions persistently plague Ukraine. Diplomatic assistance has done little in the way of paving Ukraine's path into the international community, although, prior to the Euromaidan, Ukraine strived for closer ties with the EU vis-à-vis an Association Agreement and Eastern Partnership initiative.⁶¹⁰ Even so, Western Europe regards Ukraine as a divorcee of energy powerhouse Russia, which has halted meaningful security and economic engagement.

U.S.-Ukrainian cooperation endured in the year preceding the Euromaidan, but old problems remained. The two made agreements as indicated in a Congressional Research report in 2014, including the removal of Ukraine's "entire stock of highly enriched uranium from its soil," cleanup efforts at Chernobyl, and energy development and exploration.⁶¹¹ Yet, Vice President Biden voiced concerns about Ukraine's democratic development, citing the "selective prosecutions of political opponents," and the State Department issued reports about riot police – Berkut – using batons and other forms of physical force to clear hundreds of protesters in November 2013, and raised issues with the rule of law and human rights, including the unresolved cases involving the dioxin poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko and the killing of investigative journalist Heorhiy Gongadze.⁶¹² ⁶¹³ Ukraine's economy never fully recovered from the financial

⁶¹⁰ Michael Mann, Maka Kocijancic, and Sebastien Brabant, Fact Sheet: EU's Eastern Partnership and the EU Ukraine Association Agreement (Brussels: European Union External Affairs, 2014).

⁶¹¹ Woehrel, *Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy* (May 24, 2013), 11.

⁶¹² Woehrel, *Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy* (May 24, 2013), 12.

crisis;⁶¹⁴ Ukrainian debt was 40% of its GDP, and its GDP decreased 2.1% in 2013.⁶¹⁵ Failed U.S. policy in Ukraine is not wholly responsible for these results, but the outcomes do correspond with the concentration of U.S. efforts. The meaningful conclusion to draw is the correlation between the two; that is, that the economic assistance and diplomatic demarche and the apparent bleak results are related. U.S. interests and corresponding national objectives in Ukraine led to a limited approach of commitment, centering on democratic development and economic progress. Both of these areas of concentration have struggled to achieve a considerable measure of success, and certainly not long-term, sustainable success. In terms of undermining Russian influence, understandably not part of its overt policy, U.S. efforts in Ukraine have had some unintended effects in disrupting Russian strategy—the Orange Revolution. Yet, again, it has not been sustainable not has it gained enough momentum to overcome Russia’s protracted PW.

B. RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

Russia has vital interests in Ukraine and historical ties to Russia’s origins. Ukraine is the gateway to central Europe and many would claim “that without Ukraine, it is impossible to speak not only of a great Russia but [of] any kind of Russia at all.”⁶¹⁶ Ukraine is the largest and strongest former republic of the Soviet Union in possession of strategic Soviet infrastructure. Ukraine and Russia have an expansive shared border, interdependent economies, military-industrial partnerships, and large dispersions of citizens within each other’s borders. Ukraine’s economic ties and strategic geographic position are unquestionably vital to Russia and, if lost to the West, the psychological impact on domestic Russians and political implications for Russian leaders would be

⁶¹³ United States Department of State, *Ukraine 2013 Human Rights Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2013), 1–3. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220554.pdf>; United States Department of State, *2010 Human Rights Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2011), 1–4. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160481.pdf>.

⁶¹⁴ “The Collapse of Ukraine’s Economy: Don’t Chicken Out of Kiev,” *The Economist*, November 15, 2014. <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21632475-throttled-russia-ukraines-economy-needs-more-western-helpespecially-investment>.

⁶¹⁵ *Trading Economics*, “Ukraine GDP Growth Rate.” <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/gdp-growth>.

⁶¹⁶ Kuzio, *Russia-Crimea-Ukraine*, 11.

detrimental. As described in Chapter IV, Russian national identity was essential for uniting the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union; it directed Russia's foreign policy, so a loss of the largest, closest former republic—virtually considered “Little Russia”—would be perceived as catastrophic. Among other benefits, Ukraine provides Russia with a protected southern flank, access to the Black Sea, a functional deep sea port and stationing for the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF), industrial and mineral resources, and an energy conduit to Western Europe. For Russia, Ukraine is instrumental to strengthening Russia's economy and security, but it also poses a challenge to Russia's aspiring regional dominance as the most formidable former republic. To this end, Russia's national objectives are designed to support its vital interests and dominate its former republic.

Russian national objectives in Ukraine have shifted slightly over time, but primarily focus on security, economics, and geopolitics. Russia desires “perfect” influence, if not total control, over Ukraine and its policies to advance Russia's own agenda. Equally as important, Russia seeks to marginalize Western influence in Ukraine and discourage Westward-leaning Ukrainian policy. Since Ukraine's independence, Russia has employed and continues to employ PW across all its elements of national power to achieve these objectives in varying degrees. Russia's intensity and complexity has only increased in parallel with its internal strength, and the stronger Russia becomes, the bolder it grows. Alexander Ghaleb's analysis on Russian state power identifies Russia's three demands of Ukraine following the demise of the Soviet Union, which provide context for Russia's objectives and strategy:

- (1) renunciation of its claims to the Soviet nuclear stockpile in Ukraine, and the surrender of all nuclear warheads to Russia;
- (2) recognition of Russia as the legal inheritor of all political, economic and military infrastructure belonging to the Soviet Union, to include exclusive rights to the Ukrainian pipeline infrastructure and to the Black Sea fleet and the port of Sevastopol; and

(3) recognition of Russia as the regional hegemon.⁶¹⁷

Russia has pragmatically implemented PW methods to realize these demands and to avoid triggering unrecoverable damages—such as Yugoslavia—that would potentially invoke an international response. Moreover, Russia has incorporated long-standing points of contention into its PW campaign. The potential flash points include

Ukrainian territorial integrity and demarcating border (especially the Crimea and Donbass), equity in assets and debts of the Soviet Union, the issue of dual citizenship and [the] large Russian minority in Ukraine, Russian language, nuclear weapons, Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol, . . . [and] the price of energy and its transit on Ukrainian territory.⁶¹⁸

Russia has effectively exacerbated these underlying issues as part of its overall strategy to change the political and social landscape in Ukraine. Its former position as the epicenter of the Soviet Union provides Russia with significant advantages for implementing its PW in Ukraine. As described in Chapter V, Russian PW has evolved and synchronized in the post-Soviet era, and Ukraine is a testament to this reality. Diplomatically, Russia has immense leverage over Ukraine. It can influence international audiences more effectively, craft stronger policies, perpetuate Russian-favored narratives, and tap into the extensive network of former Soviet Union political resources such as proxies and the KGB. Russia's expansion of consulates throughout Ukraine and increased emphasis on controlling information space has promulgated its strategy, even in areas with minimal ethnic-Russian populations like Odessa and Lviv.⁶¹⁹ Russian information, a crucial part of Russia's strategy and policy in Ukraine, has metamorphosed under Putin, effectively propagating its narrative—designed for an intended purpose, target

⁶¹⁷ Alexander Ghaleb, "Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 81.

⁶¹⁸ Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine, Russia, and the CIS," in *Ukraine in the World*, ed. Lubomyr A. Hajda (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 19.

⁶¹⁹ Adrian Karatnycky, "The 'Nearest Abroad': Russia's Relations with Ukraine and Belarus," in *Russia: A Return to Imperialism?* ed. Uri Ra'an and Kate Martin (New York, NY: St Martin's Press, 1996), 82.

population, and overall effect.^{620 621 622} In Ukraine, a common narrative Russia uses is to label the Ukrainian government in Kiev as incompetent fascist stooges of the West, incapable of governance, and one that criminally discriminates against ethnic Russians and Russia as a whole. Russia has primacy in Ukrainian media—“some 70 percent of the Ukrainian population watches Russia’s Ostankino Television, which transmits the strongest signal inside Ukraine,” and “Russian newspapers . . . are among the most popular periodicals in Ukraine”—thus the effects on Russian-speaking Ukrainians are apparent.⁶²³ Russian military and economic elements in Ukraine are equally as prominent.

Russia has applied unrelenting pressure on Ukraine through its military and economic means of PW. The presence of Russian service members, basing rights, and the division of Soviet military property in Ukraine have substantiated Russian encroachment into Ukrainian affairs and acted as a platform for its foreign policy. Beyond Crimea, Sevastopol, the BSF, and nuclear weapons, Ukraine’s Donbass region (Luhansk and Donetsk) was a main contributor to the Soviet defense and mining industry. Ukraine had “twenty-two Soviet central weapons manufacturing complexes, . . . the Southern Machine Building factory in Dnipropetrovsk . . . produced the intercontinental ballistic missiles of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and was one of four major missile plants on Ukrainian soil.”⁶²⁴ Coupled with regions rich mineral resources, Russia covets control over it and uses disparaging economic conditions to pit East versus West, creating political turmoil for Kiev. Economically, Russia reigns supreme over Ukraine’s economy, yet focuses intently on gas and energy transmission. Ukraine has, on several occasions, experienced drastic energy price spikes that led to an accumulation of debt or a complete cut off. Russia then

⁶²⁰ Stephen Blank, “Russian Information Warfare as Domestic Counterinsurgency,” *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy* 35, no. 1 (January 2013): 31, doi: 10.1080/10803920.2013.757946.

⁶²¹ Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy: Can the Nation Cope in Future Conflicts?” *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 27, no. 1 (October 4, 2014): .

⁶²² Peter Pomerantsev, “How Putin is Reinventing Warfare,” *Foreign Policy* 5 (2014).

⁶²³ Karatnycky, “The ‘Nearest Abroad,’” 72–73.

⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*, 72.

uses this accumulation of debt to achieve further objectives, namely regime change or policy abandonment. Russian businessmen have bought Ukrainian energy companies and infrastructure, allowing influence and money to funnel into Ukraine through shadow corporate structures and ownership.⁶²⁵ Overall, Russia's PW supports its preeminent national objective to reintegrate Ukraine into Russia's military, political, and economic spheres. Russia has concentrated on enhancing its contemporary PW by "devising non-military means of exerting greater influence on Ukraine."⁶²⁶ These nonmilitary means include implanting pro-Russian political appointees; leveraging the infrastructure and clandestine-nature of transnational-criminal organizations; increasing intelligence penetration; and forming economic unions and trade agreements.

Russia's employment of nonmilitary methods is reminiscent of Soviet takeovers in Eastern Europe.⁶²⁷ In "Interpreting and Dealing with the Ukraine Crisis," Laszlo Borhi captures Russia's long-term campaign in Ukraine:

Control over a foreign state does not necessarily entail military administration by the aggressor. Yet several events may bring one state gradually under the sway of a foreign power, including security agreements granting extensive stationing rights, unequal economic agreements and foreign trade dependency, the seizure of positions of power, and the infiltration of political parties by agents working for the intelligence services of the external power.⁶²⁸

Borhi's reference to Soviet takeovers provides context for Russia's strategy in Ukraine and reveals the intent behind their "normalization" efforts by using stationing rights for the BSF and Russian-led organizations like the CIS, Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), and Common Economic Space (CES) or Single Economic Space. Russia's intentions are entrenched in established national objectives, namely regional dominance. Russia's objectives within these organizations lie in the belief that their main strength to influence is the result of

⁶²⁵ Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*, 14, 20.

⁶²⁶ Karatnycky, "The 'Nearest Abroad,'" 75.

⁶²⁷ Laszlo Borhi, "Interpreting and Dealing with the Ukraine Crisis: Some Implications and Lessons from History," *Governance Studies at Brookings* (June 2014), 5.

⁶²⁸ Ibid.

mechanically adding up the resources of its members.⁶²⁹ An increase in resources means an increase in influence and, if Russian led, this equates to an increase in Russian influence. In light of this, Ukraine has tenaciously refuted Russia's initiatives and demands.

Ukraine, which has always feared Russia's desires for the "reconstitution of Slavic heartlands," has consistently sought to escape the stranglehold of the previous head of the former Soviet Union, but to no avail.⁶³⁰ Other former republics—Moldova, Georgia, Chechnya—have taken similar approaches, unwilling to accept Russia's objectives, but they have paid a heavy price for their resistance. Russia's approach to Ukraine has been historically less provocative, considering its size and former ties via the Soviet Union. Russia's PW leverages incentive-based and deterrence-based methods (or "carrots-and-sticks") to impose its will upon Ukraine. In the end, Russia's PW has had a steady-state corrosive effect—eroding Ukraine's security and economy, fomenting dissidence in ethnic-Russian populations (in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine), disrupting internal politics to favor Russian objectives and policies, and delegitimizing the Ukrainian government—especially when Ukraine pursues further ties with the West.

1. Russian Political Warfare in Ukraine 1991–2000

Russia's PW against Ukraine can be traced to Ukraine's declaration of independence. Though declared on August 24, 1991, Russia only acknowledged and never genuinely accepted Ukraine's sovereignty. Russian propaganda flooded the media outlets, claiming nuclear war was on the horizon.⁶³¹ Russian leadership immediately attempted to rein in the nationalist aspirations by proposing a "new union treaty that would limit the political and economic sovereignty of its members."⁶³² Russia's

⁶²⁹ Yuliya Nikitina, "Regional Security Cooperation in the Post-Soviet Space," *Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security* 17, no. 4 (October 2011): 50. doi: 10.1080/19934270.2011.609729.

⁶³⁰ Wynne Russell, "Russian Relations with the 'Near Abroad,'" in *Russian Foreign Policy since 1990*, ed. Peter Shearman (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 56.

⁶³¹ Solchanyk, "Ukraine, Russia, and the CIS," 27.

⁶³² Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1996), 674.

intentions were clear: Ukraine's independence was a temporary phenomenon and reunification with Russia was only a matter of time.⁶³³ President Yeltsin stated that "once Russia reduces its annual supply of oil [to Ukraine] from 50m to 15m tonnes this would be the final nail in its [Ukraine's] coffin of independence."⁶³⁴ Sergei Karaganov, deputy head of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences and a member of Yeltsin's presidential council, authored the Karaganov Doctrine, with a section entitled "How to Work with Ukraine" stating that Russian policy "should be aimed towards politically isolating Ukraine, restricting its economic growth and independence. Ukraine should be put under international fire by creating an image of an authoritarian-nationalist and neo-communist regime in Ukraine."⁶³⁵ Delegitimizing the government and disrupting the economy would allow Russia to exert ownership over Soviet property and infrastructure, and to "reintegrate Ukraine into a Russian-oriented CIS and Economic Union."⁶³⁶ This policy toward Ukraine was buttressed by domestic efforts at home:

A study that focused on the image of Ukraine and Ukrainians in the Russian press after the collapse of the Soviet Union found that . . . the prevailing trend in the ensuing years was to present a picture of Ukrainian independence in almost conspiratorial terms—that is, as the result of efforts by "nationalist" or "sovereign communist" elites ostensibly working against the genuine will of "the people."⁶³⁷

The study concluded that "Russian public opinion and the mass media evade serious discussion . . . in connection with the formation of an independent Ukraine."⁶³⁸ As early as Ukraine's independence, evidence can be seen of PW—diplomatic, economic, informational—reminiscent of Soviet ideological subversion, directed at producing negative economic effects on the population, isolating the target state internationally, and demonizing and fracturing the governmental and societal fibers.

⁶³³ Kuzio, *Russia-Crimea-Ukraine*, 5.

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶³⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶³⁷ Solchanyk, "Ukraine, Russia, and the CIS," 21.

⁶³⁸ *Ibid.*, 21–23.

As mentioned, Russia has had to play a delicate hand with Ukraine, unlike with the Caucasus, Moldova, and Tajikistan in the early 1990s, when “brazen military interference—some sanctioned by the Russian authorities, others rogue operations—helped destabilize and even topple the official authorities.”⁶³⁹ Instead, Ukraine’s sovereignty would be “chipped away in a piecemeal fashion by Moscow.”⁶⁴⁰ Russia began a strategy intended to draw the former republic into a Russian-led security/economic cooperation. This would allow Russia to restore control over Ukraine and the Soviet procurements it inherited—nuclear weapons, the BSF, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine. The organization Russia intended to use as its strategic vehicle was the CIS. Besides Belarus, Ukraine’s support of the CIS was instrumental as Stephen Larrabee, former U.S. National Security Council staff on Soviet–East European affairs, contends, “Ukraine is the cornerstone—the keystone in the arch—of the new European security architecture.”⁶⁴¹ Russia demanded Ukraine’s participation and full membership, less it risk “an emasculated and truncated version” stripped of all its Soviet acquisitions, both “immovable and movable.”⁶⁴² Much to Russia’s dismay, Ukraine viewed the CIS as a divorce counselor only meant to ease the transition from the Soviet Union.⁶⁴³

a. Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States

Initially, Russia tried to persuade Ukraine with “carrots,” yet, it resorted to “sticks” to force the defiant former republic to capitulate. Following the December 1991 signing of the second commonwealth accord in Alma-Ata, Yeltsin promoted agreements of Ukraine’s sovereign territory stating, “Every state is independent and there will be no center; . . . borders between the states will be inviolable. . . . Russia is not seeking to

⁶³⁹ Karatnycky, “The ‘Nearest Abroad,’” 70–71.

⁶⁴⁰ Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, “‘BACK IN THE USSR’: Russia’s Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy toward Russia,” *Ethnic Conflict Project: Harvard University* (January 1994), 85.

⁶⁴¹ F. Stephen Larrabee, “Ukraine’s Place in European and Regional Security,” in *Ukraine in the World*, ed. Lubomyr A. Hajda (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 249.

⁶⁴² Hill and Jewett, “‘BACK IN THE USSR,’” 68.

⁶⁴³ See Ukraine’s leadership opinion on the CIS predicting that it would eventually collapse. Kuzio, *Russia-Crimea-Ukraine*, 7.

bring about another empire.”⁶⁴⁴ Russia offered reduced prices for gas and oil and other economic incentives “on the condition Ukraine makes political concessions.”⁶⁴⁵ In August 1992, Russia proposed an initial Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership outlining a preponderance of provisions in the CIS Charter such as “dual citizenship, joint military and foreign policy, inability to join another alliance, and Russian bases in Ukraine on behalf of the CIS.”⁶⁴⁶ This essentially created a “*de facto* Ukrainian-Russian union or confederation which Kiev had no interest in joining.”⁶⁴⁷ Ukraine’s dismissal of the treaty and refrain from full membership in the CIS infuriated Moscow. In the summer of 1992, Russian leaders threatened to wreak havoc on Ukraine’s economy by raising oil prices, and they passed two resolutions claiming Crimea’s transfer in 1954 as illegal and Sevastopol as a Russian territory.⁶⁴⁸ Russian officials warned Eastern European countries not to bother building embassies in Kiev or to pursue ties with Ukraine as its independence is only “transitional.”⁶⁴⁹ Russia then submitted to the United Nations in February 1993—without any other CIS member’s consent—the “Russian Monroe Doctrine” purposing that “the entire former USSR must be proclaimed a [Russian] ‘sphere of vital interests’ . . . where it [Russia] would play a special role recognized by the World community.”⁶⁵⁰ Furthermore, Russia should be granted “special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability” in the near abroad “to deal with the rise in aggressive (non-Russian) nationalism, separatism of ethnic minorities, economic crisis and nuclear proliferation.”⁶⁵¹ Russia proposed regional structures, such as the CIS, to manage these peace-keeping operations.⁶⁵²

⁶⁴⁴ Hill and Jewett, “Back in the USSR,” 69.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid., 75.

⁶⁴⁶ Kuzio, *Russia-Crimea-Ukraine*, 13.

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid., 13.

⁶⁴⁸ Hill and Jewett, “Back in the USSR,” 92.

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid., 76.

⁶⁵⁰ Kuzio, *Russia-Crimea-Ukraine*, 11.

⁶⁵¹ Ibid.

⁶⁵² Ibid.

Consequently, this peace-keeping role would allow Russia uncontested authority to “stir up trouble in order then to be invited in” to quell it, which would also afford Russia an opportunity to build new forward bases.⁶⁵³ Moreover, Russia believed it would relegate or prevent NATO intervention and expansion in the near abroad. After Russia unveiled its proposal, several CIS members argued that these “police functions would lead it [Russia] to dictate and interfere in the internal affairs of other CIS members.”⁶⁵⁴ Ukraine was adamantly against such powers, “concerned that Russia could stir up trouble in the Crimea and then, on the basis of its ‘special UN powers,’ demand to be allowed to place ‘peacekeeping’ forces there which could be unlikely to leave in the short to medium term.”⁶⁵⁵ Russia, in fact, was already operationalizing in Crimea. Crimea is a historical bone of contention and home of the BSF.

b. Crimea, Sevastopol, and the Black Sea Fleet

Russia has deemed Crimea vital to its national security and claims rightful ownership over the territory. In 1991, it was agreed that the BSF, a CIS force, could remain stationed at Sevastopol. Russia wanted all of it: Crimea, the BSF, and Sevastopol. The Russian Navy was recruiting BSF sailors with incentives like higher pay and benefits.⁶⁵⁶ In mid-1992, Yevhen Marchuk, head of Ukraine’s National Security Service, revealed “that influential Russian industrial interests were actively transferring considerable funds to support separatist and pro-Russian movements in the Crimea and the Donbass . . . skillfully, so that the official roots are hidden.”⁶⁵⁷ Russian political groups—such as the Republican Movement of Crimea—held mass rallies allegedly expressing the “will of the people” as favoring closer ties with Russia and warned to take “adequate and appropriate measures on the issue of its status.”⁶⁵⁸ Seventy percent of the

⁶⁵³ Kuzio, *Russia-Crimea-Ukraine*, 12.

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁶ Hill and Jewett, “Back in the USSR,” 78.

⁶⁵⁷ Kuzio, *Russia-Crimea-Ukraine*, 12.

⁶⁵⁸ Hill and Jewett, “Back in the USSR,” 75.

population, however, felt no hostility or discrimination toward national identity, seeing national enmity inconsequential in comparison to economic conditions or economic peril at that time.⁶⁵⁹ Additionally, Moscow was offering dual citizenship to Crimean Russians and “promoted Crimean presidential candidates oriented towards Russia.”⁶⁶⁰ Covertly, several pro-Russian Cossacks, who had xenophobic sentiment toward Ukraine and had fought in “Bosnia, ‘Dniester Republic’ in Moldova and Abkhazia, were arrested transporting weapons to Crimea.”⁶⁶¹ On the informational front, Russian television included Sevastopol with other major Russian cities during local and national weather forecasts.⁶⁶² The level of Russian PW in Crimea alone is of epic proportion and illustrates a micro-level overarching approach in Ukraine. Russia proceeded similarly in ensuring Ukraine’s denuclearization.

c. Russia’s Role in Ukraine’s Denuclearization

Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal challenged Russia and created a significant hurdle in terms of coercing Ukraine to become a full member of the CIS. In 1993, tensions between Russia and Ukraine were at an all-time high, and Moscow wanted “to undermine the West’s confidence in Ukraine by accusing Kiev of maintaining unsafe facilities for the storage of the nuclear warheads. Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Tarasyuk dismissed these accusations as false and as examples of Russian pressure on Ukraine.”⁶⁶³ Moscow’s insistence and influence on Ukraine’s denuclearization was framed within a narrative that painted Russia as a steward of nonproliferation, protecting the interests of the international community, while Ukraine was a state on the verge of chaos. Adrian Karatnycky describes Russian strategy in pursuit of Ukraine’s denuclearization:

Russia had sought also to exploit international concern about Ukraine’s tactical and strategic nuclear weapons by skillfully portraying the new

⁶⁵⁹ Kuzio, *Ukraine under Kuchma*, 198.

⁶⁶⁰ Hill and Jewett, “‘Back in the USSR,’” 68.

⁶⁶¹ IHS Jane’s: Intelligence Analysis, “Murder in Crimea” IHS Global Limited, January 13, 1994.

⁶⁶² Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Ukraine’s Critical Role in the Post-Soviet Space,” in *Ukraine in the World*, ed. Lubomyr A. Hajda (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 6.

⁶⁶³ Schadow, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine,” 280.

Ukrainian state as an unreliable member of the international community, led by a president who was a neo-communist turned nationalist. . . . Russian officials sought to muster Western pressure on Ukraine to . . . isolate the new Ukrainian state . . . to weaken its hand vis-à-vis Moscow. *Ironically, such Western pressure was exerted according to Russian—not Western— strategic priorities.* For Ukraine was pressed first to rid itself of its tactical nuclear weapons—which could be deployed as a deterrent against Russia—and not the strategic nuclear arsenal, which was targeted originally at the United States [emphasis added].⁶⁶⁴

Russia reinforced its strategy through diplomatic and military channels, and incessant informational campaigns. Russian political leaders traveled to densely populated, pro-Russian regions, rallying against the fabricated anti-Russian policies of the Ukrainian government that fomented dissent and political instability for Kiev.⁶⁶⁵ The Russian Foreign Ministry Press and Information Department issued a plethora of reports, statements, and findings all bent on defacing Ukraine's nuclear program.⁶⁶⁶ The Ukrainian newspaper *Pravda* and Russian television ramped up propaganda on Ukrainian ultra-nationalism and the incompetency of the government in Kiev and created hysteria about the state of the nuclear arsenal and the potential of nuclear war. Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett's research on Russian intervention in former Soviet republics expounds on Russia's information campaign in support of denuclearizing Ukraine, stating, "Moscow raised the phantom of an accidental Ukrainian nuclear strike on the United States . . . suggesting the catastrophic deterioration of improperly-maintained Ukrainian weapons—each one a Chernobyl waiting to happen."⁶⁶⁷ They also assert that the Russian defense ministry chief director, Colonel General Yevgeny Maslin, claimed that Ukraine lacked the ability to maintain its nuclear hardware and storage facilities, which were "becoming increasingly dangerous to itself, Russia, and the international community."⁶⁶⁸ In the end,

⁶⁶⁴ Karatnycky, "The 'Nearest Abroad,'" 78.

⁶⁶⁵ Hill and Jewett, "Back in the USSR," 81–84.

⁶⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 84.

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁶⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 81.

Russia's most influential element of national power against Ukraine's nuclear arsenal, and Ukraine in general, was economic.

d. Russian Economic Political Warfare

Russia engineered economics into a weapon and, as Ukraine's economy was and is heavily dependent on Russia—particularly Russian gas and energy transmission—Russia has used this interdependency to hold Ukraine hostage. The former Russian minister of CIS relations, Igor Tuliev, pointed out that “Ukraine is economically dependent on Russia and . . . Russia's economic levers should be utilized in dealing with Ukraine.”⁶⁶⁹ Ukraine's defiance to Russian demands in the 1990s led to Moscow's economic warfare. This included drastic energy price hikes; expulsion of Ukraine from the ruble zone; suspension of fuel supplies during important state visits, such as that of German chancellor Helmut Kohl in June 1993; interruption of “resources such as gas, oil, precious metals for the electronics industry and fertilizer components”; freezing Russian Central Bank transactions with Ukraine; and imposing tariff's and taxes on Ukrainian imports.⁶⁷⁰ Most notably, Russian energy has been the vanguard of economic coercion. Russia controls the energy terms and conditions to support its political and foreign policy goals in Ukraine. Adrian Karatnycky, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and expert on Ukraine and Russia, explains the energy coercion:

In July 1993, Russia began to restrict gas and energy supplies to Ukraine and to charge near-world market prices. As a result, Ukraine began to accumulate debts it could not service. . . . For a one-month period Russia even shut off gas and oil deliveries to Ukraine for non-payment. In September 1993, Russia followed with a diplomatic demarche, signing an agreement with Poland to construct a gas pipeline that would travel through Belarus and Poland, bypassing Ukraine.⁶⁷¹

Beyond the accumulation of debt, the lack of energy has detrimental effects on Ukraine's economy. Due to the energy shortfalls, the 1993 harvesting season was

⁶⁶⁹ Brzezinski, “Ukraine's Critical Role in the Post-Soviet Space,” 6.

⁶⁷⁰ Hill and Jewett, “Back in the USSR,” 66.

⁶⁷¹ Karatnycky, “The ‘Nearest Abroad,’” 77.

crippled and the agricultural industry destroyed, leaving crops to rot in the fields.⁶⁷² In addition to overt economic coercion, covertly, the Russian FIS was preventing Ukraine from exploiting large oil and gas deposits on the Black Sea coast near Odessa through active measures.⁶⁷³ The economic pressure was fueling internal political pressure; Moscow “trumpeted the economic grievances of ethnic Russians in Ukraine’s eastern provinces, particularly miners in the Donetsk region” resulting in “a new wave of strikes.”⁶⁷⁴ ⁶⁷⁵ Combined with the diplomatic, military, and informational fronts, the pressure was overwhelming and led to a series of agreements at Massandra, Crimea in September 1993.

e. Kremlin Victories

At Massandra, Ukraine initially agreed to sell its share of the BSF to pay off the estimated \$2.5 billion debt from Russian fuel imports and to allow Russia to lease Sevastopol.⁶⁷⁶ This precursor agreement led to the 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership, which divided the BSF in half between Ukraine and Russia. In November 1993, Ukraine committed to a phased nuclear disarmament program that eventually led to the Trilateral Agreement. The pro-Russian political parties coalition claimed victory in the Crimean peninsula, “a presage political warfare over regional authority.”⁶⁷⁷ Russia continued its PW practices to manipulate Ukrainian internal politics.

In 1994, on the eve of a new political season with March elections for parliament and June-July elections for the presidency, Russia, which in 1993 had drastically reduced the supplies of energy to Ukraine, exerted no similar pressure on Ukraine when its

⁶⁷² Hill and Jewett, “Back in the USSR,” 78.

⁶⁷³ Kuzio, *Ukraine under Kuchma*, 203.

⁶⁷⁴ Hill and Jewett, “Back in the USSR,” 68.

⁶⁷⁵ Prizel, “Ukraine Between Proto-Democracy and ‘Soft’ Authoritarianism,” 347.

⁶⁷⁶ Hill and Jewett, “Back in the USSR,” 78.

⁶⁷⁷ Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Ukraine’s Parliamentary Election* (Washington, D.C.: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, April 1994), 29.

delinquencies of payments climbed in the winter of 1993-1994. This decision was calculated; any effort to heighten tension between the two states might strengthen the hand of anti-Russian forces and weaken the hand of the candidate Moscow felt was clearly preferable—Leonid Kuchma—who campaigned on improving relations with Russia.⁶⁷⁸ Kuchma won the presidency in 1994 and continued to reap support from Moscow throughout his tenure. Economic conditions remained poor, but Russia's PW machine was able to blame the "West's market economy" for its performance and, combined with NATO operations in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Croatia, approval ratings for Russia soared, while opinions of the United States and NATO plummeted.⁶⁷⁹ Preceding the 1999 Ukrainian election, Yeltsin eased the value-added tax (VAT) imposed on Ukrainian goods and, in February 1998, stated, "If you [Ukraine] change Presidents [Kuchma], you may be in for a change of relations," essentially directing the Russian-speaking population in eastern and southern Ukraine to support Kuchma.⁶⁸⁰ Kuchma also took a cue from Yeltsin's 1996 presidential election, as prior to the 1999 election, several people were murdered, including investigative journalist Heorhiy Gongadze and Vadim Hetman, who was Viktor Yushchenko's confidant and potential campaign leader. After Hetman's murder, Yushchenko abandoned campaigning altogether.⁶⁸¹ The state-controlled media dominated and heralded Kuchma; Ukrainians were "forced from factories, schools, and even hospitals to go to polls and vote for Kuchma."⁶⁸² Kuchma claimed victory, and Russia remained well positioned to dominate and control Ukraine.

f. Conclusion

Russia's PW in Ukraine, from Ukraine's independence in 1991 until the beginning of the twenty-first century, supported Russia's vital interests and national objectives. Russia was never able to achieve Ukraine's full membership in the CIS, but it

⁶⁷⁸ Karatnycky, "The 'Nearest Abroad,'" 79.

⁶⁷⁹ Klobucar and Grant, *Ukraine and the World*, 4.

⁶⁸⁰ Larrabee, "Ukraine's Place in European and Regional Security," 252.

⁶⁸¹ Aslund, "The Ancien Regime," 13.

⁶⁸² Klobucar and Grant, *Ukraine and the World*, 3.

was able to accomplish a majority of the goals that the CIS was intended for. Russia demonstrated an ability to affect Ukraine's internal politics and governance, dissuade anti-Russian policies or agendas, and implant pro-Russian leaders into positions of power. The Soviet infrastructure and materials Ukraine possessed—the BSF, energy infrastructure, nuclear weapons, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine—fell under Russian influence, ownership, or control. Ukraine dismantled its nuclear arsenal, ratified the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, permitted the stationing of the Russian BSF, afforded leasing rights on Sevastopol for 20 years, and agreed to Russian economic terms and conditions on energy transmission.⁶⁸³ Russian influence and popularity in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine gained primacy and aggravated Ukraine's internal politics and foreign policy. Ukraine became an associate member of the CIS Economic Union and joined the CIS Joint Air Defense Agreement and Industrial-Financial Groups.⁶⁸⁴ Russia's synchronized PW across all elements of national power was successful in achieving these strategic milestones. Entering the twenty-first century, Russia aptly held Ukraine within its sphere of influence commensurate with Russian national objectives.

2. Russian Political Warfare in Ukraine 2000-2014

The Twenty-First Century ushered in a transition in Russia's leadership: Vladimir Putin. Putin's Russia has had intense, direct impacts on Ukraine. As described in Chapter V, shortly after his election in 2000, Putin went to work reconstructing Russia by reigning in the power ministries and oligarchs, and establishing the internal mechanisms needed to support his rule and foreign policy agenda.⁶⁸⁵ He also eliminated any political opposition, consumed and state-institutionalized Russia's economic resources, revitalized Russia's military and informational elements of national power, and reinvigorated the intelligence and covert apparatuses. His aggressive new vision of foreign policy was designed to resurrect the once great Soviet empire, now a Eurasian

⁶⁸³ Kuzio, *Ukraine under Kuchma*, 224.

⁶⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 211, 219.

⁶⁸⁵ Brian D. Taylor, *State Building in Putin's Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 77.

empire. Putin's expansionist, revisionist aims would solidify Russia's supremacy over the former Soviet republics, creating a new Russian civilization and community.⁶⁸⁶ Ukraine was to be a vital part of this new civilization; a Eurasian civilization.

At home, Putin was paranoid about external threats, internal dissent, and political process manipulation, and in 2000 began "rebuilding a regime of repression" that would allow Russia to pursue its foreign policy goals much more aggressively.⁶⁸⁷ Putin's paranoia was fueled by his belief that outside powers were trying to take control over Russia's natural resources "by weakening its state institutions, defense capability, and independence."⁶⁸⁸ To dissolve these threats, Putin used tactics known as *policing the opposition* that included using the police to block roads, tear-gassing anti-Putin protestors, seizing radio stations by force, and contracting enforcers from outside areas to break up opposition gatherings.⁶⁸⁹ These tactics were a portent to events in Ukraine. Putin also "built [global energy company] Gazprom into a main instrument of Russia's new state capitalism," appointing allies to top positions and in effect structuring "Gazprom as a tool of foreign policy."⁶⁹⁰ Gazprom was now Putin's sword to strike Ukraine at will, a tactic that would prove useful in "Putin's new grand alternative project, the Eurasian Union."⁶⁹¹ Under Putin, Russia replenished its ailing Ministry of Defense and reenergized its information warfare in the near abroad with a revamped compatriot policy constructing a "virtual Russian supra-state populated with 'compatriots.'"⁶⁹² This

⁶⁸⁶ The vision for Eurasia vice Europe is Russia's newly revised strategy to counter the West. Jolanta Darczewska, "The Information War on Ukraine: New Challenges," *Cicero Foundation Great Debate Paper* 14, no. 08 (2014): 3–17.

⁶⁸⁷ Taylor, *State Building in Putin's Russia*, 94.

⁶⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 109.

⁶⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 96–98.

⁶⁹⁰ "Gazprom: Russia's Wounded Giant," *The Economist* (2013), 3/16/2015.

⁶⁹¹ Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis: What it Means for the West* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 17.

⁶⁹² Heather A. Conley and Theodore P. Gerber, "Russian Soft Power in the 21st Century: An Examination of Russian Compatriot Policy in Estonia," Center for Strategic & International Studies (August 2011), 12.

provided Moscow with renewed legitimacy with regard to Russian-speaking populations living in the near abroad.⁶⁹³

Russia's newly engineered policy has a twenty-first century flavor: funding and enhancing NGOs, increasing its media reach to disseminate Russian propaganda, funding political parties and leaders with pro-Russian agendas, and strengthening the Russian Orthodox Church.⁶⁹⁴ This transcendence includes new political technologies such as "arraying an army of interferers, whose techniques are much more post-modern: party managers and financiers, official script writers, Kremlin bloggers, trolls and so-called *web-brigady*."⁶⁹⁵ Putin's consolidation and control over Russian media has increased its potency, both domestically and internationally.⁶⁹⁶ Organizations like RT are able to bury Russia's Kremlin line "in a post-modern mélange of 'alternative' views," perturbing or outright confusing audiences.⁶⁹⁷ Modern Russian information warfare distorts the truth or fabricates outright lies to cause psychological impotence or lack of clarity. If needed, violent repression also plays its role and has historical roots in Russian history. Of the 1,055 journalists killed worldwide from 1992 through 2014, 80 were in Russia.⁶⁹⁸ In all, Putin's Russia has synchronized and strengthened its PW capability to achieve its national objectives, to include, most importantly, subordinating Ukraine.

The seething nature and brutality of Russia's contemporary PW in Ukraine has no bounds, even to the extent of collaborating with transnational-criminal organizations. Dr. Lada Roslycky research in Crimea has revealed Russia's "political-criminal nexus" as an effective foreign policy instrument designed to "impede the rule of law and the state's de

⁶⁹³ Blank, "Russian Information Warfare as Domestic Counterinsurgency," 31–44.

⁶⁹⁴ See instruments of soft power presented in Chapter Three. Conley and Gerber, "Russian Soft Power in the 21st Century," 12–22.

⁶⁹⁵ Web-brigady (or web-brigades) are alleged state-sponsored Internet groups linked to the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, 22.

⁶⁹⁶ Oscar Jonsson and Robert Seely, "Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal After Ukraine," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 28, (March 2015), 12.

⁶⁹⁷ Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, 22.

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid.

facto control over its territory and population.”⁶⁹⁹ ⁷⁰⁰ Roslycky’s work on Crimea concludes Russia’s strategy in Ukraine aims to promote pro-Russian separatism to challenge Ukraine’s governmental legitimacy and desires for Euro-Atlantic integration. Russia’s strategy has been supported “by a Russia-centered, post-Soviet political-criminal nexus made up of intelligence services, government executives and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s).”⁷⁰¹ In Crimea, this nexus includes “Russian Community of Choice and Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia Group (which includes over 100 NGOs), Moscow State University, the FSB (the successor to the KGB), the GRU (Russian military intelligence), former Moscow mayor Luzhkov, Konstantyn Zatulin and the Russian Orthodox Church.”⁷⁰² The SBU (Ukrainian intelligence) has also been linked to Gazprom.⁷⁰³ The variety and complexity of these actors reflects the intensity of Russia’s PW; their coordinated efforts include the

use of NGO’s to promote anti-Western/anti-NATO and anti-democratic sentiment; casting Crimean territoriality into doubt; use of language/education as a political instrument—book and school burning; publishing of “free” anti-state newspapers; (forced) dispersal of passports/passportization; renaming of streets/towns, cultural centers; hanging Russian flags and plaques, Nazi graffiti on Ukrainian buildings, separatist calls from Russian politicians, use of religion as political instrument—promotion of Russian Orthodox Church and Tatar tensions, and modification of shared common memory.⁷⁰⁴

The subversive nature of these acts is akin to classic Soviet *active measures* engineered to aggravate the political and social landscape in Ukraine. William Varettoni, a former Ukraine and NATO analyst with the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of

⁶⁹⁹ See section titled: “Separatism, Imperialism, and Transnational Crimes.” Lada L. Roslycky, “Organized Transnational Crime in the Black Sea Region: A Geopolitical Dilemma?” *Trends in Organized Crime* (2009).

⁷⁰⁰ *The Strategic Foresight Institute 2012 Speakers Series with Dr. Lada L. Roslycky*. 2012 Speaker Series session.

⁷⁰¹ Ibid.

⁷⁰² Ibid.

⁷⁰³ See section titled: “Linking up to Energy.” Roslycky, “Organized Transnational Crime in the Black Sea Region.”

⁷⁰⁴ The Strategic Foresight Institute, 2012.

Intelligence and Research whose dissertation focused on security and instability in Crimea, professes, “The Russian press and television dominate Crimea. . . . The Black Sea Fleet, businessmen, and NGOs with Russian affinities sponsor a number of local publications and television stations” fervidly delegitimizing the Ukrainian government.⁷⁰⁵ These groups were inflaming the Crimea issue, suggesting it is a grand plan of NATO to expand its foothold in the region and rob the Slavs of a “powerful shield against the West.”⁷⁰⁶ The messaging is relevant, well crafted, and attractive to the end user, both at home and abroad.

Putin’s actions are similar to Stalin’s in resurrecting the fifth column, and the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine became the leviathan of Russian PW.

a. Russian Role in the Orange Revolution

Russian involvement in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election was industrial in scale and ubiquitous in nature; however, it resulted in what is also “widely viewed as the Kremlin’s greatest foreign relations blunder since 1991.”⁷⁰⁷ Notwithstanding, the 2004 election exemplifies Russia’s twenty-first century PW in Ukraine. The election became the “clash of civilizations between two political cultures: Eurasian and European”—Yanukovych and Yushchenko.⁷⁰⁸ Or, more narrowly speaking, it was a struggle between pro-Western and pro-Russian orientations.⁷⁰⁹ Geographically this translates to a confrontation between the Russian-friendly eastern region and the nationalistic western region; the Kremlin believed Yanukovych’s victory required convincing the latter that Russia-Ukraine cooperation was instrumental for Ukrainian prosperity.⁷¹⁰ This strategy

⁷⁰⁵ William Varettoni, “Crimea’s Overlooked Instability,” *The Washington Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (Summer 2011): 92. doi: 10.1080/0163660X.2011.588128.

⁷⁰⁶ Brzezinski, “Ukraine’s Critical Role in the Post-Soviet Space,” 6.

⁷⁰⁷ Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov, “Russia’s Role in the Orange Revolution,” in *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough*, ed. Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 145.

⁷⁰⁸ Taras Kuzio, “From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 52, no. 2 (March/April 2005), 35.

⁷⁰⁹ Petrov and Ryabov, “Russia’s Role in the Orange Revolution,” 149.

⁷¹⁰ Ibid.

was implemented by Russian political technologists and funded by the Russian state.⁷¹¹ The historical East-versus-West platform was constructed and lent to demonizing Yushchenko and his coalition, Our Ukraine, as evil fascists—Nazis—and stooges of the West, particularly of the U.S., nicknaming Yushchenko as “Bushchenko.”⁷¹² Meanwhile, Yanukovych’s Russophone Party of Regions and Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU) were pro-Russian stewards of Ukraine, seeking prosperity through stronger relations with Russia.

(1) Russian Diplomatic and Economic Political Warfare

Among others, Putin’s geopolitical concerns in Ukraine revolved around halting EU and NATO expansion, securing the southern flank, solidifying the Single Economic Space, and securing Moldova and the South Caucasus.⁷¹³ He gambled on Yanukovych and Russian political technologists. Yanukovych, in turn, committed to making Russian an official language, allowing dual citizenship, and abandoning all moves toward NATO.⁷¹⁴ Russian diplomatic support for Yanukovych came from Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in the form of official state visits, public declarations, and presidential endorsements.⁷¹⁵ “Putin received extensive coverage on official Ukrainian TV, including a ninety-minute phone-in broadcast, live on national channels . . . which was unprecedented in Ukraine.”⁷¹⁶ In the summer of 2004, “Putin agreed to remove VAT on oil exports to Ukraine reducing the cost of Ukrainian petrol by 16 percent” and petrol remained at those prices even as crude oil costs soared later in the year.⁷¹⁷ Russia announced Ukrainians would be allowed to stay for up to 90 days in Russia without

⁷¹¹ Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, “Introduction: Perspectives on the Orange Revolution,” in *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough*, ed. Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2006), 7.

⁷¹² Petrov and Ryabov, “Russia’s Role in the Orange Revolution,” 149.

⁷¹³ Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*, 94.

⁷¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 89.

⁷¹⁵ Putin and Medvedev tenaciously advocated for Yanukovych’s Party of Regions. Petrov and Ryabov, “Russia’s Role in the Orange Revolution,” 145–164.

⁷¹⁶ Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*, 94.

⁷¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 89.

registering and granted freedom of entry with only domestic documentation.⁷¹⁸ Putin congratulated Yanukovych on his “victory” after the second round; then, once it was declared null and void, Putin pushed for a complete rerun in an attempt to reinsert Kuchma into power.⁷¹⁹

(2) Russian Political Technologists

Unscrupulous Russian political technologists (techs) unemployed at home (Putin essentially eliminated any need for them) were aligned in full force with Viktor Medvedchuk, leader of the SDPU and Ukraine’s most pro-Russian oligarch, and Gleb Pavlovski, owner of The Russian Club in Kiev, as well as several others.⁷²⁰ The Moscow linkage is blatant and inescapable. Medvedchuk was Kuchma’s chief of staff (1994-2005) and his daughter’s godfather is Vladimir Putin.⁷²¹ Moscow bankrolled these techs and Yanukovych with an estimated \$600-\$900 million “including a \$200 million payment from the Kremlin-controlled energy giant Gazprom”; these funds were funneled through shadowy companies and structures such as Donechchyna.⁷²²

The techs consider themselves “political metaprogrammers, masters of the local political universe.”⁷²³ They shape the direction of the favored political party or authority and manipulate the election to achieve victory. Their tactics are often crude and corrosive; they stop at nothing to win. In Ukraine, the techs orchestrated and led the PW to include covertly financed fake candidates or parties, bribed and intimidated state-administrated resources and personnel (state-owned media), hacking into the fiber optics of the Central Election Commission in Kiev, manipulated voting results through various methods like electoral tourism, hired agent provocateurs to incite anti-Western sentiment, and stage-managed events—directed conflict—to charge the political atmosphere or

⁷¹⁸Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*, 90.

⁷¹⁹ Kuzio, “From Kuchma to Yushchenko,” 41.

⁷²⁰ Ibid., 37.

⁷²¹ Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, 138.

⁷²² Ibid., 119.

⁷²³ Ibid., 86.

destabilize regions.^{724 725 726} They organized social movements in eastern and southern Ukraine against Yushchenko, falsified voter turnouts, fabricated fake ballots printed in Russia, and used proxies to distribute crude anti-Western propaganda.⁷²⁷ Additionally, they “created a network of websites, each which reprinted news from the others” creating a cyclical metastasizing effect over the Internet by concealing the initial source and providing “other media (television or newspaper) to use the information (usually disinformation).”⁷²⁸ Their PW arsenal seems to have no end.

The techs’ assault was levied generally through six mechanisms: television, anti-American propaganda, state-administrative resources, violence, encouragement of extremist groups, and the assassination of Yushchenko.⁷²⁹ Yanukovych received 80% more television time than Yushchenko and, since Yushchenko’s wife was American, the Brezhnev-era, anti-American campaign characterized Yushchenko as an American stooge (see Figure 2). Employees of state institutions were forced to demonstrate in support of Yanukovych or risk losing their jobs. Organized-crime “skinheads” started appearing at protests; fascist propaganda followed suit (see Figure 3), and then Yushchenko was poisoned with dioxin allegedly originating from laboratories in Russia (see Figure 4).⁷³⁰

⁷²⁴ Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, 86.

⁷²⁵ Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*, 70–174.

⁷²⁶ See detailed accounts of activity in Chapter Eight. Petrov and Ryabov, “Russia’s Role in the Orange Revolution,” 145–164.

⁷²⁷ Voter turnouts in the eastern and southern regions were impossibly over one-hundred percent. The fake ballots printed in Russia are referred to as “cookies.” The fake candidates were part of a technique called “relay race,” intended to confuse voters and incite anti-Yushchenko sentiment. Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*, 92, 108.

⁷²⁸ Olena Prytula, “The Ukrainian Media Rebellion,” 109.

⁷²⁹ Kuzio, “From Kuchma to Yushchenko,” 38.

⁷³⁰ *Ibid.*




Figure 2. “Yes! For Bushchenko.” Poster of Yushchenko portrayed as a puppet of the Bush administration.⁷³¹



Figure 3. Poster depicting Yushchenko as the fanatical fascist Hitler. “Does the Nation need a new FURER?” “National Liberation Front for YUSHENKO” “Cleanse Donbass – Cleanse Ukraine.”⁷³²

⁷³¹ See: Illustration 12. Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*, 82.

⁷³² *Romaninukraine Blog, The*. <http://romaninukraine.com/nazis-everywhere/>.



Figure 4. Yushchenko before and after dioxin poisoning.⁷³³

In an attempt to thwart the efforts of NGOs like PORA, the techs tried to spin these organizations in Soviet-style language as “destructive forces, extremists, and fascists.”⁷³⁴ PORA offices were raided and explosives were planted to further the terrorists’ claim. Moreover, PORA was deemed a U.S.-led group importing Westernism into Ukraine; a notion that was well established and widely accepted in Russia.⁷³⁵ Other efforts similar to Soviet active measures included

- airing pro-Yanukovich advertisements on government-controlled television networks,
- using roadblocks and the denying airplane landing rights to prevent the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko campaign from reaching major rallies,
- arresting coalition activists on false charges,
- threatening to evict students involved in the campaign from their dorms,
- using disappearing ink in the pens being used to cast votes in pro-Yushchenko districts.⁷³⁶

Religious institutions also played a role. “The Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate was still technically part of the Russian Church, and the most easily available institutional channel for Russian influence in Ukraine.”⁷³⁷ Leaders of the Moscow

⁷³³ Stoyanova-Yerburgh, Zornitsa. “Who Poisoned Yushchenko?” <http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/1995.cfm>.

⁷³⁴ Kuzio, “From Kuchma to Yushchenko,” 40.

⁷³⁵ Ibid.

⁷³⁶ Conley, “Orange Revolution of Ukraine: 2004-2005,” 821.

⁷³⁷ Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*, 93.

Patriarchate in Ukraine blessed Yanukovych and publicly endorsed him in the media. Priests politicized their sermons and the Church's opaque finances helped fund several covert operations for Yanukovych.⁷³⁸ "In November a typical stash of unsigned leaflets was found in a church near the Moldovan border attacking Yushchenko as 'a partisan of the schismatics and an enemy of Orthodox' and calling his wife a 'CIA agent.'"⁷³⁹ The Church also supported Yanukovych with propaganda; some endorsed by the Archangel Michael himself, the patron saint of Kiev.⁷⁴⁰ The massive, in-depth orchestration of PW seemed unbeatable and incomparable in scale; but, the results would soon shock Moscow.

(3) Yushchenko Wins

The international recognition and social movement fueled by Ukrainian dissatisfaction and dissent defied Russia's PW. The international electoral monitors and attention on Ukraine attenuated further Russian intervention. In addition, certain events fueled contempt for Yanukovych and his rigged victory. Defection aided in mobilizing the populace, especially Ukrainian Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk, who condemned the stolen runoff election. The confirmed results of Yushchenko's poisoning and illicit cover-up emboldened the opposition. Falsified medical reports leaked to the media claiming no evidence of poisoning and propaganda claiming Yushchenko's physical appearance was due to a hangover or a botched Botox injection only bolstered the opposition's discord.⁷⁴¹ Then, another attempt was made at Yushchenko's life. On the eve of the second round of elections, the police arrested two Russian men traveling with false passports outside of Yushchenko's headquarters in a car packed with two kilograms of plastic explosives and a remote-control detonator.⁷⁴² Allegedly, the men confessed to the police "that unnamed officials in Moscow promised them \$200,000 to assassinate

⁷³⁸ Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*, 93.

⁷³⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁴¹ Ibid., 99.

⁷⁴² Ibid., 100.

Yushchenko.”⁷⁴³ This was either a legitimate second assassination attempt or the SBU was trying to distance itself from its involvement in the dioxin poisoning. Nonetheless, after Ukraine’s parliament denounced the second round of elections, Yanukovych was finished.

In the wake of Yushchenko’s victory, damage control commenced. The railways minister, Hryhorii Kirpa, whose trains aided in electoral tourism and carried huge amounts of anti-Yushchenko propaganda, was found dead in his sauna in Kiev. He had been paid through regional branches of Yanukovych’s party, Russian Orthodox associations, and various other enterprises.⁷⁴⁴ He apparently had threatened to expose the scandal and, on the night of his alleged suicide, his neighbors reported hearing several shots.⁷⁴⁵ Yuri Liakh, head of Ukrainian Credit Bank, a key source of illicit campaign finance, allegedly committed suicide by repeatedly stabbing himself in the neck with a letter opener.⁷⁴⁶ Yanukovych and the Russian political technologists were guarding against any backlash that could damage Yanukovych’s role in the new government. In the end, Russia’s PW in Ukraine was defeated in 2004, but the loss and victory would be short-lived.

b. Putin Prepares

The Orange Revolution provoked Putin’s paranoia and intensified the conspiratorial mindset pervasive in the Kremlin. The protests were a direct threat to Russia and a challenge to its regional dominance. Paradoxically, Kremlin officials and advisers interpreted the Orange Revolution as an orchestration by foreign governments, foundations, and NGOs.⁷⁴⁷ Before long, Russia began preparing for the Ukrainian 2006

⁷⁴³ Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*, 100.

⁷⁴⁴ Ibid., 109.

⁷⁴⁵ Ibid., 6.

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁷ Taylor, *State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism*, 236.

parliamentary and 2010 presidential elections, planning to use the same tactics (see Figure 5), but adapting to avoid the mistakes made in 2004.⁷⁴⁸



Figure 5. Poster displayed in Ukraine's parliament in Kiev prior to the 2010 presidential election depicting President Yushchenko as Uncle Sam.⁷⁴⁹

Putin became prime minister and the newly appointed Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, proclaimed Russia's main tasks in Ukraine were to discredit Yushchenko, the American marionette, and disgrace the Orange Revolution's ideals.⁷⁵⁰ On the informational front, the strategy was successful in leading to a radical transformation of Ukrainian opinion.⁷⁵¹ In 2006, the "For Yanukovich Bloc" took control of the Crimean parliament and incited anti-U.S. and anti-NATO demonstrations that led to the first

⁷⁴⁸ Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*, 179.

⁷⁴⁹ Sergei Chuzakov, "Ukraine President Proposes Increase in Powers," *The Associated Press* (U-T San Diego) March, 31, 2009. <http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2009/mar/31/eu-ukraine-politics-033109/>.

⁷⁵⁰ Ghaleb, *Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power*, 79.

⁷⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 80.

cancellation of NATO joint military exercises in Crimea.⁷⁵² The economic element of national power was employed with the carrots-and-sticks strategy.

(1) Russian Economic Political Warfare

With total control over Gazprom, Russia was well-positioned to influence and manipulate Ukraine's economy. Russia cut off gas supplies in 2006 and 2009 during the winter gas wars, which led to the demise of Yushchenko's government and the Orange movement, and, in conjunction with the global recession, the collapse of Ukraine's economy.⁷⁵³ In 2010, Yanukovich returned to power. Russia negotiated a 20-year renewal of the Sevastopol port agreement and basing rights for the Russian BSF in exchange for a 30% discount on gas prices and a reduction of the amount of gas that Ukraine was obligated to purchase.⁷⁵⁴ Russian procurements and investments increased in Ukraine,⁷⁵⁵ including a proposed merger between Gazprom and Ukraine's Naftogaz.⁷⁵⁶ In 2010, a ban prohibiting foreign companies from running Ukrainian gas pipelines was lifted and a bill was initiated "that could allow Russian companies to control them."⁷⁵⁷ To sway Ukrainian oligarchs to move against the planned association agreement with the EU and leverage its media resources to influence public opinion against the agreement, Russia emphasized the money-making opportunities that existed within Russia and the consequences of signing the agreement. Russia constrained Ukrainian imports, not with provocative methods of embargoes or tariffs, but instead by instructing customs officials to intensify "carpet" inspections, effectively bringing the flow of Ukrainian goods to a halt.⁷⁵⁸ The oligarchs got the message. In conjunction with

⁷⁵² Jakob Hedenskog and Robert L. Larsson, *Russian Leverage on the CIS and the Baltic States* (FOI-R-2280) (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2007), 38.

⁷⁵³ Ghaleb, *Natural Gas as an Instrument*, 91.

⁷⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 86.

⁷⁵⁵ Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, 14.

⁷⁵⁶ Ghaleb, *Natural Gas as an Instrument*, 88.

⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁸ "Carpet" inspections were a deviation from a common practice of random inspections normally implemented at the borders. Niku Popescu, "The Russia-Ukraine Trade Spat," European Union Institute for Security Studies (August 26, 2013).

economics, several analysts and experts attest that 2006 was the year that Moscow—Putin—began preparing for a takeover of Crimea when he offered to guarantee Crimea’s territory.^{759 760}

(2) Guaranteeing Crimea

To delegitimize and invalidate Ukraine’s ownership of Crimea, Russia enhanced its use of intelligence, military, informational, ideological, and other forms of penetration of the Crimea.⁷⁶¹ Military aspects included augmenting Russia’s conventional capabilities with Russian special operations forces for “both covert and overt subversion of Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea; giving Russian military passports to soldiers and officers in the Transnistrian Russian ‘Army’ that occupies part of Moldova; and rotating these soldiers through the elite Russian officer training courses at Solnechegorsk.”⁷⁶² The contingency planning would allow these Transnistrian forces to aid the potential operation in Crimea and “bisect Ukraine capturing all of southern Ukraine.”⁷⁶³ The covert and clandestine nature of the plans speaks to Putin’s historical past and modern aggressive initiatives in Ukraine.

(3) Intelligence Penetration

Russian security service penetration and its active role in Ukraine is omnipresent and has strengthened under Yanukovich.

Russian operatives, most commonly working for the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), the KGB’s successor, permeate Ukrainian police and intelligence agencies. Russia sympathizers and agents, many of whom belong to the GRU, Russia’s resurgent military intelligence agency, fill the Ukrainian army ranks. Equipped with an array of tools—from embedded spies to communications intercepts—the GRU is tasked with locating

⁷⁵⁹ Stephen Blank and Peter Huessy, “The Truth About Ukraine,” Gatestone Institute (August 25, 2014). <http://www.gatesoneinstitute.org/4647/ukraine-russia-war>.

⁷⁶⁰ Stephen Blank, “Russia and the Black Sea’s Frozen Conflicts in Strategic Perspective,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (2008), 23.

⁷⁶¹ Blank and Huessy, “The Truth about Ukraine.”

⁷⁶² Ibid.

⁷⁶³ Ibid.

Ukrainian military units, uncovering their plans, and conducting paramilitary operations against them. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service and Ministry of Internal Affairs, likewise, have also built extensive networks in the country. In particular, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has allowed the agency to easily identify Ukrainian counterparts amenable to FSB recruitment. Under the Yanukovych regime, deep Russian involvement in the SBU had been an open secret. The organization's former deputy head, for example, admitted in 2010 that not only were there Russian agents among the SBU's ranks, but the organization had an official agreement with the FSB, spelled out in a 2010 cooperation protocol, that allowed Moscow to recruit agents from within the Ukrainian government.⁷⁶⁴

Russia was preparing for operations in Ukraine, and its military methods—intelligence, clandestine, and covert—would be incorporated to reinforce its nonmilitary methods of PW.

(4) Maidan 2.0

By late 2013, Russia had regained control over Ukraine. The pro-Russian Yanukovych was Moscow's implanted man in power. He maintained a European facade to garner support from the West, but it quickly dissipated when he could no longer keep his deception concealed. In November 2013, the government decided not to sign an association agreement aimed at stronger ties with the EU, instead opting for a \$15 billion Russian economic package. The decision sparked antigovernment demonstrations in Kiev's Independence Square, referred to as Euromaidan or Maidan 2.0. The government responded by having riot police attempt to clear the square, along with violent crackdowns on protestors by hired "roving gangs of street thugs."⁷⁶⁵ Eventually, the protestors seized key government buildings, causing Yanukovych and his supporters to flee. Russia responded quickly and with veracity, but in line with its overall strategy. The PW methods Russia had employed to this point failed to produce the desired results, so Russia escalated to the next phase, incorporating a stronger military role in conjunction

⁷⁶⁴ Mark Galeotti, "Moscow's Spy Game: Why Ukraine is Losing the Intelligence War to Russia," *Foreign Affairs* (October 2, 2014).

⁷⁶⁵ Woehrel, *Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy* (May 20, 2014), 1.

with a nonmilitary political campaign directed at appealing to the domestic population in Russia and deterring the international community's involvement.

3. Conclusion: Success or Failure

Russia's PW in the twenty-first century grew in conjunction to its internal strength. Putin increased its PW potency with massive improvements across all elements of national power. Twenty-first century advancements analogous with globalization have been incorporated into Russia's PW in Ukraine: informational, criminal, clandestine, and intelligence. The employment of PW demonstrates an overarching, comprehensive strategy aimed at reeling Ukraine back under the total control of Moscow. Arguably, some scholars and analysts suggest that Russia's actions in Ukraine have been largely unsuccessful.⁷⁶⁶ In addition to the Orange Revolution, since Ukraine's independence, Russia has been unable to gain Ukrainian compliance or partnership in terms of geopolitics, economics, and security. Ukraine's defiant tendencies and aspirations for European integration have gained momentum in opposition to the Eurasian option that Russia advocates. Viewed from a different vantage point, however, Russia has succeeded in that it has fomented dissent and unrest among an otherwise content populace, repelled foreign investment, disrupted political processes and economic stability, prevented Ukraine's NATO and EU membership, and showcased Ukraine's undeniable reliance on Russia in regard to geopolitics, economics, security, and internal politics. What's more, Russia has strengthened its hand in the southern and eastern regions, particularly Crimea. Control over a majority of Soviet military resources or infrastructure were restored to Russia. The BSF and Sevastopol remain Russian military strongholds, providing access to the Black Sea and thus allowing Russia to project military might into the region. Russia has also moved closer to controlling Ukrainian gas pipelines and infrastructure through investment and shadowy business deals. Whether Russia has prevailed or failed is debatable or yet to be seen. Irrefutably, Russia has and continues to employ PW in Ukraine, and the West continues to ignore it at its own peril.

⁷⁶⁶ Dmitri Trenin, "Russia Reborn: Reimagining Moscow's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Essay (November/December 2009).

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VII. RUSSIAN POLITICAL WARFARE: THE EVOLUTION OF THE GERASIMOV DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION IN UKRAINE

Russia's new doctrinal model for "inter-governmental conflict" is a direct product of the Kremlin's and, by extension, the Russian General Staff's view of geopolitical reality. The model, implemented with remarkable effectiveness in the Crimean and Donbass operations in 2014, combines Soviet-era subversion doctrine with a perceived Western style of waging war in the twenty-first century, where opposition movements such as "color revolutions" are understood to have been perpetrated by the U.S. to undermine and isolate Russia. This analysis demonstrates that Russia's actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014 should not be interpreted as a radical doctrinal experiment, but as a systemic restoration of proven Soviet PW methods adapted to exploit a new geopolitical reality.

This chapter is an explanation of General Valery Gerasimov's 2013 model for the "role of non-military methods in resolving intergovernmental conflicts," and establishes the KGB subversion model as a progenitor for the Gerasimov doctrine. The section concludes with a detailed analysis of the Ukraine conflict, from November 2013 to March 2015, demonstrating the application of the Gerasimov model in both the Crimean and Donbass campaigns.

A. RUSSIA'S "NEW GENERATION WARFARE"

Russia's perception of geopolitical reality is a critical component of understanding Moscow's strategy. The last decade has seen a resurgence of Cold War paranoia over an externally generated "existential threat" from the West to the Russian Federation. By the middle of the last decade, NATO and EU expansion fueled increasingly conspiratorial rhetoric and hyper-inflated threat assessments throughout the Russian political and military cultures. This intensified existing fears of Western attempts to keep Russia marginalized from global leadership through absorbing, weakening, or destabilizing the former Soviet space and plundering Russia's natural resources. Perceived use of PW by the West precipitated Moscow's response in kind.

Gerasimov's viewpoint is reflected in his 2013 article in the *Military Industrial Courier* outlining the future focus of the Russian military. Gerasimov, building on earlier concepts developed by his predecessor in the CGS, Nikolai Makarov, presented a phased model describing the "role of non-military methods in resolving intergovernmental conflicts."⁷⁶⁷ Gerasimov's model (see Figure 6) underscores the integration of military and nonmilitary measures, especially early in conflict generation, and provides a framework for initiating and fostering disequilibrium and "contradiction" within an opponent's "military-political leadership" structure, then moving into later phases of crisis generation, and eventual resolution by either military or nonmilitary means. Gerasimov stated:

The trend in the 21st century is to erase the line between war and peace... The role of non-military methods of achieving political and strategic goals, in some cases, has far exceeded the force of arms in terms of effectiveness. The emphasis of the methods of confrontation has shifted towards widespread use of political, economic, information, humanitarian and other non-military measures, implemented by taking advantage of the protest potential of the population. All this is complemented by covert military measures including information warfare and activities conducted by special operations forces Widespread asymmetrical actions allow for the neutralization of an enemy's superiority, and include the use of special operations forces and internal opposition to creating a permanent front throughout the opposing state, as well as informational influence, forms and methods which are constantly being improved.⁷⁶⁸

⁷⁶⁷ Valery Gerasimov, "Value of Science in Foresight: New Challenges Require Rethinking Forms and Methods of Warfare," *Military-Industrial Courier*, February 27, 2013.

⁷⁶⁸ Gerasimov, "Value of Science in Foresight."




Figure 6. Gerasimov Model – 2013.⁷⁶⁹

Gerasimov’s comments hint at a much broader transformation in strategic thinking. Colonel S.G. Chekinov and Lieutenant General S.A. Bogdanov (Ret.), writing for the leading Russian military theory and strategy journal in 2013, echo Gerasimov’s ideas in describing “new-generation warfare” as involving “a combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns in the form of indirect actions and nonmilitary measures.” They go on to describe conflict initiation occurring far in advance of actual new generation war through a series of distributed measures across informational, cultural, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic means. Chekinov and Bogdanov describe the initiating side of a conflict by using methods of intimidation, deception, bribery, and blackmail of military and political officials, “mass scale propaganda to drag the target country deeper into chaos and further

⁷⁶⁹ Gerasimov, “Value of Science in Foresight.”

out of control,” as well as the use of “agents” externally supplied with funds, weapons, and material to initiate discontent and criminal activity in order to “stoke up chaos, panic, and disobedience.” They close with a key statement that pervades both current and historic Russian thinking: “a country preaching a defensive doctrine may get the short end of the deal in the face of a surprise attack by an aggressor.”⁷⁷⁰

Both the Gerasimov and Chekinov documents have to be taken in context, as they do not overtly define Russian doctrine, but suggest that warfare has transformed and that their peer competitors, namely the United States, China, and the EU, have all adopted these methods as a fundamental maxim in conflict management. The underlying conclusion is that Russia must transform according to these principles in order to be competitive in future conflict. This view on the nature of twenty-first century warfare is a form of “mirror imaging,” reflecting long-standing Soviet and Russian preconceptions on the nature of Western subversion, rooted in their very own state subversion models implemented by the KGB during the Cold War. The implementation of these concepts in formulating contemporary Russian PW doctrine is unremarkable, as this approach has permeated Soviet and Russian strategic thinking for generations. However, the transcendence of this framework from the intelligence services to the historically conventional-minded General Staff, and the adoption of this new model as a vanguard of Russian military strategy, demonstrates progressive military thought on Twenty-First Century warfare (see Figure 7).

⁷⁷⁰ Col. S.G. Chekinov and Lt. Gen. S.A. Bogdanov (Ret.), “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War,” *Military Thought: A Russian Journal of Military Theory and Strategy*, no. 4 (2013): 17–23.




Figure 7. Transformation of Armed Conflict, Gerasimov – 2013.⁷⁷¹

This “new” form of warfare is hardly new, but a reinterpretation of classic, Soviet-era PW. It is framed by a transformed geopolitical global system and technological change, but based firmly in the lessons from successful Soviet interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the ill-considered Soviet adventure in Afghanistan, and the disastrous failure to suppress the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980s. The KGB model for subversion, and its implementation during the Crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968, bears a striking similarity to the Gerasimov model and Russia’s actions within Ukraine during the 2014 crisis.⁷⁷² Russia has rapidly adopted this new transformation out of necessity, due to an inability to control events on her periphery through overt economic and diplomatic measures alone. The Western world, not faced with the same shortcomings, has forgotten the lessons of the Cold War and has been slow to recognize and react to Russia’s transformation.

⁷⁷¹ Gerasimov, “Value of Science in Foresight.”

⁷⁷² See: “Case Study: The Crushing of the Prague Spring,” Chapter II.

B. “NOT-SO-NEW GENERATION WARFARE”

The Gerasimov model has clear origins in Bezmenov’s Soviet subversion doctrine.⁷⁷³ Gerasimov’s covert generation phase is a long-term preparation of the environment (PE) approach that generates the underlying causes of conflict through what are, in essence, “active measures.”⁷⁷⁴ This is Bezmenov’s demoralization phase. The second phase in both models is nearly identical, with Gerasimov even reaching back into the Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism and pulling out phrases like “transforming differences into contradictions (see Figure 8).”⁷⁷⁵



Figure 8. KGB and Gerasimov Model Comparison.

⁷⁷³ See Chapter III for a full analysis of the Bezmenov model.

⁷⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁵ Gerasimov, “Value of Science in Foresight.”

The crisis phase in Bezmenov's model is where the two structures begin to diverge. Gerasimov breaks Bezmenov's crisis phase into three sub-phases: Initiation of Conflict Actions, Crisis, and Resolution. The core content in each sub-phase, however, is consistent with Bezmenov's crisis phase, with the only substantive difference being Gerasimov's emphasis on the use of civilians to initiate the crisis. This seemingly minor variance has deep-seated roots in successful U.S. covert actions using the Solidarity trade union movement in Poland to destabilize the Soviet Bloc in the 1980s,⁷⁷⁶ as well as current Russian perceptions that color revolutions are a form of military action by the West.

It is not surprising that Russian military doctrine has assimilated the lessons of color revolutions and adopted them as a cornerstone of twenty-first century conflict. Soviet subversion doctrine utilized these principles throughout the Cold War period; using state-sponsored front organizations and communist parties as a vanguard for revolutionary transition against democratic societies. Emerging political technologies, the prevalence of social and mass media, and the exponential growth of NGOs and multinational organizations has truncated the time required to effect political change. Destabilization and exacerbation can be achieved in months, not years as was originally envisioned in Bezmenov's second phase. Gerasimov's initiation of conflict actions, crisis, and resolution phases stress a 4:1 nonmilitary to military ratio of activities, hallmarked by both violent and nonviolent civilian action. The final phase in both the Bezmenov and Gerasimov models is, once again, identical, presenting the reduction of tensions and peacekeeping operations as key components.

The overall similarity of the two models is striking, especially considering that a KGB model has such influence on a contemporary-conventional doctrine within the General Staff. Then again, the fact that the president of the Russian Federation is a former KGB officer himself gives more credence to the link. An analysis of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in 2014 offers a strong indication that Russian operations in Crimea and the Donbass were consistent with the Gerasimov and Bezmenov models.

⁷⁷⁶ See Solidarity Case Study in Chapter III.

C. THE WAR IN UKRAINE

“Jets, artillery, multiple launch systems and tanks If these are today’s European values—I’m gravely disappointed.”

–Vladimir Putin, August 27, 2014⁷⁷⁷

Russian actions on the Crimean Peninsula and Eastern Ukraine were mutually supporting and interdependent operations within a single campaign. Each was executed at its own pace within a phased sequence and, together, designed to achieve overall Russian strategic objectives. The pro-Western revolution in Kiev that started in late November 2013 directly challenged a vital Russian interest of “security through influence.” For the Kremlin, these events fit the pattern of Western subversion directed at Russia. A successful Euromaidan meant the Westward slide of Kiev, potential EU and NATO membership, the likely loss of Sevastopol, and the near certainty of similar social movements rising inside Russia. The operation to seize Crimea had to occur rapidly to capitalize on the confusion within Kiev following the ouster of Viktor Yanukovich in February.⁷⁷⁸ Once Crimea was secured and Kiev could no longer leverage Sevastopol against Moscow, the main effort in Eastern Ukraine could begin. This took the form of what American doctrine refers to as unconventional warfare (UW) with the aim of creating Russian zones of influence outside of Kiev’s control. Though not officially confirmed by Moscow, this is the most likely scenario for Russian objectives in Ukraine, with the Kremlin attempting to create a “politically immobilized opposition and a corrupt political elite that masquerades [sic] behind ethnic nationalism.”⁷⁷⁹ Applying the Gerasimov model to both the Crimea and Donbass operations in sequence demonstrates the application of the model in contemporary conflict.

⁷⁷⁷ Vladimir Putin, Speaking at a youth forum on August 27, 2014. <http://rt.com/news/183760-putin-quotes-seliger-forum/>.

⁷⁷⁸ RT, “Putin in Film on Crimea: US Masterminds Behind Ukraine Coup, Helped Train Radicals,” *RT*, March 15, 2015, <http://rt.com/news/240921-us-masterminds-ukraine-putin/>.

⁷⁷⁹ Jasmin Mujanovic, Political Trash-Talking is Nothing New, but it’s Getting Worse, York University, March 17, 2014, <http://yfile.news.yorku.ca/2014/03/17/political-trash-talking-is-nothing-new-but-its-getting-worse/>.

D. PHASE I: COVERT GENERATION (1991–2013)

Russia maintained the Soviet tradition of manipulating and subverting the social, economic, political, and cultural landscapes in its core periphery between 1991 and 2013. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 90s, Moscow initiated an intensive covert generation (demoralization in the Bezmenov model) phase in Ukraine, described in detail in Chapter VI. Russian actions and strategy coincide nearly flawlessly with Phase I actions: create differences/diverging interests, formation of unions, formation of political opposition, information warfare, and military strategic containment. All these actions lead up to what has yet to be examined: Phase II: Exacerbation.

E. PHASE II: EXACERBATION (NOVEMBER 21 TO FEBRUARY 22, 2013–2014)

Gerasimov's exacerbation phase occurred concurrently in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Following Yanukovych's announcement, on November 21, 2013, of the suspension of EU trade and association talks, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets and occupied Independence Square in Kiev. What followed was a series of violent crackdowns by hired "roving gangs of street thugs"⁷⁸⁰ and Ukrainian security forces loyal to the embattled president, and by early December, the opposition movement grew to some 800,000 protesters demanding that Yanukovych resign. On December 17, 2013, Moscow attempted to flex its economic muscle, agreeing to cut the price of gas supplied to Ukraine and offering to buy \$15 billion in Ukrainian debt.⁷⁸¹

The protests subsided in late December, only to be reignited again in January and February 2014. Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, the current head of the Ukrainian Security Services (SSB), reported that Russian agents were present during the protests and actively assisted Ukrainian law enforcement. In the book, *Ukraine Crisis*, Nalyvaichenko states that "somewhere around January 20th, two military cargo aircraft from Chkalovsk,

⁷⁸⁰ Steven Woehrel, *Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2014.

⁷⁸¹ Darina Marchak and Katya Gorchinskaya, "Russia Gives Ukraine Cheap Gas, \$15 Billion in Loans," *KyivPost*, accessed August 20, 2014. <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/russia-gives-ukraine-cheap-gas-15-billion-in-loans-333852.html>.

Russia, landed in Hostomel and Zhulyany airports near Kiev . . . delivered 5,100kg of explosives, impact munitions and additional weapons . . . twenty-six FSB were involved in planning the crackdown.”⁷⁸² Furthermore, Nalyvaichenko acknowledged that once the agents were in Kiev, his organization was responsible for housing and providing sustenance to the Russian.⁷⁸³

While the situation in Kiev was developing, Russia intensified its information war. Social and mass media was targeted at the Russian-speaking population in Crimea and the Donbass, and bolstered the existing societal divisions and conspiratorial complexion of the population to a level that mirrored and even surpassed similar Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia during the destabilization phase of suppressing the Prague Spring in ‘68. In effect, Moscow appeared to have executed a preemptive exacerbation phase designed to counteract Euromaidan and, in the event of a pro-Western victory, to create the necessary conditions on the ground for the escalation of the conflict to the crisis phase.

By early February 2014, the Kremlin viewed Yanukovych’s ouster as imminent and began to develop options, including the legitimate annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the establishment of federated regions in Eastern Ukraine through a nonmilitary approach using propaganda, social movements, contractual obligations, and international legal precedent to gradually federate and align these regions to Russia.⁷⁸⁴ A more aggressive course of action was eventually selected. On February 7, Moscow, true to its Soviet heritage, publically accused the United States of engineering a coup in Kiev⁷⁸⁵ and, by February 14, Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s personal advisor and the Kremlin’s chief ideologue, was on the ground in Crimea.⁷⁸⁶ On February 22, the situation

⁷⁸² Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, 89.

⁷⁸³ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁴ “It is Right to Initiate the Accession of Ukraine to the Eastern Regions of Russia,” *Novaya Gazeta*, Issue Number 19, February 25, 2015, <http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/67389.html>.

⁷⁸⁵ “Timeline: Political Crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s Occupation of Crimea,” *Reuters*, March 8, 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/08/us-ukraine-crisis-timeline-idUSBREA270PO20140308>.

⁷⁸⁶ Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, 108.

climaxed with the Ukrainian Parliament voting to remove Yanukovych from office.⁷⁸⁷ The actual start date for the Russian military campaign in Crimea is subject to debate. A strong indication may be the printing of the Russian Ministry of Defense campaign medals for the “Return of Crimea,” with a start date of 20 February 2014 engraved on the back, two days prior to Yanukovych’s actual ouster (see Figure 9).⁷⁸⁸ For the purposes of this study, the date of February 22 is used.



Figure 9. Crimea Campaign Medal, 2014.⁷⁸⁹

⁷⁸⁷ “Timeline: Political Crisis in Ukraine,” *Reuters*, March 8, 2014.

⁷⁸⁸ Will Cathcart, “Putin’s Crimean Medal of Honor, Forged Before the War Even Began,” *The Daily Beast*, April 25, 2014, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/25/putin-s-crimean-medal-of-honor-forged-before-the-war-even-began.html>.

⁷⁸⁹ “Established on 21 March 2014 by ministerial order no.160. Awarded to military and civilian personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for services and distinction displayed during the security measures related to the protection of the rights and lives of the citizens of the Crimea, the March 16, 2014 referendum in the Crimea and the entry of the Crimea in the Russian Federation as the result of the referendum. The medal can also be awarded to other citizens of the Russian Federation and to foreign citizens for assistance in solving the tasks assigned to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation relating to these security measures taken in the Crimea.” MO - Medal “For the Return of the Crimea,” Orders and Medals Society of America, <http://www.omsa.org/photopost/showphoto.php?photo=12470>.

F. THE CRIMEA CAMPAIGN: PHASES III-V, INITIATION OF CONFLICT ACTIONS TO RESOLUTION (FEBRUARY 22–MARCH 18, 2014)

Russian military actions in Crimea are a vivid example of Gerasimov's vision of Twenty-First Century warfare in action. In a matter of weeks, Russia moved through Gerasimov's phases III-V using nonviolent civil resistance, special operations forces, economic and diplomatic leverage, aggressive information warfare, and the strategic deployment of conventional forces to annex the peninsula and add its two million inhabitants to the Russian Federation. The annexation secured a key geostrategic position for the Russian Navy and added a substantive, long-term economic advantage by securing a key transit location between China and Europe.

What immediately followed the ouster of Yanukovych was the swift implementation of Gerasimov's phase III, initiation of conflict actions.⁷⁹⁰ On February 24, 2014, the Russian foreign ministry issued a statement accusing the West of engineering the takeover of Ukraine through "terrorists" and "extremists," and setting the groundwork for Russian intervention by declaring that the ethnic Russian minority was being persecuted, that the new government was illegitimate, and that the Ukrainian parliament was "imposing decisions and laws aimed at repressing the human rights of Russian and other national minorities," to include a ban on the Russian language.⁷⁹¹

On February 26, Russia initiated its Strategic Military Deployment, placing 150,000 troops on high alert. The initiation of conflict actions on the Crimean Peninsula was marked by a deception operation (*maskirovka*) that initially confused the Ukrainian government and paralyzed the international community from taking action. Russia conducted a massive military exercise, involving some 50,000 troops on Ukraine's eastern border, designed to distract neighbors and the international community.⁷⁹² While the focus was on eastern Ukraine, Russia executed a rapid "exercise" in the Black Sea

⁷⁹⁰ See Figure 1, Gerasimov Model, 2013.

⁷⁹¹ Ian Traynor, "Russia Denounces Ukraine 'Terrorists' and West Over Yanukovich Ousting," *The Guardian*, February 24, 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/24/russia-ukraine-west-yanukovich>.

⁷⁹² Martin Hurt, "Lessons Identified in Crimea: Does Estonia's Nation Defense Model Meet our Needs?" International Centre for Defense Studies, 2014, 1.

involving 36 naval vessels and some 7,000 troops. The movement of large conventional forces throughout the theater took focus away from the smaller, more surgical, operations by elite forces on the Crimean Peninsula, which limited any reaction from Ukraine to defend its territory. Shortly after the exercise was initiated, pro-Russian rebels started appearing throughout all of Crimea and, at 0400 on February 27, approximately 50 Russian special operations personnel occupied governmental buildings on the peninsula, including the Crimean parliament.⁷⁹³ Despite clear evidence to the contrary, Russia strongly denied any involvement and stated that the soldiers were part of an anti-Ukraine separatist group and not Russian military. The men were armed with new Russian rifles, night vision sights, and grenades launchers that were beyond the equipment capabilities organic to any military or civil force in Crimea.⁷⁹⁴ Ukrainian officials had difficulty crafting a cohesive response, mainly due to the irregular techniques of the Russian forces being employed and the inability to differentiate between Russian forces and local, pro-Russian militias. Following a nearly identical pattern to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, Russian special forces seized Belbek airfield in Sevastopol and facilitated the air landing of a 2,000-man Vozdushno-desantnye voyska (VDV) airborne force. Ukrainian forces, fearing a Czechoslovakian-style invasion of mainland Ukraine, were postured against the Russian diversionary exercise force and could not respond to actions in Crimea.⁷⁹⁵

By 27 February, Russia was already in Gerasimov's phase IV of the Crimean operation—Crisis. Russia seized key areas with special forces and then focused on information operations. The special forces started injecting rebellious sentiment, fomenting a false sense of civil unrest that eventually led to the request for the Russian Federation to intervene. Russian forces met minimal resistance and worked to recruit and integrate Ukrainian forces to the Russian military through the offering of citizenship and seize key infrastructure throughout the peninsula to include the airport and naval

⁷⁹³ Hurt, "Lessons Identified in Crimea,"

⁷⁹⁴ Anton Lavrov, *Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine*, ed. Colby Howard and Ruslan Pukhov (Minneapolis, MN: East View Press, 2014), 163.

⁷⁹⁵ Hurt, "Lessons Identified in Crimea," 1.

facilities.⁷⁹⁶ On 1 March, the Crimean Council of Ministers officially requested that Moscow intervene and “restore order.” The Russian Federation upper house voted unanimously to send forces into Ukraine and, on 2 March, Russian naval forces began a blockade and siege of Ukrainian military bases under the “guise of a civilian action,” and “on 3 March, Russian forces also took over the port of Kerch. The military victory was clinched. The Ukrainian leadership and the rest of the world had been presented a *fait accompli*.”⁷⁹⁷

Following the initial seizure of Crimea, the new Ukrainian government provided Russia with the opportunity to continue to point out contradictions that brought further support for Russian interests in pro-Russian areas of Ukraine. The new Ukrainian government, with the support of the international community, appointed an intermediate president aligned with the popular sentiment of economic cooperation with Western Europe and an unfavorable opinion of Russia.⁷⁹⁸ Russia rejected the new Ukrainian government and reaffirmed Moscow’s position “that the US and the EU had connived in the illegal overthrow of President Yanukovich.”⁷⁹⁹ Shortly thereafter, the replacement parliament voted to make Ukrainian the sole language at all levels of the government, which led to widespread protests in the ethnic Russian areas of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.⁸⁰⁰ The vote further provided Russia with the narrative necessary to justify their military actions under the banner of ethnic Russian protection.⁸⁰¹

⁷⁹⁶ William Booth, “Armed Men Take Control of Crimean Airport,” *The Washington Post*, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/pro-russia-separatists-flex-muscle-in-ukraines-crimean-peninsula/2014/02/27/dac10d54-9ff0-11e3-878c-65222df220eb_story.html. And Lavrov, *Brothers Armed*, 178.

⁷⁹⁷ Booth, “Armed Men Take Control of Crimean Airport,” 2.

⁷⁹⁸ David M. Herszenhorn, “Ukraine Rushes to Shift Power and Mend Rifts,” *The New York Times*, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/24/world/europe/ukraine.html?ref=world&_r=1.

⁷⁹⁹ Lawrence Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management,” *Survival* 56, no. 3 (2014): 20.

⁸⁰⁰ Ian Traynor, “Russia Denounces Ukraine ‘Terrorists,’” *The Guardian*, February 24, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/24/russia-ukraine-west-yanukovich>.

⁸⁰¹ Stephen J. Cimbala, “Sun Tzu and Salami Tactics? Vladimir Putin and Military Persuasion in Ukraine, 21 February-18 March 2014,” *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 27, no. 3 (2014): 370.

In one swift action, Russia deprived Kiev of a key leverage point; the lease of the Russian naval base in Sevastopol. Concurrent to Moscow's actions in Crimea, and coinciding with Putin gaining parliamentary approval to invade Ukraine on March 1, scores of pro-Russian demonstrations erupted across the southeastern portion of Ukraine, primarily in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.⁸⁰²

The Kremlin moved swiftly to consolidate its gains in Crimea. Russian forces prevented the entry of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitors onto the peninsula, conducted a naval blockade of the Crimean Strait on March 4, and executed a "directed military threat" by a second massing of troops on the Ukrainian border on March 12. Taking advantage of Ukrainian and international vacillation, Moscow set the conditions for victory with a 16 March referendum on Crimean independence. This referendum won, with 95% of the vote, under the security blanket provided by thousands of Russian conventional troops. Two days later, on March 18, Vladimir Putin signed a bill absorbing Crimea into the Russian Federation.⁸⁰³ Russia immediately transitioned the television stations to Russian-based media outlets, and began to "normalize" the peninsula.⁸⁰⁴ This transition to phase VI of the Gerasimov model saw the first signs of Moscow attempting to "reduce tensions" and establish a "postconflict settlement" through the return of over one billion USD worth of seized military equipment to Kiev.⁸⁰⁵ On March 18, phase V, the seizure of Crimea, was complete and subsequent action was initiated in Eastern Ukraine.

G. THE DONBASS CAMPAIGN: PHASES III-VI, INITIATION OF CONFLICT ACTIONS AND CRISIS (APRIL-AUGUST 2014)

In line with Gerasimov's model of using the population's protest potential as a vanguard of new generation warfare, pro-Russian protests continued to intensify in Eastern Ukraine following the Crimea Referendum. On April 6, 2014, well-organized and

⁸⁰² "Timeline: Political Crisis in Ukraine," *Reuters*.

⁸⁰³ "Timeline: Political Crisis in Ukraine," *Reuters*.

⁸⁰⁴ Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, 126.

⁸⁰⁵ Lavrov, *Brothers Armed*, 179.

armed separatists stormed government buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Karkiv, ushering in a new phase in the conflict that closely resembled the traditional Western model of UW. In the initial stages of the operation, the resistance pattern of action seemed to indicate a nonmilitary approach using local referenda to bring the regions closer to Russia. Moscow followed the Crimean pattern and attempted to use paid protestors to incite anti-Ukrainian sentiment through the region; however, the local elites and civilians had a wider array of choices than their Crimean counterparts.⁸⁰⁶ Several factors combined to signal the start of a protracted and violent conflict: the inherent lack of speed and surprise that made the Crimean operation so successful; Eastern Ukraine's more heterogeneous population; the prevalence of organized crime; clear lack of organization and chaotic, factional infighting among the opposition; and Kiev's necessity to retain the economic and industrial potential of the Donbas at all costs. For the Russian Federation, establishing pseudo-control over the Donbas was a strategic necessity to prevent Kiev from moving Westward, and Moscow made the decision to militarize the conflict. By late April, Ukrainian counterintelligence identified upwards of 300 Russian Spetsnaz and GRU troops operating in the Donbass, "recruiting paramilitary fighters in exchange for cash handouts and waging a sophisticated propaganda war."⁸⁰⁷ Amid the growing insurgency campaign, by mid-June Russia intensified pressure on Kiev by cutting off natural gas supplies to Ukraine. The Ukrainian counterinsurgency campaign began making some headway in the midsummer months with the retaking of Slovyansk on 6 July, precipitating a significant increase in the flow of heavy military equipment from Russia to its proxy forces and an escalation of operations, most notably in Novoazovsk.⁸⁰⁸

The downing of Flight MH-17 on July 17, with 298 people on board, by a reported Buk radar-guided, surface-to-air system that had been brought over from Russia

⁸⁰⁶ Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, 129.

⁸⁰⁷ Comments by the head of Ukrainian counterintelligence, from Evan Beese and Tzvi Kahn, FPI Fact Sheet: Timeline of Russian Aggression in Ukraine and the Western Response, The Foreign Policy Initiative, September 18, 2014, <http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-fact-sheet-timeline-russian-aggression-ukraine-and-western-response?gclid=CLy35efW-8ACFYhefgodKYEAYQ>.

⁸⁰⁸ Evan Beese, Tzvi Kahn, FPI Fact Sheet.

at the Sukhodolk border crossing, should have been a watershed moment.⁸⁰⁹ It was not. The Kremlin unleashed a wave of counternarrative deception and propaganda, effectively turning the incident into a conspiracy-laden spectacle that ultimately worked in Russia's favor. Russia executed an "ambiguity" deception, pushing multiple false narratives across Russian-controlled media channels. Accusations ranged from CIA involvement, an attempted Ukrainian shoot down of Vladimir Putin's personal jet, to a plane filled with cadavers. These accusations and counterblaming effectively planted the seeds of conspiratorial doubt.⁸¹⁰ Following the incident, the Russian military campaign intensified.

The Novoazovsk operation effectively opened up a second front in the fighting and secured a new Russian border crossing and southern resupply route for the separatists.⁸¹¹ In early August, Russia declared that it would be sending humanitarian aid convoys to support the people of Eastern Ukraine.⁸¹² The humanitarian convoys were used to cover the movement of other convoys. "In late August, Russia poured in enough men, tanks and armoured [sic] personnel carriers to support a counter-offensive."⁸¹³ The convoys coincided with the Ukrainian military's offensive against the separatist-held cities of Donetsk and Luhansk.⁸¹⁴ The Ukrainian military achieved some initial success, but the assaults stalled under heavy Russian artillery, reportedly fired from Russia as well

⁸⁰⁹ Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, 139–41.

⁸¹⁰ "Reports that Putin Flew Similar Tour as MH17, Presidential Airport says 'Hasn't Overflowed Ukraine for a Long Time,'" *RT news*. <http://rt.com/news/173672-malaysia-plane-crash-putin/>. Taylor Wofford, "Russian State Media Says CIA Shot Down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17," *Newsweek*, July 22, 2014. <http://www.newsweek.com/russian-state-media-says-cia-shot-down-malaysian-airlines-flight-mh-17-260381>. Julia Loffe, "The Russian Public Has a Totally Different Understanding of What Happened to Malaysia Airlines Flight 17," *New Republic*, July 20, 2014. <http://www.newrepublic.com/node/118782>.

⁸¹¹ Beese and Khan, FPI Fact Sheet.

⁸¹² Alec Luhn, "Russia to Send Humanitarian Convoy into Ukraine in Spite of Warnings," *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/11/russia-humanitarian-convoy-ukraine>.

⁸¹³ Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, 142.

⁸¹⁴ *Ibid.*

as from within Ukraine.⁸¹⁵ While the use of conventional Russian military formations through mid-August is speculative, the use of Russian contracted paramilitary forces is well documented. Vladimir Yefimov, a former Spetsnaz officer and current head of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Fund for Special Forces Veterans, described the recruitment process for Russian “volunteers.” Yefimov stated that the recruits were paid between \$1,000 and \$4,000 per month and sent into Ukraine on Red Cross trucks and “humanitarian aid” convoys. They were issued a “volunteer’s pass” to avoid Russian and international mercenary laws. Most men were selected based on previous military experience.⁸¹⁶ Some estimates place the total number of recruited “volunteers” from Russia at 12,000 fighters in 2014.⁸¹⁷ While the tactical situation in Eastern Ukraine remained precarious through the beginning of August, a series of Russian-led offensives in mid-to-late August tilted the balance of power in favor of the separatists. The introduction of conventional Russian forces signified the transition to Gerasimov’s resolution phase.⁸¹⁸

H. THE DONBAS CAMPAIGN: PHASE V-RESOLUTION (AUGUST–SEPTEMBER 5, 2014)

Gerasimov’s resolution phase is hallmarked by the intensification of conflict for a decisive military operation. The injection of Russian conventional troops into the conflict during August was a decisive point in the campaign, reversing any gains made by Ukrainian forces and forcing Kiev to agree to a settlement on Russia’s terms. A Russian-led offensive on August 23-24 broke the sieges of Donetsk and Luhansk, and made a thrust along the Azov coast towards Mariupol.⁸¹⁹ On August 31, President Putin called

⁸¹⁵ Anton Troianovski, Naftali Bendavid, and William Mauldin, “Ukraine Says Russia Violated Its Border,” *Wall Street Journal* online. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-accuses-kiev-of-deliberately-halting-humanitarian-aid-convoy-1408697601>.

⁸¹⁶ James Rupert, “How Russians Are Sent to Fight in Ukraine,” *Newsweek*, January 6, 2015. <http://www.newsweek.com/how-russians-are-sent-fight-ukraine-296937>.

⁸¹⁷ Sergey Erzhentkov, “Who Recruits Russian Volunteers and What They are Promised: The Story of One Mercenary,” [“Кто вербует российских добровольцев, и что им обещают. История одного наемника,”] *TV Rain*, February 26, 2015. http://tvrain.ru/articles/kto_verbueto_rossijskih_dobrovol'tsev_i_chno_im_obeschajut_istorija_odnogo_naemnika_ekskljuziv_dozhdja-382605/.

⁸¹⁸ Beese and Khan, FPI Fact Sheet.

⁸¹⁹ Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, 142–143.

for “substantive, meaningful negotiations, and not on technical issues, but on the political organization of society and statehood in the southeast of Ukraine” and proposing a cease-fire plan calling for the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces outside of indirect-fire range of rebel-held positions.⁸²⁰ Gerasimov’s resolution phase involves both military intensification and negotiations (referred to in the model as the “search for ways to settle the conflict”)⁸²¹ to bring about the final establishment of peace. Following a phone conversation between Putin and Ukrainian President Poroshenko, Kiev submitted to the proposal. After the implementation of the tenuous cease-fire on September 5, the exchange of prisoners, and the redeployment of a large number of Russian conventional forces out of Eastern Ukraine, Russia extracted further demands from Kiev by threatening to ban all Ukrainian imports if the EU association agreement were to go through. On September 12, the Ukrainian government capitulated to Russian pressure and announced the postponement of the EU association agreement until 2015, agreed to give special status to the Donbass region for three years, and the creation of a 30-kilometer demilitarized zone.⁸²²

I. ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE-“NORMALIZATION” (SEPTEMBER 5, 2014–PRESENT)

The last phase is a protracted process of escalation and deescalation, negotiation and the consolidation of gains, and the continuous application of all aspects of Russian national power to ensure a favorable end state. It is difficult to delineate between this phase and the one that precedes it, primarily because protracted conflicts tend to slip back and forth in intensity from an agreed upon resolution, depending on the progress of achieving a desirable end state. This pattern was clearly evident with Moscow-backed offensives in November 2014 and January/February 2015 to consolidate gains and create a more favorable solution for the Kremlin, complementing the Minsk II accords on February 12, 2015. The current state of the conflict will invariably derail EU integration

⁸²⁰ Beese and Khan, FPI Fact Sheet.

⁸²¹ Gerasimov, “Value of Science in Foresight.”

⁸²² Laura Mills and Peter Leonard, “Ukraine will Delay Implementation of EU Deal,” *Associated Press*, September 12, 2014. <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ukraine-rebels-exchange-prisoners-peace-deal>.

for Ukraine, create a frozen and lingering conflict, and will likely allow for the creation of a federated system in Ukraine that will effectively give Russia, through its proxy-controlled Eastern Ukrainian regions, a veto over all major decisions in Kiev.⁸²³ Crimea is now part of Russia and will not return to Ukraine. National reconciliation in Eastern Ukraine is highly unlikely, as periodic fighting in the Donbass will continue as long as Kiev does not embrace a degree of Russian interference in their internal politics. The establishment of peace, similar to normalization in Czechoslovakia from 1968 to 1970, and Georgia in 2008, will involve overtures to the West, attempting to curtail the massive economic effects of Western sanctions and the slumping price of oil. This idea was clearly expressed by Russian diplomats as early as September 27, 2014, with Sergey Lavrov declaring in the UN General Assembly that Russia is actively pursuing “normalizing” relations with Washington over the Ukraine crisis and that “now what’s needed is something that the Americans will call a ‘reset.’”⁸²⁴ The last phase of Gerasimov’s model does not signal an end to the conflict. The natural transition from normalization is back to the first phase of the model and to the process of long-duration PW and state subversion. The cyclic nature of the model has significant implications for potential future confrontations with the West. Once an acceptable state of normalization can be achieved in one conflict (Ukraine and the West), the Russian Federation will likely engage in other peripheral actions, though the nature of these future conflicts will be different. Russia will adjust its approach to reflect new geopolitical realities and lessons learned from the Ukrainian conflict, and find novel means to operate below the Western provocation threshold to realize its ultimate strategic aims.

J. CONCLUSION

The campaign in Ukraine is a clear reflection of progressive Russian military thinking on twenty-first century conflict, but is deeply rooted in Soviet-era PW doctrine.

⁸²³ Daryna Krasnolutska, “Ukraine Buffer to Cement Front Lines and Putin Influence,” *Bloomberg Business*, September 25, 2014. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-24/ukraine-buffer-to-cement-front-lines-and-putin-influence.html>.

⁸²⁴ Sergey Lavrov, “Comments at the 69th United Nations Assembly,” September 27, 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/28/us-russia-usa-lavrov-idUSKCN0HN09N20140928>.

The new Russian doctrine is a confluence of Soviet subversion doctrine practiced by the KGB during the Cold War, the application of nonviolent resistance techniques that played a pivotal role in the collapse of the Soviet empire and during the color revolutions in the post-Soviet space, and the evolution of Russian UW and counter-UW (c-UW) at the turn of the century. The latter developed out of hard lessons learned from the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Russia's poor performance during the First Chechen War. In 1997, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), in collaboration with the Russian Defense Ministry, conducted a comprehensive study on insurgency and counterinsurgency.⁸²⁵ Russia's performance in the decade-long Second Chechen War, beginning in 1999, was much improved. The contemporary application of Russian UW in Ukraine is largely based on this progression. The Gerasimov doctrine has taken the conceptual framework of the various lessons from UW and c-UW, civil resistance, state subversion, and the application of DIME elements of national power, and melded them into a comprehensive PW mechanism that functions in concert with Russia's strategic policy aims.

As Russia enters the establishment of peace phase in the Ukrainian conflict, this analysis of Gerasimov's model suggests that a number of European and Central Asian nations are likely to be targeted. These include NATO members in the Baltic States, due to their large Russian diaspora, and Bulgaria, due to its poor economic outlook, endemic corruption, and strong historic ties to Russia. Long-term Russian subversive efforts are also emerging in Georgia, channeling anti-Russian sentiment into a proconservative dogmatic version of Putinism and gradually introducing the concept of a Eurasian Union as a viable alternative to the West.⁸²⁶ Russian goals will not involve annexation or federalization of these countries, but gradual subversion and intimidation to shift orientation and set conditions favoring Russia in both bilateral and multinational

⁸²⁵ Col. Gen. A.A. Shkirko and Maj. Gen. V.A. Zolotareva, "The Army and Internal Forces in Counterinsurgency and Counterpartisan Warfare," Headquarters, Internal Forces MVD of Russia, The Institute of Military History and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Moscow: 1997.

⁸²⁶ Liz Fuller, "Is The Georgian Government Living On Borrowed Time?" *The Caucasus Report*, RFE/RL, March 27, 2015 <http://www.rferl.org/content/is-tghe-georgian-government-living-on-borrowed-time/26923985.html>, and David Lane, "Eurasian Integration: A Viable New Regionalism?" *Russian Analytical Digest*, no. 146 3–7.

arrangements. Russian military and economic supremacy on the European continent will remain a principal objective of Russian foreign policy. This can only be achieved by fracturing the EU and NATO consensus. An unconventional challenge to Article 5, below a calculated provocation threshold, is not out of the question. The application of Gerasimov's early stages to a number of NATO countries can present SACEUR with a Hobson's choice. In a best-case scenario for the Kremlin, the image of a NATO-flagged armored vehicle going up against Molotov-throwing, anti-Western protestors is circulated in social media and spun out of control by the Russian press, further tilting the regional narrative in Russia's favor.

On the other side of the dilemma is inaction, demonstrating NATO's lack of response to twenty-first-century models of conflict, and questioning the foundational principle of the alliance. To Westerners, the Cold War may have ended two decades ago, but to the current Russian leadership, the chess game against the "principal enemy" was put on hold, while the emerging Russian Federation reconstituted and reinvented itself. Russia is at *war* with the United States and the West, but it is a form of warfare that Western leaders are slow to grasp and counteract. Only by embracing this new form of conflict and resurrecting Western PW, can Russian revisionism be combated.

VIII. HYPOTHESIS VALIDATION AND CONCLUSIONS

This work organized an extensive empirical and case study review of Soviet and Russian political warfare into chapters designed to test one primary and five supporting hypotheses. The supporting hypotheses are the foundation upon which the primary hypothesis is based. The primary hypothesis, which proposes a role for USSOF in U.S. PW and countering Russian PW, is presented in the final chapter as an operational concept.

The supporting hypotheses are revisited below, along with key research findings, arguments, and conclusions that validate the hypotheses.

Supporting hypotheses:

- 1. George Kennan's 1948 Definition of PW is Valid for use in Today's Geopolitical Reality, as it is Prevalent and is Being Employed in the World Today**

In May 1948, in the context of the early days of the Cold War, the State Department's director of policy planning, George Kennan, defined political warfare as:

The employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP [Economic Recovery Plan; i.e., the Marshall Plan], and "white" propaganda, to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.⁸²⁷

Political warfare is the integration of all of the instruments, levers, or tools of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means—to obtain national objectives, while simultaneously avoiding war. Therefore, PW is separate from other forms of warfare because it is a deliberate effort to achieve strategic goals using

⁸²⁷ State Department Policy Planning Staff, "The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare," April 30, 1948. Box 11A, Lot File 64 D 563, Record Group 59, National Archives & Records Administration, College Park, Maryland. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269>.

less direct means. Peace and war exist on a theoretical continuum. On one end is complete utopian peace; on the other, total nuclear conflagration. On this continuum, PW occupies the space in between contentious diplomacy and conventional war; it is political because it is a strategy that deliberately avoids open war, but it is warfare because it is implicitly violent and adversarial in nature. PW is an attempt to conceptualize and operationalize the gray area between peace and war, or counter those that are doing so. Rather than create neologisms or attempt to modify a concept that is firmly rooted in American academic discourse and foreign policy practice, George Kennan's conceptualization of PW is used throughout this study: political warfare is the adversarial employment of overt and covert national power with the specific goals of attaining national interests while avoiding war. Furthermore, Kennan's definition accurately describes strategies currently being employed by China, Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, and should, therefore, be used throughout the interagency to simplify discourse on this topic.

2. The Soviet Union Conducted PW During the Cold War in Support of Its Strategic Objectives, as did the United States in an Attempt to Counter Soviet Efforts and Secure its Own Strategic Goals

Shortly following the Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks developed a PW apparatus in order to export the communist revolution to capitalist countries. Following the establishment of the USSR, PW also served to obfuscate the privations and mass deaths that were the result of forced collectivization and industrialization. After World War II, Russian PW doctrine was typified by the Sovietization of Eastern Europe. Though PW infrastructure had been in development for years, the societal upheaval wrought by the war's destruction and the presence of the victorious Red Army throughout Eastern Europe provided the opportunities necessary for a truncated PW strategy to Sovietize vulnerable countries.

It is important to note that no form of written PW doctrine was recorded; however, the methods employed to install Communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe bear a remarkable similarity. This, in conjunction with the extreme level of governmental control exercised by Stalin and a high level of coordination between Moscow and the respective communist parties in Eastern Europe, indicates that a doctrine

was implemented. “Sovietization” of communist parties created a cadre that was capable of implementing effective PW.⁸²⁸ Communist ideology and Soviet national interests demanded that states under the administrative control of the USSR become communist. The Soviets “had the advantages of geographical proximity, experience in running a police state, and the disorientation that the war had left behind.”⁸²⁹ Therefore, we see a process that is drastically quicker than later PW efforts. The transformation of independent states into Soviet satellites took place in four phases: infrastructure development, destabilization, conflict, and consolidation.

After the death of Stalin, Soviet PW doctrine shifted focus from expansion of communist states to the primary goal of state security through internal control and external threat management. Yuri Bezmenov, following his defection from the USSR in the 1970s, identified the four updated phases of Soviet PW: demoralization, destabilization, crisis, and normalization. The USSR implemented internal and external PW strategies, both designed to make target populations susceptible to Soviet influence across the DIME spectrum, while undermining the influence and power of adversarial states, namely the United States. The Bezmenov model factored in short-, intermediate-, and long-term (generational) effects and used relatively unrestrained subversion to alter the global geopolitical balance. The primary mechanisms for achieving these objectives were bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts to gain influence, economic interdependence measures, support for communist and socialist parties, active military intimidation, and advantageous arms control agreements that asserted Soviet conventional dominance.

Given the contentious environment throughout the Cold War, these overt policies were inadequate on their own and required the critical support mechanism of Soviet active measures (*aktivnyye meropriatia*), i.e., covert operations ranging from basic intelligence collection and analysis to political assassinations. Active measures were

⁸²⁸ George Schopflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe: 1945-1992* (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 47–56.

⁸²⁹ John Lewis Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life* (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2011), 195.

designed to frustrate opposition strategies by undermining a target country's social and leadership structure, straining bilateral and multilateral relationships between nations, preventing the successful posturing and modernization of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), and manipulating prices in Western markets. Soviet PW strategy also relied on the concept of *zerstzung*, or the splitting of the social and political structure of a state by targeting the tension control mechanisms in a society, be they democratic consensus or authoritarian governance.

In Europe, the USSR pursued an aggressive policy of gaining security dominance over the continent through the expulsion of American influence and the establishment of a new geopolitical defense and economic structure. It implemented this policy through overt and covert influencing of the population and the internal politics of European nations. Covertly, the USSR implemented internal PW campaigns using ideological, structural, and cultural subjugation to maintain what the Soviet bloc gained following the Second World War. In the mid-Cold War, attempts to separate or deviate from Soviet norms were met with brutal internal suppression and large-scale Soviet military interventions. In facing both internal and external security threats, PW served as the vanguard of Soviet policy.

During the Cold War, the United States engaged in its own robust PW, providing a critical counterweight to Soviet policy. The defensive posturing of NATO conventional forces, combined with a mutual nuclear threat, provided an element of military stability for the duration of the Cold War. As a result, "both sides pursued an alternative and complementary policy of keeping the opponent off balance by means of political warfare."⁸³⁰ The developing Cold War became the context for the dynamic interaction of U.S. and Soviet policy, evolving strategic goals, and the interaction of PW measures within the contested space in Europe.

U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War can be divided into four distinct phases. The first phase was the early Cold War period from 1947-1953,

⁸³⁰ Paul W. Blackstone, *The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations* (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1964), 301.

hallmarked by idealistic and aggressive actions by the Truman and early Eisenhower administrations to contain the spread of Communist influence and careless attempts to pry Eastern Europe from Moscow's control. The developing nuclear stalemate between the superpowers and the death of Stalin in 1953 ushered in the next phase. This second period, from 1953 to 1969, was true "containment" designed to halt the spread of Soviet influence in the Third World, while accepting the status quo in the Second World. This was followed by a decade of détente in the Nixon, Ford, and early Carter White Houses and was complemented by the loss of domestic U.S. consensus and substantive disengagement by the United States from previous Cold War policies, including PW. The United States began to reverse this trend in the late 1970s in the second half of Carter's term in office and into the Reagan years. The last phase of the Cold War, from 1979 to 1991, was a relentless ideological campaign against the USSR, pushing back Soviet gains in the Third World and directly targeting the Soviet Union through overt and covert measures. U.S. PW vacillated with each phase shift; from early growing pains and relative freedom of action in the first two periods, to near total incoherence as a policy tool in the third period, to a final resurrection and ascendancy in the 1980s, as indispensable to a successful foreign policy.

Full-spectrum PW, with covert action at its core, maintained the geopolitical balance for nearly two decades after World War II, stagnated in the 1970s, and decidedly tipped the Cold War balance in favor of the United States in the 1980s. The pressure generated on the Soviet system by a synchronized PW campaign across the DIME levers of national power, in support of a singular overt national policy objective of the United States, was a major contributing factor to the collapse of USSR's domination of Eastern Europe and the eventual failure of the 74-year experiment in Soviet communism.

3. Russia has Renewed its Ability to Conduct PW Since the Collapse of the Soviet Union and is using it to Consolidate Power Domestically, Establish Dominance Regionally, and, Ultimately, Challenge the Unipolarity of the West

From the collapse of the Soviet Union to 2014, Russia has evolved from a nation struggling to solidify its identity to a rising power that is capable of exerting strategic

influence through the proficient use of PW. As Russia emerged from the remnants of the Soviet Union, each of the elements of national power developed at a different rate. As a result, Russia's PW capabilities in each element of DIME evolved separately, but were largely correlated with some key factors. Russia's diplomatic PW capabilities developed alongside the solidification of the post-Soviet Russian identity. Similarly, Russia's information-based capabilities developed as Putin created Russia's authoritarian power apparatus and firmly established an anti-Western narrative through media and domestic information crackdowns. Military methods were far more developed due to the Russian Federation's inheritance of the bulk of the Soviet military personnel and equipment. Thus, the military became the preferred method of addressing regional conflicts and achieving favorable resolutions. Russia's economic methods were the slowest to develop because they were largely chained to Russia's regional dominance of the oil and gas industry, which was guided by the vagaries of the global fossil fuel market. As the overt and covert potential for effective PW developed in each of these categories, they were readily employed by Russia's leaders in order to consolidate power domestically, establish dominance regionally, and ultimately challenge the unipolarity of the West. Russia's initial implementations of PW were regionally focused and rarely synergized; but, Russia has since expanded its employment of PW to achieve strategic goals by improving its ability to synergize PW methods across all elements of national power. The Georgian War of 2008 is an excellent example of Russia's re-evolved PW capacity. During this conflict there are clear examples of PW activity across the entire DIME spectrum, utilizing the demoralization, destabilization, crisis, and normalization phases of the Bezmenov model.

4. Russia has Engaged in and Enhanced its PW Activities in Ukraine Since 1991 to Secure its National Objectives and Vital Interests

This hypothesis was tested in Chapter VI by analyzing U.S. and Russian actions and policies in Ukraine from 1991 through 2013. The comparative analysis focused on both U.S. and Russian national interests, national objectives, and the employment of DIME in Ukraine. Principally, the analysis validates the hypothesis that Russia has engaged in, and continues to engage in, PW in Ukraine to secure its national objectives

and vital interests. Russia's policy and strategy has synchronized the employment of DIME and, as its strength developed internally, Russia's PW in Ukraine developed in parallel. In addition, the comparative analysis revealed three important facets related to Russia's PW in Ukraine: (1) PW encompasses the employment of all elements of national power; (2) PW is tied to national interests; and (3) Uncontested, sustained PW strengthens and burgeons over time. Finally, the analysis concludes that U.S. national objectives and interests in Ukraine guided a limited-approach strategy, in sharp contrast to Russia's PW. This strategy resulted in short-term, unsustainable achievements.

Between 1991 and 2013, Russia's PW in Ukraine demonstrated an ability to adversely affect Ukraine through all aspects of DIME. Ukraine's internal politics and governance, economic viability, and national security were manipulated and degraded by Russia's PW. The highly-contested Soviet remnants inherited by Ukraine—the Black Sea Fleet, energy infrastructure, nuclear weapons, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine—fell under Russian influence, ownership, or control. President Putin's rise to power in 2000 and his newly energized Eurasian policy resulted in enhanced Russian PW activity in Ukraine, to include an increased emphasis on informational, criminal, clandestine, and intelligence activities. Russia's calamity during the 2004 Ukrainian Orange Revolution was quickly remediated through its PW apparatus and resulted in the appointment of a pro-Russian President (Viktor Yanukovich), abandonment of an EU Association Agreement, and containment of NATO expansion. Russian PW in Ukraine eventually matured to enable a comprehensive strategy aimed at reeling Ukraine back under the total control of Moscow.

5. Russia's Activity in Ukraine in 2014 is PW, Rather than Crisis Activity Because it is Part of a Phased Plan Encompassing Nonmilitary and Military Methods to Secure Russia's Goals as Outlined in Gerasimov's New Generation Warfare Doctrine

The 2014 Ukrainian conflict marks the culmination of a protracted PW strategy by the Russian Federation and the adoption of a systematic and phased approach to crisis generation and management by the Russian military. Since the early Cold-War period, PW has been the vanguard of Moscow's foreign policy; with every measure of coercive national power devoted to furthering the Kremlin's relative influence in regional and

global affairs. Given this perspective, Russia's actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014 should not be interpreted as a radical doctrinal experiment, but a systemic restoration of proven Soviet PW methods adapted to exploit a new geopolitical reality. Russia's new model for the conduct of PW is expressed in the views of the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov in 2013. This model, effectively implemented in the Ukrainian campaign, is a clear reflection of progressive Russian military thinking on twenty-first century conflict, but is deeply rooted in Soviet-era PW doctrine. The new Russian doctrine is a confluence of Soviet subversion doctrine practiced by the KGB during the Cold War, the application of nonviolent resistance techniques that played a pivotal role in the collapse of the Soviet empire and during the color revolutions in the post-Soviet space, and the evolution of Russian UW and counter-UW at the turn of the century. The Gerasimov doctrine has taken the conceptual framework of the various lessons from UW and counter-UW, civil resistance, state subversion, and the application of DIME elements of national power, and melded them into a comprehensive PW mechanism that functions in concert with Russia's strategic policy aims.

The model presented by Gerasimov depicts the Russian military's views on the changing nature of twenty-first century warfare. Gerasimov lays out a six phase approach to "intergovernmental conflict": covert generation, exacerbation, initiation of conflict action, crisis, resolution, and establishment of peace.⁸³¹ This model bears a striking similarity to the KGB state subversion approach implemented by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but unlike the Soviet-era model, this puts emphasis on the use of civilian proxies versus conventional military force to initiate a conflict. When the Gerasimov model is applied to the conflict in Ukraine, a clear, phased pattern emerges.

Arguably, the Russian Federation has conducted the initial phase in Ukraine, covert generation, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This consisted of the use of the Russian diaspora to nurture ethnic and linguistic divisions, economic coercion through resource denial and extortion, election tampering, the bribery of Ukrainian

⁸³¹ Valery Gerasimov, "Value of Science in Foresight: New Challenges Require Rethinking Forms and Methods of Warfare," *Military-Industrial Courier*, February 27, 2013.

officials, and other soft power methods.^{832 833 834} With the outbreak of the Euromaidan protests late in 2013, the Russian Federation moved to the second phase, exacerbation. This phase consisted of both overt and covert support to then president Viktor Yanukovych and his pro-Russian bloc, as well as the intensification of the information war designed to deepen ethnic divisions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The Gerasimov model refers to this process as the “intensification of contradictions,” a term borrowed from Soviet dialectical materialism. By early February 2014, the ouster of Yanukovych seemed imminent and Moscow began laying the groundwork to annex the Crimean Peninsula and ostensibly gain control of the Russian-speaking regions of Eastern Ukraine. While the first two phases were concurrent in Crimea and the Donbass, the military operations occurred sequentially.

The Crimean operation moved from the *Initiation of Conflict Action* to *Resolution* in a matter of weeks. Starting with the Ukrainian parliament voting Yanukovych out of office on February 22, pro-Russian separatists and Russian Special Operations Forces seized key government buildings, isolated Ukrainian military bases, and secured key infrastructure on the peninsula. This was supported by a massing of Russian conventional troops on the Ukrainian border as a diversionary force, and a blockade of the Ukrainian fleet by the Russian Navy. These actions were coupled with sophisticated Information and Cyber campaigns, and set the conditions for Crimea’s vote to secede from Ukraine on March 16 and its absorption by the Russian Federation on March 18.

The initiation of conflict action in the Donbass followed a pattern similar to that in Crimea. On April 6, pro-Russian separatists seized key government buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Karkiv. In the initial stages of the operation, the resistance pattern of action seemed to indicate a nonmilitary approach using local referenda to bring the regions closer to Russia. However, the inherent lack of speed and surprise that made the

⁸³² Marlie Maigre, “Crimea – The Achilles’ Heel of Ukraine,” International Center for Defense Studies, November 2008.

⁸³³ Jakob Tolstrup, “Studying a Negative External Actor: Russia’s Management of the Stability and Instability in the ‘Near Abroad,’” *Democratization* (September 2009): 932.

⁸³⁴ Richard B. Andres and Michael Kofman, “European Energy Security: Reducing Volatility of Ukraine-Russia Natural Gas Pricing Disputes,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, no. 264 (2011): 6.

Crimean operation so successful—Eastern Ukraine’s more heterogeneous population, the prevalence of organized crime, and the clear lack of organization and chaotic factional infighting among the opposition—necessitated Russia to “militarize” the conflict. By late April, Russian special operations forces began “recruiting paramilitary fighters in exchange for cash handouts and waging a sophisticated propaganda war.”⁸³⁵ This was the start of a prolonged UW campaign and the initiation of Gerasimov’s crisis phase. The flow of Russian “volunteers” and military equipment into Eastern Ukraine from late April to early August, as well as Russian antiaircraft and indirect fire support, stalled the Ukrainian counterinsurgency campaign. In early August, Russia used humanitarian convoys to cover a buildup of forces in the Donbass for a decisive resolution phase. “In late August, Russia poured in enough men, tanks and armoured [sic] personnel carriers to support a counter-offensive.”⁸³⁶ The introduction of conventional Russian troops tilted the balance. A series of Russian led offensives in mid-to-late August rolled back the Ukrainian forces and set conditions for Moscow to extract favorable terms to a negotiated peace, including a postponement of the EU association agreement until 2015, special status to the Donbass region for three years, and the creation of a 30-kilometer demilitarized zone.⁸³⁷ A ceasefire was signed on September 5, 2014 and marked the transition to the last phase of Gerasimov’s model. This last phase is a protracted process of escalation and deescalation, negotiation and the consolidation of gains, and the continuous application of all aspects of Russian national power to ensure a favorable end state. According to the model, this phase does not signal the stop of actual fighting. This was demonstrated by a series of separatist offensives in November 2014 and January/February 2015, leading to further territorial gains and culminating in the Minsk II agreement in February. The Russian Federation has successfully established a frozen conflict in Ukraine that can be leveraged against Kiev to influence Ukrainian foreign and

⁸³⁵ Comments by the head of Ukrainian counterintelligence, from Evan Beese and Tzvi Kahn, FPI Fact Sheet: Timeline of Russian Aggression in Ukraine and the Western Response, The Foreign Policy Initiative, September 18, 2014, <http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-fact-sheet-timeline-russian-aggression-ukraine-and-western-response?gclid=CLy35efW-8ACFYhefgodKYEAYQ>.

⁸³⁶ Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, 142.

⁸³⁷ Laura Mills and Peter Leonard, “Ukraine will Delay Implementation of EU Deal,” *Associated Press*, 12 September 2014. <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ukraine-rebels-exchange-prisoners-peace-deal>.

domestic policy. The Gerasimov model is cyclical in nature. The transition from the last phase is back into the first, with the process of PW and subversion continuing indefinitely until the next escalation.

The validated supporting hypotheses underscore the importance for the United States to adopt a PW strategy capable of offensively preempting or countering the PW practices of emerging or rising powers such as Russia. Building on the validated supporting hypotheses presented above, this work proposes as a primary hypothesis that USSOF, synchronized with other elements of national power, provide a functional platform for the U.S. Department of Defense to support USG efforts to conduct U.S. PW and undermine or counter Russian PW. This concept will be developed further in the following operational concept.

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IX. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ROLE OF USSOF

The 2014 Ukraine crisis, which some have suggested presaged the emergence of Russian hybrid warfare or new generation warfare, was actually a culminating point, or window of opportunity, for Russia to execute a provocative military-methods-based phase in a protracted political warfare campaign. Russia has conducted PW in Ukraine since its independence in 1991, with especially high degrees of intensity following the Orange Revolution. This PW campaign demonstrates a steady-state, protracted strategy across all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—or DIME) designed to alter the social and political landscape in Ukraine. Russian PW has resulted in prolonged degradation of the Ukrainian economy and internal security. Russia has fomented dissidence in ethnic-Russian populations (Crimea and Eastern Ukraine), disrupted internal politics to favor Russian objectives and policies, and delegitimized the Ukrainian government—especially when it has sought further ties with the West. As a result, Russia has tilted the balance of power in its favor by ensuring that Ukraine, or parts of it, remains under Moscow’s control or frozen in conflict. Russian actions have left the United States unable to formulate a comprehensive response beyond diplomatic condemnation and targeted economic sanctions. Western solutions have been ineffective because analysis has been focused on only a portion of the problem—the immediate violence—rather than the entirety of Russia’s protracted PW strategy.

The Ukraine crisis demonstrates the need for a U.S.-led strategy to counter Russian PW or execute U.S. PW. This operational concept first presents the definition of PW and summarizes its evolution through the Soviet era into the form that Russia is employing today. Next, a conceptual framework is presented to assist strategists in organizing and establishing linkage between activities throughout the DIME spectrum, which are often mistaken as disparate and unrelated, and reframing them more accurately as components of modern PW. Then, policy recommendations are presented that outline interagency contributions and responsibilities that would enable the United States to counter PW or implement its PW strategies, in support of national objectives. As PW is

synchronized across the elements of national power, policy recommendations include complete interagency involvement, with the Department of State in the lead, and prolific utilization of organizations capable of operating broadly across the DIME spectrum, such as U.S. country teams working out of U.S. embassies and United States Special Operations Forces (USSOF). Finally, further recommendations are presented to optimize the USSOF contribution to PW and expedite the development of an effective strategy to counter Russian PW.

A. POLITICAL WARFARE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The interaction of PW methodologies creates four natural categories that emerge from the nexus between covert and overt, and direct and indirect means (see Figure 10). Covert-direct PW involves “unilateral covert action” against a nation-state. Overt-direct PW is the expression of “overt direct influence” by one nation against another. Covert-indirect PW is the interaction between irregular warfare and PW through “non-unilateral covert action,” and is essentially the covert use of proxy non-state elements to influence a state actor. The final category of overt-indirect PW is essentially the “overt influence through a third party non-state actor” on a nation-state.




Figure 10. Categories of Political Warfare.

Elements of national power (DIME) are distinctly expressed within each PW category along the covert-overt and direct-indirect nexus. This conceptual framework serves as a tool to visualize and interpret PW in the broader context of foreign policy. Though this model can serve as an instrument for practitioners to determine measures and countermeasures for PW, careful consideration must be made of national and international statutory restrictions on specific PW actions to achieve national aims. Successful PW requires the close coordination of overt foreign policy and covert PW. Although instances of success without such coordination exist, such as the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, by and large, disparate covert and overt PW measures usually fail to achieve the desired effects.

B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE

Recent Russian actions in Ukraine, as well as the recognition of ongoing subversive activities by other adversarial state and nonstate actors, have sparked the reemergence of the PW concept in U.S. foreign policy. Two principal documents form the basis of this discussion. The 2015 draft of the United States Political Warfare Policy, prepared by an Interdepartmental Committee made up of representatives from the Department of State (DoS), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of the Treasury (DoT), CIA, and the USAID, provides broad recommendations for the conduct of U.S. PW.⁸³⁸ The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) white paper, *SOF Support to Political Warfare*, published in March 2015, proposes establishing USSOF as the lead DOD element supporting broader U.S. PW initiatives. These two documents are discussed in this section and form the framework for developing operational SOF concepts and further recommendations for establishing the Defense Department's role in PW.

The proposed U.S. PW policy identifies the necessity to build a broader framework for the conducting U.S. UW as part of a larger PW strategy incorporating “political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure variables.” This conclusion emerges from the analysis that the U.S. concept of UW is “tactical, limited, and focused on special operations forces,” while adversarial nation states—namely Russia, China, and Iran—employ strategic UW concepts that incorporate a wide range of DIME instruments. These include concepts in which U.S. UW doctrine is lacking such as commodity and trade warfare, state subversion through cyber and electronic warfare, deception and propaganda, use of organized criminal networks and NGOs, armed and nonviolent civil resistance, and a variety of other measures.⁸³⁹

To counteract adversarial PW, the United States needs to develop both robust offensive and defensive capacities. In this regard, the objective of U.S. PW “is to isolate,

⁸³⁸ United States Political Warfare Policy (draft), January 2015, Policy draft prepared by Interdepartmental Committee (DoS, DOD, DoT, CIA, USAID), drafted by D. Robert Worley.

⁸³⁹ *Ibid.*, 8–12.

erode, manipulate, exhaust, wear down, attrit, overthrow, reduce, replace, or create the conditions to coerce a belligerent government or regime to acquiesce to our national objectives, without going to war.”⁸⁴⁰ The policy identifies a number of critical methods in formulating a comprehensive U.S. PW program, including the use of information mediums to expose and discredit opposition elements and advocate U.S. positions, overt diplomacy to build international support, assistance to indigenous opposition forces acting against an external power or oppressive regime, covert action, and economic leverage. The policy also stresses the need to “minimize the risk of escalation to . . . civil, conventional, or nuclear war,” and “minimize the likelihood of direct U.S. military involvement” by relying on diverse instruments of national power and integrating proxy actors such as third country states and NGOs into the PW campaign.⁸⁴¹

Influence has a prominent role in PW. The policy proposes the design of “a coordinated influence campaign,” with either the CIA or DoS in the lead, that includes counterpropaganda efforts, public diplomacy, assistance and training to “preferred state and non-state actors” in the conduct of targeted psychological and information operations, collaboration with preferred actors in the development and distribution of “informational and educational” material, and the development and maintenance of information infrastructure.⁸⁴² In addition, DOD, though subordinate to CIA and DoS efforts in this realm, has robust organic capability to conduct psychological warfare and information operations in support of lead agency initiatives during peacetime.

The draft policy designates the DoS as the lead agency for U.S. PW. The DoS is tasked with providing “policy guidance and coordination of political warfare programs.” Each agency (DoS, DOD, DoT, USAID, and CIA) is further tasked with designating elements responsible for “continuing attention to political warfare activities.” In the event of a crisis, an interagency task force may be established, “under the chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary of State for the region in which the crisis country is located,” and

⁸⁴⁰ United States Political Warfare Policy (draft), January 2015, Policy draft prepared by Interdepartmental Committee (DoS, DOD, DoT, CIA, USAID), drafted by D. Robert Worley, 8.

⁸⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 10–11.

⁸⁴² *Ibid.*, 21–22.

including senior representatives from all applicable agencies to coordinate PW efforts.⁸⁴³ The NSC, through the Board for Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC), will “assure unity of effort and use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in waging all forms of low-intensity conflict, including political warfare”⁸⁴⁴ The NSC Deputies Committee will review issues and recommendations raised by the LIC Board, ensuring consistency with U.S. policy; stand up and monitor the progress of interagency working groups and task forces; and make recommendations to the NSC Principals Committee.⁸⁴⁵

1. The Role of the Department of State

The country team and Chief of Mission are the lead elements in U.S. PW abroad. The DoS is tasked with ensuring continued attention to foreign subversive efforts, as well as the broader PW problem set, with partner nations and international organizations. Additional tasks include intelligence collection and analysis of political, economic, and social developments; national and regional stability; and prevailing attitudes; developing plans, training, and leading assessments of PW programs; and encouraging foreign entities and U.S. private interests to support U.S. programs and policy. Finally, each country team is tasked to develop a PW plan consolidating input from various participating agencies.⁸⁴⁶

2. The Role of USAID

The policy document gives a substantial role to USAID in conducting PW programs. USAID is well suited to address many of the underlying conditions making states susceptible to external or internal subversion. USAID is tasked to develop programs within a target nation designed to respond to, cope with, and deter subversion, develop counterinsurgency programs, and support military-civic action. These efforts require close coordination with the Defense Department, especially in building host

⁸⁴³ United States Political Warfare Policy (draft), January 2015, 22–23.

⁸⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁸⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁸⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

government capacity through technical assistance and training, supporting information programs, strengthening police and paramilitary organizations to counter and make the nation more resilient against subversion and insurgency, and in conducting a variety of military-civic projects.⁸⁴⁷

3. The Role of the Department of Defense

The military's role in PW centers on special warfare (SW)⁸⁴⁸ and surgical strike.⁸⁴⁹ Special warfare includes UW and counter-UW, and can contain diverse lethal and nonlethal methods ranging from capacity building and intelligence support, psychological and information operations, up to armed revolt, guerilla warfare, and revolution. The draft policy assigns a number of tasks to the Defense Department (see below) these will be developed further when discussing USASOC support to PW.

In fulfilling its special warfare role, the DOD will:

- (a) Develop U.S. military forces trained for employment in unconventional warfare, counter-unconventional warfare, and other military guerilla-warfare operations.
- (b) Develop, test, and maintain transportation, communications, and logistic systems to support these forces, and be prepared to provide logistic support to indigenous forces in remote, contested areas.
- (c) Develop military doctrine for special warfare operations to provide guidance for the employment of U.S. forces and for the training of U.S. and friendly foreign military personnel.
- (d) Develop strategy and prepare contingency plans, in accordance with U.S. foreign policy objectives and commitments, to provide operational

⁸⁴⁷ United States Political Warfare Policy (draft), January 2015, 30.

⁸⁴⁸ Special Warfare is “the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.” ADP 3-05, Special Operations, August 31, 2012, 9.

⁸⁴⁹ A Surgical Strike is “the execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations forces in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets or influence threats.” Ibid.

assistance or reinforcement with U.S. tactical units to friendly state and non-state actors.

(e) Provide research and development activities in support of special warfare operations.

(f) Conduct military intelligence operations to provide intelligence on foreign military and paramilitary forces.

(g) Be prepared to execute military operations in support of national objectives as directed, including land/sea/air interdiction and strikes and raids in support of proxy forces.

(h) Plan, develop, and implement civilian unconventional and counter-unconventional warfare programs where appropriate with AID and CIA.

(i) Assess the adequacy of its part of the overall political warfare program in relation to those of other U.S. agencies.

(j) Develop language-capable and area-oriented U.S. forces for possible employment in training or providing operational advice or operational support to indigenous forces.

(k) Provide, in coordination with other interested governmental agencies, training and advisory assistance in all aspects of military intelligence.

(l) Maintain continuous surveillance of foreign military and paramilitary forces potentially available for political warfare, evaluating their state of effectiveness and readiness, and making appropriate recommendations for their support and improvement or for their subversion.

(m) Develop the military sections of Country political warfare Plans.

(n) Support the psychological operations of CIA in political warfare situations.

Through the Military Assistance Program the Department of Defense will:

(a) Provide, in collaboration with AID, military weapons and material within available resources to friendly indigenous military and paramilitary forces and training in the fields of guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and counterinsurgency.

(b) Encourage and support, in collaboration with AID where appropriate, the use of indigenous military and paramilitary forces of vulnerable states in military civic action programs, including such projects as public works,

sanitation, transportation, communications, and other activities helpful to economic development.⁸⁵⁰

4. The Role of the Department of Treasury

The draft policy assigns a very narrow role to the Treasury Department in conducting PW. The limited role of “monitoring and, when appropriate, interdicting money flows that support non-state actors whose actions are inimical to U.S. interests”⁸⁵¹ is only a small aspect of the Treasury Department’s capacity for PW. The policy paper does not discuss the critical role played by the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in developing comprehensive or selective sanctions, or The International Affairs Department in crafting global economic stability measures.⁸⁵²

5. The Role of the Central Intelligence Agency

The CIA, throughout its history, has played a prominent role in U.S. PW. The draft policy emphasizes CIA covert actions programs that encourage the “formation of coalitions of state and non-state actors,” the planning and conduct of “false flag operations and support pseudo operations,” and “interventions into foreign political processes.” In coordination with the Defense Department, the CIA is further tasked to fund, train, equip, and advise proxy military and paramilitary forces, as well as to conduct psychological and informational influence operations to further U.S. interests.⁸⁵³

6. SOF Support to Political Warfare

While the draft policy document assigns broad roles to various agencies in the conduct of a PW program, the USASOC white paper proposes establishing USSOF as the principal DOD element in this area. The USASOC document describes the military aspects of PW as “counter-unconventional warfare (C-UW) and unconventional warfare

⁸⁵⁰ United States Political Warfare Policy, January 2015 (draft), 31–33.

⁸⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁸⁵² U.S. Department of the Treasury, International Affairs, <http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-Of-International-Affairs.aspx> and U.S. Department of the Treasury, Sanctions Programs and Country Information, <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx>.

⁸⁵³ United States Political Warfare Policy, 33–34.

(UW), foreign internal defense (FID), Security Sector Assistance (SSA), and Information and Influence Activities (IIA), closely calibrated with and in support of those of other government departments.”⁸⁵⁴ The document argues that inherent SOF capabilities are well suited to facilitate and synchronize PW efforts by acting as the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) “connective tissue” though existing foreign military and interagency partnerships.⁸⁵⁵

The USASOC paper complements the broader U.S. policy document by identifying two critical areas for U.S. PW: counter-UW and deterrence. First, to “comprehensively mitigate the effect of subversion, UW, and delegitimizing narratives in partner countries targeted by adversaries,” U.S. policy requires the capability to strengthen the “capabilities, capacity, and legitimacy of partners.” Second, a deterrence mechanism must be established to “dissuade adversaries from conducting hybrid warfare by increasing the cost of such activities to the point that they become unsustainable.” This latter approach must proactively employ “coercive diplomacy, legal-economic measures, and UW against adversaries, and aggressively [prosecute] a battle of narratives to undermine adversary legitimacy among critical populations.” By establishing escalation dominance along the PW spectrum, and demonstrating both the capacity and willingness to engage in such activity, the United States can institute an effective deterrent against state-sponsored subversion efforts.⁸⁵⁶

Five general categories form the framework for a comprehensive PW approach. They are persuasive and coercive diplomacy; economic aid and coercion; security sector assistance (SSA); UW; and information and influence activities (IIA). While the first category, diplomacy, has a role for the military component through the establishment of the credible use of force, primarily special warfare and surgical strike, SOF plays a prominent role in the latter three categories: SSA, UW, and IIA.

⁸⁵⁴ USASOC, “SOF Support to Political Warfare White Paper,” March 10, 2015, 1.

⁸⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 10–12.

⁸⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 10–11.

7. Security Sector Assistance

Security sector assistance (SSA) is defined by the Executive Branch as

policies, programs, and activities the United States uses to: engage with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the security sector; help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and, enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges.⁸⁵⁷

The USASOC document breaks down SSA into three categories: security sector reform (SSR), building partner nation capacity (BPC), and foreign internal defense (FID).

SSR occurs at the top national levels and focuses on “defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice; police; corrections; intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and/or reduction of armed violence.”⁸⁵⁸ Comprehensive SSR strategies require both robust interagency activities and high-level DOD involvement beyond traditional military partnership engagements, with the latter focused on the “promotion of the establishment of a civilian led defense ministry.”⁸⁵⁹ SOF plays a far more prominent role in BPC and FID.

While no joint definition of BPC exists, and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review mentions “building partnership capacity” in broad terms,⁸⁶⁰ BPC can be classified as “targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the DoD and its partners,” through “training, equipping, exercises, and education designed to enhance a partner country’s ability to improve its own internal security

⁸⁵⁷ Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy, The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, April 5, 2013. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/fact-sheet-us-security-sector-assistance-policy>

⁸⁵⁸ USAID, DOD, DoS, “Security Sector Reform,” February 2009. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115810.pdf>, from USASOC, “SOF Support to Political Warfare,” 16.

⁸⁵⁹ Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform, JSOU Report 13-5, September 2013, 62.

⁸⁶⁰ Charles T. Hagel, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, March 2014).

situation and make valuable contributions to coalition operations.”⁸⁶¹ SOF has a key role in BPC though participation in the security cooperation and assistance programs under the combatant command’s (COCOM) theatre security cooperation plan (TSCP) and in line with U.S. Embassy mission strategy and resource plans (MSRPs); the DoS-USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP); and DoS’s Joint Regional Strategies (JRS).⁸⁶² SOF activities under Section 1206 (building foreign military capacity) of the FY 2006 NDAA, joint combined exchange training (JCET), joint planning and assistance teams (JPAT), military liaison elements (MLE), special operations liaison officers (SOLO), partnership development teams (PDT), and SOF representatives form the basis of SOF BPC programs.⁸⁶³ These SOF programs complement other DOD and interagency initiatives under Section 1207 (transfer of defense articles and funding to DoS for reconstruction, security or stabilization assistance), the defense coalition support fund (DCSF) that authorizes the stockpile of defense articles such as helmets, body armor, and night vision devices for potential use by partner nations through operations and maintenance (O&M) funds, and the combatant commander initiative fund (CCIF) consisting of short-term, low-cost projects that meet the requirements of unforeseen situations.⁸⁶⁴

FID is U.S. support to “action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats,”⁸⁶⁵ including “organized crime and cyber.”⁸⁶⁶ FID is a core SOF mission, often requiring a small footprint and minimal resources to achieve disproportionate effects in support of host-nation programs. U.S. FID falls under SSA and is distinct from BPC. FID primarily deals with supporting host-nation programs

⁸⁶¹ Jennifer D. P. Moroney, D. Thaler, and Joe Hogler, *Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity* (RAND: 2013), 2.

⁸⁶² USASOC, “SOF Support to Political Warfare,” 17.

⁸⁶³ Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, July 16, 2014, III-18–III-22.

⁸⁶⁴ Rebecca Williams, Stephen Abott, and Gordon Adams, DOD Authorities for Foreign and Security Assistance Programs: A Comparison of the FY 2010 House and Senate Armed Services Defense Authorization Bills, July 20, 2009* Stimson: Budgeting for Foreign Affairs and Defense. http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/DOD_security_assistance_authorities.pdf.

⁸⁶⁵ Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010, ix.

⁸⁶⁶ USASOC, “SOF Support to Political Warfare,” 18.

under the framework of internal defense and development (IDAD) through active participation and training. BPC is a broader range of programs tailored to both internal and external threats, and does not include active U.S. involvement in operations and planning.⁸⁶⁷

8. Unconventional Warfare

SOF support to PW requires a broadening of the U.S. definition of UW. The USOSOC document frames UW under the full spectrum of conflict, from nonviolent resistance up to insurgency and revolution, and delineates three areas of focus: traditional UW, C-UW, and UW in a proactive fashion (Pr-UW).⁸⁶⁸ Traditional UW is defined as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”⁸⁶⁹ Traditional UW was the founding concept of U.S. Special Operations, and remains a core competency of Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) today. Since the end of the Cold War, technological and geopolitical change has made traditional forms of UW—direct support to guerilla forces—far more complex and difficult to apply as a U.S. foreign policy tool. Novel approaches, incorporating civil-resistance and the protest potential of a population, third nation proxy forces with U.S. support to disassociate U.S. direct involvement, social media, and cyber, must be fused with traditional methods to move U.S. UW doctrine into the twenty-first century. Our geopolitical rivals have incorporated these methods into their SOF and conventional military doctrines, and the U.S. must present viable response measures against these types of threats.

The concept of C-UW is a necessary step forward and presents policy makers with additional options outside of the SSA framework to deal with external state or nonstate actor subversion against allies and partner nations. C-UW can be offensive or

⁸⁶⁷ Derek C. Jenkins, “Distinguishing Between Security Force Assistance & Foreign Internal Defense: Determining A Doctrine Road-Ahead,” *Small Wars Journal*, (2008).

⁸⁶⁸ USASOC, “SOF Support to Political Warfare,” 18–19.

⁸⁶⁹ Joint Publication 3-05: Special Operations, April 2011, II-9.

defensive. Offensive UW can be used to either coerce or deter an adversary engaged in UW through a “SOF-led or SOF-supported C-UW campaign” and entails “UW conducted within the territory of the state (or nonstate/parastatal entity) aiding an insurgency or separatist movement in another country—threatening the adversary’s ‘home front’ or rear area.”⁸⁷⁰ The ally or partner nation targeted by external subversion can provide the principal force to conduct this type of campaign. Defensive C-UW complements U.S. SSA and FID efforts in a targeted country and involves a comprehensive program across the DIME spectrum including “law enforcement, rule of law (ROL), governance . . . conventional force posturing, regional and global IIA, diplomatic engagements, economic aid and sanctions—or any combination of the above.”⁸⁷¹ Complex twenty-first century deterrence problems require the United States to develop and maintain a robust C-UW capability and demonstrate a willingness to employ that capability.

Finally, the concept of Pr-UW has long been neglected by U.S. foreign policy. In recent history, the United States has been unwilling to risk setting up the infrastructure necessary to run a UW or C-UW operation in either allied, neutral, or adversarial states; instead defaulting to a crisis response model (Poland 1982, Georgia 2008, Syria 2011, Ukraine 2014) that significantly limits U.S. options. The USASOC document advocates long-term, preemptive UW infrastructure development

through small footprint, scaled application of force campaigns in order to develop persistent influence among potential UW constituencies; deepen understanding of significant individuals, groups and populations in the Human Domain of the potential UW operational area; and build trust with SOF’s likely UW partners in regions before U.S. leaders are constrained to react to crises.⁸⁷²

The application of extensive preparation of the environment (PE) programs well in advance of a crisis would not only expand the options available to the National Command

⁸⁷⁰ USASOC, “SOF Support to Political Warfare,” 20.

⁸⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁸⁷² *Ibid.*, 20–21.

Authority, but serve as a deterrent against potential adversaries seeking to engage in PW or UW that are inimical to U.S. interests.

9. Information and Influence Activities

While the State Department and the CIA play a leading role in information and influence activities (IIA), DOD and USSOF have extensive capability to support those lead agencies. IIA is defined as “the integration of designated information related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform United States and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decision making.”⁸⁷³ U.S. foreign policy has significant limitations in this critical aspect of PW, as adversarial nations have put a premium on information and excel at controlling both the domestic and international information environments. As an example, Russia has established tight domestic controls on both social and mass media. It uses these mediums to drive anti-Western, nationalistic, and ethno-centric narratives, relying heavily on deception and misinformation as a means to control and suppress dissent. Moscow has also expanded its capacity to conduct their own external IIA, buying up the majority of mass media programming in the Baltic States,⁸⁷⁴ and expanding its foreign propaganda wing (*RT*) across Europe.⁸⁷⁵ The United States must aggressively conduct IIA in order to compete in the battle for the narrative.

The USASOC paper delineates three categories of IIA: public affairs (PA), public diplomacy, and cognitive joint force entry (CJFE), and military information support operations (MISO). PA primarily targets the domestic American audience and members of the uniformed services, and is designed to inform them about U.S. and DOD “activities, initiatives, and operations” by interfacing with both U.S. and international

⁸⁷³ FM 3-13: Inform and Influence Operations, 25 January 2013, 1-1; HQDA, ADRP 3-0: Unified Land Operations, May 16, 2012, from USASOC, “SOF Support to Political Warfare,” 21–22.

⁸⁷⁴ Agnia Grigas, “Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power: Russian Influence in the Baltic States,” Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House, August 2012. http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0812bp_grigas.pdf.

⁸⁷⁵ Chase Gummer, “Germany Faces Tricky Quest Countering Russian Propaganda,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 28, 2015. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-faces-tricky-quest-countering-russian-propaganda-1422443056>.

media. Public diplomacy promotes “United States foreign policy objectives to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers.”⁸⁷⁶ Public diplomacy is a critical component of U.S. PW, and ARSOF organic assets can enhance DoS efforts in the planning and execution of a PW program. This requires continuous integration of ARSOF Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) elements into DoS regional initiatives and specific country team programs. CJFE is defined as “information and influence activities to shape the environment beginning in pre-conflict stages.”⁸⁷⁷ This concept is not simply the application of psychological operations to shape the “perceptions, beliefs, opinions, and attitudes” of a target population through print, broadcast, and social media. CJFE also involves targeted influence operations on government and military individuals, often through individual interaction, to shape opinions within a target regime and set conditions for future actions. SOF’s forward posture and habitual interaction with foreign military and law enforcement leadership provide a natural mechanism for execution. Military Information Support Operations (MISO), defined as “planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives”⁸⁷⁸ is a principal tool to affect CJFE from a DOD and SOF perspective, but must be in concert with broader State Department and CIA programs. A critical recommendation from the USASOC white paper is the reestablishment of an independent United States Information Agency (USIA) to coordinate both overt and covert IIA programs abroad.⁸⁷⁹

10. Centrality of SOF to Political Warfare

The primary aim of PW is “to assist the destruction of the foundations’ of the adversary state’s capacity to obstruct U.S. and partnered interests, in order to ‘break the

⁸⁷⁶ USASOC, “SOF Support to Political Warfare,” 23.

⁸⁷⁷ USASOC, “Cognitive Joint Force Entry White Paper,” September 26, 2014, 4–5, 7.

⁸⁷⁸ Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, November 8, 2010 (as amended through January 15, 2015), 159.

⁸⁷⁹ USASOC, “SOF Support to Political Warfare,” 23.

will to' sustain actions contrary to U.S. desires.”⁸⁸⁰ SOF is ideally suited to lead DOD efforts in support of broader PW initiatives. USSOF elements are well integrated both within the interagency and multinational communities, and can serve as a natural DOD synchronization and coordination component for PW. SOF is integrated at all levels of foreign military and civilian institutions, have established relationships with interagency and NGOs, and “avoid creating large footprints, disrupting local economic and civil conditions, and causing damage to their partners’ narratives.” The Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), with its multinational networked structure and established “non-governmental, commercial, and academic” relationships, is positioned to function as a principal geographic node to coordinate regional PW efforts.⁸⁸¹ Further applications of SOF in PW are discussed in the following section.

C. FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS: COUNTERING RUSSIAN POLITICAL WARFARE

In addition to the broader policy recommendations captured in the USASOC white paper: *SOF Support to Political Warfare* and the draft United States Political Warfare Policy, there are specific recommendations that can be implemented to expedite the development of a strategy to counter Russian PW and optimize the integration of USSOF into that strategy. These recommendations include acknowledgement of PW activity by rising powers, maintaining a persistent presence through SOF engagements, expanding PW education programs, the establishment of European Combatant Command (EUCOM) and Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) regional PW cells, and establishing country team billets for PW SOLOs.

1. Acknowledgement of PW Activity by Rising Powers

First and foremost, the leadership of the United States must acknowledge that political warfare strategies are being implemented by regional powers, including Russia, that seek to shift the current balance of geopolitical power in their favor. PW, however, is not a unilateral issue and countries conducting active PW must still be engaged on other

⁸⁸⁰ USASOC, “SOF Support to Political Warfare, 27.

⁸⁸¹ Ibid., 29.

regional and global issues; but, there needs to be an overt acceptance that rising regional powers are actively pursuing interests that may not align with those of the United States and its allies. More importantly, it must be acknowledged that PW is being used to circumvent the relative military superiority of the United States and the West. Acknowledgement of the PW activity of other states necessitates and justifies a robust national policy to drive counter-PW initiatives and, perhaps, preemptive PW strategies. Without acknowledging PW's relevance to the contemporary geopolitical environment, there will be no acceptable or effective response to actions such as the Russian annexation of Crimea and its subsequent UW campaign in the Donbass. The most dangerous consequence of refusing to acknowledge the proliferation of PW, however, will be increasingly provocative, foreign PW programs designed to erode U.S. national interests throughout the world.

2. Maintaining a Persistent Presence through SOF Engagements

Early stages of PW activity are subtle and difficult to detect, and Russian PW is no exception. The U.S. country teams form the foundation for effective PW detection capability, but may lack the “bandwidth” in their information collection apparatus to focus efforts specifically on Russian PW. Fortunately, USSOF have the training, equipment, reporting channels, and experience to monitor Russian PW initiatives and effects, while conducting routine military engagements. USSOF practitioners also augment the PW detection and intelligence collection architecture that is centered on the U.S. country teams. The demand from our Eastern European partners for SOF partnership is high, and these demands should be supported as often as possible to sustain a strategy of persistent engagement and presence. Also, persistent engagement promotes cultural, lingual, and geographical familiarization within the SOF community, which enables expanded PW campaign potential. Also, a persistent SOF presence signals to the international community that the United States is committed to preserving the sovereignty of our allies and mitigating external influence. This signal, as opposed to a conventional military presence, is relatively inexpensive, less provocative, and can be sustained for a longer period of time. Finally, SOF force structures are highly scalable and modular. This means that their presence can be optimized to fit within the tolerances

of the host nation, the strategic vision of the country team, the financial constraints of the U.S. Government, and any other unique circumstances. This presence can be further scaled or modulated to include specific SOF capabilities and assets, as required by the country team's resident PW strategy.

3. Expanding PW Education Programs

Specialized education focusing on PW theory and application for service members occupying key billets would positively impact the implementation of the nation's PW strategy. Quality academic programs specific to the individual requirements of agencies conducting PW must be expanded for American PW efforts to be successful. Executive courses tailored to the schedules and expertise of decision makers must also be implemented. Within DOD, emphasis must be placed on educating U.S. and partner nation SOF on key elements of twenty-first century PW, including civil and nonviolent resistance, social media, social network analysis, cyber warfare, and NGO coordination. In addition, education on PW activity indicators across the DIME spectrum would improve SOF contribution to the intelligence collection activities required to detect and counter Russian PW. This education should be interdisciplinary and holistic. Currently, programs at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) offered by the Defense Analysis (DA) department are ideal for providing PW practitioners and planners with relevant and applicable education. The Defense Analysis Department also provides limited off-site education to military units that request support.

4. Establishment of EUCOM Regional PW Cell

The EUCOM Commander will play a pivotal leadership role in any strategy to counter Russian PW. Because the EUCOM Commander is dual-hatted as the NATO SACEUR, he plays an even more critical role than would be expected for another Combatant Commander. Fortunately, EUCOM is equipped with interagency advisors in the joint staff to assist the commander in synergizing strategic and operational efforts with other agencies. It is recommended that the joint staff be augmented with a regional PW cell to be the focal point for all of EUCOM's DOD contributions to PW strategies.

This cell will lead interagency coordination efforts for PW in the EUCOM area of responsibility. It will also establish itself as a nexus to synergize regional strategies developed by the Board for LIC, regional strategies developed by the interagency, regional DOD strategies developed by EUCOM, country specific strategies developed by country teams, and SOF-oriented strategies developed by SOCEUR. The EUCOM regional PW cell will be optimally run by an officer in the grade of O-6 and assigned a staff of officers and Non-Commissioned Officers commensurate to the manpower required to synergize PW strategies as they are directed and developed by the Board for LIC. As more countries in the EUCOM AOR are nominated for PW programs, the EUCOM regional PW cell should be appropriately equipped with relevant subject matter experts and PW practitioners.

5. Establishment of SOCEUR Regional PW Cell

A SOCEUR regional PW cell should be developed to augment the SOCEUR J3. Because SOF are particularly well-suited for involvement in PW strategies, it can be expected that most, if not all, regional SOF engagements can be tailored to have PW effects. SOCEUR will require a dedicated cell to be the focal point for all SOF-based initiatives that support the broader PW strategy. This cell will coordinate heavily with joint command and staff sections to optimize the contributions of SOF engagements and preparation of the environment initiatives for integration into national PW strategies. Actions taken by the cell to maximize PW outputs can range anywhere from simply providing forward operational elements with specific intelligence requirements to detect PW activity, to designing SOF-centric PW campaign plans to be injected into the planning cycles of EUCOM, the interagency, or even the Board for LIC. Moreover, the SOCEUR regional PW cell will facilitate the appropriate allocation of SOF resources to PW initiatives by participating in the annual Requests For Forces (RFF), 1206/7 programs, and all other relevant sourcing processes. The SOCEUR regional PW cell will be optimally run by an officer in the grade of O-5 and assigned a staff of officers and NCOs commensurate to the manpower required to develop and implement SOF-centric PW strategies. As more countries in the SOCEUR AOR are nominated for PW programs, the SOCEUR regional PW cell should be appropriately enabled with relevant subject

matter experts and PW practitioners. If adequately enabled by appropriate manpower and talent, the SOCEUR regional PW cell represents an ideal foundation for a SOC-Forward element to be deployed in support of matured PW strategies that require high levels of SOF involvement.

6. Establishment of Country Team Billets for PW SOLO

Both of the leading policy papers agree that the country team will be the primary focal point for country-specific PW strategies. Despite the wide variety of country team organizational constructs, the senior DOD representative is usually the Senior Defense Official (SDO). As such, the SDO will be the proponent for all DOD interests and contributions to the country's PW strategy. Unfortunately, there is no telling what background or formal training that an individual SDO may have in the area of PW, which represents a potential chokepoint for the flow of coherent PW strategy from the DOD community writ large into the country-specific PW campaign, its governing documents, and planning processes. In order to mitigate this potential shortfall of PW expertise, each SDO should minimally have reach-back to a EUCOM and SOCEUR-based regional PW cells, but should ideally be assigned a PW SOLO to augment the SDO on PW strategy and its implementation. Once the Board for LIC nominates countries for PW programs, a PW SOLO should be selected through a nominative assignment process and co-located with the senior defense official in the embassy. The PW SOLO should be a post-Intermediate Level Education (ILE) O-4 or above, with regional experience and familiarity with PW. This will be considered a joint broadening assignment and will require an assignment of two to three years. Ideally, the position will be added as an NSDD-38 supported billet and become a part of the country team organizational structure. Since PW strategies span years or decades, the billet should be stabilized as much as possible once the Board for LIC has identified a country for a PW program. Alternatively, the PW SOLO could be sourced from SOCOM or SOCEUR, but this comes at the expense of reducing organizational PW talent in these staff elements. As a worst case, the billet can be sourced annually through a formal RFF. In this case, the primary SOF force provider for the region, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), will likely attempt to support the billet by requisitioning additional officer

manpower from Human Resources Command (HRC) on an annual basis. This sourcing strategy for the PW SOLO is the least desired due to its lack of billet stability, reliance on annual RFFs, and reliance on officer assignments from HRC above the authorized amount. However, until additional billets can be codified in the country team itself, in SOCOM or in SOCEUR, the informal assignment of PW SOLOs might be best accomplished through the RFF process.

These recommendations go beyond the policy-based recommendations of the USASOC white paper: *SOF Support to Political Warfare* and the draft United States Political Warfare Policy, and represent the first critical steps that must be undertaken to enable a coherent strategy to counter Russian PW. Although the DoS will be the proponent for national PW strategies, the DOD and, more specifically, the SOF community, will play a substantial role in countering Russian PW through unilateral programs, multinational partnerships, and supporting operations that complement other PW programs led by the U.S. interagency.

D. CONCLUSION

The events in Ukraine since 2014 have sparked a renewed interest in Russian activity within the former Soviet space, with policy makers and academics alike theorizing as to whether Russia's actions mark an emerging form of hybrid-war, asymmetric warfare, or "new-generation warfare." This work proposes that Russia's activity in Ukraine is, instead, part of a decades-long and continent-spanning Russian *political warfare* campaign reminiscent of those that the Soviet Union employed during the Cold War era. The United States and the West have placed a myopic focus on the violent events in Ukraine. As a result, they have incorrectly framed the problem as an isolated crisis event, rather than the culmination point of a protracted PW strategy. By incorrectly identifying the problem, which precludes an effective solution strategy, the United States has promulgated the perception that it is incapable of leading a multinational effort to counter PW strategies of rising regional powers. In order to mitigate this perception, and the proliferation of increasingly provocative PW strategies from other regional powers, the United States must demonstrate that it is capable of

properly framing the problem of Russian PW and developing full-spectrum, multinational strategies to counter it.

This operational concept provides the necessary tools to initiate the development of an effective strategy to counter Russian PW. A detailed historical analysis reveals that Russian PW doctrine has its roots in the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and has continued to adapt throughout the Soviet era and post-Cold War period into the form that the Russian Federation is employing today, the Gerasimov doctrine. The doctrinal templates for Russian PW provide an essential lens through which Russia's seemingly isolated actions can be viewed as linked components of a larger PW strategy.

Furthermore, this document proposes a conceptual framework and supporting visual models for foreign policy makers, planners, and practitioners to better understand PW. This framework is a helpful tool for categorizing seemingly disparate, and DIME spectrum-spanning actions of adversarial powers as components and indicators of PW. Using these models to categorize PW activity across the DIME spectrum also assists in identifying AORs for the interagency and multinational community, which is essential for developing and synchronizing counter PW strategy.

Policy recommendations are proposed that optimize the current interagency structure for dealing with PW activity globally, as well Russian PW specifically. These policy recommendations acknowledge that the DoS and its country teams will play a primary role in leading the nation's PW campaigns. These recommendations, however, are also founded on the knowledge that USSOF are particularly well-suited for PW and are capable of augmenting the interagency in a variety of initiatives that will be led by agencies other than the DOD.

Geographic Combatant Commanders maintain operational control over a specialized toolset for countering PW in the form of its regionally aligned Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs).⁸⁸² These TSOCs, in turn, implement the primary SOF action arm, which is comprised of approximately 660 Army Special Forces

⁸⁸² Andrew Feickert, *U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 1–2.

Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) teams and their equivalents; Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) platoons.⁸⁸³ Other SOF forces, such as Army civil affairs, Army military information support operations, Marine special operations teams, Air Force special tactics teams, and operational aviation detachments round out the core ODA and SEAL teams with additional capabilities across the DIME spectrum.⁸⁸⁴

These tactical-level SOF teams are particularly proficient at conducting and countering PW because of their regional expertise, language capability, advanced training, adaptability, and interagency experience. They can be employed in a modular, scalable, and nonkinetic manner throughout the world as part of military-to-military training programs, military exercises, train-and-equip programs, or humanitarian aid missions, during which they double as sensors capable of detecting early indicators of PW threat activity. They can subsequently be employed to lay the groundwork for a deliberate campaign to counter PW by conducting detailed area assessments and network development. As the counter PW campaign matures, appropriate interagency assets can be imposed upon and beyond the initial framework emplaced by USSOF.

⁸⁸³ Ibid., 7.

⁸⁸⁴ Ibid.

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